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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The seventy-two verses of Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s Sāṃkhyakārikā (ca. 350-550 C.E.) form the 
core text of the classical school of Sāṃkhya philosophy.  Of the classical 
commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā, the anonymous Yuktidīpikā (ca. 600-700 C.E.) 
provides the most extensive information on the ṛṣi Kapila, the legendary founder of 
the Sāṃkhya system, known as the paramarṣi or ‗highest seer‘. 
In the Yuktidīpikā, the circumstances of Kapila‘s incarnation and the 
production of his knowledge are discussed in relation to the epistemological, 
psychological and phenomenological paradigms of Sāṃkhya.  Often the text 
mentions Kapila in terms of a limit or exception to these paradigms, thereby 
providing much information on the defining limits of the paradigms, on the apparent 
connections between them, and on the distinctions between ordinary experience and 
that of Kapila. 
For these reasons, the interpretative implications of the appearances of Kapila 
in the Yuktidīpikā deserve more consideration than they have generally been given in 
Sāṃkhya studies.  In particular, the importance attributed by the Yuktidīpikā to 
Kapila‘s original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the circumstances of its 
production and transmission provide a basis for a re-evaluation of the role of the 
epistemological notion of āptavacana or ‗authoritative testimony‘ in the Sāṃkhya 
system.  In addition, the evidence of the Yuktidīpikā suggests that the purpose behind 
Kapila‘s very incarnation was primarily soteriological. 
In this study, my intention is to approach the figure of Kapila in the 
Yuktidīpikā as an interpretative link between various elements of the Sāṃkhya 
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system.  I will thus take an integral approach to the various occurrences of Kapila in 
the text, in order to construct a comprehensive picture of the mechanics of the 
production and transmission of liberating knowledge, and to present a re-evaluation 
of the importance of doctrinal authority in classical Sāṃkhya. 
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OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
CHAPTER I: Introduction.  The short introductory chapter will outline the scope and 
methodology of the study.  It will also formulate the interpretative questions to be 
explored in the study, with regard to the Yuktidīpikā‘s portrayal of Kapila and his 
knowledge. 
 
CHAPTER II: Basic Structure of the Classical Sāṃkhya System.  The nature of 
Kapila and the significance of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine present 
some interpretative difficulties when considered in the context of the systematised 
framework of classical Sāṃkhya.  In order to provide the background necessary for a 
consideration of the evidence in the Yuktidīpikā with regard to these theoretical 
problems, the second chapter will outline the general features of the system as 
presented in the Sāṃkhyakārikā.  The various paradigms of Sāṃkhya will be 
outlined in five sections: ontology (§1), cosmology (§2), teleology/soteriology (§3), 
epistemology (§4), and psychology/phenomenology (§5).  For the sake of simplicity, 
references to the commentaries and to secondary sources will be kept to a minimum 
here. 
 
CHAPTER III: Literature Review.  This will outline the history of interpretative 
contributions to the study of classical Sāṃkhya, insofar as they are relevant to the 
problems formulated in CHAPTER I.  The objective of this chapter will be to identify 
the interpretative gaps in this area yet to be filled and the limits of prior scholarship 
on the Yuktidīpikā. 
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CHAPTER IV: A Comparison of the Sāṃkhya Commentators’ Views on Key 
Interpretative Issues.  This chapter will look in more depth at the Sāṃkhya 
paradigms most relevant to the discussion of the role of Kapila and his knowledge in 
Sāṃkhya, namely: the epistemological paradigm of the pramāṇas (§1-5) and 
Sāṃkhya‘s two psychological/phenomenological paradigms, the conditions (bhāva) 
and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) (§6-10).  These are also the aspects of 
Sāṃkhya on which there is the most divergence in the views of the classical 
commentators on the Sāṃkhyakārikā.  The primary objective of this chapter will be 
to identify evidence in the Yuktidīpikā that may be used to fill certain interpretative 
gaps apparent in the other commentaries. 
 
CHAPTER V: The Soteriological Role of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā.  This chapter 
will present an interpretative analysis of the passages relevant to our understanding 
of the issues identified in the previous chapters.  Of primary importance will be the 
commentator‘s understanding of the notion of āptavacana and his attitude to 
received knowledge in general (§1), and to the Sāṃkhyakārikā in particular (§2).  
Links will be drawn between the role of Kapila‘s knowledge in the system and the 
notions of āptavacana, jñāna, and siddhi, as interpreted by the commentator.  This 
chapter will also discuss references in the text to the Lord (īśvara) and to yogins, 
devas and ṛṣis in general (§3).  The nature and origin of Kapila in particular and the 
apparent reasons behind his incarnation will be considered (§4).  Ultimately, this 
discussion will construct a comprehensive picture of the text‘s treatment of the 
nature and origin of Kapila and his knowledge, and the significance of his authority 
to the individual‘s attainment of knowledge and consequent liberation.  The relation 
of this portrayal of Kapila to the broader historical development of the figure and to 
our overall understanding of classical Sāṃkhya will then be considered (§5). 
10 
 
CHAPTER VI:  Conclusion.  The final chapter will summarise the main findings of 
the study and suggest possible avenues of further inquiry into the significance of the 
YD‘s views of Kapila and of the production and transmission of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER I: Introduction. 
 
 
Since the time of its composition (ca. 350-550 C.E.)
1
, Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s Sāṃkhyakārikā 
(SK) has been regarded as the definitive formulation of the Sāṃkhya system of 
philosophy.  Although the tradition testifies to earlier texts belonging to an 
established school or schools of Sāṃkhya, none of these texts are extant except in 
fragments found in later Sāṃkhya literature.2  The system presented by the SK 
appears to have become the normative version of the Sāṃkhya doctrine from the 
time of its composition, and the philosophical content of this text is thus often 
referred to as ‗classical Sāṃkhya‘.3 
 Although the reasons for the normatisation of Sāṃkhya in Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s text 
are unclear,
4
 the anonymous author of the Yuktidīpikā (YD), a commentary on the 
SK, goes to pains to defend the integrity of the system presented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as 
the definitive expression of Sāṃkhya doctrine, and also to clarify Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s 
differences of opinion from some of the earlier Sāṃkhya teachers.  Motivated by 
these concerns, the YD-kāra5 presents quite detailed arguments in defense of the 
doctrines of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.  In this connection, an examination of the YD offers the 
                                                 
1
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 15) have suggested the dates 350-450 C.E., but the more 
recent scholarship of HARZER (2006, pp. 107-109) has placed the Sāṃkhyakārikā at ‗around 550 
A.D.‘ 
2
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, pp. 3-14) outline the occurrences of ‗Proto-Sāṃkhya‘ ideas (in 
texts such as the Arthaśāstra, Carakasaṃhitā, Suśrutasaṃhitā, and the Upaniṣads) and the 
reconstruction of doctrines and texts, such as the Ṣaṣṭitantra, considered to represent ‗Pre-Kārikā 
Sāṃkhya‘ (on the basis of quotations in the Yuktidīpikā and portions of the Mokṣadharma (a section 
of the Mahābhārata) and early Purāṇas) undertaken by scholars such as FRAUWALLNER (1973) and 
HACKER (1962).   CHAKRAVARTI (1975) similarly presents an overview of the early development of 
Sāṃkhya ideas (pp. 4-110) and a reconstruction of the views of early Sāṃkhya teachers, largely based 
on the evidence of the YD (pp. 111-155).  VAN BUITENEN (1956; 1957) also undertakes a 
reconstruction of the doctrines of Pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya (primarily on the basis of passages from the 
Mokṣadharma and the Upaniṣads) and considers their relation to classical Sāṃkhya. 
3
 Cf. LARSON (1979)‘s definition, p. 4. 
4
 Cf. the discussion in LARSON (1979), pp. 134-135. 
5
 I have used the suffix -kāra in the sense of an ‗author‘ of a particular work, in order to refer to the 
anonymous author of the YD. 
12 
 
opportunity to clarify several major interpretative issues only touched upon by the 
other classical commentaries on the SK. 
The present study is focused primarily on the problem of the role of doctrinal 
authority in classical Sāṃkhya. The SK calls the founder of Sāṃkhya philosophy the 
paramarṣi or ‗supreme seer‘. According to all of the commentaries on the SK, this 
figure was named Kapila.
6
  SK 70-71 tell us that Kapila‘s knowledge was passed 
down to Īśvarakṛṣṇa through a series of disciples.7  It is not clear, however, whether 
an individual might gain Sāṃkhya knowledge independently or must rely on the 
authoritative Sāṃkhya texts for this. 
According to classical Sāṃkhya, the means to liberation (mokṣa, kaivalya) 
from the cycle of transmigration (saṃsāra), which is characterised by the experience 
of pain (duḥkha), is the discriminative realisation of the ultimate duality of 
Materiality (prakṛti) and Consciousness (puruṣa)8 (see §II.1-3).  In general, the 
Sāṃkhya texts demonstrate that this duality may be inferred by any individual.  
However, they also ascribe an extraordinary origin and extraordinary capabilities to 
Kapila, the first to discover this knowledge.  They also tend to emphasize the 
conformity of the SK to Kapila‘s original treatise. 
                                                 
6
 It should be noted that there is no evidence to suggest that there ever was an actual historical figure 
named Kapila who was the founder of the Sāṃkhya system.  LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 
108) point out that ‗Kapila and [his disciple] Āsuri are only vague memories‘ in the Sāṃkhya texts.  
As CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 111) judges, all early references to Kapila ‗clearly point to his 
mythological origin and he may not be taken as an historical personage‘.  BRONKHORST (2007, pp. 61-
68) suggests that Kapila may even have originated as a deity associated with the ascetic traditions of 
the region of ‗Greater Magadha‘.  The issues surrounding the development of the figure of Kapila will 
be considered in more detail in §V.5. 
7
 SK 70-71: ‗The sage bestowed this purifying, foremost [knowledge] to Āsuri out of compassion.  
Āsuri likewise [bestowed this knowledge] to Pañcaśikha, and by him the philosophical system was 
expanded.  It was transmitted through a succession of disciples, and it has been condensed by the 
noble-minded Īśvarakṛṣṇa in āryā [verses], having completely discerned the established truth.‘ (etat 
pavitram agryaṃ munir āsuraye ’nukampayā pradadau / āsurir api pañcaśikhāya tena ca bahudhā 
kṛtaṃ tantram // śiṣyaparamparayāgatam īśvarakṛṣṇena caitad āryābhiḥ / saṃkṣiptam āryamatinā 
samyag vijñāya siddhāntam //). 
8
 I have capitalised ‗Consciousness‘ for puruṣa in order to distinguish this term from ‗consciousness‘ 
(cetanā) as the defining characteristic of puruṣa.  Likewise, I have capitalised ‗Materiality‘ for prakṛti 
as the other primary principle of Sāṃkhya.  Although prakṛti is often translated as ‗Nature‘, this term 
has too many connotations not present in the Sāṃkhya conception of prakṛti. 
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The central question of this study is: to what extent are individual seekers of 
liberation considered to be dependent upon Kapila‘s original formulation of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge and the tradition initiated by it?  In order to answer this 
question on the basis of an examination of the evidence of the YD, several related 
interpretative issues will be explored: 1. How is the Sāṃkhya tradition considered to 
be related to the epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (āptavacana)?  2. 
Does inference (anumāna), often used by the texts to establish the existence of 
Sāṃkhya principles, depend upon the authority of the Sāṃkhya texts for its efficacy, 
or may it be used independently by an individual to attain the same knowledge 
attained by Kapila?  3. What is the nature of Kapila and his knowledge, and what are 
the reasons behind his incarnation and the production of his knowledge? 
Two secondary contributions to the study of Sāṃkhya will also be made by 
this study: 1. a detailed comparison of the classical commentators‘ views with regard 
to the major, as yet unresolved, interpretative problems of classical Sāṃkhya, and 2. 
a consideration of the place of the YD‘s views within the broader historical 
development of the figure of Kapila.  The former will be presented in CHAPTER IV, 
while the latter will be presented in §V.5 
Of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, the YD offers the most 
interpretative information with regard to Kapila and to the production and 
transmission of knowledge.  Much of this information is found in connection with 
discussions of the epistemological paradigm of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) 
and the psychological/phenomenological paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and 
the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga).  A discussion of these elements of the 
Sāṃkhya system and a comparison of the YD‘s views to those of the other 
commentators will provide the context for a holistic discussion of the YD‘s view of 
the role of Kapila and the tradition of knowledge initiated by him. 
14 
 
 The classical commentaries on the SK agree, with slight variations, on the 
basic structure of the Sāṃkhya system.  CHAPTER II of this study will be devoted to a 
presentation of this structure.  This will provide the basic context for a consideration, 
in CHAPTER III, of the contributions of previous scholars to resolving the 
interpretative issues apparent in the system.  CHAPTER IV will compare the views of 
the commentators on the SK with regard to the pramāṇas, the bhāvas and the 
pratyayasarga.  In addition to the YD, this discussion will draw on material from the 
Gauḍapādabhāṣya (GBh), the Māṭharavṛtti (MV), and the Tattvakaumudī (TK). 
Although it has generally been difficult for scholars to determine the dates of 
these texts, I have adopted the basic chronology established by LARSON AND 
BHATTACHARYA (1987): GBh (ca. 500-600 C.E.), YD (ca. 600-700 C.E.), MV (ca. 
800 C.E. or later), TK (ca. 850 or 975 C.E.).
9
 
The work of SOLOMON (1974) has established the affinities between GBh, 
MV, Suvarṇasaptati (SVS) (translated by Paramārtha into Chinese, 557-569 C.E.)10, 
Sāṃkhyavṛtti (SV) (ca. 500-600 C.E.)11, and Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (SSV) (ca. 500-600 
C.E.)
12
.  However, it is clear on the basis of the text‘s treatment of Kapila that the 
MV in its present form should be considered to be a relatively late text, as shown by 
the work of JACOBSEN (1998; 2008).
13
  In any case, it appears that GBh, MV, SVS, 
SV, and SSV all stem from the same text, which SOLOMON tentatively suggests to be 
SV.
14
 
I will thus be taking the GBh as representative of the Sāṃkhya commentaries 
produced shortly before the YD, and the MV and TK as representative of those 
                                                 
9
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 16. 
10
 Ibid., p. 15. 
11
 Ibid., p. 15. 
12
 Ibid., p. 16. 
13
 JACOBSEN (1998), pp. 77-78; JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 33-34. 
14
 SOLOMON (1974), p. vii; LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 179. 
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produced shortly after.
15
  The fact that MV differs from GBh largely in terms of its 
portrayal of Kapila, particularly in its association of Kapila with Viṣṇu, provides an 
index of the development of this figure within the Sāṃkhya tradition. 
It is evident that by the time of the MV and TK, a new mythological view of 
Kapila had come to be accepted by Sāṃkhya commentators.16  In addition to 
Vācaspatimiśra‘s TK, his Tattvavaiśāradī (TV), a commentary on Vyāsa‘s 
Yogasūtrabhāṣya, contains valuable information in this regard.  CHAPTER V will 
examine the YD‘s references to Kapila, as well as to the Lord (īśvara), to gods 
(deva), to ṛṣis in general, and to yogins, and will then compare this evidence to that 
found in the GBh, MV, TK and TV, as well as to evidence with regard to Kapila 
found in earlier texts of the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition. 
The primary objective of this study is to clarify the YD‘s views on the nature 
of Kapila and the importance of his original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine with 
regard to the attainment of liberating knowledge by later individuals.  The study will 
also consider the relation of these views to those of the other classical commentaries 
on the SK and their place in the broader historical development of the figure of 
Kapila, in order to construct a picture of the development of the role of Kapila‘s 
knowledge, and of doctrinal authority in general, in the Sāṃkhya texts of the 
classical period. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 I have not had the opportunity to consult another apparently contemporaneous commentary, the 
Jayamaṅgalā (JM) (ca. 700 or later), but a summary provided in LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA 
(1987, pp. 271-287) shows general agreement with the other commentaries in terms of the basic 
structure of the system.  With regard to the apparent date of this text, CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 166) 
suggests that ‗the author of the Jayamaṅgalā seems to pre-suppose the existence of the Yukti-dīpikā‘. 
16
 WEZLER (1970, p. 262) suggests that this was due to the influence of the Vaiṣṇavas; JACOBSEN 
(1998, p. 77-79; 2008, pp. 33-37) discusses this development in some detail. 
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NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
 
The primary focus of this study is an interpretative problem: an examination of the 
YD‘s views on the nature and origin of Kapila and the role of his original 
formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine in the attainment of liberating knowledge by later 
generations of Sāṃkhya seekers.  Accordingly, the structure and composition of the 
YD are not direct concerns, although a brief outline of the structure of the text will 
be presented at the beginning of CHAPTER IV. 
 The YD is a very lengthy text, and my intention is not to present a treatment 
of the text in its entirety.  Rather, the choice of passages for analysis will be based 
upon their relevance to the interpretative issues at hand, which will often mean 
bringing together references from disparate sections of the text.  This approach can 
be characterised as ‗holistic‘ insofar as it draws together relevant information from 
the contexts of all of the major Sāṃkhya paradigms treated by the YD.  As a 
consequence, connections will be drawn between several Sāṃkhya paradigms—
namely, the pramāṇas, the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga—which, as will be made 
clear in CHAPTER III, have not yet been fully understood by scholars of Sāṃkhya.  
These are also the Sāṃkhya paradigms upon which there is the most divergence in 
the views of the classical commentators on the SK.  In itself, the detailed comparison 
of these views in CHAPTER IV will form a secondary contribution of the study, 
although these paradigms have been chosen for examination primarily due to their 
relevance to the main interpretative focus of the study. 
 Nor do I intend to approach the YD primarily from the point of view of the 
history of textual composition or of the history of Indian philosophy in general.  The 
place of the text‘s views within the broader historical development of the figure of 
17 
 
Kapila and the relation of the text‘s views on the origination and transmission of 
knowledge to the evidence of sources beyond the classical Sāṃkhya texts are 
secondary concerns of the study.  Suggestions in this regard will be introduced in 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 
NOTE ON TRANSLATION 
 
Unless otherwise specified, all translations and summaries are my own.  The 
summaries of portions of the SK provided in CHAPTER II are based primarily on the 
text as attested by the GBh and reproduced in LARSON (1979).
17
  The text of the SK 
varies only slightly among the various commentaries, although the YD does not 
contain extant commentary on all of the verses.
18
  In translating the Sāṃkhya 
commentaries, Mainkar (Gauḍapādhabhāṣya (1972)), Kumar and Bhargava 
(Yuktidīpikā (1990-92)), and Jha (Tattvakaumudī (2004)) have been useful as guides, 
but I have generally endeavoured to be more literal and to be consistent in my 
translation of technical Sāṃkhya terms.  With regard to the YD, my translations and 
summaries follow the readings established in the critical edition (1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 LARSON (1979), pp. 255-277. 
18
 SK 5c, 11-12, 60-63, 64a, 65-66, and 67a are absent from the text of the YD.  Also, SK 73 is 
attested only by the MV. 
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CHAPTER II: Basic Structure of the Classical Sāṃkhya System. 
 
 
§1. Ontology: the twenty-five tattvas. 
 
The Sāṃkhya texts posit a basic duality between two existent principles (tattva), 
Materiality (prakṛti) and Consciousness (puruṣa).  These two principles are eternal 
and all-pervasive (SK 10-11).  They are also eternally separate (SK 62); they do not 
interact, though they do exist in ‗proximity‘ or ‗conjunction‘ (saṃyoga: SK 20-21, 
66) with one another. 
Consciousness (puruṣa) is a passive witness to the activity of Materiality 
(prakṛti).  While prakṛti is active but non-conscious, puruṣa is inactive but conscious 
(SK 10-11, 19). 
Prakṛti is further distinguished as existing in two states, unmanifest (avyakta) 
and manifest (vyakta).  Unmanifest prakṛti (also called mūlaprakṛti or pradhāna) is 
primordial Materiality, from which the whole of the created world evolves.  In this 
sense, unmanifest prakṛti can be thought of as the raw matter for creation or the 
potential for creation.  It is also the subtle substratum of manifest prakṛti. 
When the subtle, inactive form of prakṛti comes into conjunction with 
puruṣa, the process of the manifestation of prakṛti is triggered.  This process is 
governed by three constituent qualities (guṇa)19 inherent in prakṛti: goodness 
(sattva), activity (rajas), and inertia (tamas).
20
  When prakṛti is in its unmanifest 
                                                 
19
 I have chosen to translate guṇa as ‗constituent quality‘ in order to capture two aspects of the 
concept.  While the guṇas represent the ontological components of prakṛti, they are also observable as 
particular qualities apparent in objects at all levels of experience. 
20
 In translating the names of the guṇas themselves, I have decided on the most abstract translations 
rather than those which would reflect certain qualities of the guṇas as manifested in various 
phenomena, such as ‗illumination‘ or ‗buoyancy‘ for sattva, ‗darkness‘ for tamas, etc. 
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state, the three guṇas are in a state of equilibrium.  This balance is upset by the 
presence of the puruṣa.  When one guṇa becomes dominant over the others, new 
principles (tattva) evolve out of prakṛti.  This activity leads to the emergence of 
twenty-three other principles, known collectively as manifest (vyakta) Materiality.  
The existence of unmanifest prakṛti as the source of these twenty-three principles, 
the fact that these principles emerge from prakṛti in a fixed order, and the fact that 
both unmanifest and manifest prakṛti are characterised by the guṇas, are supported 
by the ‗doctrine of the [pre-]existent effect‘ (satkāryavāda), according to which 
every effect exists in its cause in a potential form (SK 9, 14-16). 
Unmanifest Materiality gives rise to the intellect (buddhi, mahat)
21
.  Intellect 
gives rise to the ego (ahaṃkāra), which is described as self-conceit (abhimāna) (SK 
24).  Ego is productive in two directions (SK 24-25).  When characterised by 
goodness (sattva), ego gives rise to the eleven organs or faculties (indriya).  These 
are mind (manas); the five faculties of apprehension (buddhīndriya): ears (śrotra), 
skin (tvac), eyes (cakṣus), tongue (rasana), nose (ghrāṇa); and the five faculties of 
action (karmendriya): voice (vāc), hands (pāṇi), feet (pāda), anus (pāyu), and 
genitals (upastha).  Mind is considered to be both a faculty of apprehension and a 
faculty of action (SK 27), since it acts as a superintendent of the activities of both. 
When ego is characterised by inertia (tamas), it gives rise to the five subtle 
elements (tanmātra), namely: sound (śabda), touch (sparśa), form or colour (rūpa), 
taste (rasa), and scent (gandha).  These five subtle elements are described as aviśeṣa 
or non-specific (SK 38); in other words, they lack the particular qualities of matter 
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 The intellect (buddhi) is also known as ‗the great [principle]‘ (mahat), an appellation which might 
stem from the existence of a separate principle known as ‗the great self‘ (mahat ātman) in proto-
Sāṃkhya enumerations such as Kaṭha Upaniṣad 6.7-9 (see LARSON (1979, p. 98)).  The author of the 
YD (on SK 22a, p. 187, ll. 25-26) explains: ‗It is great because of being great in [terms of] space and 
because of being great in [terms of] time.  It is great because of being possessed of a greater extent 
than all produced things.‘ (sa tu deśamahattvāt kālamahattvāc ca mahān / sarvotpādyebhyo 
mahāparimāṇayuktatvān mahāni /). 
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perceivable in the everyday world, such as sweetness with regard to taste, redness 
with regard to colour, and so on. 
The subtle elements, in turn, give rise to the five great elements (mahābhūta): 
ether (ākāśa), air (vāyu), fire (tejas), water (ap), and earth (pṛthivī).  In contrast to 
the subtle elements, these are specific (viśeṣa) (SK 38); that is, they are characterised 
by particular qualities. 
 These twenty-five principles
22
 are treated as the common framework through 
which all individuals experience the world; that is, as the substratum of prakṛti’s 
activity as witnessed by the Consciousness (puruṣa) of an individual. 
 
§2. Cosmology: transmigration (saṃsāra) and the phenomenal creation 
(bhautika sarga). 
 
There is only one prakṛti, but there are countless puruṣas.  While there is only one 
prakṛti active with regard to all individuals, there is a distinct puruṣa associated with 
each individual (SK 11, 18).  This accounts for the variety of experience in the world 
(SK 18). 
A puruṣa, due to conjunction (saṃyoga) with prakṛti, becomes associated 
with a subtle body (liṅga), consisting of intellect, ego, the eleven faculties, and the 
subtle elements (SK 40).  This subtle body transmigrates (saṃsṛ-) from birth to birth 
(SK40), taking on various physical bodies composed of the five great elements (SK 
39). 
The phenomenal universe (bhautika sarga) is divided into three levels: the 
divine (daiva), the human (mānuṣya), and the animal (tairyagyona) (SK 53).  These 
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 For a chart showing the relationships among the twenty-five tattvas, see LARSON AND 
BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 52. 
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three levels are described as the upper (ūrdhva), middle (madhya), and lower 
(mūlata), respectively (SK 54).  The upper level is characterised by a predominance 
of goodness (sattva), the middle by a predominance of activity (rajas), and the lower 
by a predominance of inertia (tamas) (SK 54). 
The level of the cosmos in which one is born and the various circumstances 
of a particular birth are determined by the conditions (bhāvas) of the intellect (SK 
40, 43-45, 52) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) (SK 46-51).  These two 
paradigms and the relationship between them will be discussed below (§II.5, IV.6-
10). 
While the phenomenal circumstances of an individual‘s life change from 
birth to birth, the structure of the subtle body (liṅga) remains constant.  The 
principles (tattva) which make up the subtle body are thus common to all 
individuals, while the phenomenal results of the activity of the subtle body vary 
according to the operation of the bhāvas and pratyayasarga with regard to each 
individual Consciousness (puruṣa). 
The transmigration of the subtle body continues through the periodic 
dissolution and re-manifestation of prakṛti, during which the manifest principles 
(buddhi, etc.) are absorbed into the unmanifest and then re-emerge in the same 
pattern.
23
  The subtle body resumes the process of transmigration after these periods 
of dissolution and continues to transmigrate until the liberation (mokṣa) and isolation 
(kaivalya) of the particular puruṣa (SK 65-66) with which it is associated.  At this 
point the activity of Materiality (prakṛti) with regard to that puruṣa ceases (SK 59, 
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 E.g., GBh on SK 40, p. 146, ll. 8-10: ‗The subtle body, from the intellect down to the subtle 
elements, possessing the instruments [of apprehension and action], dissolves into primordial 
Materiality at the time of dissolution.  It remains unassociated with transmigration until the time of 
creation, being bound by the bonds of delusion in Materiality and incapable of actions such as 
transmigration; then the subtle body transmigrates again at the time of creation.‘ (liṅgam iti / 
pralayakāle mahadādisūkṣmaparyantaṃ karaṇopetaṃ pradhāne līyate / asaṃsaraṇayuktaṃ sat 
āsargakālam atra vartate prakṛtimohabandhanabaddhaṃ sat saṃsaraṇādikriyāsvasamartham iti 
punaḥ sargakāle saṃsarati tasmāt liṅgaṃ sūkṣmam //). 
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61, 65, 66, 68).  Although the body presently associated with that puruṣa continues 
to exist for some time (SK 67), no further incarnation will take place upon the death 
of that body (SK 66-67). 
 
§3. Teleology/Soteriology: conjunction (saṃyoga), discrimination (vijñāna), and 
 isolation (kaivalya). 
 
Two reasons are given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa for the conjunction (saṃyoga) of Materiality 
(prakṛti) and Consciousness (puruṣa): the observation of Materiality‘s activity by 
Consciousness and the eventual isolation (kaivalya) of Consciousness (SK 21, 37).  
Creation (that is, the manifestation of  prakṛti) occurs as a result of this conjunction 
(SK 21).  Thereafter, the activity of prakṛti, as described by the functions of the three 
constituent qualities (guṇa), is directed entirely towards the dual purpose of the 
puruṣa (SK 13, 31, 36-37, 56-58, 60). 
 With regard to the first purpose of the puruṣa, the intellect (buddhi) is 
described as the locus of all knowledge processes.  It is characterised by the 
determination (adhyavasāya: SK 23) of objects.  The ego (ahaṃkāra), mind (manas) 
and ten faculties (indriya), present all sensory information to the intellect, which 
illuminates the objects of experience for the passive observation of the puruṣa (SK 
31, 36). 
 The second purpose of the puruṣa is also fulfilled by this illuminative activity 
of the buddhi (SK 37). In this case, a specific form of knowledge is required for the 
liberation (mokṣa) or isolation (kaivalya) of the puruṣa.  The Sāṃkhya texts reject 
perceptible (dṛṣṭa) and scriptural (ānuśravika) forms of knowledge (SK 1-2), 
prescribing instead the discrimination (vijñāna) between the manifest (vyakta), the 
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unmanifest (avyakta), and the knower (jña; i.e. the puruṣa) (SK 2).  The manner in 
which this discrimination is attained will be discussed below (§IV.5-10). 
 Due to the conjunction of prakṛti and puruṣa, they appear to take on each 
other‘s characteristics.  That is, the unconscious prakṛti appears to be conscious, and 
the inactive puruṣa appears to be active (SK 20).  This relationship is compared to a 
partnership between a lame man and a blind man (SK 21).  That is, just as the lame 
man provides the function of sight for the blind man, so does puruṣa lend its 
consciousness to prakṛti, while just as the blind man provides the function of 
movement for the lame man, so does prakṛti direct its activity to the needs of the 
puruṣa.  Thus, both consciousness and activity characterise the experience of an 
incarnated individual. 
 Due to the illusion of activity on the part of the puruṣa, it is described as 
experiencing the suffering (duḥkha) which is considered to be the nature of worldly 
existence (SK 55).  Suffering is also given as the reason for undertaking the 
Sāṃkhya inquiry into the means of liberation (SK 1). 
 However, due to its complete passivity (SK 60), the puruṣa is never actually 
bound to worldly existence; that is, it never transmigrates and is thus never in need 
of liberation (SK 62).  Rather, it is prakṛti which, due to the illusion of its own 
consciousness (in the context of a particular puruṣa), transmigrates and attains 
liberation (SK 62). 
Thus, liberation is attained by the production of the knowledge in buddhi that 
consciousness is not an attribute of buddhi itself (SK 64).  Liberation then takes the 
form of the cessation of prakṛti‘s activity (SK 59, 65, 66, 68) and the consequent 
isolation (kaivalya) of the puruṣa.  This isolation consists in the fact that there is no 
longer any activity on the part of prakṛti for the puruṣa to witness (SK 65, 68). 
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Īśvarakṛṣṇa illustrates the conjunction and eventual separation of prakṛti and 
puruṣa with several analogies.  In addition to the analogy of the lame man and the 
blind man, mentioned above, prakṛti is compared to the milk which unconsciously 
functions for the benefit of a calf (SK 57).  The relationship between prakṛti and 
puruṣa is also compared to that between a woman and a man.  This analogy is 
facilitated by the fact that prakṛti is a feminine noun, while puruṣa literally means 
‗man‘.  Prakṛti is portrayed as a modest woman who, having realised that she has 
been observed by a man, withdraws from sight (SK 61).  She is also compared to a 
dancer who leaves the stage after the performance (SK 59), while puruṣa is likened 
to a member of the audience (SK 65). 
These analogies serve to reinforce the fact that the cessation of the process of 
transmigration is entirely a function of prakṛti, while puruṣa is at all times merely a 
passive witness.  The means by which the discrimination (vijñāna) leading to this 
cessation is produced within manifest prakṛti will be considered in detail in 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
§4. Epistemology: the pramāṇas. 
 
The epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) and its relation 
to the attainment of liberating knowledge in Sāṃkhya will be a major focus of the 
discussion of the YD in CHAPTERS IV and V.  Of all the elements of the Sāṃkhya 
system, its epistemological framework is the locus of the most disagreement among 
the commentators on the SK.  In order to provide sufficient background for a 
discussion of the relationship between āptavacana and the production and 
transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, a detailed discussion of the commentator‘s 
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views on Sāṃkhya epistemology will take up a large portion of CHAPTER IV (§1-5).  
The current section will be limited mainly to testimony of the SK itself. 
As mentioned above (§II.3), Īśvarakṛṣṇa treats the intellect (buddhi) as the 
locus of knowledge.  The process of perception is explained in terms of the function 
of the principles (tattva) (SK 30-36).  In ordinary perception, the great elements 
(mahābhūta) become the objects of the eleven faculties (indriya), which then present 
the sensory data to the intellect (SK 34-36). 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa includes also non-specific (aviśeṣa) objects—i.e. the subtle 
elements (tanmātra)—as objects of the sense-faculties (buddhīndriya) (SK 34).  The 
GBh and MV both explain that the sense-faculties of human beings apprehend 
specific (viśeṣa) objects, while those of gods (deva) apprehend non-specific 
objects.
24
  The YD and TK mention both gods (in the TK, ūrdhvasrotas: literally, 
‘those having an upward stream’25) and yogins as those capable of perceiving the 
subtle elements.
26
  This extraordinary form of perception will become relevant to the 
discussion of the commentators’ definition of the pramāṇa (means of valid 
knowledge) of perception (dṛṣṭa) in §IV.1, as well as to the broader discussion of the 
YD’s views on the attainment of suprasensuous (atīndriya) knowledge in CHAPTER 
V. 
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 saviśeṣaviṣayaṃ mānuṣāṇāṃ śabdasparśarūparasagandhān sukhaduḥkhamohayuktān 
buddhīndriyāṇi prakāśayanti / devānāṃ nirviśeṣān viṣayān prakāśayanti / (GBh on SK 34, p. 134, ll. 
6-8); atrocyate śabdasparśarasarūpagandhāḥ pañca devānāṃ tanmātrasaṃjñitā nirviśeṣāḥ 
kevalasukhalakṣaṇatvāt / y tatasmāta duḥkhamohau na staḥ tasmān nirviśeṣāste iti / tathā hi / 
viśiṣyante śāntghoramūḍhatvādineti viśeṣāḥ taiḥ saha saviśeṣāḥ, devalā nirviśeṣā iti tātparyam / 
evaṃ śabdādayaṃ manuṣyāṇāṃ saviśeṣāḥ sukhaduḥkhamohayuktā ityarthaḥ / devānāṃ tu 
buddhīndriyāṇi nirviśeṣaṃ sukhātmakaṃ prakāśayanti / (MV on SK 34, p. 50, ll. 14-21). 
25
 See nn. 484, 488, 489 (§IV.9). 
26
 tatra devānāṃ yānīndriyāṇi tāni dharmotkarṣād viśuddhāny aviśeṣān api gṛhṇanti [prāg eva 
viśeṣāt] / yogināṃ ca samprāptaviśeṣāṇām / asmadādīnāṃ tu viśeṣān eva tamasā parivṛtatvāt / (YD 
on SK 34, p. 218, ll. 3-5); tatrordhvasrotasāṃ yogināś ca śrotraṃ śabdatanmātraviṣayaṃ 
sthūlaśabdaviṣayaṃ cāsmadādīnāṃ tu sthūlaśabdaviṣayam eva / evaṃ teṣa tvak sthūlasūkṣma-
sparśaviṣayā asmadādīnāṃ tu sthūlasparṣaviṣayaiva / evaṃ ca kṣurādayo ’pi teṣām asmadādīnāṃ ca 
rūpādiṣu sūkṣmasthūleṣu draṣṭavyāḥ // (TK on SK 34, p. 113, ll. 26-29). 
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The knowledge of perceived objects (whether specific or non-specific) is 
presented by the sense-faculties to the mind (manas), ego (ahaṃkāra), and intellect 
(buddhi).  These latter three principles are common in functioning with regard to 
every object of knowledge (SK 35), while the sense-faculties function only with 
regard to particular elements (SK 28). 
The relationship between the three-fold internal organ (manas, ahaṃkāra, 
and buddhi) and the external organs (the ten sense- and action-faculties) is compared 
to that between a door-keeper and doors (SK 35).  In other words, the internal organs 
serve to process external information attained through the sense-faculties and to 
direct the action-faculties on the basis of that information, thus acting as 
superintendent of the interaction between the subtle body (liṅga) and the 
phenomenal world. 
The knowledge produced in the intellect is then presented to Consciousness 
(puruṣa) for its passive observance (SK 36) and ultimate liberation (see §II.3). 
In addition to direct perception (dṛṣṭa), thus explained in terms of the 
function of the principles of the subtle body (liṅga), Īśvarakṛṣṇa includes inference 
(anumāna) and authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in his list of accepted means of 
valid knowledge (pramāṇa) (SK 4).  The YD clarifies that although there is really 
only one means of knowledge—that is, the constituent quality of goodness (sattva) 
in the form of the intellect (buddhi)—the acquisition of knowledge takes on three 
different forms depending on the circumstances surrounding it.
27
  Moreover, 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that all other means of knowledge (accepted by other schools) can 
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 anenaitad ācaṣṭe: ekam eva buddhilakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃ nimittāntarānugrahopajanitābhiḥ kārya-
viśeṣaparicchinnarūpabhedābhiḥ śaktibhir upakārād bhinnam iva pratyavabhāsamānaṃ dṛṣṭādi-
śabdavācyaṃ bhavati / na tu yathā tantrāntarīyāṇāṃ viṣayopanipātibhir indriyair upajanitā bahvyo 
buddhayas tatheha vidyante yāḥ parikalpyamānāḥ svatantrāṇi trīṇi pramāṇāni syuḥ / (YD on SK 4c, 
p. 69, ll. 2-6) 
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be subsumed under these three headings (SK 4b), as demonstrated by the 
commentators in various ways.
28
 
The commentators’ views on the respective spheres of perception, inference, 
and authoritative testimony, and the applicability of these categories to the 
production and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, will be discussed in CHAPTER 
IV (§1-5).  In addition to the pramāṇas, two other Sāṃkhya paradigms, to be 
introduced below, partly describe the process by which knowledge is produced and 
transmitted. 
 
§5. Psychology/Phenomenology
29
: the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual 
 creation (pratyayasarga). 
 
The SK presents two paradigms, the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation 
(pratyayasarga), that describe the process by which the circumstances of the 
phenomenal incarnation and experience of an individual subtle body (liṅga, 
sūkṣmaśarīra) are determined.  The relationship between these two paradigms is 
unclear from the text of the SK and has been much debated among scholars.
30
  In 
§IV.10, it will be shown that the YD provides more evidence linking these two 
paradigms than do the other classical commentaries on the SK.  The implications of 
this relationship will be discussed further in CHAPTER V. 
                                                 
28
 The commentators variously incorporate presumption (arthāpatti), equivalence (sambhava), 
negation (abhāva), conceptualisation or intuition (pratibhā), folklore (aitihya), comparison 
(upamāna), and gesture (ceṣṭa) into the three pramāṇas accepted by the SK (see §IV.4). 
29
 I do not intend here to suggest any parallels with the Western traditions of psychology and 
phenomenology.  My usage of these terms merely reflects the fact that the bhāvas and the 
pratyayasarga describe the psychological make-up of the individual and the phenomenal experience 
of the individual.  The respective spheres of these two paradigms and the relationship between them 
(and attempts by previous scholars to understand them) will be discussed in more detail in §IV.10. 
30
 See especially the reviews in CHAPTER III of CHAKRAVARTI (1975), FRAUWALLNER (1973), 
OBERHAMMER (1961) , KENGHE (1968), LARSON (1984), and LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987). 
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 The SK itself provides a good deal of information about the first of these 
paradigms and its relation to the other elements of the Sāṃkhya system.  Īśvarakṛṣṇa 
states that the intellect (buddhi) is invested (adhivāsita, literally ‗perfumed‘) with 
conditions (bhāva) (SK 40) and specifies that there are eight of these conditions: 
merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), knowledge (jñāna), ignorance (ajñāna), 
dispassion (vairāgya), passion (avairāgya), lordliness (aiśvarya)31, and non-
lordliness (anaiśvarya) (SK 44-45).  Īśvarakṛṣṇa explains that merit, knowledge, 
dispassion, and lordliness are the forms of intellect characterised by goodness 
(sāttvika), while demerit, ignorance, passion, and non-lordliness are the forms of 
intellect characterised by inertia (tāmasa) (SK 23).32  Merit is said to result in 
upward movement (interpreted by the commentators as transmigrational movement 
upward in the scale of beings), demerit in downward movement, knowledge in 
liberation (apavarga), ignorance in bondage (to the cycle of transmigration), 
dispassion in dissolution into Materiality (or into the eight sources or productive 
principles; see §IV.6) (prakṛtilaya), passion in transmigration (saṃsāra), lordliness 
in non-obstruction (of one‘s will), and non-lordliness in obstruction (SK 44-45).  In 
summary, these conditions determine the transmigratory path taken by the individual 
and the circumstances of a particular incarnation. 
 With regard to the relationship between these conditions (bhāva) and the 
subtle body (liṅga), the SK states that they are mutually dependent for their function 
(SK 52).  Specifically, seven of the conditions (merit, demerit, ignorance, dispassion, 
passion, lordliness, and non-lordliness) serve to maintain the process of 
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 I have translated aiśvarya as ‗lordliness‘, rather than with the common translation ‗power‘, in order 
to draw attention to the connection of this term with the figure of īśvara, the Lord (see §IV.6, V.3). 
32
 The fact that the constituent qualities (guṇa), which are responsible for the manifestation of the 
other principles (tattva) from the intellect, are thus also responsible for determining the various 
conditions (bhāva) of the intellect, which themselves are not considered separate principles, presents 
an interpretative problem of its own.  For an in-depth discussion of this problem, see MALINAR 
(2003). 
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transmigration, while one condition (knowledge) leads to the cessation of this 
process (SK 63, 65, 67-68).  The condition of knowledge (jñāna) thus provides a link 
between the paradigm of the bhāvas and the epistemological and soteriological 
aspects of the system presented in the SK (see §II.3-4). 
 The SK applies a further threefold division to the conditions, stating that they 
are sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, and vaikṛta (SK 43).  These terms are usually translated 
as ‗innate‘, ‗natural‘, and ‗acquired‘, respectively.33  The interpretation of these three 
types varies slightly among the commentators, although they all take the labels to 
refer to the manner of the production of the conditions (see §IV.8).  The evidence of 
the YD suggests the possibility of a novel, but more literal, interpretation of these 
three types: as ‗innate‘ (sāṃsiddhika), ‗deriving from primordial Materiality‘ 
(prākṛtika), and ‗deriving from the products‘ (vaikṛta) (see §IV.8).  The implications 
of this interpretation will be discussed in further detail in CHAPTER V. 
 Immediately following the explanation of the conditions (bhāva) and their 
consequences (SK 43-45), Īśvarakṛṣṇa appears to provide a link between these 
conditions and the paradigm of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga): ‗This is the 
intellectual creation, called error (viparyaya), incapacity (aśakti), contentment (tuṣṭi), 
and attainment (siddhi); and because of suppression through imbalance of the 
constituent qualities (guṇa), it has fifty divisions.‘34  If we take the term eṣas (‗this‘) 
in this verse to refer back to the substance of the preceding verses,
35
 it is, however, 
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 E.g., LARSON (1979, p. 269); LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 266); and Kumar and 
Bhargava (Yuktidīpikā (1990-92) on SK 43, pp. 307-310). Mainkar similarly translates ‗connate‘, 
‗natural‘, and ‗acquired‘ (GBh on SK 43, pp. 153-154). 
34
 eṣa pratyayasargo viparyayāśaktituṣṭisiddhyākhyaḥ / guṇavaiṣamyavimardāt tasya ca bhedās tu 
pañcāśat // (SK 46). 
35
 SK 43-45: ‗The conditions—merit, etc.—are innate, deriving from primordial Materiality, and 
deriving from the products.  They are seen to be located in the instrument, while the embryo, etc., are 
located in the effect.  Merit results in upward movement; demerit results in downward movement.  
Knowledge results in liberation; from the opposite [of knowledge] bondage results.  From dispassion 
is dissolution into the sources; from passion, characterised by activity, there is transmigration.  From 
lordliness is non-obstruction; from the opposite [of lordliness] is the opposite [of non-obstruction].‘ 
(sāṃsiddhikāś ca bhāvāḥ prākṛtikā vaikṛtāś ca dharmādyāḥ / dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ kāryāśrayiṇaś 
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still unclear whether Īśvarakṛṣṇa sees the pratyayasarga as another classification of 
the conditions (bhāva) themselves or of their phenomenal consequences. 
 Īśvarakṛṣṇa provides an enumeration of the categories of the pratyayasarga 
but does not provide much information on their nature.  He explains the further fifty-
fold division of the four categories of error (viparyaya), incapacity (aśakti), 
contentment (tuṣṭi), and attainment (siddhi), by listing five varieties of error, twenty-
eight of incapacity, nine of contentment, and eight of attainment (SK 47-51).  Of 
these categories, the forms of error (viparyaya) also have further subdivisions; 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa tells us that there are eight varieties of ignorance (tamas)36, eight 
varieties of delusion (moha), ten varieties of extreme delusion (mahāmoha), eighteen 
varieties of gloom (tāmisra)37, and eighteen varieties of blind gloom (andhatāmisra) 
(SK 48).  The twenty-eight varieties of incapacity (aśakti) include injuries to the 
eleven faculties and the opposites of the nine contentments and eight attainments 
(SK 49).  The nine contentments (tuṣṭi) are divided into four internal contentments, 
including Materiality (prakṛti), means (upādāna), time (kāla) and fate (bhāgya), and 
five external contentments that arise from the abandonment of the objects of the 
senses (SK 50).  The eight attainments (siddhi), which will become a major focus of 
the study of the YD‘s views in CHAPTERS IV and V, are listed as reflection (ūha), 
speech (śabda), study (adhyayana), the three removals of pain (duḥkhavighāta), 
attainment of/from friends (suhṛtprāpti)38, and charity (dāna) (SK 51abc).  
Īśvarakṛṣṇa also states that error, incapacity, and contentment are hindrances to 
                                                                                                                                          
ca kalalādyāḥ // dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvaṃ gamanam adhastād bhavaty adharmeṇa / jñānena 
cāpavargo viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ // vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ saṃsāro bhavati rājāsād rāgāt / 
aiśvaryād avighāto viparyayāt tadviparyāsaḥ //). 
36
 The interpretation of this form of error by the commentators is more precisely conveyed by the 
translation ‗ignorance‘ than by ‗inertia‘ (as used to translate tamas in its technical sense as one of the 
guṇas). 
37
 I have adopted the translation of tāmisra used by Mainkar (Gauḍapādabhāṣya (1972)), Jha 
(Tattvakaumudī (2004)), and LARSON (1979). 
38
 suhṛtprāpti is generally interpreted by the commentators as ‗attainment from friends‘, but the TK 
explicitly interprets the compound as ‗acquisition of friends‘ (see §IV.9, n. 521). 
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attainment (SK 51d).  The nature of this relationship between the categories of the 
pratyayasarga will be considered in §IV.9-10. 
Aside from this information, no further explanation of the nature of these 
categories of the pratyayasarga, or of their connection with the bhāvas, is given in 
the SK itself, and the views of the commentators vary in this respect (see §IV.9-10).  
However, it is clear from the SK that both the bhāva of jñāna and the siddhi category 
of the pratyayasarga are related to the process of the production of knowledge.    
Moreover, the condition of jñāna is specifically connected to the production of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge, which leads to liberation.  It will be shown below (§IV.10) that 
the YD links the concepts of jñāna and siddhi to each other and to the figure of 
Kapila. 
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CHAPTER III: Literature Review. 
 
 
From the late nineteenth century to the present, a great deal has been written on 
Sāṃkhya, particularly with regard to the early history of its development.  The 
present study is concerned primarily with an interpretative rather than historical 
problem: the YD‘s understanding of the nature of the ṛṣi Kapila, and of the role of 
his knowledge in the Sāṃkhya system.  The study will also consider the place of the 
YD‘s understanding of these issues in relation to the views presented in the other 
classical commentaries on the SK (§V.5).  The historical focus of this study is thus 
upon the classical period of Sāṃkhya, rather than on the early development of the 
school. 
LARSON (1979) aptly summarises the contributions of Sāṃkhya scholarship 
prior to the publication of the first edition of his work in 1969: ‗Unfortunately, the 
great strides achieved in sorting out some of the complicated problems in the history 
of Sāṃkhya have not been matched on the side of the interpretation of the meaning 
of classical Sāṃkhya.‘39  Partly as a consequence of this, the present review will be 
limited mainly to more recent publications.
40
 
Another issue affecting the choice of material for review here is the fact that 
the text upon which this study is focused has only relatively recently been 
discovered.  The YD was first edited, on the basis of a single manuscript, by 
Pulinbehari Chakravarti in 1938.
41
  By the time of the publication of the critical 
edition by Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi in 1998, which makes use of five 
                                                 
39
 LARSON (1979), p. 73. 
40
 For a review of earlier literature on Sāṃkhya, from GARBE (1897) to BHATTACHARYA, K.C. (1956), 
see LARSON (1979), pp. 15-74. 
41
 Wezler and Motegi, YD, p. IX. 
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manuscripts,
42
 the YD had come to be considered ‗the most important text for 
understanding the details of the Sāṃkhya system‘.43  Nevertheless, extended studies 
focused on the YD have so far been very few.  In particular, the YD‘s apparent 
understanding of the process of the formulation and transmission of Sāṃkhya 
knowledge deserves a full treatment, though several publications have touched on 
these issues in passing. 
The following review will include not only publications dealing with the YD 
itself, but also relevant contributions to our understanding of the presentation of 
Kapila in Sāṃkhya more generally, particularly with regard to the classical 
commentators‘ understanding of the nature and importance of Kapila‘s original 
formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge.  Attention will be given to the treatment of 
issues related to this problem, including the role of authoritative testimony 
(āptavacana), the position of the Lord (īśvara)44 in Sāṃkhya, and the relationship 
between the intellectual conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation 
(pratyayasarga).  One of the aims of the present study is to bring these various 
contributions together in one place. 
 
CHAKRAVARTI (1975)
45
 was one of the first scholars to deal with the YD in depth, 
and his work remains one of the most satisfactory treatments of the evidence of the 
YD with regard to many of the major interpretative problems of classical Sāṃkhya 
doctrine. 
                                                 
42
 See YD, pp. XII-XVII. 
43
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. xiii. 
44
 I prefer to translate īśvara as ‗the Lord‘ rather than ‗God‘ (as BRONKHORST (1983), for instance) for 
two reasons: 1. ‗God‘ has connotations (in the Judeo-Christian context) inappropriate to the Sāṃkhya 
conception of īśvara, who, although a sort of ‗supreme being‘, is uninvolved in the creation of the 
world; 2. īśvara literally means ‗powerful‘ or ‗masterful‘ and as an adjective can refer to any 
powerful individual or ‗lord‘ in the sense of ‗sovereign‘. 
45
 CHAKRAVARTI, P. (1975).  Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought.  Delhi.  (2nd 
edition; 1
st
 edition, 1951). 
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 A large portion of CHAKRAVARTI‘s publication46 deals with the origin and 
early development of Sāṃkhya, in which he makes extensive use of the evidence of 
the YD with regard to pre-classical Sāṃkhya texts and teachers.  He also presents an 
overview of the major classical and post-classical Sāṃkhya texts47 and an 
interpretative analysis of classical Sāṃkhya doctrine,48 which makes particular use 
of the detailed discussions found in the YD. 
 CHAKRAVARTI characterises the YD as a ‗unique commentary‘ and the style 
of the commentator as ‗archaic and highly polemical‘.49  He observes that ‗the main 
intention of the author was to refute the arguments of the opponents and thereby to 
establish the validity of the Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘.50  The implications of the YD-
kāra‘s view of the SK will be considered further in §V.2 of the present study.  
CHAKRAVARTI also notes that ‗our author was not only a philosopher but also a 
grammarian‘.51  The apparent influences of the grammarian tradition upon the YD-
kāra will also be discussed in more detail in §V.2. 
  In the course of his treatment of Sāṃkhya doctrine, CHAKRAVARTI outlines 
the YD‘s interpretation of the SK‘s classification of the conditions (bhāva) into 
sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, and vaikṛta (see §II.5, §IV.8).52  With regard to the YD‘s 
attribution of innate knowledge (sāṃsiddhika jñāna) to Kapila,53 he interprets the 
evidence of the text to mean that ‗in the revered sage, there lies the highest degree of 
sattva.  Thus owing to the absence of rajas and tamas there is no obstruction in him, 
and knowledge reveals itself automatically.‘54  This is contrasted to the prākṛtika 
                                                 
46
 CHAKRAVARTI (1975), pp. 1-155. 
47
 Ibid., pp. 155-171. 
48
 Ibid., pp. 171-325. 
49
 Ibid., p. 160. 
50
 Ibid., p. 150. 
51
 Ibid., p. 161. 
52
 Ibid., pp. 183-185. 
53
 See n. 460 (§IV.8). 
54
 CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 184. 
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variety of the bhāvas, which ‗are those which exist potentially in the substratum, but 
reveal very quickly whenever there is an external stimulus‘.55  In the cases of both 
sāṃsiddhika and prākṛtika bhāvas, ‗the influx comes directly from the prakṛti.‘56  In 
the case of vaikṛta bhāvas, ‗ordinary individuals with predominance of tamas strive 
to dispel the inertia of the buddhi by dint of their own effort and thus sattva begins to 
flow by slow degrees‘57, in which case ‗the flow of sattva comes directly from the 
buddhi‘58 rather than from prakṛti.  The YD-kāra‘s interpretation of the varieties of 
the bhāvas will be used in §IV.8 to support a new translation of these varieties as 
‗innate‘ (sāṃsiddhika), ‗deriving from primordial Materiality‘ (prākṛtika), and 
‗deriving from the products‘ (vaikṛta).  The interpretative implications of the 
ascription of Kapila‘s jñāna to an unimpeded flow of sattva from prakṛti will be 
considered further in CHAPTER V. 
 With regard to the relationship between the bhāvas and the intellectual 
creation (pratyayasarga; see §II.5), CHAKRAVARTI recognises that the YD presents 
the pratyayasarga as the result (phala) of the manifest (vyakta), the form (rūpa) and 
function (pravṛtti) of which are identified with the principles (tattva) and the 
conditions (bhāva) respectively.59 In other words, as CHAKRAVARTI is the first 
scholar to note,
60
 the evidence of the YD suggests that the bhāvas and the 
pratyayasarga are not alternative explanations of the same theory, but rather that the 
categories of the pratyayasarga represent the phenomenal results of the activity of 
the tattvas as described by the bhāvas.  However, the present study will argue, in 
§IV.10, that further evidence found in the YD complicates this relationship between 
                                                 
55
 Ibid., p. 184. 
56
 Ibid., p. 184. 
57
 Ibid., p. 185. 
58
 Ibid., p. 185. 
59
 Ibid., p. 302; see n. 545 (§IV.10). 
60
CHAKRAVARTI (1975, pp. 302-303) mentions the earlier view of KEITH (1949, pp. 96-97), who 
suggests that the verses of the SK dealing with the pratyayasarga were ‗a later interpolation‘. 
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the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga, insofar as the categories of the pratyayasarga 
have the capacity to generate new bhāvas, and that the two paradigms thus represent 
two mutually determinative planes of experience.  In the light of this evidence, 
CHAKRAVARTI‘s assumption that the bhāva of jñāna gives rise to siddhi61 cannot be 
supported. 
 CHAKRAVARTI treats the epistemological notion of authoritative testimony 
(āptavacana) in a single paragraph, offering a general summary of the 
commentators‘ classification of the sources of āptavacana.62  He does not consider 
the relation of this concept to the process of the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine, 
which will form a major focus of the present study (§IV.3, V.1-2). 
 With regard to the nature and origin ascribed to Kapila in Sāṃkhya texts, 
CHAKRAVARTI notes that VBh 1.25 identifies Kapila with the Lord (īśvara), who 
assumes a transformation-mind (nirmāṇacitta) in order to transmit Sāṃkhya doctrine 
to Āsuri.63  CHAKRAVARTI perhaps takes the implications of this passage too far 
when he writes: ‗It shows that the teacher assumed a form by dint of his supernatural 
power and appeared before Āsuri to impart to him the knowledge of Sāṃkhya.  This 
shows that Kapila had no physical body and thus he cannot be regarded as an 
historical person.‘64  Regardless of whether or not the figure of Kapila actually 
originated with an historical person, which seems unlikely but would be very 
difficult to determine with any certainty,
65
 he was at least regarded within the 
tradition as having had a physical human body, despite his supernatural origins.  In 
fact, the YD states that his innate knowedge arose at the same time as the production 
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 CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 307: ‗And finally it is wisdom which exclusively gives rise to 
achievement.‘ 
62
 Ibid., p. 196; see §IV.3. 
63
 Ibid., p. 67; see n. 675 (§V.3).  CHAKRAVARTI (pp. 84-85) points out the similarity of the concept of 
nirmāṇacitta to the Buddhist concept of nirmāṇakāya (‗transformation-body‘). 
64
 Ibid., p. 111. 
65
 Cf. the reviews of BRONKHORST (2007) and JACOBSEN (2008) below. 
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of his physical body and intellectual apparatus.
66
  CHAKRAVARTI is justified, 
however, in his observation that Kapila‘s appearances in the Sāṃkhya texts and 
other sources all ‗clearly point to his mythological origin‘.67  In his discussion of the 
nature and origin of Kapila and his relation to other mythological personalities, 
CHAKRAVARTI focuses on the evidence of the YD in particular. 
 CHAKRAVARTI notes that the term māhātmyaśarīra (‗body of greatness‘), 
occurring in the YD, ‗is not found in any other available text of Sāṃkhya‘.68  He 
takes the term to refer to an entire category of mythological beings: ‗The term speaks 
of those divine personalities who by dint of their strong power of will can give rise 
to various forms of creations.  Brahman, or Hiraṇyagarbha, Maheśvara and such 
other divine beings fall under this category.‘69  He observes that of such beings, 
‗Brahman is held to be the foremost‘.70  However, the term māhātmyaśarīra does not 
occur in the plural in the text, and the present study will argue, in §V.3, that it refers 
to Brahmā alone, as the initiator of the process of the physical manifestation of 
beings. 
   CHAKRAVARTI observes that Kapila is put on a cosmological par with 
Brahmā (and, according to CHAKRAVARTI, other māhātmyaśarīras), insofar as they 
both ‗emerge into existence at the beginning of each cycle of creation‘71, their bodies 
being produced directly from prakṛti,72 but that Kapila is in fact ‗the first personality 
who immerges [sic] into existence at the beginning of creation‘73 and is 
‗distinguished from the rest by the fact that his activity proceeds from an abnormal 
flow of sattva, while in the case of the māhātmyaśarīra group, both sattva and rajas 
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 See n. 458, 460 (§IV.8). 
67
 CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 111. 
68
 Ibid., p. 222. 
69
 Ibid., p. 222. 
70
 Ibid., p. 224. 
71
 Ibid., p. 222. 
72
 Ibid., pp. 225, 279. 
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 Ibid., p. 225. 
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become equally dominant‘.74  With regard to the apparent reasons behind the 
production of such figures out of prakṛti, CHAKRAVARTI writes: 
The individuals of this order of creation are not born to enjoy the fruits of their 
previous activities.  They are said to possess perfect wisdom, and so the 
potentiality of their activities is completely destroyed.  Of these, some are born 
with an impersonal disinterested mission of their own in order to render 
selfless service to the individual selves that would come later on.  The case of 
the revered sage Kapila may be furnished here as an illustration.
75
 
 
CHAKRAVARTI contrasts this ‗mission‘ of Kapila with the roles of other divine 
figures, such as Brahmā, who is ‗vested with the lordship of the universe‘, and 
Maheśvara (Śiva), who is ‗associated with destruction‘.76  The unique soteriological 
purpose behind Kapila‘s embodiment, and its relation to the YD-kāra‘s view of the 
initiation and maintenance of the Sāṃkhya tradition, will be discussed further in 
CHAPTER V of the present study. 
 
The work of Erich Frauwallner contributed largely to our understanding of the early 
history of Sāṃkhya.  Like  CHAKRAVARTI (1975), Frauwallner made extensive use of 
the evidence found in the YD with regard to early Sāṃkhya teachers and texts.  For a 
review of this contribution as a whole, see LARSON (1979).
77
  In the context of the 
present interpretative study of the YD, a few remarks will suffice. 
 Concerning the role of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in the classical 
Sāṃkhya system, FRAUWALLNER (1973)78 says, ‗The acceptance of trustworthy 
communication which includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing 
Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system practically unimportant.‘79  While 
FRAUWALLNER‘s observation is partly valid, the present study will highlight, in 
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 Ibid., p. 225. 
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 Ibid., pp. 282-283. 
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 Ibid., p. 283. 
77
 LARSON (1979), pp. 48-52. 
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 FRAUWALLNER, E. (1973). History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1.  Trans. V.M. Bedekar. Delhi.  (1st 
edition, 1953:  Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Vol. 1.  Salzburg.) 
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§V.1-2, the attempts by the author of the YD to reconcile Sāṃkhya doctrine with the 
Vedas and to make room in the notion of authoritative testimony for the transmission 
of Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 With regard to the relationship between the Sāṃkhya paradigms of the 
intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) and the conditions (bhāva) (see §II.5), 
FRAUWALLNER takes the pratyayasarga to be the older doctrine, attributing it, as part 
of the Ṣaṣṭitantra, to the Sāṃkhya teacher Vṛṣagaṇa.80  He observes that the doctrine 
of the bhāvas ‗seeks to solve the same questions and takes the same place in the 
system as the theory of the fifty ideas‘ but ‗represents a more advanced stage of 
development than the theory of fifty ideas‘.81  Further, he suggests that the bhāvas 
were introduced due to the influence of the Vaiśeṣika school.82  He claims that the 
relationship between the two doctrines is never adequately explained by the 
commentaries on the SK: ‗The relation between the two theories remains naturally 
confused and unclear and the explanations which the commentaries give for their 
juxtaposition are unsatisfactory and forced.‘83  The present work, however, will 
demonstrate that a clear understanding of the relationship between the two 
paradigms can be reconstructed from the evidence in the YD (§IV.10). 
 FRAUWALLNER observes that the doctrines of Vṛṣagaṇa tend to use a 
‗sectarian terminology‘ and to be presented in ‗a drapery of myths‘,84 which is 
apparent in a passage quoted in the YD which relates the categories of the 
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 Ibid., p. 252.  For a discussion of the issues surrounding the possible authorship and date of the 
Ṣaṣṭitantra, as well as the question as to whether the term refers to a single text or group of texts, or 
just a general framework for the discussion of Sāṃkhya, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), 
pp. 125-128. 
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 Ibid., p. 268. 
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 Ibid., pp. 270-271. 
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 Ibid., p. 269. 
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 Ibid., p. 260. 
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pratyayasarga to a series of four ‗streams‘ (srotas) produced by Brahmā.85  The 
extent to which the YD represents a continuation of this mythological orientation, 
particularly with regard to the role of deities in relation to the soteriological function 
of Materiality (prakṛti), will be considered in §V.3-4.  One instance in which this 
orientation is apparent, for example, is the YD‘s statement, also noted by 
FRAUWALLNER,
86
 that both Brahmā and Kapila were born directly from primordial 
Materiality (pradhāna).87  FRAUWALLNER‘s work is thus useful, above all, when 
considering the relation of the YD‘s views on these matters to previous Sāṃkhya 
thought. 
 
MISHRA (1961)
88
 offers a novel interpretation of the SK‘s classification of the objects 
of Sāṃkhya‘s three accepted means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa)89 and suggests 
that the classical commentators misinterpreted Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s intention in this regard.  
MISHRA‘s interpretation hinges largely on the argument that Īśvarakṛṣṇa would only 
have included the means of knowledge necessary for establishing the three major 
categories—the manifest (vyakta), the unmanifest (avyakta) and the knower (jña) 
(i.e., puruṣa)—laid out in SK 2 as the objects of the Sāṃkhya inquiry (see §II.3, 
IV.5).
90
  He thus suggests that Īśvarakṛṣṇa included perception (dṛṣṭa) as a means of 
establishing the manifest, inference (anumāna) as a means of establishing the 
unmanifest, and authoritative testimony (āptavacana) as a means of establishing 
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 Ibid., p. 260-261. For a more detailed analysis of this passage (YD on SK 46ab, p.239, ll. 11-18), 
see the review of OBERHAMMER (1961) below. 
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 Ibid., p. 285. 
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 śarīraṃ pradhānānugrahād yathā paramarṣer viriñcasya ca (YD ad SK 39ab, p. 228, ll. 12-13). 
88
 MISHRA, U. (1961).  ‗Pramāṇas and their objects in Sāṃkhya.‘  In: Adyar Library Bulletin 
(=Brahmavidyā) 25: 371-380. 
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 I.e., perception (dṛṣṭa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative testimony (āptavacana) (SK 4); see 
§II.4. 
90
 MISHRA (1961), pp. 412-413. 
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Consciousness.
91
  In connection with this classification, MISHRA suggests a 
reinterpretation of SK 6
92
.  While the commentators take the term sāmānyato dṛṣṭa 
as a particular type of inference, MISHRA takes the phrase sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād in 
this verse to mean that ‗the obvious, ordinary categories recognized by the system 
are cognized by dṛṣṭa‘.93  According to MISHRA, the verse can thus be read as a 
correlation between the three Sāṃkhya ontological categories and their respective 
pramāṇas. 
Of particular relevance in the context of the present study is MISHRA‘s 
reinterpretation of the original significance of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) 
in Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s system. It is true that the commentators usually mention objects 
peripheral to the concerns of Sāṃkhya (heaven, apsarases, etc.) as the objects of the 
pramāṇa of authoritative testimony (see §IV.3), as MISHRA illustrates with a 
discussion of the interpretations of the GBh, JM and TK.
94
  (MISHRA also notes that 
the SVS translated by Paramārtha and the Sāṃkhyacandrikā (ca. 1680-1720 C.E.)95 
agree with the TK‘s explanation.96)  However, it should be kept in mind that the 
possibility of rebirth in the realms of gods (deva) and other divine beings, through 
the cultivation of the condition of merit (dharma), is an integral part of the Sāṃkhya 
discussion (see §IV.6).  Perhaps MISHRA is thus too hasty to dismiss these 
commentorial references as departures from Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s intentions.  Although his 
hypothesis is nevertheless somewhat attractive, since it might explain the apparent 
lack of conformity among the commentators in this regard, it does little, in the 
                                                 
91
 Ibid., pp. 411-413. 
92
 sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād atīndriyāṇām prasiddhir anumānāt / 
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context of the present study, to help our understanding of the YD‘s rather complex 
attitude towards the significance of āptavacana. 
 
OBERHAMMER (1961)
97
 identifies eleven prose quotations appearing in the YD, 
which the author of the YD attributes simply to a śāstra.98  Based on the similarity in 
terminology and content in these passages, among other factors, OBERHAMMER 
concludes that they all belong to the same text.
99
  OBERHAMMER  identifies this 
śāstra as the Ṣaṣṭitantra,100 which, following FRAUWALLNER (1973), he attributes to 
the Sāṃkhya teacher Vṛṣagaṇa,101 who is also often explicitly quoted in the YD, 
‗though he is not mentioned as the author of the śāstra‘.102 
 OBERHAMMER focuses on the analysis of one of these fragments
103
 and a 
comparison of this text to several related passages in the Mahābhārata (MBh) and 
various Purāṇas,104 ‗in order to show the interlacing which connects this text with the 
past and the contemporary Purāṇic literature‘.105  In this respect, OBERHAMMER takes 
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 OBERHAMMER, G.R.F. (1961).  ‗On the ―Śāstra‖ Quotations of the Yuktidīpikā.‘  In: Adyar Library 
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 mahadādiviśeṣāntaḥ sargo buddhipūrvakatvāt / utpannakāryakaraṇas tu māhātmyaśarīra 
ekākinam ātmānam avekṣyābhidadhyau hantāhaṃ putrān srakṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti / ye māṃ 
paraṃ cāparaṃ ca jñāsyanti / tasyābhidhyāyataḥ pañca mukhyasrotaso devāḥ prādurbabhūvuḥ / 
teṣūtpanneṣu na tuṣṭiṃ lebhe / tato ’nye tiryaksrotaso ’ṣṭāviṃśatiḥ prajajñe / teṣv apy asya matir 
naiva tasthe, athāparena vordhvasrotaso devāḥ prādurbabhūvuḥ / teṣv apy utpanneṣu naiva 
kṛtārtham ātmānaṃ mene / tato ’nye ’ṣṭāv arvāksrotasa utpeduḥ / (YD on SK 46ab, p.239, ll. 11-18).  
OBERHAMMER (1961, pp. 139, 168-169) quotes from Chakravarti‘s earlier (1938, p. 152, ll. 8-15) 
edition of the text, which contains only slight variations.  OBERHAMMER (p. 168, n. 2) suggests that 
the first line should be read ‗mahadādidiviśeṣāntaḥ (tattvasargaḥ, pratyaya)sargo buddhipūrvakatvāt 
/‘; he thus reads the line (in its hypothetical original context in the Ṣaṣṭitantra) as a transition from a 
discussion of the tattvas to a discussion of the pratyayasarga (p. 164). 
104
 MBh 12.310.16-25 (Critical Ed.: 12.298.16-25), 14.35.47 – 14.38.13 (Critical Ed.: 14.35.37 – 
14.38.13), 14.39.6-8, 12.314.3-5 (Critical Ed.: 12.302.3-4); Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa 47.14-36; 
Viṣṇupurāṇa 1.5.3-26; Padmapurāṇa 5.3.52-75; Vāyupurāṇa 6.35-69; Kūrmapurāṇa 7.1-18; 
Agnipurāṇa 20.1-6; Bhagavatapurāṇa 3.10.13-28 (OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 140-165). 
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up the reconstruction of Sāṃkhya‘s early development in the manner initiated by 
FRAUWALLNER (1973).
106
 
The fragment which forms the focus of OBERHAMMER‘s study relates the 
categories of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) to a series of four ‗streams‘ 
(srotas) produced by the meditation of a māhātmyaśarīra (‗body of greatness‘)107, 
whom the author of the YD takes to be Brahmā.108  In the MBh three of the four 
streams found in the śāstra fragment occur as part of a series of nine creations, 
which are not yet connected with the meditation of Brahmā or the 
māhātmyaśarīra.109  OBERHAMMER concludes that the srotas doctrine found in the 
MBh was taken up by Vṛṣagaṇa in the Ṣaṣṭitantra, in which he connected the 
srotases with his classification of the fifty categories of the pratyayasarga into four 
groups (viparyaya, aśakti, tuṣṭi, siddhi) (see §II.5).  OBERHAMMER also suggests that 
Vṛṣagaṇa ‗might have introduced into the series of creations also the 
anugrahasarga‘, 110  a particular creation found in some Purāṇas but absent from the 
SK.
111
  ‗On account of the great renown of the Ṣaṣṭitantra‘, OBERHAMMER says, this 
version of the series of creations and the srotas doctrine was introduced into the 
Purāṇas.112 
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 ūrdhvaṃ srotas tathā tiryag utpadyati narādhipa / 
aṣṭamaṃ sargam ity āhur etad ārjavakaṃ smṛtam // 
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 Aside from this historical analysis, OBERHAMMER makes several 
interpretative suggestions of relevance to the present study.  He suggests that the 
viparyaya, tuṣṭi, and possibly siddhi categories of the pratyayasarga ‗might have 
been elaborated in circles connected with Yoga‘ as ‗meditative existential attitudes‘, 
at the time of the composition of the MBh.
113
  With respect to aśakti, he cautions that 
not much can be known with regard to its development.
114
  Similarly, with regard to 
the addition to the srotas doctrine of the notion that these streams were caused by the 
meditation of Brahmā, he says that ‗little can be stated for the moment‘115 but 
suggests that this must have occurred after composition of the MBh passage and 
prior to that of the Ṣaṣṭitantra.116  These points will be taken into account in §IV.9-
10 of the present study, which will reconstruct a coherent picture of the YD-kāra‘s 
interpretation of the nature of the pratyayasarga.  CHAPTER V will discuss further the 
relation of this paradigm to figures of cosmological prominence and divine authority 
(māhātmyaśarīra, Brahmā, Kapila). 
 Of particular relevance to the present study of the YD is OBERHAMMER‘s 
view of the relationship between the pratyayasarga and the conditions (bhāva) of the 
intellect.  Like FRAUWALLNER (1973), OBERHAMMER views the bhāvas as having the 
same basic function as the pratyayasarga and as having been introduced into the 
Sāṃkhya system after the Ṣaṣṭitantra‘s exposition of the pratyayasarga.117  He 
further suggests that SK 52
118
 can be viewed as an attempt by Īśvarakṛṣṇa to replace 
the Ṣaṣṭitantra‘s treatment of the anugrahasarga with that of the new doctrine of the 
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bhāvas.119  With regard to the evidence in the YD concerning the relationship 
between the production of the bhāvas and that of the pratyayasarga, OBERHAMMER 
notes that the processes of the ‗inflow‘ of both are described in a similar manner: 
[W]e can suppose that the Pratyaya-s are, like the Bhāva-s, innate, i.e. 
conditioned by Karma, and thus condition the historical existence of beings.  
On the other hand, they are acquired as ‗habitus‘, and thus they lead to 
salvation.
120
 
 
OBERHAMMER rightly observes that, according to the YD, the bhāvas partly 
determine phenomenal experience and are partly determined by it.  However, as will 
be shown in §IV.10, a more precise picture of the relationship between the bhāvas 
and the pratyayasarga can be reconstructed on the basis of the evidence in the YD, 
according to which they represent two mutually determinative planes of experience. 
 
OBERHAMMER (2007)
121
 deals mainly with the role of the Lord (īśvara) in the texts 
of the Yoga school but also touches on the YD‘s portrayal of Kapila.  OBERHAMMER 
notes the fact that the Vyāsabhāṣya (VBh) on Yogasūtra (YS) 1.25122 refers to 
Kapila as an incarnation of īśvara.123  He compares this to the YD‘s presentation of 
Kapila as consisting entirely of the constituent quality of goodness (sattva),
124
 
suggesting that the Yoga school‘s view of the nature of īśvara was influenced by the 
Sāṃkhya system in this regard.125  The present study will consider the relationship 
between īśvara and Kapila in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts in more detail (§V.3-5). 
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 OBERHAMMER, G.R.F. (2007).  ‗Gott, Urbild der emanzipierten Existenz im Yoga des Patañjali.‘  
In: Ausgewählte kleine Schriften.  Vienna: pp. 59-73.  (1st published 1964: Zeitschrift für Katholische 
Theologie 86(2): 197-207.) 
122
 See n. 675 (§V.3). 
123
 OBERHAMMER (2007), p. 69. 
124
 See n. 695 (§V.3). 
125
 OBERHAMMER (2007), p. 69-70. 
46 
 
KENGHE (1968)
126
 examines the place of the pratyayasarga in the classical Sāṃkhya 
system and the points of connection between the categories of the pratyayasarga 
(see §II.5) and the doctrines of the Yoga school as laid out in the YS and VBh.  
Throughout this discussion, KENGHE relies heavily on the YD, which tends to 
provide clearer or more satisfactory explanations of the categories of the 
pratyayasarga than do the other commentaries. 
 KENGHE demonstrates the relation of the five categories of error (viparyaya) 
in the pratyayasarga to the five ‗afflictions‘ (kleśa) in Yoga (YS 2.3).127  He 
compares the notion of contentment (tuṣṭi) as explained by the YD to the ‗state of 
not having attained a stage [of Yoga]‘ (alabdhabhūmikatva), which is mentioned in 
YS 1.30 as one of nine ‗distractions of thought‘ (cittavikṣepa).128  He further 
compares the first variety of tuṣṭi, called prakṛti, to the notion of prakṛtilaya (see 
§IV.6) as it occurs in YS 1.19.
129
  With regard to the categories of attainment 
(siddhi) in the pratyayasarga, KENGHE notes that the term siddhi ‗has got a very 
much different significance in the Sāṃkhya than in the Yoga‘ and that the siddhis of 
the Yoga school are included in the Sāṃkhya texts as forms of aiśvarya (‗lordliness‘; 
see §IV.6).
130
 
 KENGHE‘s article shows that many of the categories of the pratyayasarga can 
be thought of (especially in the light of the YD) in terms of stages of mental 
development in the practice of yoga and hindrances to that development.  This 
apparent connection to yogic practice can be compared to OBERHAMMER (1961)‘s 
suggestion that these categories originated as ‗meditative existential attitudes‘ in 
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‗circles connected with Yoga‘131 (see above).  The extent to which the YD accepts 
yogic practice as conducive to the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge and 
consequent liberation will be considered in more detail in §V.3-4. 
 KENGHE touches on another aspect of the YD‘s presentation of the 
pratyayasarga of particular relevance to the present study.  Like CHAKRAVARTI 
(1975), he observes that the YD presents the pratyayasarga as the result (phala) of 
the manifest (vyakta), the form (rūpa) and function (pravṛtti) of which are identified 
with the principles (tattva) and the conditions (bhāva) respectively.132  An 
understanding of the interpretative implications of this view of the relationship 
between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga (see §IV.10) will be shown in §V.1-2 to 
be key to understanding the YD‘s view of the process of the production and 
transmission of liberating knowledge. 
 
LARSON (1979)
133
 represents the first comprehensive interpretative study of classical 
Sāṃkhya.  LARSON presents both an overview of the historical development of the 
Sāṃkhya system, drawing heavily on the work of earlier Sāṃkhya scholars, and a 
holistic interpretation of the classical Sāṃkhya system as embodied in the SK and its 
commentaries.  In the course of this interpretation, LARSON makes occasional 
references to the YD but does not make full use of its evidence with regard to the 
major interpretative problems of classical Sāṃkhya.134  He was familiar enough with 
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the text to recognise the apparent grammatical leanings of the YD-kāra,135 but his 
assessment of the value of the YD with regard to interpretative issues seems ill-
judged: 
[T]his work is valuable historically in that it offers some information regarding 
other teachers and schools.  Generally, however, the text is quite confusing and 
problematic.  It does contain a number of polemics against various kinds of 
Buddhism, and may prove valuable as a source for further knowledge 
concerning various schools or traditions of Buddhism.  As a source for 
understanding the difficult points of Sāṃkhya doctrine, however, it takes one 
little further than the other commentaries.
136
 
 
Granted that the YD tends to be confusing, perhaps even contradictory at points, the 
present study will demonstrate that a consideration of the text‘s evidence allows for 
the resolution of several major interpretative problems only touched upon by the 
other classical commentaries. 
 With regard to the relationship between the conditions (bhāva) and the 
intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), LARSON anticipates the interpretation he later 
develops in LARSON (1984) and LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) (see below): 
It could be the case that the eight bhāvas and the fifty bhāvas or components 
represent two dimensions or two aspects of the same phenomenon.  Whereas 
the eight bhāvas are the deeper, causal predispositions that determine the 
future of the liṅga, the fifty bhāvas or components may be the phenomenal, 
manifest effects of the deeper causal predispositions in one‘s present life.137 
 
While this interpretation is partially apt, the present study will argue that the 
evidence of the YD further clarifies the nature of this relationship (§IV.10).  
Similarly, LARSON‘s neglect of the YD leads him to overlook the fact that this text 
holds the Lord (īśvara) to be a particular Consciousness (puruṣa),138 mentioning 
only that ‗the classical Sāṃkhya recognizes no conscious Absolute or Creator God.  
To be sure, the gods may exist, but they too are simply products of the interaction of 
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unconscious mūlaprakṛti and the conscious puruṣa.‘139  With regard to the 
epistemological notion of authoritative testimony (āptavacana), LARSON notes only 
that this ‗is probably used primarily with respect to the tradition of Sāṃkhya 
teachers‘.140 
 
WEZLER (1970)
141
 examines a passage of the Nyāyakusumāñjali that refers to the fact 
that the ‗supporters of Kapila‘ worship God in the form of the ‗accomplished first 
knower‘ (ādividvān siddhaḥ).142  WEZLER argues that this phrase refers to Kapila, 
observing that ‗the deification of Kapila, adequately testified in epic and purāṇic 
sources, was also a prevalent mythological view of the Sāṃkhya authors‘.143  He also 
notes that both the VBh and the TK refer to Kapila as ‘the first knower’ 
(ādividvas)144 and suggests that the VBh passage served as the source of the 
application of the term ādividvas to Kapila.145  He recognises that the MV views 
Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu146 and suggests that while Kapila had occasionally 
been identified with Viṣṇu since the time of the MBh, the Sāṃkhya acceptance of 
this view must have been due to the influence of the Vaiṣṇavas upon the school.147  
The significance of these references in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts will be 
considered further in §V.3-5 of the present study. 
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SOLOMON (1974)
148
 compares the GBh, MV, SVS, SV, and SSV in detail and argues 
that they all stem from the same text, which she tentatively suggests to be SV: ‗[M]y 
feeling is that it is the earliest of the commentaries and has the fairest claim to being 
regarded as the original of the Chinese Version of Paramārtha.‘149  She observes that 
in comparison to these five commentaries, the other classical Sāṃkhya 
commentaries (YD, JM, and TK) ‗do not bear much affinity to the former in point of 
thought or expression‘.150  In the course of the present study, the lack of connection 
between the YD and these other texts, with regard to several major interpretative 
issues, will become apparent. 
 
On the basis of an examination of passages from a variety of texts, mainly from 
outside of the Sāṃkhya and Pātañjalayoga traditions, BRONKHORST (1981)151 argues 
that ‗until a rather late date ―Yoga‖ and seśvara sāṃkhya did not refer to Patañjali‘s 
philosophy‘.152  Rather, BRONKHORST suggests, the term yoga in early texts often 
refers to ‗Nyāya and/or Vaiśeṣika‘,153 and ‗came to be applied to one form of the 
Sāṃkhya philosophy owing to Śaṅkara‘s incorrect understanding of some 
Brahmasūtras‘.154  BRONKHORST notes that the Tattvasaṅgraha and its commentary 
Pañjika (‗both dating from the 8th century A.D.‘155) make a distinction between 
nirīśvara (‗without the Lord‘) and seśvara (‗with the Lord‘) Sāṃkhya, and suggests 
that their definition of seśvara Sāṃkhya corresponds to the Pañcarātra system,156 
while both Pātañjalayoga and the Sāṃkhya of the commentaries on the SK ‗should 
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be deemed nirīśvara sāṃkhya ―Sāṃkhya without God‖ in the sense of the 
Tattvasaṅgraha‘.157  In support of this conclusion, he observes that Patañjali‘s 
system ‗was on a par with the Sāṃkhya of the commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā 
in that it accepted the existence of God, but did not consider Him Creator God‘, 
directing the reader to his following publication, BRONKHORST (1983), for evidence 
of this view of īśvara in classical Sāṃkhya.158 
 BRONKHORST (1983)
159
 provides a comprehensive discussion of the classical 
Sāṃkhya commentators‘ views on the nature of the Lord (īśvara), drawing heavily 
on the YD in particular.  BRONKHORST points out that the YD accepts the existence 
of īśvara but views him as a particular Consciousness (puruṣa) and therefore 
passive.
160
  Moreover, BRONKHORST observes, ‗no Sāṃkhya texts of the first 
millennium deny God‘s existence‘, and ‗more often than not they give us the 
impression that they accept God‘s existence as a matter of course, but do not accept 
His causal agency with respect to the world‘.161  
BRONKHORST notes that the author of the YD specifies that although īśvara is 
passive, he does incarnate in various forms, including the ‗body of greatness‘ 
(māhātmyaśarīra), to which the characteristics of Śiva seem to be attributed.162  
BRONKHORST argues that the evidence of the YD suggests that Kapila is also 
considered an incarnation of īśvara, primarily on the basis of the commentator‘s use 
of the term īśvaramaharṣi in describing authoritative individuals (āpta).163  He 
suggests that īśvaramaharṣi could mean either ‗God and the great seers‘ or ‗the great 
seers who are [incorporations of] God‘, and makes a case for the latter interpretation, 
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arguing that, given the YD‘s view of īśvara as passive consciousness, the term 
īśvara alone cannot refer to an authoritative figure, ‗for pure awareness does not 
possess authoritativeness or opinions‘, while the term īśvara does not refer 
specifically to the māhātmyaśarīra elsewhere in the YD.164  BRONKHORST assumes 
that Kapila, as ‗the great seer par excellence‘, would be included among ‗the great 
seers who are [incorporations of] God‘.165  He finds support for this interpretation in 
two passages of the MV, which appear to identify Kapila as an incarnation of 
īśvara.166 
While BRONKHORST‘s interpretation is plausible, it implies that other great 
ṛṣis than Kapila would also be considered incarnations of īśvara, which would be 
surprising, given Kapila‘s privileged position in the YD‘s interpretation of Sāṃkhya 
cosmology (see §V.3-4).  In §V.3, we will examine the relevant passages in detail 
and consider two alternatives to BRONKHORST‘s interpretation of the term 
īśvaramaharṣi.  It should be kept in mind that the YD does not explicitly refer to 
Kapila as an incarnation of īśvara.  As pointed out by WEZLER (1970)167 and 
JACOBSEN (2008)
168
, the MV actually views Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in 
particular, while this Vaiṣṇava influence is not yet apparent in the YD (see §V.5).  
Moreover, it is not clear that the YD-kāra identifies the māhātmyaśarīra as Śiva in 
the passage quoted by BRONKHORST, while elsewhere he refers to the 
māhātmyaśarīra as Brahmā.169 
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LARSON (1984)
170
 offers an interpretation of the YD‘s treatment of the paradigm of 
the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) and its relationship to the conditions 
(bhāva) of the intellect.  With regard to the approach of previous scholars to this 
interpretative problem in classical Sāṃkhya, LARSON observes that ‗there has been 
almost a total lack of comprehension of the structural significance of the 
pratyayasarga in the Sāṃkhya philosophical scheme of things‘.171  On the basis of 
the evidence of the YD, LARSON argues (contrary to FRAUWALLNER (1973) and 
OBERHAMMER (1961), for instance) that the pratyayasarga and the bhāvas are ‗not at 
all the same thing or alternative explanations of the same thing‘.172  Like 
CHAKRAVARTI (1975) and KENGHE (1968), LARSON observes that the YD refers to 
the principles (tattva) as the forms of manifest Materiality, the bhāvas as descriptive 
of its activity, and the pratyaysarga as the result of this activity.
173
  LARSON takes 
this to mean that the particular bhāvas that come to be associated with an 
individual‘s subtle body during one incarnation determine the configuration of the 
categories of the pratyayasarga encountered in the next incarnation: 
The bhāva-s eschew, distort, and blur experience so that my knowledge is 
insufficiently discriminatory.  At the moment of birth the liṅga is already 
disposed to a certain life-trajectory by reason of its past lives, and the 
particular constellation of viparyaya-s, aśakti-s, tuṣṭi-s, and siddhi-s represents 
the mediating field through which the organism experiences its present life.
174
 
 
On this basis of this structure, LARSON suggests that the attainment of Sāṃkhya 
knowledge is a progressive process, involving an engagement first with the 
categories of the pratyayasarga, then an understanding and cultivation of the bhāvas 
which are ‗conducive to continuing discrimination‘, and finally an understanding of 
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the tattvas and discrimination between puruṣa and prakṛti.175  This interpretation 
seems to have become the basis for LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)‘s treatment 
of the relationship between the pratyayasarga and the bhāvas in Sāṃkhya. 
 In §IV.10, we will examine further evidence in the YD that complicates this 
picture of the relationship between the pratyayasarga and the bhāvas.  An alternative 
interpretation will be presented, according to which these two paradigms represent 
two mutually determinative planes of experience.  The implications of this 
relationship with regard to the process of the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge will 
be considered in §V.1-2. 
  
POLLOCK (1985)
176
 provides an interpretative framework that helps us to understand 
the apparent assumptions of the author of the YD with regard to the origination and 
transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge.  POLLOCK illustrates the widespread 
assumption, in the texts of the classical period of Indian śāstra, of the primordial 
existence of valid doctrine.  He characterises the initial apprehension and articulation 
of a body of doctrine by a qualified individual as ‗the necessary commencement of 
the tradition‘.177  Subsequently, the learning of this śāstra ‗serves to enhance the 
efficacy of the practice‘ of which it treats.178  Such a text is considered the ideal 
prototype for future treatments of its subject.  Tradition thus takes the form of a 
perpetual appeal to this prototype, which is viewed as the vital substance of a 
particular system of knowledge. 
 POLLOCK suggests that this view of the nature of doctrine stems from the 
notion of the primordial existence of the Vedas: 
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The veda, the transcendent śāstra, subsumes all knowledge.  It is itself eternal, 
infallible, the source of the caturvarga and thus the basis of all activity.  
Secular śāstra in general, consequently, as a portion of the corpus […] comes 
to share the veda‘s transcendent attributes.179 
 
As will be shown in §V.1-2, the author of the YD appears to similarly emulate the 
model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the origination and transmission of 
Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 POLLOCK further suggests, on the basis of a passage of the Carakasaṃhitā180 
dealing with the nature of śāstra in relation to causality, that this view of the 
primordial existence of knowledge may be related to the ‗doctrine of the [pre-] 
existent effect‘ (satkāryavāda), an important doctrine in the Sāṃkhya system (see 
§II.1).
181
  With regard to this possibility,  POLLOCK notes: 
The epistemological implications of satkāryavāda [...] seem never to be clearly 
expressed in Indian philosophical literature, as far as I can tell.  But that need 
not stop us from supposing they could have operated subliminally in the 
mythic representation of the transcendent provenance and authority of 
śāstra.182 
 
Similarly, in §V.2, I will present the possibility that the notion of satkāryavāda, 
though not explicitly connected with the formulation and transmission of knowledge 
in the YD, bears an implicit relation to the YD‘s conception of Sāṃkhya śāstra. 
 Like Vedic doctrine, the knowledge represented by any śāstra, according to 
POLLOCK, is ‗permanently fixed in its dimensions‘,183 and therefore, ‗the 
improvement of any given practice lies, not in the future and the discovery of what 
has never been known before, but in the past and the more complete recovery of 
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what was known in full in the past.‘184  With regard to the relationship between the 
initial articulation of a śāstra and its future manifestations, POLLOCK explains: 
Extant śāstras, consequently, come to view themselves as either the end-point 
of a slow process of abridgement from earlier, more complete, and divinely 
inspired prototypes; or as exact reproductions of the divine prototypes obtained 
through uncontaminated, unexpurgated descent from the original, whether 
through faithful intermediaries or by sudden revelation.
185
 
 
In §V.2, we will consider the applicability of this model to the YD‘s conception of 
the relationship between Kapila‘s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine and the 
attainment of this doctrine by later generations. 
 
LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)
186
 is a comprehensive study of the history of 
the Sāṃkhya system and an interpretation of its meaning.  It includes summaries of 
all of the major Sāṃkhya texts, including a summary of the YD187 attributed to 
Dayanand Bhargava, Shiv Kumar, and Raghunatha Sharma.
188
  Bhargava and Kumar 
would go on to publish their translation of the YD (1990-92),
189
 which, though 
helpful in deciphering the text‘s complex arguments, appears to be somewhat 
flawed.  When Bhargava and Kumar encounter a difficult phrase or passage, they 
generally present an interpretative summary rather than a literal translation; I have 
noticed that they seem even to amend the text on at least one occasion, where it was 
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impossible to make sense of the passage otherwise.
190
  In the summary appearing in 
LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA, this interpretative liberty is even more apparent.
191
  
Both summary and translation might generally have benefitted from the readings 
later established by Wezler and Motegi in their critical edition of the text (1998).
192
  
Although LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA make more use of the YD than many earlier 
Sāṃkhya scholars, one suspects that they may have relied too heavily upon the 
summary by Bhargava, Kumar, and Sharma, which would explain their apparent 
incomplete understanding and occasional misinterpretations
193
 of the YD.
194
 
 Compared to LARSON (1979) (see above), LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA give 
a much more favourable assessment of the value of the YD in the interpretation of 
Sāṃkhya doctrine: ‗The Yuktidīpikā [...] offers several intriguing interpretations that 
provide a larger view of the Sāṃkhya system as a whole, certainly more so than the 
Kārikā itself and all of its other commentaries.‘195  Perhaps the most significant set 
of interpretative conclusions drawn from the YD by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA is 
their interpretation of the nature of the paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and the 
intellectual creation (pratyayasarga) and the relationship between them.  Drawing 
largely upon LARSON (1984)‘s interpretation of the evidence of the YD with regard 
to these paradigms, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA treat the tattvas as the 
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‗constitutive dimension‘ of the Sāṃkhya system, the bhāvas as the ‗projective 
dimension‘, and the pratyayasarga as the ‗consequent dimension‘.196  They compare 
these three dimensions, respectively, to the ‗hardware‘ of a computer, the ‗software‘, 
and the ‗printout of the functioning system‘.197  With regard to the relationship 
between the condition of knowledge (jñāna, a component of the second ‗dimension‘) 
and the attainments (siddhi, a component of the third ‗dimension‘), like 
CHAKRAVARTI (1975), they interpret the evidence of the YD to suggest that ‗the 
predisposition toward knowledge (jñāna) generates the spiritual attainments (siddhi) 
conducive to final discrimination and release‘.198  However, as I will argue in 
§IV.10, further evidence in the YD linking the concepts of jñāna and siddhi 
complicates this interpretation of the relationship between the bhāvas and the 
pratyayasarga.  Although their classification of the Sāṃkhya paradigms into ‗three 
dimensions‘ agress with the evidence of the YD, their suggestion that jñāna 
generates siddhi is contrary to this evidence. 
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA downplay the role of authoritative testimony 
(āptavacana) in Sāṃkhya,199 and they do not discuss the YD‘s views on this subject 
in any detail.  Similarly, they do not discuss the YD‘s portrayal of Kapila in much 
detail, but they do observe that Kapila is given a similar status to major deities in the 
YD: 
From one point of view, the divine realm is the realm of the māhātmyaśarīras, 
Brahmā, Hiraṇyagarbha, Prajāpati, and so forth, who perform specific tasks 
(adhikāra) in the cosmos and who are able to generate their own bodies by a 
simple act of will.  From another point of view, the divine realm is the realm of 
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the great Sāṃkhya precursors, especially Kapila who emerges at the beginning 
of the world cycle fully endowed with the positive fundamental predispositions 
of meritorious behaviour, knowledge, renunciation, and power.
200
 
 
Although, as will become apparent in §V.3-4, there is reason to believe that the YD‘s 
references to māhātmyaśarīra, Brahmā and Hiraṇyagarbha all refer to the same 
figure, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA do recognize the difference between the 
respective roles of this figure and Kapila in the YD (see §V.4). 
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA also offer a short survey of the textual 
evidence with regard to the role of Kapila in the history of Sāṃkhya and an 
interpretation of its significance: 
[A]ll that can be said is that Kapila and Āsuri are linked with the beginning of 
the Sāṃkhya tradition.  There is little reliable information about them apart 
from Kapila‘s linkage with ancient ascetic traditions and Āsuri‘s association 
with the brahmanical sacrificial system.  That the later Sāṃkhya teachers 
unanimously refer to Kapila and Āsuri as the founders of the system probably 
reflects the Sāṃkhya tradition‘s attempts to appropriate traditions of ascetic 
speculation as its own and to relate that ascetic speculation to dissatisfaction 
with the older sacrificial religion.  Moreover, what might be called the 
upgrading of Kapila to the status of Hiraṇyagarbha or one or another 
mythological figure (Agni, Rudra, Śiva, and so forth) together with efforts to 
list Kapila, Āsuri, and other Sāṃkhya teachers in enumerations of the ‗great 
seers‘ in the epic and Purāṇic literature may be taken as further attempts to 
establish a proper lineage for the Sāṃkhya philosophy.201 
 
In §V.5, we will look in more detail at the ways in which Kapila is represented in the 
classical Sāṃkhya texts and earlier literature, and will compare the YD‘s portrayal of 
Kapila to these occurrences. 
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PARROTT (1990a; 1990b)
202
 offers an interpretative reassessment of the value of 
Materiality (prakṛti) in classical Sāṃkhya.  PARROTT argues against ‗the commonly 
held notion that classical Sāṃkhya negatively values the world‘203, emphasizing 
instead the soteriological role of prakṛti.  He suggests that prakṛti is viewed by the 
Sāṃkhya texts as ‗a guru who teaches Puruṣa through her skilful means‘.204 
 PARROTT argues that the verses of the SK should be read as progressive aids 
to a seeker on the path to liberation: 
That is, the seeker to whom these teachings are declared must be viewed as 
evolving during the course of instruction contained in the text.  A seeker, on 
first approach to a preceptor, would experience his reality [...] in one way, and 
in quite another after long years of practised discipline.  Different perspectives 
would arise as his insight into the nature of things matures.
205
 
 
Based on this interpretation, PARROTT suggests that SK 55-61 should be viewed as 
‗emotion-filled poetry‘ directed towards prakṛti by the mature seeker: ‗By 
expressing deeply felt love, praise and gratitude to Prakṛti, the seeker enters the 
realm of feeling.  These feelings open the heart and bolster him for his death.‘206  
Accordingly, he emphasizes the tendency of these verses to personify prakṛti, 
although he admits: ‗Prakṛti is not a person; she is simply a world with a whole lot of 
personality.‘207 
 Although PARROTT does not make much use of the YD or discuss the role of 
Kapila in relation to the soteriological aspect of prakṛti, his original interpretation 
accords with the YD‘s apparent view of Kapila as a direct manifestation of prakṛti‘s 
soteriological tendency in the form of a guru for all puruṣas (see §V.4). 
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NAKADA (1992)‘s208 very brief communication outlines the YD‘s defense of 
authoritative testimony (āptavacana) as a distinct means of knowledge (pramāṇa), 
separate from inference (anumāna).209  NAKADA suggests that this argument is a 
response to the view of the Buddhist Dignāga, who denies the validity of āptavacana 
as a separate pramāṇa.210 
 
MOTEGI (1994)
211
 draws several conclusions regarding the YD-kāra‘s apparent 
knowledge of his Vaiśeṣika opponents.  Based on a discussion of the evidence in the 
YD, he suggests that the commentator refers to an unknown commentary on the 
Vaiśeṣikasūtra (VS), as well as to two sūtras from the VS that have been lost.212  He 
further identifies a possible original sense of the term vyapadeśa as it occurs in VS 
9.1
213
, as a form of inferential mark based on the function of an object.
214
  Finally, 
based on the occurrence of the phrase madhyamaka kāla (‗intermediate time‘) in a 
verse attributed to the Vaiśeṣika school by the author of the YD, he advances the 
possibility that this concept, not found in the extant Vaiśeṣika literature, was used by 
the Vaiśeṣikas to support the ‗doctrine of the non-existent effect‘ (asatkāryavāda).215  
MOTEGI also draws attention to the YD‘s arguments with the Vaiśeṣika in regard to 
other matters, including the nature of the Lord (īśvara),216 although he does not take 
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up the discussion of this subject, which will be discussed in §V.3 of the present 
study. 
 
JACOBSEN (1998)
217
 is a survey of the occurrences of Kapila in the Indian tradition 
and an interpretation of the development of this figure, from early occurrences in the 
Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (ŚU) and Mahābhārata (MBh),218 through his portrayal as 
the founder of the Sāṃkhya system219 and his later portrayal as an incarnation of 
Viṣṇu in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and late classical Sāṃkhya texts.220  JACOBSEN 
would later incorporate the bulk of the material in this article into his book, 
JACOBSEN (2008).  We will look in more detail at JACOBSEN‘s contribution in the 
review of this book below, and the majority of references in the main body of this 
study will be to the later publication. 
 
Like BRONKHORST (1981), HATTORI (1999)
221
 argues that the term seśvara Sāṃkhya 
did not come to be applied to Pātañjalayoga until a rather late date.  HATTORI 
observes that Mādhava, in his Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, refers to the followers of 
Patañjali as seśvara sāṃkhya and the followers of Kapila as nirīśvara sāṃkhya222, 
while according to an earlier view (as identified by BRONKHORST (1981) on the basis 
of the Tattvasaṅgraha), seśvara Sāṃkhya referred to ‗a certain group [of Sāṃkhyas 
who] admitted the existence of the īśvara as the creator of the world, and formed the 
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theory that explains the process of creation and destruction of the world by the 
cooperation of the īśvara with the three guṇas of pradhāna‘.223 
 HATTORI discusses the role of ‗devotion to the Lord‘ (īśvarapraṇidhāna) in 
the YS and suggests that the term praṇidhāna was adopted from the Buddhists, for 
whom it signified ‗ ―fixation of mind‖ or ―taking a vow‖ ‘.224  Accordingly, he 
suggests that īśvarapraṇidhāna is of a different nature from devotion (bhakti), 
consisting rather of a vow directed to īśvara or the concentration of the mind upon 
īśvara.225  HATTORI, citing BRONKHORST (1983), notes that the role of īśvara in 
classical Sāṃkhya is the same as that in Pātañjalayoga.226  HATTORI concludes that 
because in the classical Sāṃkhya texts īśvara, ‗who played not so important role 
from the beginning, came to be neglected‘, while in the YS īśvara is ‗clearly 
mentioned in several sūtras‘, the term seśvara sāṃkhya came to be applied to the 
latter school by the time of Mādhava.227  In summary, HATTORI‘s article confirms 
that although īśvara does not play a prominent role in classical Sāṃkhya, his nature 
must be considered the same as in Pātañjalayoga. 
 
MALINAR (1999)
228
 is a study of the concepts of generality (sāmānya) and 
particularity (viśeṣa) in classical Sāṃkhya.  In this course of this study, MALINAR 
suggests that because yogins have attained an insight into the productive nature of 
the tattvas as principles common (sāmānya) to all particular (viśeṣa) aspects of the 
phenomenal world, they are able to influence the particular phenomenal 
configurations of reality: 
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Insight into the productivity of prakṛti is only ascribed to gods and Yogins.  
This is one implication of what is designated as aiśvarya.  They alone are able 
to manipulate the common causal potency and to change the arrangement and 
the formation of the effects, of individual things, without, however, 
transgressing the scope of ‗natural‘, prākṛtic possibilities.229 
 
In other words, yogic practice may lead to the ability to manifest particular physical 
effects directly out of the productive potential of pradhāna.  This interpretation of 
the nature of yogic attainment will prove to be applicable to the evidence of the YD 
with regard to the abilities of yogins and devas (see §V.3-4). 
 
WEZLER (2001)
230
 discusses the original significance of a passage of the Nirukta 
(NU) quoted by the YD in connection with the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the attainments 
(siddhi).
231
  WEZLER interprets this passage as a description of the process by which 
knowledge of the meaning of the Vedic mantras is transmitted,
232
 which ‗deals with 
the praise of those who know the meaning—of course of the Veda—and the censure 
of those who do not.‘233  WEZLER‘s insights will be drawn upon in §IV.9, where we 
will consider the implications of the YD‘s quotation of this passage. 
 WEZLER notes in passing the lack of an extended study of the knowledge of 
ṛṣis and other supernatural forms of knowledge: ‗Typical of the state of Indological 
research there is no, at least comprehensive, study of the ideas concerning the 
manner of cognition of the mantras—or related to the ṛṣi [...] or the means of 
―supernatural‖ cognition in general.‘234  AKLUJKAR (2009) (see below) represents a 
significant contribution to our understanding of the process of Vedic revelation.  The 
present study aims to contribute likewise to our understanding of the knowledge of 
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ṛṣis and their role in the dissemination of doctrine more generally, at least as 
understood by the Sāṃkhya school. 
 
HARZER (2006)
235
 is an extended study of Sāṃkhya epistemology as interpreted by 
the YD.  HARZER makes extensive use the works of the Buddhist logician Dignāga 
(480-540 C.E.)
236, an opponent of the Sāṃkhya school: ‗In his critique of the various 
philosophical schools, Dignāga paid a good deal of attention to the Sāṅkhya.‘237  
HARZER argues that, in the SK, the Sāṃkhya school ‗formulated anew its 
epistemological theories as a direct response‘ to Dignāga.238  Accordingly, she 
suggests a new date for the SK, placing it at ‗around 550 A.D‘.239 
HARZER examines the YD‘s views on perception (pratyakṣa, dṛṣṭa) and 
inference (anumāna) but does not deal with authoritative testimony (āptavacana), 
the third means of knowledge (pramāṇa) according to Sāṃkhya, as she explains: 
There are two reasons for this: first, since Dignāga‘s system has only two 
instruments of knowledge, he focuses in his criticism of Sāṅkhya on these two, 
perception and inference.  In his opinion, verbal testimony is a part of 
inference.  The second reason is that verbal testimony belongs to two areas of 
philosophy: epistemology and philosophy of language.  The philosophy of 
language is a distinct discipline of philosophy, not considered for scrutiny in 
the present volume and therefore verbal testimony is excluded from this 
study.
240
 
 
The present study aims to fill, to some extent, this apparent gap in the study of the 
YD‘s views on epistemology.  HARZER‘s study, nevertheless, provides several points 
of clarification that will be drawn upon in the discussion of perception and inference 
in §IV.1-2.  Most notably, HARZER discusses the YD‘s classification of inference 
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into direct (vīta) and indirect (avīta) inference,241 as well as the ten members 
(avayava) of formal inference.
242
  She observes that the author of the YD treats the 
verses of the SK as ‗arguments in accordance with the rules of forming an 
inference‘.243  The implications of this view of the SK will be used to suggest a 
possible interpretation of the relationship between inference and authoritative 
testimony in §V.2. 
 
MOTEGI (2006)
244
 examines the YD‘s discussions of śabda from two major 
perspectives: that of sound (śabda) as an object of perception manifested by 
Materiality (prakṛti), and that of authoritative testimony (āptavacana, śabda) as a 
means of correct knowledge (pramāṇa).  With regard to the first topic, he discusses 
the YD‘s arguments against the Vaiśeṣika school regarding the attribution of the 
qualities of pleasure and pain to sound (as a product of prakṛti characterised by the 
three guṇas) rather than to the self (ātman) as held by the Vaiśeṣikas.245  In the 
context of this discussion, MOTEGI points out that ‗whenever the objects of direct 
perception are at issue, sound is often cited in the Yuktidīpikā as an example of the 
objects of direct perception‘.246 
This usage of śabda is distinct from its use to refer to authoritative testimony 
(āptavacana), one of the three means of correct knowledge according to Sāṃkhya.  
With regard to this latter usage, MOTEGI focuses on the YD‘s treatment of the Vedas 
as sources of authoritative testimony.
247
  He points out that the author of the YD 
supports the SK‘s rejection of Vedic sacrifice as a means to liberation (SK 2) yet 
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also maintains ‗that liberation by means of knowledge is supported by the Vedic 
scriptures.‘248  In the context of this discussion in the YD, MOTEGI observes, the 
proponent of the Sāṃkhya viewpoint makes use of grammatical arguments taken 
from the Mahābhāṣya, while the opponent employs exegetical methods borrowed 
from Mīmāṃsā.249  It is indeed clear throughout the YD that the commentator is 
largely concerned with reconciling Sāṃkhya ideas with aspects of the greater 
Brāhmaṇical tradition, particularly with the authority of the Vedas, as MOTEGI 
suggests: 
Especially in the context of its theory of liberation, Sāṃkhya thought is 
compelled to take a negative view of the Vedas, but the author of the 
Yuktidīpikā attempts nonetheless to find some way of recognizing their 
authority.  Viewed historically, it could be said that originally Sāṃkhya 
rejected Vedic ritual and propounded ideas not found in Vedic literature, but 
later, rather than pitting itself against the Vedas, it made attempts to reconcile 
its ideas with the Vedas.
250
 
 
This impulse to acknowledge the authority of the Vedas, MOTEGI suggests, is shown 
in the YD‘s definition of āptavacana under SK 5d (see §IV.3), which accords a 
special status to the Vedas as being ‗exceptional in their reliability‘.251 
 With regard to the YD‘s description of authoritative individuals (āpta; see 
§IV.3), MOTEGI notes the occurrence of the term īśvaramaharṣi, which he translates 
as ‗great seers of lord-like power‘.252  As has been made clear by BRONKHORST 
(1983) (see above), the interpretation of this term is not a straightforward matter.  
MOTEGI‘s translation is potentially problematic, since, as pointed out by 
BRONKHORST,
253
 the YD treats īśvara as a particular puruṣa and therefore passive 
(without power as such).  However, MOTEGI‘s suggestion that ‗this usage of īśvara is 
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similar to that found in the Yogasūtra 1.24‘254 may be apt.  Based upon the role of 
īśvara in the Yoga school, and further upon the usage of the term aiśvarya in the 
Sāṃkhya texts, I will outline (in §V.3) the possibility that the term īśvaramaharṣi 
refers to those ṛṣis who, though the practice of yoga, have become similar to īśvara, 
who is considered omniscient (YS 1.25). 
 MOTEGI does not directly address the role of the ṛṣi Kapila with regard to the 
notion of āptavacana in the YD.  As will be shown in §V.1-2, the author of the YD 
appears to model Kapila‘s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine upon the Vedic 
model, perhaps as a result of the same desire, identified by MOTEGI, to reconcile 
Sāṃkhya with the Vedic tradition. 
 
BRONKHORST (2007)
 255
 argues for the origination of several traditions of asceticism, 
outside of the Vedic milieu, in the region of ‗Greater Magadha‘, drawing on a variety 
of textual evidence.
256
  He further suggests that Kapila was originally a deity 
associated with these ascetic traditions.
257
  In support of this theory, he cites a 
passage of the Baudhāyanadharmasūtra (BDhS) in which Kapila is presented as a 
demon (asura) and an opponent of Vedic orthodoxy.
258
  He takes as further evidence 
of the demonic nature of Kapila an episode in the MBh in which a wrathful Kapila 
destroys the sons of King Sagara.
259
  He further observes that Kapila is associated 
with a variety of deities in the MBh, including Viṣṇu, Śiva, Prajāpati and Viriñca,260 
while ‗Kapila‘s divine nature may [...] be taken as established for classical 
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Sāṃkhya‘.261   He suggests that the fact that Kapila was originally considered a deity 
would clear up some scholarly confusion regarding a passage of the ŚU,262 identified 
by BRONKHORST as ‗perhaps the earliest reference to ―the seer Kapila‖ ‘:263 
Modern interpreters have not infrequently preferred the translation ‗tawny, red‘ 
to ‗Kapila‘, because comparison with other verses of the Upaniṣad (3.4; 4.11-
12) shows that this seer Kapila must be identical with Hiraṇyagarbha and 
linked to Rudra.  This identity poses no problem the moment we abandon the 
idea that Kapila ever was an ordinary human being.
264
 
 
Although BRONKHORST‘s interpretation of the origin of Kapila may be at least 
partially correct, the development of this figure appears to be more complicated than 
he allows.  Kapila is presented not only as a non-Vedic ascetic and demon in the 
early texts, but is also associated with elements of Vedic-style asceticism and Vedic 
orthodoxy, and is even portrayed as a Vedic ṛṣi (see §V.5). 
 
JACOBSEN (2008)
265
, incorporating the material covered in JACOBSEN (1998), deals 
with the occurrences of figures known as Kapila throughout the history of Sanskrit 
literature.  This publication also includes a translation of the Kapilāsurisaṃvāda, a 
late addition to the MBh (‗probably C.E. 1400-1500‘266),267 and a treatment of the 
association of Kapila with various places of pilgrimage (tīrtha) in India and of the 
forms of worship associated with him.
268
 
 JACOBSEN observes that the earliest text to refer extensively to a ṛṣi (or ṛṣis) 
called Kapila is the MBh.
269
  He argues that ‗several Kapilas‘ are mentioned in the 
                                                 
261
 Ibid., p. 62. 
262
 See n. 771 (§V.5). 
263
 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63. 
264
 Ibid., p. 63. 
265
 JACOBSEN, K.A. (2008).  Kapila: Founder of Sāṃkhya and Avatāra of Viṣṇu.  Delhi. 
266
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 71. 
267
 Ibid., pp. 71-148. 
268
 Ibid., pp. 149-211. 
269
 Ibid., p. 12. 
70 
 
MBh,
270
 and identifies two distinct Kapila figures in particular, representing two 
different forms of ascetic tradition.  He cites an episode in which Kapila destroys the 
sons of King Sagara (MBh 3.3.104-8),
271
 and suggests that this Kapila is a 
representative of the Vedic tradition of asceticism ‗associated with tapas; with the 
acquisition of powers and immense feats of asceticism‘.272  In contrast, he suggests 
that the Kapila who converses with Syūmaraśmi in the form of a cow in MBh 
12.260-62
273
 represents a tradition that ‗belonged to a different world-view, a world-
view that emphasised karma, saṃsāra, punarbhava, and mokṣa‘.274  JACOBSEN 
suggests that these passages testify to the existence of two different Kapilas or of two 
stages in the development of the figure: 
The contradictory natures of these two Kapilas may be considered evidence of 
the existence of two different Kapila figures, one a Vedic ascetic and one 
influenced by Śramaṇa ideas, or they may represent two stages in the history of 
Kapila, beginning as a Vedic ascetic and thereafter being appropriated by 
ascetics who had adopted Śramaṇa values.  If any of these should be thought of 
as the Sāṃkhya Kapila is not clear.275 
 
The contradictory nature of these two aspects of Kapila in the MBh will be discussed 
in relation to the Sāṃkhya conception of Kapila in §V.5. 
 JACOBSEN also notes the non-Vedic, anti-ritual nature of Kapila in the 
passage of the BDhS discussed by BRONKHORST (2007) (see above).
276
  Also like 
BRONKHORST, he observes that Kapila is associated with a variety of deities in the 
MBh.
277
  In contrast to BRONKHORST‘s view that Kapila originated as a deity 
associated with śramaṇa traditions, JACOBSEN suggests that the early association of 
Kapila with Rudra and Hiraṇyagarbha in the ŚU ‗may perhaps have contributed to 
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the later divinization of Kapila and to the Sāṃkhya perception of him having been 
created at the beginning of each cycle of creation‘.278  With regard to the portrayal of 
Kapila as a Vedic-style ṛṣi, JACOBSEN observes that Kapila does not usually appear 
in the traditional lists of seven ṛṣis, although he does appear in such a list in the 
MBh.
279
 
 With regard to the classical Sāṃkhya texts‘ views on the nature and origin of 
Kapila, JACOBSEN observes: 
Most commentaries agree that Kapila passed his teaching on to Āsuri, but they 
offer different versions of Kapila‘s origin and nature.  One gets the impression 
that each commentary had to add a new detail or an original interpretation to 
the body of knowledge regarding the nature and origin of Kapila as part of its 
general interpretative contribution.  There is, in fact, a remarkable variety in 
the speculations about Kapila in the Sāṃkhyakārikā commentaries.280 
 
 In his discussion of the YD‘s views on Kapila, JACOBSEN notes that the text holds 
that both Kapila and Brahmā were produced directly out of primordial Materiality 
(pradhāna) after the production of the tattvas, and that Kapila ‗was born naturally 
endowed with the means of liberation because of the predominance of sattva in 
him‘,281 while Brahmā (i.e., the ‗body of greatness‘ (māhātmyaśarīra)) was born 
with an excess of rajas.
282
  With regard to the relative roles of Kapila and Brahmā 
according to the YD, JACOBSEN concludes: ‗Here the salvific function—the 
revelation of knowledge that leads to release—and the world creating function are 
separated.  The first function belongs to Kapila, the second to the body of 
greatness.‘283  He argues that this distinction is justified by the structure of the 
Sāṃkhya system itself: ‗Since the Sāṃkhya system is a dualist system—that it 
believes in two ultimate principles—and since it also believes in a plurality of selves 
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and a plurality of real manifestations of the material principle, it is not forced by the 
principle of monism to identify these as one and the same principle.‘284  This 
apparent distinction between the roles of the two figures will be discussed further in 
§V.4. 
 JACOBSEN contrasts the YD‘s division in labour between Kapila and Brahmā 
to the Vaiṣṇava view of Kapila as an avatāra of Viṣṇu: ‗Making Kapila an avatāra 
of Viṣṇu is a development in the direction of monotheism.  The idea of avatāra is an 
elegant way of keeping the divine functions apart and at the same time unifying 
them.‘285  He observes that the MV‘s identification of Kapila as an avatāra of 
Viṣṇu286 is unique among the classical commentaries on the SK: ‗The fact that 
Kapila was considered the son of Devahūti and Kardama is in accordance with the 
Bhāgavatapurāṇa but this is not stated in the early Sāṃkhya commentaries.‘287 
JACOBSEN takes this fact, along with a reference by Māṭhara to Viṣṇu‘s incarnation 
as Kalki,
288
 as evidence of the text‘s late date,289 citing the dates for the text 
proposed by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) as ‗anywhere from the ninth 
century onward‘.290  JACOBSEN also notes that Vācaspatimiśra‘s TV, also a late text, 
similarly refers to Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in its commentary on VBh 
1.25.
291
  With regard to the reason for this development, JACOBSEN suggests: ‗The 
fact that Kapila was accepted as an avatāra of Viṣṇu in these texts probably means 
that the Sāṃkhya tradition had lost much of its independence by the ninth 
century.‘292  He cites the work of WEZLER (1970) in support of this conclusion.293  
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The acceptance by the Vaiṣṇavas of Kapila as an avatāra of Viṣṇu, JACOBSEN 
suggests, ‗served the interests of the Vaiṣṇavas in their attempts to make Vaiṣṇavism 
an all-inclusive religion‘.294  The relation of the YD‘s view of the nature of Kapila to 
this later view of Kapila as an avatāra of Viṣṇu will be considered further in §V.5. 
 
Like WEZLER (2001), AKLUJKAR (2009)
295
 is primarily useful, in the context of the 
present study, as an aid in understanding the significance of the YD‘s quotation of a 
passage of NU 1.20 in the context of the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the attainments 
(siddhi).
296
  AKLUJKAR‘s article deals with the grammarian Bhartṛhari‘s view of the 
process of Vedic revelation and transmission.  He bases his interpretation of the NU 
passage primarily upon the context of Bhartṛhari‘s Vākyapadīyavṛtti (VPV), in 
which it is quoted.
297
  He justifies this interpretative strategy as follows: ‗As there is 
no other theoretician between Yāska and BH known to us at present who echoes 
Yāska‘s words, it is also commonsense to proceed on the assumption that BH would 
help us in recovering a part of Yāska‘s world.‘298 
 AKLUJKAR‘s interpretation of the NU passage will be utilised in §IV.9 to 
clarify the YD‘s interpretation of the siddhis.  The assumptions behind this 
interpretation with regard to the process of the attainment and transmission of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge will be considered further in §V.1-2.  Most significantly, 
AKLUJKAR offers an interpretation of the phrase ṛṣayaḥ sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ (‗seers 
who had discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things‘299), which 
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occurs in the NU passage: ‗The sākṣāt-kṛta-dharmatva of the seers means direct, 
undistorted and extraordinary knowledge of those properties and actions or processes 
which make the world what it is.‘300  The possibility that the YD-kāra holds a similar 
view of those ṛṣis who have independently attained Sāṃkhya knowledge will be 
considered in §V.1. 
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CHAPTER IV: A Comparison of the Sāṃkhya Commentators’ Views 
on Key Interpretative Issues. 
 
 
As has become evident in the course of the reviews in CHAPTER III, two major 
interpretative issues in classical Sāṃkhya have not been adequately dealt with in 
previous scholarship.  The first of these issues is the role of authoritative testimony 
(āptavacana) in relation to the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge and consequent 
liberation.  The first part of this chapter (§1-5) will examine the classical Sāṃkhya 
commentators’ views on authoritative testimony and the other two means of 
knowledge (pramāṇa), perception (pratyakṣa, dṛṣṭa) and inference (anumāna).  This 
discussion will be directed towards a clearer understanding of the nature of 
authoritative testimony in relation to the other pramāṇas, and the respective roles of 
the three pramāṇas in the attainment and transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge. 
 The second major issue requiring clarification is the relationship between the 
paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga).  
Although CHAKRAVARTI (1975), LARSON (1984) and LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA 
(1987) have made strides in understanding the nature of the relationship between 
these two paradigms, the evidence of the YD suggests a more precise interpretation 
of this relationship.  The second part of this chapter (§6-10) will examine the 
commentators’ views on the nature and function of these paradigms and the 
relationship between them. 
 The presentation of the views of the GBh, MV, and TK on the issues 
considered in this chapter will serve to aid us in understanding the views of the YD, 
and to provide an historical context for these views.  The conclusions drawn in this 
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chapter with regard to the YD’s views on the significance of āptavacana and the 
categories of the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga will be drawn upon in CHAPTER V, 
which will explore the interpretative implications of these views with regard to the 
process of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine and the nature and 
origin of the ṛṣi Kapila. 
 
 
PRELIMINARY MATTERS: 
The structure of the Yuktidīpikā and its relation to the other classical 
commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā. 
 
Like the other classical commentaries on the SK, the YD is structured around the 
verses of the SK in their standard numerical order (although the YD does not contain 
extant commentary on all of the verses
301
).  This makes it fairly easy to compare the 
views of the various commentators with regard to any point of Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 To give an idea of the basic contents of the SK, as well as the basic structure 
of the commentaries, an outline of the subject matter of the verses may be useful: 
 
SK 1-2 deal with the reasons for initiating the Sāṃkhya inquiry (the experience 
of pain and inability to dispel this pain by other means) and the goal of the 
inquiry (knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower; see §II.1). 
 
SK 3 summarises the nature of the three categories of manifest, unmanifest and 
knower. 
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SK 4-7 deal with the epistemology of the system, specifically the three means 
of knowledge (pramāṇa; see §II.4), their definitions and spheres of 
applicability. 
 
SK 8-11 deal with the relation between manifest and unmanifest; the doctrine 
of the (pre-)existent effect (satkāryavāda; see §II.1); the characteristics of the 
three categories of manifest, unmanifest and knower; and the differences 
between them. 
 
SK 12-16 discuss the nature and function of the constituent qualities (guṇa), 
their inherence in manifest and unmanifest Materiality (prakṛti), and reasons 
for the existence of the unmanifest. 
 
SK 17-21 give reasons for the existence and plurality of Consciousness 
(puruṣa), list its characteristics, and describe its relationship with prakṛti. 
 
SK 22-38 describe the manner and order of the emergence of the manifest 
principles (tattva) from unmanifest prakṛti, describe their functions and 
characteristics (including the conditions (bhāva; see §II.5) as forms of the 
intellect (buddhi) (SK 23)), and describe the motivation of their activity as 
being for the sake of the enjoyment and liberation of puruṣa (see §II.3). 
 
SK 39-42 deal with the subtle body (liṅga) and its relation to the manifest 
tattvas and the physical body (see §II.2). 
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SK 43-45 list the varieties of the bhāvas (sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, vaikṛta) and 
the results of the bhāvas (see §II.5). 
 
SK 46-51 list the categories of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga; see 
§II.5). 
 
SK 52 describes the relationship between the liṅga and the bhāvas. 
 
SK 53-54 describe the phenomenal creation (bhautika sarga; see §II.2). 
 
SK 55-68 deal with the relationship between prakṛti and puruṣa and explain 
the nature of transmigration (saṃsāra) and liberation (mokṣa, kaivalya) (see 
§II.3). 
 
SK 69-73 explain that the supreme ṛṣi (Kapila) expounded the Sāṃkhya 
system and describe the manner in which this knowledge was transmitted 
through a series of disciples to Īśvarakṛṣṇa. 
 
The discussions in the present chapter will focus mainly on the commentaries on the 
portions of the SK dealing with the pramāṇas (SK 4-7), the bhāvas (SK 23, 43-45), 
and the pratyayasarga (SK 46-51), although passages from other portions of the 
commentaries will be introduced where relevant. 
 Despite the common framework around which all of the classical 
commentaries are structured, the YD is unique among the commentaries in its 
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division of the text of the SK.   The YD-kāra applies a form of chapterisation which 
bears little relation to the structure or content of the SK.  The text of the YD is 
divided into four books (prakaraṇa) and further into eleven chapters (āhnika), which 
CHAKRAVARTI (1975) characterises as ‗an old-fashioned division‘.302  The YD also 
divides the verses of the SK themselves into fragments and treats them as sūtras 
(prose aphorisms) rather than kārikās (verses) (see §V.2). 
 The YD also contains a long introduction, which deals largely with the 
commentator‘s view of the history and continuity of the Sāṃkhya tradition.  This 
portion of the YD, as well as the commentary on SK 69-72, will be utilized in the 
discussions in CHAPTER V of the commentator‘s view of the importance of Kapila‘s 
original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge and the continuity of the tradition of 
Sāṃkhya teachers. 
 The YD differs from the other commentaries in another important respect.  
While the other commentaries generally offer short and simple interpretations of the 
verses of the SK, the YD‘s explanations are generally much longer and much more 
involved.  CHAKRAVARTI (1975) has aptly described the YD-kāra‘s style of exegesis: 
The style of the author is archaic and highly polemical.  He first of all puts in a 
nut-shell what he has to say, and then expands the same.  In doing so he attacks 
the view of the opponent who also in his turn re-attacks that of the defendent.  
In this way attacking, re-attacking and counter-attacking go on continually 
until the accepted conclusion is reached.  This method has sometimes rendered 
it difficult to trace the place where the version of the opponent begins and that 
of the defendent ends.
303
 
 
This type of involved dialectic is unique among the classical commentaries on the 
SK.  In the course of these meandering exchanges, the YD-kāra often refers to verses 
of the SK (or their subject matter) from outside the immediate context of the verse at 
hand.  This means that in the interpretative analysis undertaken in the present 
                                                 
302
 CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 161. 
303
 Ibid., pp. 160-161. 
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chapter, references from widely disparate sections of the YD have sometimes been 
brought together for the sake of clarifying a particular aspect of the commentator‘s 
views. 
 Although the YD-kāra does not explicitly engage with the views of the 
earlier classical commentaries on the SK, and it is thus not clear whether he was 
familiar with any of these commentaries, his views are often compatible with the 
views of the other commentators.  In general, the evidence of the YD can be used to 
clarify statements found in the other commentaries and points of doctrine which 
remain largely obscure in the other commentaries, as will become apparent in the 
course of the present chapter.  The commentators‘ views on relevant interpretative 
issues will be compared point by point in this chapter, in order to establish the YD‘s 
views, and the points of agreement and departure with the views of the other 
commentaries, with as much clarity as possible.  This comparison will be undertaken 
primarily in preparation for a consideration of the interpretative implications of these 
views in CHAPTER V.  In addition, the overall relation between the YD‘s views to 
those of the other classical commentaries, and their implications with regard to the 
historical development of the classical Sāṃkhya tradition, will be considered in 
§V.5. 
 
§1. The commentators’ views on the pramāṇa of perception (dṛṣṭa). 
  
The first sections of this chapter (§1-5) will be directed towards a clearer 
understanding of the means by which a seeker of liberation is held to attain 
knowledge of the principles (tattva) according to the classical Sāṃkhya texts.  These 
sections will thus focus upon the commentators’ views on the means of valid 
knowledge (pramāṇa) accepted by Sāṃkhya, especially with regard to their 
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applicability to the attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas.  It is generally 
assumed that inference (anumāna) is held as the most important pramāṇa for the 
attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge.304  However, the evidence of the commentaries, 
particularly of the YD, calls this assumption into question. 
 The first pramāṇa accepted by the Sāṃkhya system is perception (dṛṣṭa).  
Although the sphere of perception is usually confined to the everyday objects of 
experience comprised of the gross elements (mahābhūta), the commentators, as 
mentioned in §II.4, also allow for the perception of the subtle elements (tanmātra) 
by gods and yogins.  Of the commentaries, the YD provides the most information 
about how this extraordinary form of perception works. 
 Perception is defined by Īśvarakṛṣṇa as prativiṣayādhyavasāya (SK 5).  As 
mentioned above (§II.3), the intellect (buddhi) is characterised by determination 
(adhyavasāya) (SK 23).  The interpretation of the term prativiṣaya varies among the 
commentators.  GBh interprets it as ‘with regard to each particular object’, referring 
to sound (śabda), touch (sparśa), form (rūpa), taste (rasa), and scent (gandha), as 
apprehended by their corresponding sense-faculties (ears (śrotra), skin (tvak), eyes 
(cakṣus), tongue (jihvā), and nose (ghrāṇa), respectively).305  Presumably, this 
includes both the specific (viśeṣa; mahābhūta) and non-specific (aviśeṣa; tanmātra) 
forms of these sense-objects (see §II.1). 
                                                 
304
 E.g., CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 191: ‗Its prakṛti, its puruṣa, nay even its theory of causation are 
established by sheer reasoning and this shows that ―inference‖ played a very important part in the 
building up of the Sāṃkhya as a system.‘  LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 29) observe that 
‗Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning‘. 
305
 dṛṣṭaṃ yathā śrotraṃ tvak cakṣuḥ jihvā ghrāṇam iti pañca buddhīndriyāṇi / śabdasparśa-
rūparasagandhā eṣāṃ pañcānāṃ pañcaiva viṣayā yathāsaṃkhyam / śabdaṃ śrotraṃ gṛhṇāti tvak 
sparśaṃ cakṣū rūpaṃ jihvā rasaṃ ghrāṇaṃ gandham iti / (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 22-24); 
prativiṣayeṣu śrotrādīnāṃ śabdādiviṣayeṣu adhyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṃ pratyakṣam ity arthaḥ / (GBh on SK 
5, p. 51, l. 28). 
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MV gives a similar explanation for the term prativiṣayādhyavasāya as 
referring to the apprehension of each particular sense-object by its corresponding 
sense-faculty.
306
 
TK interprets prativiṣaya as a synonym for the faculties (indriya)—that is, as 
that which functions with regard to each (prati) object (viṣaya).307  The term 
prativiṣayādhyavasāya can thus be understood as ‘determination by appropriate the 
sense-faculties’.  TK includes the great elements (mahābhūta), as well as things like 
pleasure (sukha), etc., as the objects (viṣaya) of perception for ordinary people.  
Vācaspati also mentions in this context the fact that yogins and gods 
(ūrdhvasrotas)308 are able to perceive the subtle elements (tanmātra).309  It is not 
clear from the TK, however, in what way things like pleasure and the subtle elements 
are also considered objects of the sense-faculties. 
The YD also mentions in this context the fact that yogins and gods (deva) are 
able to perceive the subtle elements.
310
  Under SK 34, the YD clarifies how this 
suprasensuous perception works.  The commentator specifies that gods, having had 
their faculties (indriya) purified by an abundance of merit (dharma), are able to 
perceive the subtle elements even prior to perceiving the gross elements, while 
yogins can perceive the subtle elements only after they have ‘completely attained’ 
the gross elements.
311
  The YD interprets the term prativiṣayādhyavasāya as an 
ekaśeṣa (literally, ‘single remainder’), an interpretative technique according to which 
one word denotes two or more different but identical words.  According to this 
                                                 
306
 viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prati yo ’dhyavasāyo netrādīnām īndriyāṇāṃ pañcānāṃ rūpādiṣu pañcasu tat 
pratyakṣaṃ pratipattirūpaṃ dṛṣṭākhyam / (MV on SK 5, p. 12, ll. 12-14). 
307
 viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prati vartate iti prativiṣayam indriyam / (TK on SK 5, p. 19, ll. 20-21). 
308
 See n. 488 (§IV.9). 
309
 viṣayāḥ pṛthivyādayaḥ sukhādayaś cāsmadādīnām aviṣayāḥ tanmātralakṣaṇāḥ yoginām 
ūrdhvasrotasāṃ ca viṣayāḥ / (TK on SK 5, p. 19, ll. 18-20).  Cf. nn. 24, 26 (§II.4). 
310
 viśiṣṭāḥ pṛthivyādilakṣaṇā asmadādigamyāḥ / aviśiṣṭāś ca tanmātralakṣaṇā yoginām 
ūrdhvasrotasāṃ ca gamyāḥ / (YD on SK 5, p. 76, l. 27 – p. 77, l. 1).  
311
 tatra devānāṃ yānīndriyāṇi tāni dharmotkarṣād viśuddhāny aviśeṣān api gṛhṇanti [prāg eva 
viśeṣāt] / yogināṃ ca samprāptaviśeṣāṇām / (YD on SK 34ab, p. 218, ll. 3-5). 
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interpretation, prativiṣayādhyavasāya signifies 1. ‘determination by the sense-
faculties’ and  2. ‘determination of each particular object’.  The second meaning 
provides for the inclusion of internal forms of perception (incuding the perception of 
yogins and the perception of emotional states).
312
 
The YD, like the other commentaries,
313
 thus makes room for the direct 
perception of things beyond ordinary sensory experience.  The YD also suggests that 
this suprasensuous perception is a progressive process in the case of yogins and the 
result of accumulated merit (dharma) in the case of gods.  This suggests that through 
yogic practice or the accumulation of dharma one may begin to develop knowledge 
of the Sāṃkhya tattvas (beginning with the subtle elements) through the medium of 
direct perception.  This evidence will be taken into account in the broader context of 
the discussion of the process of the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas 
in CHAPTER V.
314
 
 
§2. The commentators’ views on the pramāṇa of inference (anumāna). 
 
Inference (anumāna) is held to make possible the apprehension of objects of 
knowledge beyond the sphere of perception (see §IV.5) and is generally accorded a 
privileged place in the Sāṃkhya texts with regard to the establishment of knowledge 
of the tattvas. 
                                                 
312
 ucyate: astu tarhīndriyāṇāṃ prativiṣayagrahaṇaṃ viśeṣaṇam / yat tūktaṃ (82.6) rāgādīnām 
upasaṃkhyānaṃ kartavyam iti tatra brūmaḥ ekaśeṣanirdeśāt (cf. MBhāṣya I.88.25 et passim) 
siddham / evaṃ tarhi prativiṣayādhyavasāyaś ca prativiṣayādhyavasāyaś ca prativiṣayādhyavasāya 
iti sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣaḥ (cf. Pāṇ. 1.2.64) kariṣyate / tatraikena bahiraṅgasyendriyasya parigrahaḥ / 
dvitīyenāntaraṅgasya prātibhasyeti rāgādiviṣayaṃ yogināṃ ca yad vijñānaṃ tat saṅgṛhītaṃ bhavatīti 
vyākhyātaṃ pratyakṣam / (YD on SK 5a, p. 82, ll. 20-26). 
313
 Cf. nn. 24, 26 (§II.4). 
314
 See also the discussion below of the commentators’ views on the production of knowledge leading 
to discrimination (§IV.5). 
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 There are several forms of inference with different spheres of applicability.  
The commentators vary in their classification and interpretation of the forms of 
inference.  The YD provides a good deal of information on the ways in which 
inference is used to establish the primary objects of the Sāṃkhya enquiry.  The YD 
is also unique among the commentaries in providing a link between inference and 
the explanation of philosophical texts (śāstra), which are classed as authoritative 
testimony (āptavacana; see §IV.3).  The present section will compare the 
commentators‘ views on the nature of inference in general and on the particular 
forms of inference, in order to provide some context for a discussion of the YD‘s 
views on the relationship between inference and authoritative testimony. 
 Inference in general is said to be dependent upon prior knowledge of a 
characteristic mark (liṅga) and that which bears the characteristic mark (liṅgin) (SK 
5).  For instance, TK gives the common example of the inference of fire from smoke, 
in which fire is considered the liṅgin and smoke the liṅga.315 
GBh’s interpretation of the term liṅgaliṅgipūrvaka (‘preceded by a 
characteristic mark and that which bears the mark’; SK 5) is somewhat different.  
Gauḍapāda explains that inference can be preceded by either a characteristic mark 
(liṅga) or that which bears the mark (liṅgin).  He gives as examples the inference of 
a mendicant (yati), the liṅgin, from his staff (daṇḍa), the liṅga; and the inference of 
his staff, again the liṅga, from the sight of the mendicant, the liṅgin.316  MV also 
uses the example of the mendicant and his staff, but only offers the first possibility, 
that a mendicant, the liṅgin, can be inferred from the sight of his staff, the liṅga.317  
                                                 
315
 dhūmādir vyāpyo vahnyādir vyāpaka iti yaḥ pratyayas tatpūrvakam / (TK on SK 5, p. 22, ll. 35). 
316
 tad anumānaṃ liṅgapūrvakaṃ yatra liṅgena liṅgi anumīyate yathā daṇḍena yatiḥ / liṅgipūrvakaṃ 
ca yatra liṅginā liṅgam anumīyate yathā dṛṣṭvā yatiṃ asyedaṃ tridaṇḍam iti / (GBh on SK 5, p. 52, 
ll. 4-6). 
317
 liṅgena tridaṇḍādidarśanenādṛṣṭo ’pi liṅgi sādhyate nūnam asau parivrā[jo ’sti] yasyedaṃ 
tridaṇḍam iti / (MV on SK 13, ll. 9-11; parivrāḍāsti must be a corrupt reading). 
85 
 
MV’s interpretation is thus closer to that of TK.  YD does not comment on the 
phrase tal liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam.  In summary, the commentators hold that inferential 
knowledge is dependent upon prior direct knowledge of the relation between two 
objects or characteristics. 
With regard to the forms of inference, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states simply that 
inference is threefold (SK 5).  The commentators are unanimous in identifying the 
three forms of inference as pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa,318 although the 
interpretation of these terms varies from text to text. 
GBh interprets pūrvavat as the inference of an effect from the perception of a 
cause, based on precedent (pūrva), and gives the example of the inference of rain 
from clouds, based on the prior perception of rain as a result of the accumulation of 
clouds.  As an example of śeṣavat, Gauḍapāda gives the inference that the remainder 
(śeṣa) of the ocean’s water is salty, based on the perception that a portion of it is 
salty.  He interprets sāmānyatodṛṣṭa as inference based on a generally perceived 
correlation, giving two examples: the inference of the movement of the moon and 
stars from their change in position, based on the perception of the movement of a 
man from place to place; and the inference of blossoming mango trees in other 
places from the perception that they have blossomed in one place.
319
 
MV begins with an alternative explanation of the SK’s statement that 
inference is threefold, taking this to refer to three members (avayava) of a formal 
                                                 
318
 trividham anumānam ākhyātam / pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ceti / (GBh on SK 5, p. 51, l. 
29); tac ca trividham / pūrvavat śeṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca / (MV on SK 5, p. 13, l. 2); anumānaṃ 
triprakāram ācāryair ākhyātam / pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca / (YD on SK 5b, p. 83, ll. 
1-2); tat sāmānyatoviśeṣalakṣām traividhyam nulakṣitam anumānaṃ viśeṣatas trividhaṃ 
pūrvavatśeṣavatsāmānyato pūrvavaccheṣavatsāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ceti / (TK on SK 5, p. 23, ll. 34-36). 
319
 pūrvam asyāstīti pūrvavad yathā—meghonnatyā vṛṣṭiṃ sādhayati pūrvadṛṣṭatvāt / śeṣavad 
yathā—samudrād ekaṃ jalapalaṃ lavaṇam āsādya śeṣasyāpy asti lavaṇabhāva iti / sāmānyato 
dṛṣṭaṃ—deśād deśāntaraṃ prāptaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ gatimac candratārakaṃ, caitravat / yathā 
caitranāmānaṃ deśād deśāntaraṃ prāptam avalokya gatimān ayam iti, tadvac candratārakam iti / 
tathā puṣpitāmradarśanād anyatra puṣpitā āmrā iti sāmānyato dṛṣṭena sādhayati / etat sāmānyato 
dṛṣṭam / (GBh on SK 5, p 51, l. 30 – p. 52, l. 3). 
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inferential argument: thesis (pakṣa), reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta).  Māṭhara 
also states that there are nine fallacies (ābhāsa) of thesis, fourteen of reason, and ten 
of example.  An objection is then offered that others hold there to be five members 
of an inference: thesis (pratijñā), reason (apadeśa), example (nidarśana), application 
(anusaṃdhāna), and conclusion (pratyāmnāya).  The first three of these correspond 
to the three previously mentioned (pakṣa, hetu, and dṛṣṭānta), but the application and 
conclusion are not explained by Māṭhara.  Māṭhara accepts these five members of 
inference, which he then defines as ‘the explanation for the sake of others by one 
who has determined a view himself’.  He then explains that this five-membered 
inference is threefold, giving the same forms of inference attested by the GBh 
(pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa), and interpreting them in basically the same 
fashion.  Māṭhara gives the same example of pūrvavat inference given by Gauḍapāda 
(of rain from the accumulation of clouds), as well as the additional example of the 
inference that it has rained from the sight of a swollen river.  The latter example 
illustrates that, according to Māṭhara, pūrvavat inference includes not only the 
inference of an effect from a perceived cause, but also the inference of a cause from 
a perceived effect.  Māṭhara’s example of śeṣavat is the same as Gauḍapāda’s (of the 
saltiness of the ocean), while for sāmānyatodṛṣṭa he gives Gauḍapāda’s inference of 
flowering mangoes, as well as the somewhat dissimilar inference that the moon has 
risen based on the general observation of this fact by others.
320
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 anumānaṃ trividham / trisādhanaṃ tryavayavaṃ pañcāvayavam ity apare / tadākhyātaṃ kathitam 
/ pakṣahetudṛṣṭāntā iti tryavayavam / pakṣaḥ pratijñāpadam / yathā—vahnimān ayam pradeśaḥ / 
sādhyavastūpanyāsaḥ pakṣaḥ / itare pakṣābhāsāḥ prayakṣaviruddhādayo nava / trirūpo hetuḥ / 
trairūpyaṃ punaḥ pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe cāsattvam iti / atrodāharaṇaṃ yathā 
dhūmavattvād iti / anye hetvābhāsāḥ caturdaśa / asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhādayaḥ / sādharmya-
vaidharmyābhyāṃ dvividhaṃ nidarśanam / yathā mahānasam / itare nidarśanābhāsā daśa / evaṃ 
trayastriṃśadābhāsarahitaṃ tryavayavam anumānam / pañcāvayavam ity apare / tad āha—avayavāḥ 
punaḥ pratijñāpadeśanidarśanānusandhānapraty-āmnāyāḥ / evaṃ pañcāvayavena vākyena 
svaniścitārthapratipādanaṃ parārtham anumānam / tac ca trividham / pūrvavat śeṣavat 
sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ ca / tatra viśiṣṭameghonnatidarśanāt bhavitrīṃ vṛṣṭim sambhāvayati / pūrvam iyaṃ 
dṛṣṭeti pūrvavat / nadīpūradarśanād upari vṛṣṭo deva iti vā pratītiḥ / śeṣavad yathā—
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The five members (avayava) of inference accepted by the MV correspond to 
five of the ten members of inference given by the YD.
321
  The first five members of 
inference according to the YD—desire to know (jijñāsā), uncertainty (saṃśaya), 
purpose (prayojana), determination of what is possible (śakyaprāpti), and removal 
of uncertainty (saṃśayavyudāsa)—are described as the ‘members of explanation’ 
(vyākhyāṅga).322  These five members are illustrated by a dialogue between a student 
and a Sāṃkhya teacher whom he approaches for knowledge.  The example of 
inference illustrated by this dialogue is that of the existence of Consciousness 
(puruṣa).323  The latter five members according to the YD—thesis (pratijñā), reason 
(hetu), example (dṛṣṭānta), application (upasaṃhāra), and conclusion (nigamana)—
which correspond to the five members attested by MV, are described as the 
‘members of teaching to others’ (parapratipādanāṅga).324  These latter five 
members are not illustrated by the commentator; HARZER (2006) suggests that this is 
                                                                                                                                          
samudrodakabinduṃ prāśya śeṣasya lavaṇabhāvo ’numīyate iti śeṣavat / sāmānyato dṛṣṭam—
puṣpitāmradarśanāt anyatra puṣpitā āmrā iti / punar yathā—bahir udyota iti kenāpy uktaṃ 
tatrāpareṇāpy uktam / candra udito bhaviṣyatīty arthasaṅgatiḥ / (MV on SK 5, p. 12, l. 14 – p. 13, l. 
9). 
321
 SOLOMON (1974, p. 13) has also noted this discrepancy in the number of members of inference 
between the two texts. 
322
 tasya punar avayavā jijñāsāsaṃśayaprajoyanaśakyaprāptisaṃśayavyudāsalakṣaṇāś ca 
vyākhyāṅgam / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 16-17). 
323
 tatra jñātum icchā jijñāsā / kaścit kaṃcid upasadyāha—puruṣaṃ jñātum icchāmi kim asti nāstīti / 
kutaḥ saṃśaya iti paryanuyuktaḥ pratyāha—anupalabhyamānasyobhayathādṛṣṭatvāt / 
ihānupalabhyamānam ubhayathādṛṣṭaṃ sadbhūtam asadbhūtaṃ ceti / sadbhūtaṃ ca 
arkendumaṇḍalāparabhāgādi / asadbhūtaṃ ca śaśaviṣāṇādi / ayam api cātmā nopalabhyate ’taḥ 
saṃśayaḥ kim astināstīti / kim asyāś cintāyāḥ prayojanam iti pṛṣṭo vyācaṣṭe—śāstrasatattvādhigamaḥ 
tataś ca mokṣāvāptiḥ / katham iti / yadi tāvadayam ātmāsti tato ’syāprakṛtitvaudāsīnya-
vibhutvādibhāvinīti / yad uktaṃ vyaktāvyaktajñavijñānān mokṣo ’vāpyate (cf. SK2d) iti tac chāstram 
arthavad bhavati / atha nāstīti niścīyatetena sāmānyatodṛṣṭād anumānāt tadvad anye ’pi padārthā na 
santīti vipralambhabhūyiṣṭham ārṣaṃ arśanam apahāyātmagrahadṛṣṭivigamāl lokottaram 
anavalambana<ṃ> śūnyaṃ dhyānaviṣayam upasamprāptas traidhātukakleśanirodhalakṣaṇam 
ātyantikaṃ nirvāṇam avāpsyāmīti / śakyaś cāyam artho niścetuṃ pramāṇatrayaparigrahād iti 
vyavasthite vyudasya saṃśayam / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, l. 19 – p. 90, l. 12).  For an analysis of this 
conversation, see HARZER (2006), p. 100. 
324
 pratijñāhetudṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāranigamanāni parapratipādanāṅgam iti / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 17-
18). 
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‘perhaps because these latter five are shared with other schools and are common 
knowledge’.325 
Although the names of these latter five members of inference in the YD are 
different from those cited by the MV, the correspondence shows that the two texts 
may have been influenced by the same tradition of interpretation in this regard, 
which would explain the MV’s departure from Gauḍapāda’s interpretation of 
inference, with which it otherwise generally agrees. 
HARZER (2006) has pointed out that the list given by the YD corresponds to a 
list given in the Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (NSBh) (ca. 450 C.E.) on Nyāyasūtra (NS) 1.32, 
in which the first five members are rejected ‘as a psychological process unnecessary 
in an inference’.326  NS 1.32 gives five members of inference corresponding to the 
list accepted by the MV and the second group of five in the YD (the members for 
teaching to others), although the names given in the NS are not all identical to those 
in either the MV or the YD.
327
  The author of the NSBh, Pakṣilasvāmin, mentions 
that other Naiyāyikas accept ten members of inference, the names of the first five of 
which are the same as those given in the YD, although the order of the third and 
fourth members (śakyaprāpti and prayojana) is reversed.328  HARZER observes that 
the ten-membered inference is also mentioned in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (ca. 2nd 
cent. B.C.E.) on Pāṇini 5.2.42.329   It is thus evident that the ten-fold division held by 
the YD was relatively old and had gone out of fashion by the time of its composition, 
as perhaps also evidenced by the MV’s acceptance of only five members of 
inference.  HARZER suggests that the YD applied the two-fold division, into members 
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 HARZER (2006), p. 100. 
326
 HARZER (2006), p. 98. 
327
 pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ // (NS 1.32, p. 36, l. 2). 
328
 daśāvayavān eke naiyāyikā vākye sañcakṣate / jijñāṣā saṃśayaḥ śakyaprāptiḥ prayojanaṃ 
saṃśayavyudāsa iti / (NSBh on NS 1.32, p. 36, ll. 3-4). 
329
 HARZER (2006), p. 131, n.108. 
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for acquiring knowledge (for oneself from a teacher) and members for explaining 
knowledge to others, to this older ten-fold division of inference under the influence 
of the Buddhist logician Dignāga, who held a similar two-fold division.330 
The YD argues that the first five members of the ten-fold formal inference 
are necessary, despite the fact that they are not considered part of the self-
ascertainment (svaniścaya) of knowledge, since this formal inference is meant for 
the benefit of those lacking the intellect of the wise men who have initially 
ascertained such knowledge for themselves.  The commentator explains that this 
assistance to those lacking in insight is in fact the reason for the explanation 
(vyākhyāna) of a treatise (śāstra) and points out that this is why these members are 
referred to as ‘members of explanation’ (vyākhyāṅga).331  In this passage, the word 
used for the ‘assistance’ or ‘favour’ of those who are ‘confused, mistaken and having 
an inferior intellect’ is anugraha, a term which will become important in the 
discussion of doctrinal authority in the YD in CHAPTER V. 
Although the first five members of inference (‘members of explanation’) are 
useful from the perspective of the student, while the second five members (‘members 
of teaching to others’) pertain to the perspective of the teacher, all ten members thus 
relate to the explanation to another of inferred knowledge.  The reason given by the 
commentator for this formulation of an inference in ten members is that the object of 
an inference cannot be communicated to another without the use of a statement 
(vākya).332   Moreover, the fact that the first five members are illustrated by a 
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 HARZER (2006), pp. 101-102. 
331
 yad ucyate (91.15f.) svaniścaye ’naṅgabhāvagamanāt parapratyāyanārthaṃ jijñāsādy-
anabhidhānam ity atra brūmaḥ: na uktatvāt / uktam (89.16ff.) etat purastād vyākhyāṅgam 
jijñāsādayaḥ <iti> / sarvasya cānugrahaḥ kartavya ity evamarthaṃ śāstravyākhyānaṃ vipaścidbhiḥ 
pratāyate na svārthaṃ svasadṛśabuddhyarthaṃ vā / tatraivaṃ kalpyamāne ye vyutpāddyās tān prati 
<naiṣam ānarthakyam(?)> / athaitad aniṣṭaṃ yad uktam sandigdhaviparyastāvyutpannabuddhy-
anugrahārtho hi satāṃ viniśayaḥ eṣām āvaśyakam abhidhānam ācakṣmahe / (YD on SK 6, p. 93, l. 
12 – p. 94, l. 3). 
332
 vākyam antareṇārthasya buddhyantare saṃkrāmayitum aśakyatvāt (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 14-15). 
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situation involving the teaching of Sāṃkhya knowledge in particular, shows the 
importance of the formal inference in the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.  This 
interpretation of inference, as a tool for the exposition of śāstra, will be brought to 
bear upon the discussion in CHAPTER V of the YD’s conception of the role of 
authoritative testimony (āptavacana) and its relation to inference. 
According to the YD, the ten-membered inference constitutes the direct (vīta) 
form of inference,
333
 as contrasted to the indirect (avīta) form of inference.  The 
direct inference is defined as the employment of a reason (hetu) to prove a thesis 
(sādhya), without eliminating other positions (pakṣa).  The indirect inference uses 
the elimination of other possibilities in order to establish the thesis.  As an example 
of indirect inference, the commentator gives the inference that the universe arises 
from primordial Materiality (pradhāna), based on the elimination of atoms 
(paramāṇu), Consciousness (puruṣa), the Lord (īśvara), [previous] actions (karma), 
fate (daiva), time (kāla), innate nature (svabhāva), and chance (yadṛcchā), as 
possible sources of the universe.
334
  As will be shown below, in the discussion of the 
YD’s definition of śeṣavat inference (under which the above example can be 
classified), it is evident that, according to the YD, the indirect inference may be used 
as an aid to establish the thesis of a direct inference.  With regard to the example of 
primordial Materiality, under SK 8 the commentator illustrates the joint use of direct 
                                                 
333
 tatra yadā vīto hetuḥ svabuddhāv avahitavijñānasvarūpaṃ vijñānāntaram ādadhānena vaktrā 
pratipādyādau vākyabhāvam upanīyate—vākyam antareṇārthasya buddhyantare saṃkrāmayitum 
aśakyatvāt—tadāvayavivākyaṃ parikalpyate / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 12-15). 
334
 tatra yadā hetuḥ parapakṣam <an>apekṣya yathārthena svarūpeṇa sādhyasiddhāv apadiśyate 
tadā vītākhyo bhavati / yadā tu svasādhyād arthāntarabhūtānāṃ prasaṅgināṃ kṣepam apohaṃ kṛtvā 
pariśeṣataḥ sādhyasiddhāv apadiśyate tadāvītākhyo bhavati tadyathā na cet paramāṇupuruṣeśvara-
karmadaivakālasvabhāvayadṛcchābhyo jagadutpattiḥ sambhavati pariśeṣataḥ pradhānād iti tadā 
punar avītākhyo bhavati / (YD on SK 6, p. 89, ll. 7-12). 
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and indirect inference in establishing that the non-perception of pradhāna is due to 
its subtlety rather than non-existence.
335
 
The YD also accepts the threefold classification of inference into pūrvavat, 
śeṣavat, and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.  The commentator interprets pūrvavat inference as the 
inference of an effect from the perception of its cause (or causes),
336
 śeṣavat as the 
inference of a cause from its effect,
337
 and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa as inference based on the 
general perception of the association of two related characteristics.
338
  The YD’s 
interpretation of pūrvavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is thus essentially the same as that of 
GBh and MV, although its interpretation of śeṣavat is somewhat different; the YD 
takes the term śeṣa to refer to an effect rather than a remainder. 
The YD offers several examples of the pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and 
sāmānyatodṛṣṭa forms of inference, several of which are dismissed on the basis of an 
opponent’s objections.  For pūrvavat, the commentator first offers the example, also 
given by GBh and MV, of the inference of rain from the perception of clouds.  This 
is rejected by an opponent, since rain does not invariably result from the presence of 
clouds.  A revised definition of pūrvavat inference is then accepted, according to 
which the causal power (kāraṇaśakti) must be accompanied by the instrumental or 
                                                 
335
 āha: evam api pratijñān<ya>tarānarthakyam ekena kṛtatvāt / saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhir ity ukte 
gamyata etan nābhāvād iti / tasmāt tadvacanam anarthakam iti / ucyate: na vītāvītaparigrahārthatvāt 
/ evaṃ siddhe yat pratijñādvayaṃ karoti taj jñāpaty ācāryo (cf. MBhāṣya I.33.17, I.35.9 et passim) 
vītāvītābhyām abhipretārthasiddhiḥ <iti> / prāk ca saukṣmyātiśayāt tadanupalabdhir ity ācakṣāṇaḥ 
pratipādayati purastād vītaḥ prayoktavya iti / ekasmiṃś ca viṣaye dvau prayuñjānaḥ samuccayena 
siddhiṃ dyotayati / kiṃ siddhaṃ bhavati / yad uktaṃ tantrāntarīyaiḥ na pṛthakpratipattihetū vītāvītau 
iti tad iṣṭam eva saṅgṛhītaṃ bhavati / tatra vītasya pratijñā saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhiḥ tatra 
cāvītasya prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛttirūpeṇa nābhāvāt / hetur ubhayayogī / katham / yasya 
pratyakṣato ’nupalabdhiḥ (SK8a) dṛṣṭā tadyathendriyāṇām / yadi punar asyābhāvad anupalabdhiḥ 
syāt, kāryato ’nupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ / asti ceyaṃ kāryata upalabdhiḥ / tasmāt nābhāvāt (SK8b) / na 
ced abhāvāt pariśeṣataḥ saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhiḥ (SK 8a) iti / (YD on SK 8ab, p. 106, l. 14 – p. 
107, l. 10). 
336
 tatra pūrvavad yadā kāraṇam abhyuditaṃ dṛṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvaṃ kāryasya pratipadyate (YD on SK 
5, p. 83, ll. 6-8). 
337
 śeṣavat yadā kāryani<r>vṛttiṃ dṛṣṭvā kāraṇasadbhāvaṃ pratipadyate (YD on SK 5, p. 84, ll. 2-
3). 
338
 sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ nāma yatraikadārthay<o>r avyabhicāram upalabhya deśāntare kālāntare ca 
tajjātīyayor avyabhicāraṃ pratipadyate (YD on SK 5, p. 85, ll. 4-6). 
92 
 
assisting powers (kāriśakti) necessary for bringing about the effect and free from 
obstructions to the production of the effect.  The example given for this is the 
inference of the production of a pot from the perception of clay possessed by a potter 
who is working and in possession of a wheel, water, an irod rod and other 
instruments.
339
  The YD thus offers a more sophisticated definition of pūrvavat 
inference than GBh or MV.  According to this definition, causality depends upon the 
fulfillment of certain necessary conditions. 
The YD offers three examples of śeṣavat inference, interpreted as the 
inference of a cause from the perception of its effect, that are successively rejected 
by an opponent.  These are the inference of the union of a couple from the perception 
of a child, the inference that the sun or moon has risen from the perception of a red 
sky, and lastly the inference, included by Māṭhara under his definition of pūrvavat 
inference, that it has rained from the perception of a flooded river.  The opponent 
objects in each of these cases that the effect does not invariably arise from the 
particular cause mentioned.  The final example offered by the proponent is the 
inference of a root from the perception of a leaf or the inference of a seed from the 
perception of a sprout.  He then suggests that the three previously rejected examples 
can be considered valid examples of śeṣavat inference if made in conjunction with 
indirect (avīta) inference, through which other possible causes are eliminated by 
taking into account particularities of place (deśa), time (kāla), or characteristic marks 
(liṅga).340 
                                                 
339
 tatra pūrvavad yadā kāraṇam abhyuditaṃ dṛṣṭvā bhaviṣyattvaṃ kāryasya pratipadyate yathā 
meghodaye bhavitavya<tā> vṛṣṭeḥ / āha: naitad asty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi meghodayo 
’vaśyaṃ vṛṣṭeḥ kāraṇaṃ bhavati vāyvādinimittapratibandhasambhavāt / ucyate: yadi tarhi 
kāraṇaśaktiṃ sahakāriśaktyantarānugṛhītām apratiyoginīṃ dṛṣṭvā kāryasya vyaktiṃ pratipadyate 
tadyathā yadā <cakrodakadaṇḍādisādhanasampannena> vyāpāravatā kumbhakāreṇādhiṣṭhitāṃ 
mṛdam upalabhya ghaṭasya tadā pūrvavat / (YD on SK 5, p. 83, l. 6 – p. 84, l. 2). 
340
 śeṣavat yadā kāryani<r>vṛttiṃ dṛṣṭvā kāraṇasadbhāvaṃ pratipadyate tadyathā kumārakaṃ 
dṛṣṭvā dvayasamāpattim / āha: naitad apy asty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi dvayasamāpatti-
pūrvaka eva prāṇabhṛtāṃ prādurbhāvo droṇādīnām anyathotpattiviśeṣaśravaṇāt / ucyate: yadā tarhi 
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The YD begins by defining sāmānyatodṛṣṭa as an inference based on the 
perception of an invariable association between two objects, offering the stock 
example of the inference of fire from the perception of smoke, based on their 
invariable association.  An opponent objects that this definition would apply also to 
inference from cause to effect (pūrvavat) and from effect to cause (śeṣavat), to which 
the proponent replies that sāmānyatodṛṣṭa functions with regard to objects existing 
simultaneously, giving the example, similar to that given by GBh and MV of the 
flowering mango trees, of the inference that the fruits of other trees are ripe from the 
observation of ripe fruit in one tree.  The opponent objects that the fruits of all trees 
do not ripen simultaneously.  The proponent then offers a definition of 
sāmānyatodṛṣṭa equivalent to the definition of śeṣavat given by GBh and MV, citing 
the example of the inference of the saltiness of the ocean based on the taste of one 
drop, as well as the additional example of the inference that all the rice in a pot has 
been cooked after tasting one grain.  The opponent objects that according to this 
definition, sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference would not serve as a source of knowledge of 
Consciousness (puruṣa), since there is no object similar to it, thus contradicting the 
statement in SK 6 that knowledge of suprasensuous things (atīndriya) is attained 
through sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference (see §IV.5).  The proponent then offers a 
definition of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa as the inference of one characteristic (dharma) from 
                                                                                                                                          
prabhānurañjitam antarikṣaṃ dṛṣṭvā candrārkayor udayaṃ pratipadyate tadā śeṣavat / āha: etad api 
nāsty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi prabhānurāgo ’ntarikṣe candrārkanimitta eva bhavati / kiṃ tarhi 
/ digdāhādinimitto ’pi / ucyate: yadā tarhi nadīpūraṃ dṛṣṭvā vṛṣṭiṃ pratipadyate tadā śeṣavat / 
āha:etad api nāsty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / nadīpūrasya hi nimittamanekavidhaṃ bhavatīti 
himavilayanasetubhaṅgagajakrīḍādi / tasmād ayuktam etat / ucyate:yadā tarhi parṇaṃ dṛṣṭvā 
śālukaṃ pratipadyate ’ṅkuraṃ vā dṛṣṭvā bījam iti tadā śeṣavat / athavā punar astu pūrv<am> 
evodāharaṇam / yat tūktam (83.9) anekāntād ityatra brūmaḥ: vītāvītasāmarthyāt / vītāvītābhyāṃ 
hetubhūtābhyām abhipretārthasiddhir iti vakṣyāmaḥ / prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛttimukhena 
cāvītaprayogaḥ / tatra yadā prasaṅgināṃ himavilayanādīnāṃ deśakālaliṅgaiḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate 
tadā muktasaṃśayaṃ pratipattir bhavati / deśatas tāvat tadyathā dakṣiṇāpathe nāsti 
himavilayanasambhavaḥ / kālato yathā prāvṛṭkāle / liṅgato ’pi yasmān mudgagavedhuka-
śyāmākakāṣṭhatṛṇamūtraśakṛtprabhṛtīnām anupalambhas tathoṣmakaluṣatvādīnām upalambhaḥ / 
tasmāt pariśeṣato meghyā evāpa iti / tasmān nānekāntaḥ / evaṃ kṛtvā pūrvāṇy apy udāharaṇāny 
upapannāni bhavanti deśādivicārasāmarthyāt / (YD on SK 5, p. 84, l. 2 – p. 85, l. 4). 
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another, based on their invariable association, giving the example of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa 
found in the GBh of the inference of the movement of the heavenly bodies from their 
change in position, as well as additional example of the inference of growth in the 
case of plants and trees from the observation of their height, having already observed 
that the height of a building is caused by growth.  The opponent objects that these 
are merely examples of inference from effect to cause (śeṣavat), thus making śeṣavat 
identical with sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.  The proponent‘s reply to this objection is somewhat 
obscure.  He rejects the opponent‘s criticism on the basis of the presence of a rule 
(niyama) in śeṣavat inference that is absent from sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference, and 
gives as examples of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa the inference of the general quality of being for 
the sake of another from the general quality of being an aggregate, used to prove the 
existence of Consciousness (cf. SK 17a: saṃghātaparārthatvāt), and the inference 
that sound (śabda) is non-eternal from the fact that it is produced.341  HARZER (2006) 
                                                 
341
 sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ nāma yatraikadārthay<o>r avyabhicāram upalabhya deśāntare kālāntare ca 
tajjātīyayor avyabhicāraṃ pratipadyate tadyathā kvacid dhūmāgnisambandhaṃ dṛṣṭvā kvacid 
dhūmāntareṇāgnyantarasyāstitvaṃ pratipadyate / āha: naitad asty udāharaṇam aviśeṣaprasaṅgāt / 
sarvatraiva hy anumāne kvacid arthayor avyabhicāram upalabhyānyatra tajjātīyayor arthayor 
avyabhicāraṃ pratipadyate tadyathā kvacit sādhanavato mṛtpiṇḍād ghaṭaniṣpattim upalabhyānyatra 
sādhanavataḥ piṇḍāntarād ghaṭāntaraniṣpattiṃ pratipadyate / tathaikatra nadīpūrād vṛṣṭim 
upalabhyānyatra nadīpūrād vṛṣṭyantaram avasīyate / tathā ca sati trayāṇām aviśeṣaprasaṅgaḥ / 
ucyate: yadā tarhi sahabhuvām ekasya viśiṣṭaguṇam upalabhya śeṣāṇām api tadvattvam anumīyate 
tadā sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ tadyathā vṛkṣād ekasya phalasya pākam upalabhya śeṣāṇāṃ phalānāṃ 
vṛkṣāntarāṇāṃ ca pāko ’numīyate / āha: etad api nāsty udāharaṇam anekāntāt / na hi sarveṣāṃ 
phalānāṃ tylakālaṃ pāko bhavati pūrvāparakālaniṣpannatvān nimittabhedāc ca / ucyate: yadā tarhi 
samudrād ekam udabinduṃ prāśya śeṣasya lavaṇatānumīyate, sthālyāṃ vaikaṃ pulākam upalabhya 
śeṣāṇāṃ pāko ’numīyate tadā sāmānyatodṛṣṭam / āha: naitad apy asty udāharaṇam akṛtsnasaṅgrahāt 
/ vakṣyaty ayam upariṣṭād ācāryaḥ 
 sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād atīndriyāṇāṃ prasiddhir anumānāt / (SK6ab) 
iti / tatraivaṃ pramāṇe parikalpyamāne kāryakāraṇayos tatsaṅghātānāṃ ca sukhaduḥkhamoha-
svabhāvopalambhāt tanmātrāhaṃkāramahatpradhānānāṃ samadhigamaḥ syāt na puruṣasya 
tajjātīyārthānupalambhāt / ucyate: yadā tarhi kvacid dharmeṇa dharmāntarasyāvyabhicāram 
upalabhyaikadharmopalambhād bhinnajātīye ’tyantānupalabdhasya dharmāntarasya pratipattis tadā 
sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṃ tadyathā devadatte gamanād deśāntaraprāptim upalabhyātyantādṛṣṭaṃ jyotiṣāṃ 
deśāntaraprāpter gamanam anumīyate / tathā prāsādādīnāṃ vṛddhipūrvakaṃ dīrghatvam 
upalabhyauṣaddhivanaspatīnāṃ dīrghatvadarśanād vṛddhir anumīyate / āha: naitad apy asty 
udāharaṇaṃ pūrveṇāviśeṣāt / kāryāt kāraṇasyādhigamaḥ śeṣavad iti pūrvam atisṛṣṭaṃ bhavatā / 
atrāpi ca deśāntaraprāptilakṣaṇāt kāryād gatilakṣaṇasya kāraṇasyādhigamaḥ / tasmāc 
cheṣavatsāmānyatodṛṣṭayor abhedaprasaṅgaḥ / ucyate: na aniyamāt / yatra hi niyamataḥ kāryeṇa 
kāraṇam adhigamyate tac cheṣavad ity ayam asmadabhisandhiḥ / na tu tad asti sāmānyatodṛṣṭe / 
kasmāt / saṅghātatvasāmānyāt pārārthyasāmānyasādhanam api dṛśyate / yathāha— 
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translates niyama as ‗regular causal relation‘342 and takes the proponent‘s point to be 
that sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is not based (like pūrvavat and śeṣavat) upon a causal 
relation, thus making it a key tool in establishing the existence of Consciousness, 
which is not involved in any causal relation.
343
 
Although the YD‘s explanations of the forms of inference are generally 
similar to those of the GBh and MV, the evidence of the YD offers a number of 
insights absent from the other two texts.  The YD offers a most sophisticated 
definition of pūrvavat inference, an additional classification of inference into vīta 
and avīta, and an illustration of the ten members of formal inference (five of which 
are also accepted by the later MV, which otherwise generally follows the GBh).  The 
YD also shows that the sāmānyato dṛṣṭa, vīta and avīta forms of inference are useful 
in establishing the existence of the Sāṃkhya tattvas, particularly of the two primary 
tattvas (prakṛti and puruṣa). 
A noticeable difference in the manner of classification of the forms of 
inference is apparent from the YD to the later TK, which perhaps testifies to a loss of 
knowledge of the intricacies of Sāṃkhya epistemology after the period in which the 
YD was composed. 
The TK also mentions the twofold division of inference into direct (vīta) and 
indirect (avīta) and the threefold division into pūrvavat, śeṣavat, and 
sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, but does not mention the members (avayava) of inference (ten in 
the YD, five in the MV).  Moreover, its interpretation of the relationship between the 
twofold division (into vīta and avīta) and the threefold division (into pūrvavat, 
śeṣavat, and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa) is somewhat different from that attested by the YD.  
                                                                                                                                          
 <vya>bhicārād viśeṣās tu pratītāḥ pratipādakāḥ // (PS.2.19cd; PSV.:Peking.Ce.32a8-32b1, 
113b5-6; Derge.Ce.31a7) 
iti / sādhyasādhanasāmānyayor api dṛśyate / yathānityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād iti / tatraivaṃ sati 
niyamavādinaḥ pratijñāhāniḥ / (YD on SK 5, p. 85, l. 4 – p. 86, l. 23). 
342
 HARZER (2006), p. 46. 
343
 HARZER (2006), p. 115, n. 59. 
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Vācaspati equates avīta with śeṣavat344 and vīta with pūrvavat and 
sāmānyatodṛṣṭa345.  This correlation is absent from the YD, although the use of avīta 
is mentioned in connection with śeṣavat inference in the YD (see above). 
The TK interprets avīta or śeṣavat inference as having ‗that which remains‘ 
as its object
346
 and presents an example of this type of inference in the context of its 
discussion of SK 9, which presents the Sāṃkhya position that an effect pre-exists in 
its cause (satkāryavāda; see §II.1).347  Here, Vācaspati gives a series of proofs for 
the identity of cause and effect, based on the example of threads and the cloth which 
they produce.  Each of these reasons consists in the presentation of a relation 
between two objects different in nature, the inapplicability of which to the case of 
the threads and cloth is then demonstrated.
348
  This is somewhat different from the 
illustration of avīta inference in the YD, where it is used to establish a cause by the 
elimination of all possible alternative causes (see above).  HARZER (2006) suggests 
that the differences between the YD and TK with regard to the interpretation of avīta 
                                                 
344
 tatrāvītaṃ śeṣavat / (TK on SK 5, p. 24, l. 17). 
345
 vītaṃ dvedhā—pūrvavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ca / (TK on SK 5, p. 25, l. 1). 
346
 śiṣyate pariśiṣyate iti śeṣaḥ, sa eva viṣayatayā yasyāsty anumānajñānasya tac cheśavat / (TK on 
SK 5, p. 24, ll. 17-18). 
347
 SK 9: asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt / śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt 
kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam // ‗Because of the non-production of a non-existent thing, because of the 
relation of a cause [to its instruments], because of the absence of origination from everything, because 
of the production of that which it is possible [to produce from a particular cause] by that which is 
capable [of producing that particular effect], and because of the state of being a cause, the effect is 
[pre-]existent [in the cause].‘ 
348
 kāryasya kāraṇābhedasādhanāni—ca pramāṇāni (1) na paṭas tantubhyo bhidyate, 
tantudharmatvāt / iha yat yato bhidyate tat tasya dharmo na bhavati, yathā gaur aśvasya dharmaś ca 
paṭas tantūnāṃ, tasmān nārthāntaram / (2) upādānopādeyabhāvāc ca nārthāntaratvaṃ tantupaṭayoḥ 
/ yayor arthāntaratvam na tayor upādānopādeyabhāvaḥ, yathā ghaṭapaṭayoḥ / upādānopādeya-
bhāvāś ca tantupaṭayoḥ / tasmān nārthāntaratvam / (3) itaś ca nārthāntaratvaṃ tantupaṭayoḥ, 
saṃyogāprāptyabhāvāt / arthāntaratve hi saṃyogo dṛṣṭo yathā kuṇḍabadarayoḥ, aprāptir vā yathā 
himavadvindhayoḥ / na ceha saṃyogāprāpto, tasmān nārthāntaratvam iti / (4) itaś ca paṭas 
tantubhyo na bhidyate, gurutvāntarakāryāgrahaṇāt / iha yat yasmād  bhinnam, tat tasmāt tasya 
gurutvāntaraṃ kāryaṃ gṛhyate, yathaikapalikasya svastikasya gurutvakāryo ’vanativiśeṣas tasmād 
dvipalikasya svastikasya gurutvakāryo ’vanatibhedo ’dhikaḥ / na ca tathā tantugurutvakāryāt 
paṭagurutvakāryāntaraṃ dṛśyate / tasmād abhinnas tantubhyaḥ paṭa iti /tāny etāny abhedasādhanāny 
avītāni / (TK on SK 9, p. 47, ll. 12-24). 
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inference testify to the loss of knowledge of its original function by Vācaspati‘s 
time.
349
 
The TK defines pūrvavat inference as the inference of a universal (sāmānya) 
based on the previous perception of a particular individual (svalakṣaṇa), giving the 
example of the inference of fire (as a universal) on a hill from the perception of 
smoke, based on the the prior perception of a particular fire in a kitchen.  
Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, on the other hand, is defined as the inference of a universal of 
which a specific individual has not been perceived.  As an example of 
sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, Vācaspati gives the inference of the faculties (indriya), the 
particular individuals of which are by their nature beyond perception, based on the 
fact that there must be an instrument by which sense-objects are perceived.
350
  
Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is thus, as in the YD, again presented as a key tool for establishing 
knowledge of certain Sāṃkhya tattvas. 
The TK‘s interpretation of inference, perhaps as a reflection of the text‘s late 
date, thus differs greatly from those of the GBh, MV, and YD, although its 
interpretation of sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is similar to that of the YD and not incompatible 
with that of GBh and MV.  It is this third form of inference which will prove most 
relevant to the discussion of the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge, since it allows 
                                                 
349
 HARZER (2006), pp. 96-97. 
350
 tatraikaṃ dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyaviṣayaṃ yat tat pūrvavat, pūrvaṃ prasiddhaṃ, 
dṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasāmānyam iti yāvat, tad asya viṣayatvenāsty anumānajñānasyeti pūrvavat / yathā 
dhūmād vahnitvasāmānyaviśeṣaḥ parvate ’numīyate, tasya vahnitvasāmānyaviśeṣasyasvalakṣaṇaṃ 
vahniviśeṣo dṛṣṭo rasavatyām / aparaṃ ca vītaṃ sāmānyato dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa-
sāmānyaviṣayam / yathendriyaviṣayam anumānam / atra hi rūpādivijñānānāṃ kriyātvena 
karaṇavattvam anumīyate / yady api karaṇatvasāmānyasya chidrādau vāsyādisvalakṣaṇam 
upalabdham, tathā ’pi yajjātīyaṃ rūpādijñāne karaṇatvam anumīyate tajjātīyasya karaṇasya na 
dṛṣṭaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ prayakṣeṇa / indriyajātīyaṃ hi tat karaṇam, na cendriyatvasāmānyasya 
svalakṣaṇam indriyaviśeṣaḥ pratyakṣagocaro ’rvāgdṛśām, yathā vahnitvasāmānyasya svalakṣaṇaṃ 
vahniḥ / so ’yaṃ pūrvavataḥ sāmānyato dṛṣṭāt saty api vītatvena tulyatve viśeṣaḥ / atra ca dṛṣṭaṃ 
darśanam, sāmānyata iti sāmānyasya, sārvavibhaktikas tasil / adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇasya sāmānya-
viśeṣasya darśanam sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam ityarthaḥ / sarvaṃcaitad asmābhir 
nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkāyāṃ vyutpāditam iti nehoktaṃ vistarabhayāt // (TK on SK 5, p. 25, ll. 1-14). 
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for the ascertainment of objects beyond sensory experience (cf. SK 6 and discussion 
in §IV.5). 
As has been shown above, the YD provides a good deal of information on the 
ways in which inference is used to establish the primary objects of the Sāṃkhya 
enquiry.  In the YD, sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is presented as the key to establishing the 
existence of Consciousness (puruṣa), which is by nature exempt from any causal 
relation.  The inference of Consciousness is also used to illustrate the ten-membered 
formal expression of a direct (vīta) inference.  The commentator makes use of the 
indirect (avīta) inference in establishing the existence of Materiality (prakṛti).  The 
evidence of the YD also shows that the vīta and avīta inferences may be used in 
conjunction.  In addition, the implications of the YD‘s presentation of the ten 
members of formal inference will be used in CHAPTER V to clarify the 
commentator‘s assumptions with regard to the relationship between inference and 
authoritative testimony (āptavacana) in the context of the transmission of Sāṃkhya 
knowledge. 
 
§3. The commentators’ views on the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony 
 (āptavacana). 
 
The third and final pramāṇa accepted by the Sāṃkhya tradition is authoritative 
testimony (āptavacana).  The SK tells us that what is beyond the sphere even of 
sāmānyato dṛṣṭa inference can be apprehended through āptavacana (SK 6; see 
§IV.5).  However, it has generally been assumed that āptavacana holds little value in 
the Sāṃkhya tradition with regard to the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya 
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tattvas,
351
 although LARSON (1979) speculates that āptavacana ‗is probably used 
primarily with respect to the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers‘.352  The general lack of 
attention in Sāṃkhya studies given to the relation of āptavacana to the production of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge is primarily a consequence of the fact that the classical 
Sāṃkhya commentaries have little to say in this respect.  However, some of the 
evidence of the YD suggests links between the notion of āptavacana, the 
transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge, and the use of inference to establish the 
existence of the Sāṃkhya tattvas. 
 In general, the commentators‘ interpretations of āptavacana are similar in 
their essential aspects, although the evidence of the YD provides more information 
regarding the sources of āptavacana and suggests links between this pramāṇa and 
the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and teachers.  A summary of the commentator‘s 
interpretations of āptavacana follows below.  A more detailed discussion of the 
YD‘s treatment of this pramāṇa and its applicability to the ṛṣi Kapila will be 
presented in CHAPTER V.
353
 
 The GBh states that what is not apprehended by perception or inference is 
apprehended by authoritative testimony and mentions three statements as examples 
of authoritative testimony: ‗Indra is the king of the gods‘; ‗there is [the land of] the 
northern Kurus‘; and ‗there are nymphs (apsaras) in heaven‘.  These statements are 
presumably given as examples of the communication of information which cannot be 
confirmed by perception or inference but which must taken on trust in the authority 
of the speaker.  This is typical of statements made by the Vedas and their 
ancillaries—that is, statements which must be taken on trust in the infallibility of 
                                                 
351
 E.g., FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 274: ‗The acceptance of trustworthy communication which 
includes the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the 
system practically unimportant.‘ 
352
 LARSON (1979), p. 159. 
353
 The testimony provided by the TK with regard to Kapila in this context will also be introduced in 
§V.5. 
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Vedic revelation.  Following these statements, Gauḍapāda quotes two verses 
explaining that authoritative testimony is equivalent to doctrine (āgama), and that an 
authority (āpta) is one whose faults have been eradicated and who thus would not 
utter a false statement, who is intent on his own duty, who is free from passion and 
hatred, and who is always respected by other people of this kind.
354
  In other words, 
the authoritative status of a statement depends on the credentials of the speaker. 
SK 5d defines āptavacana as āptaśruti.  GBh reads the latter compound as a 
dvandva, meaning authorities (āpta) and revelation (śruti).  Gauḍapāda defines 
authorities as teachers (ācārya), including Brahmā and others, and revelation simply 
as the Veda.
355
 
The MV mentions Brahmā and Sanatkumāra as examples of authoritative 
individuals who are free from passion and hatred, and gives the following statements 
as examples of authoritative testimony: ‗there are nymphs in heaven‘; ‗there is a 
divine grove, where are particular sounds, etc.‘; and ‗there is an occupant in the 
celestial chariot (vimāna)‘.356  Again, these are examples of statements which cannot 
be confirmed through perception or inference by an ordinary human being. 
 Māṭhara gives the same interpretation of āptaśruti as the GBh and then adds 
that an authority (āpta) is one who has directly ascertained objects in accordance 
with reality, thus has ‗the qualities [of things] placed [directly] before the eyes‘ 
                                                 
354
 pratyakṣeṇānumānena vā yo ’rtho na gṛhyate sa āptavacanād grāhyaḥ / yathā—indro devarājaḥ, 
uttarāḥ kuravaḥ svarga ’psarasa ityādi / pratyakṣānumānāgrāhyaṃ athāptavacanād gṛhyate / api 
coktam— 
 āgamo hy āptavacanaṃ, āptaṃ doṣakṣayād viduḥ / 
 kṣīṇadoṣo ’nṛtaṃ vākyaṃ na brūyād dhetvasambhavāt // 
 svakarmaṇy abhiyukto yaḥ saṅgadveṣa vivarjitaḥ / 
 pūjitas tadvidhair nityaṃ āpto jñeyaḥ sa tādṛśaḥ // (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 25-31). 
355
 āptaśrutir āptavacanaṃ ca / āptā ācāryā brahmādayaḥ / śrutir vedaḥ / āptāś ca śrutiś ca 
āptaśrutiḥ, tad uktam āptavacanam iti // (GBh on SK 5, p. 52, ll. 7-8). 
356
 yathā svarge’psarasaḥ santi, nandanaṃ vanaṃ, tatra viśeṣāḥ śabdādayo viṣayā, vimāne ’dhivāsa 
iti / āptā rāgadveṣādirahitā brahmasanatkumārādayaḥ, śrutir vedaḥ, tābhyāṃ upadiṣṭaṃ tatheti 
śraddheyam āptavacanam / (MV on SK 4, p. 11, ll. 2-5). 
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(sākṣātkṛtadharman357, a term also occurring in the YD; see §IV.9, V.1-2), and 
grasps the meaning of revelation in accordance with reality.  Here, Māṭhara quotes 
the two verses found in the GBh‘s commentary on SK 4, explaining that 
authoritative testimony (āptavacana) is equivalent to doctrine (āgama) and defining 
an authoritative person (āpta).358 
 The TK interprets the term āptaśruti differently.  Vācaspati interprets the 
term śruti in this context as the knowledge of the meaning of a statement, produced 
by that statement.  He thus defines āptaśruti as ‗valid knowledge of the meaning of a 
statement‘.359 
Vācaspati states that authoritative testimony is preceded by the inference of 
the connection between a statement and its meaning and suggests that this is why 
authoritative testimony is defined after inference in the SK.
360
  But he also clarifies 
that authoritative testimony is distinct from inference, since a statement cannot be 
considered a characteristic mark (liṅga) of the object it expresses.  He also states that 
there need not be any previously perceived connection between a statement and its 
meaning, giving as an example the work of a new poet who formulates statements 
not seen before.
361
 
                                                 
357
 On the interpretation of this term, see the review of AKLUJKAR (2009) in CHAPTER III. 
358
 āptaśrutir āptavacanaṃ tu / tṛtīyaṃ pramāṇam / āptā brahmādaya ācāryāḥ, śrutir vedas tad etad 
ubhayam āptavacanam / āptiḥ sākṣādarthaprāptir yathārthopalambhaḥ tayā vartata ity āptaḥ 
sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathārthāptyā śrutārthagrāhī tad uktam āptacanam / tatrāpi prasiddhilakṣaṇā 
guṇayogāt tisraḥ śabdavṛttayaḥ / tatra lākṣaṇātraividhyam / jahallakṣaṇā ’jahallakṣaṇā 
jahadajahallakṣaṇā cetyādi pramāṇaśāstreṣu bahutaraḥ prapañca āste / tatra prakrāntam eva tāvad 
abhidhīyate bhagavataḥ kapilasya matam / 
 āgamo hy āptavacanam āptam doṣakṣayād viduḥ / 
 kṣīṇadoṣo ’nṛtaṃ vākyaṃ na brūyād dhetvasambhavāt // 
 svakarmaṇy abhiyukto yo rāgadveṣavivarjitaḥ / 
 pūjitas tadvidhair nityam āpto jñeyaḥ sa tādṛśaḥ // (MV on SK 5, p. 13, ll. 11-22). 
359
 āptā prāptā yukteti yāvat / āptā cāsau śrutiś ceti āptaśrutiḥ śrutiḥ vākyajanitaṃ vākyārthajñānam / 
(TK on SK 5, p. 26, ll. 26-27). 
360
 prayojakavṛhaśabdaśravaṇasamanantaraṃ prayojavṛddhapravṛttihetujñānānumānapūrvakatvāc 
chabdārthasambandhagrahaṇasya, svārthasambandhajñānasahakāriṇaś ca śabdasyārthapratyāyaka-
tvād anumānapūrvakatvam ity anumānānantaraṃ śabda lakṣayati—āptaśrutir āptavacanaṃ tu iti / 
(TK on SK 5, p. 26, ll. 22-25). 
361
 tu śabdenānumānād vyavacchinati / vākyārtho hi prameyo, na tu taddharmo vākyam, yena tatra 
liṅgaṃ bhavet / na ca vākyaṃ vākyaṃ vākyārthaṃ bodhayat sambandhagrahaṇam apekṣate, 
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The TK also states that authoritative testimony is valid because it is grounded 
in the Veda, which is not composed by humans and free from deficiencies and 
doubts, and that not only the Veda itself but also the traditional texts (smṛti), epics 
(itihāsa), and mythological texts (purāṇa) are considered authoritative because they 
are grounded in the Veda.
362
  This twofold classification of authoritative testimony, 
traditionally formulated as a distinction between śruti and smṛti, may be compared to 
the classification in the GBh and MV into authorities (āpta) and revelation (śruti).  
Thus, Vācaspati‘s interpretation of the sources of āptavacana does not essentially 
conflict with that of the previous two commentators. 
The YD interprets the term āptaśruti as an ekaśeṣa (‗single remainder‘), an 
interpretative technique also used in the YD‘s interpretation of the term 
prativiṣayādhyavasāya in the context of its definition of the pramāṇa of perception 
(see §IV.1).  According to this interpretation, the term āptaśruti refers both to the 
Veda (śruti), which is by nature authoritative (āpta), and to the statements (śruti) of 
reliable people (āpta), which include traditional texts (smṛti), the limbs of the Veda 
(vedāṅga)363, texts treating logic (tarka), the epics (itihāsa), and the mythological 
texts (purāṇa), as well as the statements of learned, good men who are engaged in 
various arts (śilpa).  The commentator also specifies that an authoritative statement 
is made by one who is free from passion, etc.
364
 
                                                                                                                                          
abhinavakaviracitasya vākyasyādṛṣṭap[ū]rvasyānanubhūtacaravākyārthabodhakatvād iti / (TK on 
SK 5, p. 28, ll. 17-20). 
362
 tac ca svataḥ pramāṇam / apauruṣeyavedavākyajanitatvena sakaladoṣāśaṅkāvinirmukte[na] 
yuktaṃ bhavati / evaṃ vedamūlasmṛtītihāsapurāṇavākyajanitam api jñānaṃ yuktaṃ bhavati / (TK on 
SK 5, p. 27, ll. 10-12). 
363
 The limbs or auxiliaries of the Veda (vedāṅga) are traditionally six: pronunciation (śikṣā), metre 
(chandas), grammar (vyākaraṇa), etymology (nirukta), astrology (jyotiṣa), and ritual (kalpa). 
364
 āptā nāma rāgādiviyuktasyāgṛhyamāṇakāraṇā parārthā vyāhṛtiḥ / śravaṇaṃ śrutiḥ / āptā cāsau 
śrutiś ca āptaśrutiḥ / athavāptāsyāstīty āptaḥ / akāro matvarthīyaḥ (cf. Pāṇ. 5.2.127) / tadyathā tundo 
ghaṭa iti / āptebhyaḥ śrutir āptaśrutiḥ / āptaśrutiś cāptaśrutiś cāptaśrutiḥ / sarūpāṇām ity ekaśeṣaḥ 
(cf. Pāṇ. 1.2.64) / tatra pūrveṇāptaśrutigrahaṇenedaṃ pratipādayati / apuruṣabuddhipūrvaka 
āmnāyaḥ svatantraḥ puruṣaniḥśreyasārthaṃ pravartamāno niḥsaṃśayaṃ pramāṇam iti / dvitīyena 
manvādinibandhanānāṃ ca smṛtīnāṃ vedāṅgatarketihāsapurāṇānāṃ śiṣṭānāṃ nānāśilpābhi-
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Interestingly, given the SK‘s rejection of the Veda as a means to liberation 
(see §II.3), the author of the YD describes the Veda in this context as ‗functioning 
for the sake of the ultimate bliss of human beings‘ (puruṣaniḥśreyasārthaṃ 
pravartamānaḥ).  This could be taken as an instance of mere lip-service to the Veda, 
such as is apparent elsewhere in Sāṃkhya texts.  However, as will be discussed 
further in §V.1, in another context (under SK 2) the YD goes to great lengths to 
show that the Veda does not contradict Sāṃkhya doctrine but in fact supports it.365  
The YD thus promotes a continuity of authority between the Veda and Sāṃkhya 
śāstra. 
Later in the text, in the context of its commentary on SK 6cd, the YD 
specifies that the condition of authority (āptatva) is applicable to people described as 
īśvaramaharṣi366,  ‗who are free from faults such as passion, who are of undoubted 
intelligence, and who have seen suprasensuous objects, or to anyone else (i.e. besides 
an īśvaramaharṣi) who has these characteristics‘.  Further, the statements of a person 
in his own field of learning are considered necessarily valid.  The maintenance of 
each body of teaching (śāstra) is given as the reason for this latter provision.367  One 
would assume that Sāṃkhya śāstra would be included in this provision.  The YD-
kāra thus appears to make room for the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine in his 
definition of the function of āptavacana. 
The YD‘s classification of the sources of authoritative testimony thus 
basically accords with those given in the GBh, MV, and TK, although in the latter 
                                                                                                                                          
yuktānāṃ cāduṣṭamanasāṃ yad vacas tat pramāṇam ity etat siddhaṃ bhavati / (YD on SK 5d, p. 87, 
ll. 4-12). 
365
 See MOTEGI (2006), pp. 47-52, for an analysis of this discussion in the YD. 
366
 See CHAPTER III for BRONKHORST (1983)‘s contribution to the discussion of this problematic term, 
and further discussion in §V.3. 
367
 vyapagatarāgādidoṣāṇām asandigdhamatīnām atīndriyārthadṛśvanām īśvaramaharṣīṇām 
āptatvam ācakṣmahe na sarveṣām / yadi vānyo ’py evaṃdharmo ’sti bhavatu pramāṇam / kiṃ cānyat 
/ svaviṣaye ca tatprāmāṇyasyādoṣavattvāt / yasya khalv api[ ]yo viṣayas tasya tasmin viṣaye vaco 
’ntareṇāpi sādhanaṃ pramāṇam ity avaśyam abhyupagantavyam / itarathā pratiśāstram 
ācārasthitiniyamānām adṛṣṭārthānām apratipattiḥ syāt / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 4-10). 
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three texts the provision for the maintenance of śāstra is not explicitly given.  As 
will be discussed further in §V.2, this provision by the YD appears to reflect the 
text‘s broader interpretation of the nature of the transmission of doctrine from 
generation to generation. 
The YD mentions that the objects of authoritative testimony are ‗completely 
beyond perception‘ (atyantaparokṣa).368  However, later the commentator states that 
the objects of authoritative testimony include both those objects the knowledge of 
which is obstructed for some reason and those objects completely beyond perception 
(atyantaparokṣa) and devoid of any common characteristic (by which they might be 
inferred).  As examples of the latter category, he lists heaven (svarga), liberation 
(apavarga), and the gods (deva).
369
 
The fact that the YD leaves room for the attainment through authoritative 
testimony of knowledge of things normally capable of being perceived or inferred 
(this inference being hindered in some way), not just of knowledge of things 
completely beyond the sphere of perception and inference, will become crucial to the 
discussion of the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine in §V.2, where it will be shown 
that inference and authoritative testimony tend to overlap with regard to their 
application in the transmission of doctrine. 
However, like the TK, the YD makes a point of distiguishing authoritative 
testimony from inference.  The YD gives as a reason for this the fact that not all 
statements but only those which are authoritative can be considered valid means of 
                                                 
368
 āptavacanaṃ tu pramāṇabhūtadvārako ’tyantaparokṣe ’rthe niścaya ity uddeśamātram idam / 
(YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 14-15). 
369
 etad uktaṃ bhavati: tasmād api sāmānyatodṛṣṭād anumānād yan na siddhyati pratyakṣagrāhyam 
api svayam adṛṣṭaṃ kāraṇāntarapratibaddhaviṣayabhāvam atyantaparokṣaṃ vā svargāpavarga-
devatādi dharmasāmānyarahitaṃ td āptāgamāt sādhyam / (YD on SK6cd, p. 99, ll. 10-13). 
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knowledge.
370
  The commentator later gives a lengthy argument in defense of this 
distinction.
371
 
It is clear from all of the commentaries that the texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition 
(assuming that they are composed by authoritative individuals) can be classed among 
the sources of authoritative testimony, although this fact is generally implicit.  
Although the YD and TK both emphasize the distinction between inference and 
authoritative testimony, the YD makes clear that formal inference is an essential tool 
in the explanation of a śāstra (see §IV.2), the maintenance of which is provided for 
in the YD‘s definition of authoritative individuals.  Thus, we can say that for an 
authority such as a Sāṃkhya commentator, formal inference serves as a tool by 
which to transmit Sāṃkhya doctrine through the medium of authoritative testimony, 
by demonstrating the inferential process by which Sāṃkhya principles are 
established.  In this and other respects (see §V.1-2), the evidence of the YD suggests 
that āptavacana can be seen to hold more value in Sāṃkhya than generally assumed. 
 
§4. The inclusion of other means of knowledge under the headings of 
 perception, inference, and authoritative testimony. 
 
Although the Sāṃkhya tradition accepts only three pramāṇas, various other 
pramāṇas are accepted by other schools.  As mentioned in §II.4, the SK states that 
all other pramāṇas are included within the three accepted in Sāṃkhya.  The manner 
in which the commentators attempt to illustrate the inclusion of other pramāṇas in 
                                                 
370
 tuśabdo ’vadhāraṇārthaḥ / āptaśrutir eva āptavacanaṃ na śabdamātram / evaṃ sati yad uktaṃ 
tantrāntarīyaiḥ śiṃśapādiśabdānāṃ nirvikalpam anumāne ’ntarbhāvas trilakṣaṇatvāt iti tad 
ayatnataḥ pratikṣiptaṃ bhavatīti vyākhyātāni pramāṇāni / (YD on SK 5d, p. 87, ll. 12-16). 
371
 YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 10 – p. 105, l. 9.  NAKADA (1992, p. 485) suggests that this argument is a 
response to the view of the Buddhist logician Dignāga, who denies the validity of āptavacana as a 
separate pramāṇa. 
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perception, inference and authoritative testimony, provides some insight into the 
respective spheres and limits of these pramāṇas. 
 SK 4b
372
 suggests that all valid means of knowledge can be subsumed under 
the categories of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.  Commenting on 
this portion of the verse, the GBh, MV, TK, and YD illustrate the ways in which the 
various pramāṇas accepted by other schools can be considered to fall into one of 
these three categories. 
 GBh mentions presumption (arthāpatti), equivalence (sambhava), negation 
(abhāva), conceptualisation (pratibhā)373, folklore (aitihya), and comparison 
(upamāna), and says that these are held by Jaimini (the author of the 
Mīmāṃsāsūtra).374  However, these do not entirely correspond to the usual 
Mīmāṃsā list of six valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa): presumption (arthāpatti), 
inference (anumāna), negation (abhāva), perception (pratyakṣa), doctrine (āgama), 
and comparison (upamāna).  The reasons for this discrepancy are unclear, but the 
pramāṇas dealt with in the YD, MV, and TK correspond, with slight variations, to 
Gauḍapāda‘s list (see below). 
Gauḍapāda explains that presumption is included in inference, while 
equivalence, negation, conceptualisation, folklore, and comparison are all included 
                                                 
372
 sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt (SK 4b). 
373
 I have chosen to translate pratibhā as ‗conceptualisation‘—in the sense of any mental formation of 
an object of knowledge independent of the operation of the sense-faculties—because this term seems 
to best cover the range of meanings (‗memory‘, ‗intuition‘, and ‗imagination‘) ascribed to the term in 
the YD (see below, n. 390), while the other commentators do not offer interpretations of the term.  
The second interpretation offered by the YD, ‗intuition‘, corresponds to the meaning of the term in the 
Grammarian (vyākaraṇa) tradition. 
374
 ṣaṭ pramāṇāni jaiminiḥ / atha kāni tāni pramāṇāni / arthāpattiḥ, sambhavaḥ, abhāvaḥ, pratibhā, 
aitihyaṃ, upamānaṃ ceti ṣaṭ pramāṇāni / (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, ll. 1-3). 
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in authoritative testimony.
375
  MV‘s list is the same as GBh‘s, but Māṭhara includes 
all six under the category of inference.
376
 
The TK mentions five of the six pramāṇas listed in the GBh and MV, but 
deals with them in a different order and under SK 5 rather than SK 4.  He first 
explains that comparison (upamāna) functions by means of a combination of 
perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.
377
  He then argues that 
presumption (arthāpatti) should be included in inference,378 negation (abhāva) in 
perception,
379
 equivalence (sambhava) in inference,
380
 and folklore (aitihya) in 
authoritative testimony.
381
 
The variety in the commentators‘ classifications of these pramāṇas suggests 
that there was no set tradition of interpretation in this regard, and that they were all 
unsure as to how to deal with the problem.  Very little justification is provided for 
                                                 
375
 etāni ṣaṭ pramāṇāni triṣu dṛṣṭādiṣv antarbhūtāni / tatrānumāne tāvad arthāpattir antarbhūtā / 
sambhavābhāvapratibhaitihyopamāś cāptavacane / (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, ll. 14-15). 
376
 nanv arthāpattiḥ sambhavo ’bhāvaḥ pratibhā aitihyam upamānaṃ cetiprabhṛtīni santi bahūni 
pramāṇāntarāṇi katham atra trividhaṃ pramāṇam iti saṅgatiḥ / atrocyate—sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt 
/ sarvāṇi hi pramāṇāni pramāṇatraye ’viruddhāni / tatra pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkta ity ukte 
rātrau bhuṅkta ity arthaḥ / sā ’rthāpattir anumānam eva / prastha ity ukte catvāraḥ kuḍavā iti bodhaḥ 
sambhavaḥ / so ’py anumānam eva / abhāvaś ca prāgitaretarapradhvaṃsātyantābhāvabhedāc 
caturddhā / yathā vrīhiśeṣaṇadarśanān na vṛṣṭo deva iti vṛṣṭer abhāvaṃ sādhayati / so ’py 
anumānabhedaḥ / pratibhā yathā— 
 dakṣiṇena tu vindhyasya sahyasya tu yad uttaram / 
 pṛthivyām ā samudrāyāṃ sa pradeśo manoramaḥ // 
ity ukte tatra śobhanā guṇāḥ santīti pratibhotpadyate / pratibhā jānatāṃ jñānam / sā’py anumānavam 
eva / aitihyaṃ yathā—asmin vaṭe yakṣiṇī prativasati iti janā vadanti ity ukte, sā vighnaṃ karoti, 
dhanādi yacchatīti jñānaṃ, tad apy anumānam eva / upamānam—yathā gaus tathā gavaya ity apy 
anumānam eva / (MV on SK 4, p. 11, ll. 6-21). 
377
 tathā hi—upamānaṃ tāvad yathā gaus tathā gavaya iti vākyam / tajjanitā dhīrāgama eva / yo ’py 
ayaṃ gavayaśabdo gosadṛśasya vācaka iti pratyayaḥ, so ’py anumānam eva / yo hi śabdo yatra 
vṛddhaiḥ prayujyate, so ’sati vṛttyantare, tasya cācakaḥ, yathā gośabdo gotvasya / prayujyate caivaṃ 
gavayaśabdo gosadṛśe, iti tasyaiva vācaka, iti tat jñānam anumānam eva / yat tu gavayasya 
cakṣuḥsannikṛṣṭasya gosādṛśyajñānaṃ tat pratyakṣam eva / ata eva smaryamāṇāyāṃ gavi, 
gavayasādṛśyajñānaṃ pratyakṣam / na tv anyad gavi sādṛśyam anyac ca gavaye / bhūyo 
’vayavasāmānyayogo hi jātyantaravartī jātyantare sādṛśyam ucyate / sāmānyayogaś caikaḥ / sa ced 
gavaye pratyakṣo, gavy api tathait nopamānasya prameyāntaram asti, yatra pramāṇāntaram 
upamānaṃ bhavet, iti na pramāṇāntaram upamānam // (TK on SK 5, p. 30, ll. 1-10). 
378
 tasmān nānumānāt pramāṇāntaram arthāpattir iti siddham (TK on SK 5, p. 32, l. 4). 
379
 evam abhāvo ’pi pratyakṣam eva / (TK on SK 5, p. 33, l. 30). 
380
 sambhavas tu, yathā—khāryāṃ droṇāḍhakaprasthādyavagamaḥ / sa cānumānam eva / (TK on SK 
5, l. 7). 
381
 yac cānirdiṣṭapravaktṛkaṃ pravādapāramparyamātram iti hocur vṛddhāḥ, ity aitihyam, yathā iha 
vaṭe yakṣaḥ prativasati iti, na tat pramāṇāntaram anirdiṣṭapravaktṛkatvena sāṃśayikatvāt / 
āptavaktṛkatvaniścaye tvāgama eva / (TK on SK 5, p. 34, ll. 20-23). 
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these classifications in the commentaries discussed above, but the YD presents a 
more involved discussion, in the course of which some relevant points are raised 
with regard to the spheres of perception and inference. 
The YD deals with seven separate pramāṇas held by other schools, adding 
gesture (ceṣṭa) to the list in the GBh and MV.  The commentator begins this 
discussion by responding to an opponent who quotes NS 1.1.3, which asserts 
perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony 
(śabda) as the four accepted means of knowledge according to Nyāya,382 and then 
quotes an unidentified verse giving six means of knowledge, corresponding to the six 
accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), 
testimony (śabda), comparison (upamāna), presumption (arthāpatti), and negation 
(abhāva).383  The opponent also mentions that according to others, there are nine 
pramāṇas, with the addition of equivalence (sambhava), report (aitihya)384, and 
gesture (ceṣṭa).385  The proponent responds by arguing that  comparison (upamāna) 
and report (aitihya) should be included in authoritative testimony
386
 and that 
presumption (arthāpatti), equivalence (sambhava), negation (abhāva), and gesture 
(ceṣṭa) should be included in inference.387 
                                                 
382
 pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni / (NS 1.1.3, quoted in YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 18-
19). 
383
 pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca śabda<ś> copamayā saha / arthāpattir abhāvaś ca hetavaḥ 
sādhyasādhakāḥ // (YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 20-21). 
384
 Based on the example given in the YD (iti ha uvāca yājñavalkyaḥ (Bṛh. U. 2.4.13) (YD on SK 4ab, 
p. 71, l. 4)), the translation ‗report‘ for aitihya seems more appropriate, in contrast to its use (as 
‗folklore‘) in the example offered by GBh, MV, and TK: bravīti loko yathātra vaṭe yakṣiṇī 
pravasatīty (GBh on SK 4, p. 48, l. 13); asmin vaṭe yakṣiṇī prativasati iti janā vadanti ity ukte, sā 
vighnaṃ karoti, dhanādi yacchatīti jñānam (MV on SK 4, p. 11, ll. 18-20); iha vaṭe yakṣaḥ 
prativasati (TK on SK 5, p. 34, l. 21). 
385
 etāni sambhavaitihyaceṣṭāsahitāni navety apare / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 70, ll. 22). 
386
 tasmāt suṣṭhūktam (71.1) upamaitihyāvacanam āptopadeśāt siddher iti / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 72, ll. 
20-21). 
387
 arthāpattisaṃbhavābhāvaceṣṭānām anumānasiddeḥ / avacanam ity anuvartate / (YD on SK 4ab, 
p. 72, l. 22 – p. 73, l. 1; and see ff.). 
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The YD‘s treatment of ‗conceptualisation‘ (pratibhā)388 as a potential 
pramāṇa deserves some attention, since it will become relevant to the discussion of 
the nature of Kapila‘s knowledge in CHAPTER V.  The opponent objects that 
pratibhā, interpreted firstly as memory, should be considered a separate pramāṇa.  
The proponent argues that the knowledge of which memory consists is gained 
originally through perception, inference, or authoritative testimony.  The opponent 
then suggests that the innate knowledge of seers (ārṣaḥ sāṃsiddhikaḥ pratyayaḥ) 
should be considered pratibhā.389  The proponent responds by arguing that Kapila‘s 
knowledge was already established (at his birth; cf. the discussion of innate 
knowledge (sāṃsiddhika jñāna) in §IV.8), so that Kapila had no need to acquire it 
through a pramāṇa.  No reference to other ṛṣis (besides Kapila) is made here, but the 
opponent does then suggest that pratibhā be applied to the knowledge of yogins, to 
which the proponent replies that the knowledge of yogins is included in perception 
(see §IV.1).  Finally, the opponent suggests that pratibhā refers to ‗worldly‘ 
(laukika) knowledge, interpreted as pure imagination.  The proponent dismisses this 
type of knowledge as invalid.
390
  The YD thus dismisses pratibhā as a potential 
                                                 
388
 See n. 373 above on the translation of the term pratibhā. 
389
 This interpretation of the term pratibhā corresponds to its use in the Grammarian tradition as 
‗intuition‘. 
390
 āha: pratibhā tarhi pramāṇāntaraṃ bhaviṣyati / ucyate: keyaṃ pratibhā nāma / āha: yo ’yam 
anādau saṃsāre devamanuṣyatiraścām abhinne ’rthe bāhye stryādau pratyaye pūrvābhyāsa-
vāsanāpekṣaḥ kuṇapakāminībhakṣyādyākārabhedabhinnapratyaya itikartavyatāṅgam utpadyate sā hi 
pratibhā / tathā coktam— 
 yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate / 
svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā // (PS. 5.47; PSV.:Peking.Ce. 82b6, 168b3; 
 Derge.Ce. 7a5) 
yena hi yo ’rtho ’bhyastaḥ sukhāditvena tasya vināpi tenārthena śabdamātrāt pratipattir utpadyate / 
tadyathā vyāghro ’tra prativasatīty ukte vināpi bāhyenārthenābhyāsavaśād eva svedavepathu-
prabhṛtayo bhavanti / tasmāt pratibhaiva devamanuṣyatiraścām itikartavyatāṅgatvāt pramāṇam iti / 
āha ca— 
 pramāṇatvena tāṃ lokaḥ sarvaḥ samanugacchati / 
 vyavahārāḥ pravartante tiraścām api tadvaśāt // (cf. VP. II.147) 
ucyate: pratibhāyā dṛṣṭāddivyatirekeṇa rūpāntarānupapatteḥ / avacanam ity anuvartate / yadi pūrvā-
bhyāsavāsanāpekṣaḥ pratyayaḥ pratibhety upagamyate tena tarhy asau pratyakṣam anumānam 
āptavacanaṃ <v>ety etad āpannam / kasmāt / yato na hi dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa pratyayarūpaṃ kadācid 
apy upalabhāmahe / tasmān na tebhyo ’rthāntaraṃ pratibhā / ārṣapratyayasambhavād ayuktam iti 
cet / syād etat / asty ārṣo hi dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa sarvapadārtheṣu sāṃsiddhikaḥ pratyayaḥ sa prātibho 
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means of knowledge, and instead positions the supernormal knowledge of yogins 
within the framework of the pramāṇas and the knowledge of Kapila outside of this 
framework.  As has already been discussed (§IV.1), the YD suggests that yogins may 
gain the ability to directly perceive the subtle elements (tanmātra) as a result of 
progressive yogic practice.  This form of knowledge is here contrasted with the 
innate ārṣa knowledge of Kapila, who is exempt from such progressive practice as 
well as from the need to attain knowledge through any pramāṇa. 
A contrast can be drawn between this passage in the YD and a statement by 
Vācaspati in the TK regarding ārṣa knowledge (the knowledge of ṛṣis).  Vācaspati 
states that the three means of knowledge posited by the SK (perception, inference, 
and authoritative testimony) are only those which apply to ordinary people, since a 
philosophical treatise (śāstra) is for their benefit, while the ārṣa discrimination 
(vijñāna) of yogins and gods is not mentioned, since it does not apply to ordinary 
people.
391
  In contrast to the YD, Vācaspati thus does not distinguish between the 
knowledge of ṛṣis and the knowledge of yogins, nor does he attempt to reconcile 
their knowledge with the three pramāṇas.  The fact that the YD does address these 
issues appears to reflect a more elaborate conception of the nature of ārṣa knowledge 
                                                                                                                                          
bhaviṣyatīti / etac cāpy ayuktam / kasmāt / uktatvāt / uktam (68.12) etat siddharūpaṃ bhagavataḥ 
paramarṣer jñānam / ato na pramāṇāpekṣam iti / yoginām iti cen na anabhyupagamāt / na hi 
yoginām apramāṇapūrvakaṃ jñānam iti yathā tathā vakṣyāmaḥ / sa laukika iti cen na aniścitatvāt / 
syād etat asti laukikaḥ pratyayo dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa / tadyathā santamase vrajato drāg iti vijñānam 
utpadyate ’sti me pratīghāti dravyaṃ purastād ūrdhvam avasthitam iti / tac ca naivam / kasmāt / 
aniścitatvāt / na hi tatra niścaya utpadyate idaṃ tad dravyam asti purato vā vyaktam astīti / na 
cāniścitaṃ pramāṇajñānam iṣyate / kiṃ cānyat / anavasthāprasaṅgāt / yadi caivaṃjātīyako ’pi 
pratyayaḥ pramāṇam abhyupagamyate tenānavasthā prāpnoti / kiṃ kāraṇam / anavasthānād dhi 
vikārasya <kāmakrodhalobhabhayaviṣādādidvārako> vikalpaḥ saṃyaṅ mithyā vā yasmād aneka 
utpadyate tasmān na laukikaḥ pratyayaḥ pratibhā / yat tu khalv idam ucyate (75.8) 
arthābhyāsavāsanāpekṣāsatsv api vyāghrādiṣu pratipattir utpadyata iti / satyam etat / sā tu 
mithyājñānatvāt pramāṇatvena na parigṛhyata ity ayam adoṣaḥ / tasmāt siddhaṃ dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa 
rūpāntarānupapatteḥ pratibhāyāḥ pṛthaganabhidhānam / (YD on SK 4ab, p. 74, l. 22 – p. 76, l. 12). 
391
 etac ca laukikapramāṇābhipreyam, lokavyutpādanārthatvāc chāstrasya, tasyaivātrādhikārāt / 
ārṣaṃ tu vijñānaṃ yoginām ūrdhvasrotasāṃ na lokavyutpādanāyālam iti sad api nābhihitam, 
anadhikārāt // (TK on SK 4, p. 17, ll. 22-24). 
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and its role in the formulation and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine, as will be 
discussed in CHAPTER V. 
 
§5. The means of knowledge (pramāṇa) as productive of the discrimination 
 (vijñāna) leading to liberation (mokṣa). 
 
With regard to the epistemology of Sāṃkhya, the main concern of this study is the 
production of knowledge specifically leading to liberation (mokṣa) and the process 
by which such knowledge is transmitted through text and doctrine.  Therefore, of 
paramount concern in the present context are the views of the commentators with 
regard to which means of knowledge (pramāṇa) lead to the stated goal of Sāṃkhya, 
i.e. discrimination (vijñāna) betweeen the manifest (vyakta), the unmanifest 
(avyakta), and the knower (jña; i.e. puruṣa) (SK 2; see §II.3). 
 This is a complex issue, on which none of the commentators entirely agree, 
and there are even apparent discrepancies within some of the commentaries 
themselves.  MISHRA (1961) suggests that none of the commentators grasped the 
original intent of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, which was to correlate the three pramāṇas (perception, 
inference and authoritative testimony) with the three objects of the Sāṃkhya inquiry: 
manifest, unmanifest and knower.
392
  Whatever the merits of MISHRA’s hypothesis, 
which would be difficult to determine with certainty, the evidence of the 
commentaries provides us with a much more complex picture of the relation of the 
pramāṇas to the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge.  This issue, particularly in the 
YD, is also connected with the Sāṃkhya paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and 
the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), to be treated in the second half of this 
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 MISHRA (1961), pp. 411-413. 
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chapter.  The passages examined in the present section will be confined to those 
which offer explicit connections between the respective spheres of the pramāṇas and 
the attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas. 
 The GBh introduces SK 4 as an explanation of the means of knowledge of 
the manifest, unmanifest, and knower,
393
 and clarifies that some of the tattvas are 
established through perception, some through inference, and some through 
authoritative testimony.
394
  Strangely, though, in this context Gauḍapāda does not 
specify which principles are established through which means of knowledge. 
However, in his commentary on SK 6, which states that suprasensuous 
objects are established through sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference and those not established 
even through this are established through authoritative doctrine,
395
 Gauḍapāda 
explains that primordial Materiality (pradhāna) and Consciousness (puruṣa) are 
established through sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference, while the manifest (vyakta)—
presumably including the manifest principles of intellect (buddhi), ego (ahaṃkāra), 
the five subtle elements (tanmātra), the eleven faculties (indriya), and the five gross 
elements (mahābhūta)—is established through perception.  As examples of the 
objects to be established through authoritative testimony, he gives the stock 
examples: ‘Indra is the king of the gods’, ‘there is [the land of] the northern Kurus’, 
and ‘there are nymphs (apsaras) in heaven’.396  This interpretation seems to conflict 
                                                 
393
 evam eṣāṃ vyaktāvyaktajñānāṃ trayāṇāṃ padārthānāṃ kaiḥ kiyadbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ, kena kasya vā 
pramāṇena siddhir bhavati / (GBh on SK 4, p. 47, ll. 15-16). 
394
 prameyaṃ—pradhānaṃ, buddhiḥ, ahaṅkāraḥ, pañca tanmātrāṇi, ekādaśendriyāṇi, pañca 
mahābhūtāni, puruṣa iti / etāni paṅcaviṃśatis tattvāni vyaktāvyaktajñā ity ucyante / tatra kiñcit 
pratyakṣeṇa sādhyaṃ, kiñcid anumānena, kiñcid āgameneti trividhaṃ pramāṇam uktam // (GBh on 
SK 4, p. 48, ll. 18-21). 
395
 sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād atīndriyāṇāṃ prasiddhir anumānāt/ tasmād api cāsiddhaṃ parokṣam 
āptāgamāt siddham // (SK 6); see MISHRA (1961) for an alternative interpretation of the original 
meaning of this verse. 
396
 pradhānapuruṣāv atīndriyau sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumānena sādhyete yasmān mahadādi liṅgaṃ 
triguṇam / yasyedaṃ triguṇaṃ kāryaṃ tat pradhānam iti / yataś cācetanaṃ cetanam ivābhāti, ato 
’nyo ’dhiṣṭhātā puruṣa iti / vyaktaṃ pratyakṣasādhyam / tasmād api cāsiddhaṃ parokṣam āptāgamāt 
siddham / yathā indro devarājaḥ, uttarāḥ kuravaḥ, svarge ’psarasa iti parokṣam āptavacanāt 
siddham // (GBh on SK 6, ll. 7-11). 
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with his statement under SK 4 that some of the tattvas are to be established through 
authoritative testimony,
397
 as well as with the general Sāṃkhya view that of the 
manifest principles, only the gross elements (mahābhūta) are open to perception by 
ordinary people.  The GBh offers no further evidence to explain these discrepancies. 
This classification of the objects of the pramāṇas also leaves open the 
question: what role do the Sāṃkhya texts themselves, presumably to be classed as 
authoritative testimony, play in the attainment of knowledge of the tattvas? 
The MV follows the GBh in treating SK 4 as an exposition of the means of 
knowledge of the manifest, unmanifest, and knower,
398
 but differs from Gauḍapāda 
by stating that some of the principles are established through perception, some 
through inference, and some through both authorities (āpta) and inference.399  If we 
interpret this to mean that some of the principles can be established either by 
inference or by authoritative testimony, it would seem to resolve one of the 
discrepancies apparent in Gauḍapāda’s classification of the principles into objects of 
perception and inference, which Māṭhara follows.400  In this case, we might assume 
that knowledge of the Sāṃkhya principles normally established through inference 
(i.e. prakṛti and puruṣa) could also be gained from the authoritative testimony of a 
Sāṃkhya teacher.  The MV’s commentary on SK 6 also differs from that of the GBh 
                                                 
397
 SOLOMON (1974, p. 12 ) notes that the SVS, SV, and SSV bear the same discrepancy: ‗It may be 
noted that all the commentators say that of the 25 Sāṃkhya principles some are established by 
pratyakṣa, some by anumāna and some by āgama; but none has mentioned even later what is 
established by āgama.‘ 
398
 eṣāṃ vyaktāvyaktajñānāṃ prameyāṇāṃ sādhanāya pramāṇāny āha pramāṇaprameyapramātṛ-
pramitikrameṇa hi sakalasya siddhir dṛṣṭā / (MV on SK 4, p. 10, ll. 13-14). 
399
 prameyā vyaktāvyaktajñāḥ / pramātā ātmā / tatra trayoviṃśatikaṃ vyaktam / avyaktam 
pradhānam / jñaḥ kṣetrajñaḥ / tad amīṣāṃ madhye kiñcit pratyakṣeṇānyad anumānenetarad 
āptānumānābhyāṃ pramīyate (MV on SK 4, p. 12, ll. 4-7). 
400
 atra pradhānapuruṣāv atīndriyau tayoḥ sāmānyato dṛṣṭād anumānāt siddhiḥ / yasmān mahādi 
liṅgaṃ triguṇaṃ dṛṣṭvā kāryaṃ tatkaraṇam aḍṛṣṭam apy asti triguṇaṃ ceti sādhyate pradhānam / na 
hy asata sadutpattiḥ syād iti / na ca kāraṇāsadṛśam kāryaṃ syād iti / vyaktaṃ tu pratyakṣeṇaiva 
sādhitam iti tadarthe na prayatnaḥ / yasmāj jaḍamakriyāśaktihetucumbakavad avaśyaṃ puruṣa iti 
jñasiddhiḥ // (MV on SK 6, p. 14, ll. 5-11). 
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in not offering any examples of the objects of authoritative testimony, so Māṭhara’s 
intentions with regard to the nature of āptavacana are not entirely clear. 
The TK offers yet another classification of the respective spheres of the 
pramāṇas.  Introducing SK 6, Vācaspati states that the means of valid knowledge 
(pramāṇa) have been explained (in the previous two verses) for the purpose of 
establishing the existence of the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower.  
Vācaspati then explains that the manifest, which he takes to refer to the five gross 
elements (mahābhūta), is known directly through perception, while pūrvavat 
inference is used to establish such things as the existence of fire from the presence of 
smoke.  He then introduces SK 6 as an explanation of the means used to establish 
objects of knowledge difficult to establish by ordinary means and suggests that this 
explanation is an important function of a philosophical treatise (śāstra).401 
Although SK 6 mentions only the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa form of inference, 
Vācaspati takes also śeṣavat inference to be implied (by the use of the particle ca in 
the verse) as a means of establishing suprasensuous objects of knowledge. Strangely, 
he does not comment on the establishment of suprasensuous objects through 
authoritative testimony, but rather lists heaven (svarga), the unseen force of action 
and consequence (apūrva), deities (devatā), and the order of the manifestation of the 
manifest principles (intellect, etc.) as objects established through śeṣavat inference 
(equated by Vācaspati with indirect (avīta) inference; see §IV.2).402  Thus, according 
to the TK, the gross elements (mahābhūta) are established through perception, 
                                                 
401
 evaṃ tāvad vyaktāvyaktajñalakṣaṇaprameyasiddhyarthaṃ pramāṇāni lakṣitāni / tatra vyaktaṃ 
pṛthivyādi svarūpataḥ pāṃsulapādako hāliko ’pi pratyakṣataḥ pratipadyate, pūrvavatā cānumānena 
dhūmādidarśanāt vahnyādīni ceti, tad vyutpādanāya mandaprayojanaṃ śāstram iti duradhigamam 
anena vyutpādyam / tatra yat pramāṇam yatra śaktam tad uktalakṣaṇebhyaḥ pramāṇebhyo niṣkṛṣya 
darśayati / (TK on SK 6, p. 35, ll. 1-5). 
402
 upalakṣaṇaṃ caitat, śeṣavad ity api draṣṭavyam / (TK on SK 6, p. 35, ll. 31-32); tat kiṃ sarveṣv 
atīndriyeṣu sāmānyato dṛṣṭam eva pravartate / tathā ca yatra tan nāsti mahadādyārambhakrame 
svargāpūrvadevatādau ca, tatra teṣām abhāvaḥ prāpta ity ata āha—tasmād api iti / tasmād ity 
etāvataiva siddhe cakāreṇa śeṣavad ity api samuccitam / (TK on SK 6, p. 36, ll. 14-15). 
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primordial Materiality (pradhāna) and Consciousness (puruṣa) are established 
through sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference, and the rest of the principles are established 
through śeṣavat inference.  Vācaspati thus seems to have no use for authoritative 
testimony,  at least insofar as the establishment of Sāṃkhya knowledge is concerned.  
It is perhaps significant, though, that he holds the explanation of the inference of 
these principles to be an important function of the SK as a philosophical treatise 
(śāstra).  This can be compared to the YD’s statement that the ‘members of 
explanation’ (vyākhyāṅga) used in formal inference fulfill an important role in the 
explanation of śāstra to those of lesser intellectual capacity.403 
As discussed above (§IV.2-3), the YD makes a provision for the transmission 
of śāstra as a part of the function of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) and treats 
the ten members (avayava) of formal inference as a tool for the exposition of śāstra, 
as illustrated by the commentator’s establishment of the existence of Consciousness 
(puruṣa) by means of this formal inference.  This suggests that authoritative 
testimony may serve as the medium by which inferential Sāṃkhya knowledge is 
transmitted from teacher to pupil. 
It has also been shown that, according to the YD, the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa form of 
inference, in particular, is a key tool in the establishing the existence of 
Consciousness, which is not involved in any relationship of cause and effect, while 
the indirect (avīta) form of inference is used to the establish the thesis that primordial 
Materiality is the source of the manifest universe (§IV.2).  In addition, we have seen 
that the YD allows for the perception of the subtle elements (tanmātra), in addition 
to the gross elements (mahābhūta), by yogins and gods (§IV.1).  In summary, several 
forms of inference are treated by the YD as cooperative tools in the acquisition of 
                                                 
403
 See n. 331 (§IV.2). 
116 
 
knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas, although authoritative testimony also appears to 
play a role in connection with inference, while direct perception of at least some of 
the higher tattvas is a possibility for extraordinary individuals. 
Aside from the evidence discussed above, the YD does not, in the manner of 
the other commentaries, offer a direct correlation between the various means of valid 
knowledge (pramāṇa) and the manifest, unmanifest and knower as objects of 
knowledge.  However, in the context of another Sāṃkhya paradigm, that of the 
conditions (bhāva) of the  intellect, the commentator distinguishes between ordinary 
knowledge, which is gained by means of perception, inference, and authoritative 
testimony, and the extraordinary knowledge of the distinction between Materiality 
and Consciousness.
404
  This paradigm, along with the related paradigm of the 
intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), provides further clarification of the process by 
which the discrimination (vijñāna) leading to liberation (mokṣa) is attained.  The 
views of the commentators with regard to these two paradigms will be outlined in 
the following sections (§IV.6-10).  The conclusions drawn in these sections with 
regard to the YD’s views will be explored further in the discussions in CHAPTER V of 
the commentator’s views on the importance of Kapila’s original formulation of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge and the tradition to which it gave rise. 
 
 
 
                                                 
404
 jñānaṃ dvividhaṃ śabdādyupalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ ca / tatra 
śabdādyupalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ pratyakṣānumānāgamarūpam / guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ ca 
dvividham apūrvam abhyāsajaṃ ca / tayor apūrvam ūhaḥ śabdo ’dhyayanam (SK 51a) iti 
siddhikāṇḍānupatitāni pramāṇāni / abhyāsajaṃ punar vairāgyaparvāvajayapṛṣṭhalabdhaṃ śāntam 
amalaṃ dhruvaṃ sakalabhavābhavapratipakṣabhūtam / yad ācāryo vakṣyati— 
 evaṃ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham iti apariśeṣam / 
 aviparyayād viśuddhaṃ kevalam utpadyate jñānam // (SK 64) iti / 
(YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 7-14). 
117 
 
§6. The commentators’ views on the results of the conditions (bhāva). 
 
In the Sāṃkhya system, knowledge of the principles (tattva) underlying the 
experiential world is considered the only means to liberation (mokṣa).  As outlined in 
CHAPTER I, the present study seeks to determine how the production of this 
knowledge in individual seekers is considered to be related to the tradition of 
Sāṃkhya teachers and texts initiated by the ṛṣi Kapila.  In addition to the paradigm 
of the three means of knowledge (pramāṇa), which deals with the production of 
knowledge in general, two other paradigms treated by the Sāṃkhya texts are 
connected with the production of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas in particular.  
These are the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga).  Of 
these, the former also contains information regarding the results of certain objectives 
often emphasized in other schools of Indian philosophy: the attainment of merit 
(dharma) through Vedic ritual and ethical conduct, the maintenance of an attitude of 
dispassion (vairāgya) with regard to the objects of experience, and the attainment of 
a set of supernatural powers, termed lordliness (aiśvarya) in Sāṃkhya, as a result of 
yogic discipline. 
 As outlined in §II.5, Īśvarakṛṣṇa holds that there are eight conditions (bhāva) 
of the intellect (buddhi): merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), knowledge (jñāna), 
ignorance (ajñāna), dispassion (vairāgya), passion (avairāgya), lordliness 
(aiśvarya), and non-lordliness (anaiśvarya).  Of these conditions, only knowledge 
leads to liberation from the cycle of transmigration (saṃsāra), while the other seven 
conditions serve to maintain this cycle, determining the circumstances of the 
subsequent incarnation of the subtle body (liṅga).  It is unclear from the SK, 
however, how the bhāva of jñāna is produced in relation to the operation of the three 
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pramāṇas accepted in Sāṃkhya.  It is also unclear whether any of the other bhāvas 
may assist in the production of jñāna. 
 The commentators generally agree in their interpretations of the results of the 
bhāvas.  The YD, however, provides much information not found in the other 
commentaries, particularly with regard to the bhāva of jñāna and the relationship 
between jñāna and the other bhāvas (see §IV.7).  The function of jñāna in relation to 
Kapila in the YD will be explored further in CHAPTER V.  Below follows a summary 
of the commentators‘ views on the results of the bhāvas, with attention drawn to the 
YD‘s interpretative contributions. 
The GBh explains that the merit (dharma) results in the transmigration of the 
subtle body (sūkṣmaśarīra) to the worlds of eight kinds of supernatural beings, but 
mentions only seven in this context: the worlds of Brahmā, Prajāpati, Soma, Indra, 
the gandharvas, the rākṣasas, and the piśācas.405  According to Gauḍapāda, demerit 
(adharma) results in rebirth in the bodies of cattle, deer, birds, reptiles, and 
inanimate objects.
406
  The MV presents nearly identical lists, with the omission of 
the world of Soma and the addition of the worlds of the ancestors (pitṛ) and of the 
yakṣas.407  The YD also states that eight divine levels can be attained through 
merit,
408
 and five animal levels through demerit,
409
 though it does not list them in 
                                                 
405
 GBh adds the world of the yakṣas as an eighth to this list under SK 53. 
406
 dharmaṃ nimittaṃ kṛtvā ūrdhvaṃ upayāti / ūrdhvam ity aṣṭau sthānāni gṛhyante / tad yathā—
brāhmaṃ, prājāpatyaṃ, saumyaṃ, aindraṃ, gāndharvaṃ, rākṣasaṃ, paiśācam iti / tat 
sūkṣmaśarīraṃ gacchati / paśumṛgapakṣisarīsṛpasthāvarānteṣv adharmo nimittam / (GBh on SK 44, 
p. 155, ll.33-35). 
407
 tatra dharmo nimittam / iha loke dharmaṃ yaḥ kurute tan nimittaṃ kṛtvā sūkṣmaśarīram ūrdhvaṃ 
gacchati / ūrdhvam iti aṣṭānāṃ devayonīnāṃ grahaṇam / tatra ādyaṃ brāhmam / prājāpatyam, 
aindraṃ, pitryaṃ, gāndharvaṃ, yākṣaṃ, rākṣasaṃ paiśācam ity etāny aṣṭau sthānāni sūkṣmaśarīraṃ 
gacchati / tatra dharmo nimittam, ūrdhvagamanaṃ naimittikam / (MV on SK 44, p. 61, ll. 10-14). 
408
 ukto dharmaḥ / tadanuṣṭhānād aṣṭavikalpāyāṃ tiryagbhūmāv utpattir bhavati / (YD on SK 44a, p. 
235, l. 8). 
409
 adharmo ’py uktaḥ / tadanuṣṭhānāt pañcavikalpāyāṃ tiryagbhūmāv utpattir bhavati / (YD on SK 
44b, p. 235, ll. 10-11). 
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this context.
410
  This classification of beings corresponds to that of the phenomenal 
creation (bhautika sarga) in SK 53, which states that there are eight divine levels, 
five animal levels, and one human level (see §II.2).  The TK offers a slightly 
different interpretation of the effects of merit and demerit, mentioning only that 
worlds such as heaven (dyu) are attained through merit, while worlds such as sutala 
(a subterranean region) are attained through demerit.
411
  It is unclear from the text of 
the TK how this scheme is related to the threefold classification of the bhautika 
sarga in SK 53.  In any case, in all of the commentaries it is clear that merit and 
demerit determine the level of the phenomenal cosmos on which the subtle body is 
reincarnated.  The YD further clarifies that merit and demerit are also responsible for 
the relative circumstances of one‘s birth—in terms of social position, appearance, 
disposition, benefits, and disease—within a single level of the cosmos.412 
 As discussed in §II.5, SK 44 states that the condition of knowledge (jñāna) 
results in liberation.  The GBh and MV specify that this condition refers to the 
knowledge of the twenty-five principles (tattva),
413
 held by the Sāṃkhya texts to be 
the only means to liberation (see §II.3).  This interpretation also seems to be implicit 
in the commentary of the TK and the YD on SK 44. 
Under SK 23, however, the YD specifies that the condition of knowledge is 
twofold; it includes both the knowledge of words (śabda), etc., which is gained 
                                                 
410
 Under SK 53, the YD lists Brahmā, Prajāpati, Indra, the ancestors (pitṛ), the Gandharvas, the 
Nāgas, the Rakṣases, and the Piśācas as the eight divine beings, and cattle, deer, birds, reptiles, and 
inanimate objects as the five levels of animal life (YD on SK 53abc, p. 256, ll. 12-15). 
411
 dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam dyuprabhṛtiṣu lokeṣu / gamanam adhastād bhavaty adharmeṇa 
sutalādiṣu lokeṣu / (TK on SK 44, p. 129, ll. 14-15). 
412
 āha: ekabhūmiviśeṣānupapattiḥ gativiśeṣāt / yadi bhāvānāṃ bhūmiviśeṣanimittatvaṃ niyamyate 
tenaikasyāṃ bhūmau hīnamadhyamotkṛṣṭatvaṃ jātyākṛtisvabhāvānugrahopaghātānāṃ na prāpnoti / 
ucyate: na tarhy anena bhūmiviśeṣo niyamyate / kiṃ tarhi / ūrdhvaśabda utkṛṣṭavacanaḥ / dharmeṇa 
deveṣu mānuṣeṣu tiryakṣu cordhvagamanam utkṛṣṭaṃ janma bhavati / tathādharmād adhogamanam 
apakṛṣṭaṃ janma bhavatīti / (YD on SK 44ab, p. 235, ll. 12-18). 
413
 kiṃ ca, jñānena cāpavargaḥ / apavargaṃ ca pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānam / tena nimittenāpavargo 
mokṣaḥ / (GBh on SK 44, p. 156, ll. 1-2); kiṃ cānyat—jñānena cāpavargaḥ / yat 
pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ tena jñānena tat sūkṣmaśarīraṃ nivartate / (MV on SK 44, p. 61, ll. 19-
20). 
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through perception, inference, and authoritative testimony (see §II.4), as well as the 
knowledge of the difference between Materiality and Consciousness.  This latter 
form of knowledge is further divided into that which is unprecedented (apūrva) and 
that which is generated through practice (abhyāsaja).  The commentator equates the 
unprecedented form with ‗the means of knowledge discussed under the heading of 
the attainments (siddhi), including reflection (ūha)414, speech (śabda), and study 
(adhyayana)‘ (these are part of the pratyayasarga; see §IV.9-10).415  He refers to 
these attainments as means of knowledge (pramāṇa), although the context suggests 
that these are considered different in nature from the normal three pramāṇas of 
perception, inference, and authoritative testimony.  This supposition may be 
supported by reference to a statement made by the commentator under SK 51, that 
the first attainment, reflection (ūha), occurs in the absence of perception, inference, 
or authoritative testimony.
416
 
The commentator‘s definition of the second form of liberating knowledge, 
that which is generated through practice (abhyāsaja), is somewhat obscure.  He says 
that this form of knowledge is vairāgyaparvāvajayapṛṣṭhalabdha.417  Immediately 
prior to this discussion of the forms of knowledge, the commentator uses the term 
parvan to refer to a particular form of merit (dharma) as a ‘step’ on a stairway to 
elevation and ultimate bliss, via the other bhāvas characterised by the constituent 
quality of goodness (sāttvika): 
Through the performance of these [yamas and niyamas as a form of 
dharma
418
], the quality of sattva, in such an ascendance (uttaraṇa)419 of an 
                                                 
414
 On the YD‘s interpretation of the term ūha, see §IV.9, n. 507. 
415
 jñānaṃ dvividhaṃ śabdādyupalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ ca / tatra 
śabdādyupalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ pratyakṣānumānāgamarūpam / guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ ca 
dvividham apūrvam abhyāsajaṃ ca / tayor apūrvam ūhaḥ śabdo ’dhyayanam (SK 51a) iti 
siddhikāṇḍānupatitāni pramāṇāni / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 6-11). 
416
 tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam arthaṃ vicāraṇābalenaiva 
pratipadyate sādyā siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 251, ll. 12-13). 
417
 abhyāsajaṃ punar vairāgyaparvāvajayapṛṣṭhalabdhaṃ (YD on SK 23ab, p. 192, l. 11). 
418
 See §IV.7, nn. 444, 445. 
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ascetic (yati), attains the state of being an impression (āśayatā), which causes 
an increase of the forms [i.e. bhāvas] such as knowledge (jñāna).  This first 
step (parvan)
420
 becomes a stairway (sopāna) to elevation (abhyudaya)421 and 
ultimate bliss (niḥśreyasa), engaged in which this ascetic becomes qualified 
for undertaking the other steps.
422
 
 
Based on this usage of the term parvan, the compound vairāgyaparvāvajayapṛṣṭha-
labdha, as a description of abhyāsaja jñāna, might be translated as ‗attained upon 
the height of winning
423
 the step of dispassion‘.  This suggests that this form of 
liberating knowledge is considered the result of a progressive form of practice, 
perhaps involving the generation of both merit and dispassion (see §IV.7) as ‗steps‘ 
to knowledge.  The commentator goes on to describe knowledge generated through 
practice as ‗peaceful, pure, eternal, and being the opposite of all existence and non-
existence‘.  In this connection, the commentator quotes SK 64, which describes 
liberating knowledge as arising from ‗the practice of truth (or of the tattvas)‘424 
(tattvābhyāsa).425 
                                                                                                                                          
419
 The root ut-tṝ- can mean ‗to cross over‘ or ‗to arise out of‘ [water].  Here, the term uttaraṇa 
probably alludes to the common Sāṃkhya image of the cycle of transmigration (saṃsāra) as an 
ocean.  Cf., for instance, the YD‘s explanation of the name tāraka for the first siddhi (ūha): ‗tāraka 
carries one over the ocean of saṃsāra‘ (tārayati saṃsārārṇavād iti tārakam / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, 
ll. 13-14)).  In keeping with the image in the present passage of the bhāvas as a ‗stairway‘ (by which 
one would ‗arise out of‘ the ocean of saṃsāra), I have translated uttaraṇa as ‗ascendance‘. 
420
 The entry for parvan in MONIER-WILLIAMS testifies to its use as ‗the step of a staircase‘ also in the 
Raghuvaṃśa. 
421
 This use of the term abhyudaya probably encompasses both its literal meaning, as the ‗elevation‘ 
attained by climbing a stairway, and its figurative meaning of ‗prosperity‘ or ‗happiness‘. 
422
 eteṣām avilopenānuṣṭhānād yater evaṃvidhottaraṇe sattvadharma āśayatāṃ pratipadyate yo 
jñānādīnāṃ rūpāṇām āpyāyanaṃ karoti / etad abhyudayaniḥśreyasayoḥ sopānabhūtaṃ prathamaṃ 
parva yatrāyam avasthito yatir itareṣāṃ parvaṇām anuṣṭhāne yogyo bhavati / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 
192, ll. 4-6). 
423
 I have used ‗winning‘ for avajaya here as in ‗winning a foothold‘.  The term avajaya means 
‗overcoming‘, ‗conquering‘ or ‗winning through conquest‘.  The implication here seems to be that one 
has gained through effort or ‗won‘ the vairāgya step.  From the ‗height‘ or ‗top‘ (pṛṣṭha) of this 
conquest, the jñāna step is attained next. 
424
 The significance of the phrase tattvābhyāsa in its original context is probably ‗repeated study of 
the tattvas‘, but in the present passage the YD-kāra seems to take abhyāsa as ‗practice‘ in a broader 
sense. 
425
 abhyāsajaṃ punar vairāgyaparvāvajayapṛṣṭhalabdhaṃ śāntam amalaṃ dhruvaṃ sakala-
bhavābhavapratipakṣabhūtam / yad ācāryo vakṣyati— 
 evaṃ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham iti apariśeṣam / 
 aviparyayād viśuddhaṃ kevalam utpadyate jñānam // (SK 64) iti / 
(YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 11-14). 
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In summary, the YD divides the condition of knowledge into 1. the ordinary 
knowledge gained through perception, inference, and authoritative testimony; 2. 
liberating knowledge attained suddenly (apūrva) through one of the attainments 
(siddhi; see §IV.9-10); 3. liberating knowledge resulting from a progressive form of  
practice (abhyāsaja). 
This classification of the forms of the condition of knowledge presents some 
interpretative problems when considered in connection with several other passages 
of the YD.  The relation between these forms and the threefold division of the 
bhāvas into innate (sāṃsiddhika), deriving from Materiality (prākṛtika), and deriving 
from the products (vaikṛta) in SK 43 (see §IV.8) is unclear.  In its commentary on 
SK 43, the YD equates the vaikṛta form of knowledge, like the unprecedented 
(apūrva) form mentioned under SK 23, with the attainments (siddhi) (see §IV.10 and 
CHAPTER V), but it is unclear if a precise identification of vaikṛta with apūrva is to 
be supposed.  Also, the suggestion that the liberating knowledge of the distinction 
between Materiality and Consciousness is attained without the use of the normal 
pramāṇas of perception, inference, and authoritative testimony, appears to conflict 
with the general position of the Sāṃkhya commentators that knowledge of these 
principles is established through inference, as demonstrated by the YD‘s illustrations 
of the ten-membered inference, the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa form of inference, and the 
indirect (avīta) inference (see §IV.2, IV.5).  It is probably the case that the YD-kāra 
does not always consider the implications of his views outside of their immediate 
interpretative context.  Nevertheless, several apparent assumptions behind these 
views can be established with some certainty, as will be demonstrated in §IV.10 and 
§V.1-2. 
Aside from the passage discussed above, the YD does not discuss the bhāva 
of knowledge (jñāna) as representative of forms of knowledge apart from the 
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liberating knowledge of the Sāṃkhya principles (tattva), while the issue is not raised 
in the other commentaries.  In most contexts, the commentators focus on the fact that 
the condition of knowledge leads to liberation (SK 44c), while its opposite, the 
condition of ignorance (ajñāna), is a precondition of bondage to transmigration (SK 
44d). 
The commentators are unanimous in listing three forms of the bondage 
resulting from ignorance: deriving from Materiality (prākṛta, prākṛtika, 
prakṛtibandha), deriving from the products (vaikārika, vaikṛtika, vaikārikabandha), 
and deriving from sacrifice (dākṣiṇika, dākṣiṇaka, dakṣiṇābandha).426  This 
classification may appear to conflict with the classification of the conditions (bhāva) 
in general into innate (sāṃsiddhika), deriving from Materiality (prākṛta, prākṛtika), 
and deriving from the products (vaikṛta, vaikṛtika) (see §IV.8).  It should perhaps be 
kept in mind, though, that the three forms of bondage refer to the phenomenal 
consequences of one of the bhāvas (ignorance, in this case) rather than to the bhāva 
itself.  In any case, no attempt is made by the commentators to reconcile these two 
classifications. 
The MV provides a brief explanation of the three forms of bondage resulting 
from the condition of ignorance.  Māṭhara interprets the first form, prakṛtibandha, as 
self-identification with the eight sources (prakṛti) or productive principles, that is, 
with primordial Materiality, intellect, ego, and the five subtle elements.  According 
                                                 
426
 viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ / ajñānaṃ nimittam / sa caiva nimittikaḥ prākṛto vaikāriko dākṣiṇikaś 
ca bandhaḥ iti vakṣyati purastāt / yad im uktam— 
 prākṛtena ca bandhena tathā vaikāikeṇa ca / 
 dākṣiṇena tṛtīyena baddho nānyena mucyate // 
(GBh on SK 44, p. 156, ll. 3-6); jñānaviparyayo ’jñānam, tasmād bandhas trividho bhavati / 
prakṛtibandho, dakṣiṇābandho vaikārikabandhaś ceti // (YD on SK 44d, p. 236, ll. 5-6); ato ’jñānaṃ 
nimittaṃ bandho naimittikaḥ / sa ca bandhas trividhaḥ / prakṛtibandho vaikārikabandho 
dakṣiṇābandhaś ceti / (MV on SK 44, p. 62, ll. 1-3); viparyayāt atattvajñānāt iṣyate bandhaḥ / sa ca 
trividhaḥ—prākṛtiko vaikṛtiko dākṣiṇakaś ceti / (TK on SK 44, p. 129, l. 18 – p. 130, l. 4); I have 
departed from Mainkar‘s (Gauḍapādabhāṣya (1972)) and Jha‘s (Tattvakaumudī (2004)) translations 
of the forms of bondage as ‗natural, acquired and personal‘ and ‗natural, evolutional and personal‘, 
respectively, in order to be more literal and to draw attention to the interpretation of these three forms 
by the YD (see below). 
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to the MV, bondage to the products (vaikārikabandha) is the idea of ultimate bliss in 
the worlds of Brahmā, etc.  In other words, according to Māṭhara, this second form 
of bondage lies in the misconception that the ultimate goal of life is rebirth at a 
higher level of the cosmos, rather than liberation from the cycle of transmigration 
altogether.  Māṭhara interprets the third form of bondage, dakṣiṇābandha, simply as 
resulting from the sacrifice of cows, etc.
427
 
The TK offers a slightly different interpretation of the first two forms of 
bondage.  According to Vācaspati, prākṛtika bondage applies to those who worship 
primordial Materiality (prakṛti) as the self (ātman).  Vācaspati mentions that those 
under this first form of bondage are called prakṛtilaya, ‗dissolved into the sources‘, 
referring to the result of the condition of dispassion (vairāgya) (SK 45; see below).  
According to Vācaspati, vaikṛtika bondage applies to those who worship the evolutes 
(vikāra), including the elements, faculties, ego, and intellect, as Consciousness 
(puruṣa).  Like Māṭhara, Vācaspati interprets the dākṣiṇaka form of bondage as 
resulting from sacrificial acts.
428
 
 The YD treats SK 45abc as an explanation of the three forms of bondage 
(mentioned as the result of the condition of ignorance under SK 44).  The 
commentator equates prakṛtibandha with prakṛtilaya (interpreted as dissolution into 
                                                 
427
 tatra prakṛtibandho nāmāṣṭāsu prakṛtiṣu paratvenābhimānaḥ / vaikārikabandho nāma 
brahmādisthāneṣu śreyobuddhiḥ / dakṣiṇābandho nāma gavādidānejyānimittaḥ / (MV on SK 44, p. 
62, ll. 2-5). 
428
 prakṛtāv ātmajñānād ye prakṛtim upāsate teṣāṃ prākṛtiko bandhaḥ, yaḥ purāṇe prakṛtilayān 
pratyucyate pūrṇaṃ śatasahasraṃ hi tiṣṭhanty avyaktacintakāḥ iti / vaikāriko bandhas teṣāṃ ye 
vikārān eva bhūtendriyāhaṅkārabuddhiḥ puruṣadhiyopāsate tān pratīdam ucyate— 
daśa manvantarāṇīha tiṣṭhantīndriyacintakāḥ / 
bhautikās tu śatam pūrṇaṃ, sahasran tv ābhimānikāḥ // 
bauddhā daśa sahasrāṇi tiṣṭhanti vigatajvarāḥ / 
te khalv amī videhā yeṣām vaikṛtiko bandhaḥ iti // 
iṣṭāpūrtena dākṣiṇakaḥ / puruṣatattvānabhijño hīṣṭāpūrtakārī kāmopahatamanā badhyate iti // (TK 
on SK 44, p. 130, ll. 5-15). 
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the eight sources), as the result of the condition of dispassion (vairāgya) (SK 45a).429  
In this passage, he mentions that dispassion falls under the heading of contentment 
(tuṣṭi),430 one of the four divisions of the pratyayasarga, thus providing an important 
link between the two paradigms (see §IV.10).  The commentator then equates 
bondage to sacrifice (dakṣiṇābandha) with the performance of sacrifice leading to 
transmigration (saṃsāra) as the result of the condition of passion (rāga, avairāgya) 
(SK 45b).
431
  He equates bondage to the products (vaikārikabandha) with the 
pleasure taken in the the non-obstruction (avighāta) (of one‘s will) resulting from the 
condition of lordliness (aiśvarya).432  No connection is made between the forms of 
bondage and the remaining condition, non-lordliness (anaiśvarya). 
 The YD‘s interpretation of prakṛtibandha is thus similar to that of the TK, 
while its interpretation of dakṣiṇabandha is compatible with that of the TK and MV, 
although the latter commentaries do not provide any of the correlations between the 
forms of bondage and the results of the conditions of dispassion, passion, and 
lordliness.  The fact that the YD does provide this correlation between the results of 
ignorance and the results of the other conditions shows that the conditions overlap 
with regard to their functions.  The YD addresses this issue by explaining that 
ignorance serves as a precondition for the results brought about by the other 
conditions (besides knowledge).  The commentator also explains that in the case of 
someone, such as Kapila (see CHAPTER V), who has attained the condition of 
                                                 
429
 āha: kasmād bhāvāt prakṛtibandho bhavati <iti> / ucyate: vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ (SK 45a) 
vairāgyād aṣṭasu prakṛtiṣu layaṃ gacchati / asāv ucyate prakṛtibandha iti / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, 
ll. 7-10). 
430
 tataś ca viparītaṃ yad eva vairāgyaṃ tuṣṭikāṇḍānupatitaṃ prakṛtyādiṣu paratvābhimānāḥ / tata 
eva prakṛtilayo bhavati nānyasmāt / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, ll. 16-18). 
431
 āha: atha dakṣiṇābandhaḥ kutaḥ / ucyate: saṃsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt / (SK 45b) yo ’yaṃ 
dṛṣṭānuśravikaviṣayābhilāṣaḥ sa rāgaḥ / tatra dṛṣṭaviṣayarāgāt tatprāptinirvartakaṃ karma karoti 
tataś ca tatropapadyate / ānuśravikaviṣayābhilāṣād agnihotrādiṣu pravartate tataś ca 
svargādiṣūtpattir bhavati / asau dakṣiṇābandhaḥ / (YD on SK 45b, p. 236, l. 23 – p. 237, l. 2). 
432
 ayad aṣṭaguṇam aiśvaryam aṇimādi prāg upadiṣṭaṃ (193.1) tasmāt sve sve viṣaye ’vighāta 
utpadyate / tadabhiratir vaikāriko bandhaḥ / (YD on SK 45c, p. 237, ll. 12-13). 
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knowledge (jñāna), the other conditions (such as dispassion) do not lead to the 
results described (such as dissolution in Materiality).
433
  In other words, the 
conditions determine the path of the subtle body only for so long as one has not 
attained knowledge.  As we have seen above, the YD also suggests that the other 
sāttvika conditions may even serve as steps to the attainment of knowledge in a 
particular incarnation (see further discussion in §IV.7). 
Although the YD differs substantially from the other commentaries in 
correlating the condition of lordliness (aiśvarya) with the vaikṛta form of bondage, 
the commentators all agree with regard to the interpretation of lordliness itself.  GBh, 
YD, MV, and TK all equate lordliness with eight traditional supernatural powers, 
commonly referred to as siddhi in the Yoga school but also referred to as aiśvarya in 
the Vyāsabhāṣya (ca. 500-700)434 on Yogasūtra 3.45.  Vyāsa enumerates these as 
atomisation (aṇiman), lightness of weight (laghiman), magnification (mahiman), 
acquisition (prāpti), irresistibility (prākāmya), control (vaśītva), lordship (īśitṛtva), 
and transportation to wherever one likes (yatrakāmāvasāyitva).435  The TK‘s 
interpretation of these powers is closest to the VBh, although like the other 
commentators, Vācaspati states that there are eight but lists nine, adding heaviness 
(gariman).  Gauḍapāda provides explanations for eight of the nine listed, leaving out 
                                                 
433
 āha: yadi [tribhis] tribhir nimittair vairāgyādibhis trividho bandho nirvartyate yad uktam (236.5) 
ajñānād bandha iti tad ayuktam / bhāvāntaraṃ hy ajñānam / ataḥ phalāntarena bhavitavyam iti / 
ucyate: na mūlakāraṇatvāt / jñānavarjitānāṃ hi bhāvānāṃ yat phalaṃ tatrājñānaṃ mūlaṃ 
tannimittatvāt sarveṣām / na hi jñānivairāgyam alaṃ prakṛtilayāya, tathetarāṇi paramarṣyādāv 
adṛṣṭatvāt / vicitraṃ kāryam ekasmāt kāraṇād ayuktam iti vairāgyādīny asādhāraṇāni pṛthak 
kalpyante / sādhāraṇaṃ tv ajñānam / ato na kaścid doṣaḥ / (YD on SK 45c, p. 237, ll. 14-21). 
434
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 16. 
435
 tato ’ṇimādiprādurbhāvaḥ kāyasaṃpattadharmānabhighātaś ca // (YS 3.45, p. 371, l. 12); 
tatrāṇimā bhavaty aṇuḥ / laghimā laghur bhavati / mahimā mahān bhavati / prāptir aṅgulyagreṇāpi 
spṛśati candramasam / prākāmyam icchānabhighātaḥ, bhūmāv unmajjati nimajjati yathodake / 
vaśitvaṃ bhūtabhautikeṣu vaśībhavaty avaśyaś cānyeṣām / īśitṛtvaṃ teṣāṃ prabhavāpyayavyūhānām 
īṣṭe / yatra kāmāvasāyitvaṃ satyasaṅkalpatā, yathā saṅkalpas tathā bhūtaprakṛtīnām avasthānam / 
na ca śakto ’pi padārthaviparyāsaṃ karoti / kasmāt / anyasya yatra kāmāvasāyinaḥ pūrvasiddhasya 
tathābhūteṣu saṃkalpād iti / etāny aṣṭāv aiśvaryāṇi / (VBh on YS 3.45, p. 371, ll. 13-19); I have 
adopted the translations for the first seven of these terms from LARSON AND  BHATTACHARYA (2008), 
p. 210. 
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heaviness, while Vācaspati provides explanations for all nine.  The YD states simply 
that atomisation, magnification, lightness, and heaviness are characteristics of the 
elements (bhūta), while the rest are characteristics of the intellect (buddhi).  In other 
words, some of these abilities are physical while others intellectual.  The GBh and 
MV provide an etymological gloss of the term aiśvarya as the ‗condition of the 
Lord‘ (īśvarabhāva).436  The TK connects these abilities with yogins.437  While it is 
thus apparent that the powers of lordliness are generally connected with some form 
of spiritual attainment in the Sāṃkhya texts, it should be kept in mind that the YD 
equates the pleasure taken in these abilities with bondage to the products 
(vaikārikabandha), which is considered a hindrance to liberation. 
Similarly, the condition of dispassion (vairāgya), resulting in dissolution into 
the eight productive principles (prakṛtilaya), is presented by the Sāṃkhya 
commentators in terms of a certain degree of spiritual attainment but also as a 
hindrance to liberation.  In this respect, the Sāṃkhya system differs from 
                                                 
436
 See §V.3 for a discussion of the role of īśvara in classical Sāṃkhya and in the YD in particular. 
437
 aiśvaryam īśvarabhāvaḥ / tac cāṣṭaguṇam—aṇimā, mahimā, garimā, laghimā, prāptiḥ, 
prākāmyaṃ īśitvaṃ, vaśitvaṃ yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṃ ceti / aṇor bhāvo ’ṇimā, sūkṣmo bhūtvā jagati 
vicaratīti / mahimā, mahān bhūtvā vicaratīti, laghimā, mṛṇālītūlāvayavād api laghutayā 
puṣpakesarāgreṣv api tiṣṭhati / prāptiḥ, abhimataṃ vastu yatratatrāvasthitaṃ prāpnoti / prākāmyaṃ, 
prakāmato yad evecchati tad eva vidadhāti / īśitvaṃ, prabhutayā trailokyam api īṣṭe / vaśitvaṃ, 
sarvaṃ vaśībhavati yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṃ, brahmādistambaparyantaṃ yatra kāmas tatraivāsya 
svecchayā sthānāsanavihārān ācaratīti / (GBh on SK 23, p. 107, ll. 21-28); tathā aiśvaryād 
avighātaḥ / etad aiśvaryaṃ, aṣṭaguṇam aṇimādiyuktam / (GBh on SK 45, p. 158, l. 1); aiśvaryam 
apratīghātalakṣaṇam / <t>at punar aṣṭavidham aṇimā mahimā laghimā garimā prāptiḥ prākāmyam 
īśitvaṃ vaśitvaṃ yatrakāmāvasāyitvam iti / tatrāṇimā mahimā laghimā garimeti bhūtavaiśeṣikam / 
buddhes tu prāptyādi / (YD on SK 23c, p. 193, ll. 1-4); yad aṣṭaguṇam aiśvaryam aṇimādi prāg 
upadiṣṭaṃ (193.1) tasmāt sve sve viṣaye ’vighāta utpadyate / (YD on SK 45c, p. 237, ll. 12-13); 
aiśvaryaṃ īśvarabhāvenety aṣṭavidham / aṇimā laghimā garimā mahimā prāptiḥ prākāmyam īśitvaṃ 
vaśitvaṃ yatrakāmāvasāyitvam iti / (MV on SK 23, p. 40, l. 22, p. 41, l. 2); kiṃ cānyat—aiśvaryād 
avighātaḥ yat pūrvam aiśvaryam aṇimādikam aṣṭavidhaṃ nirdiṣṭaṃ tasmād aiśvaryāt prārthitānām 
avighāto bhavati na muktiḥ / (MV on SK 45, p. 62, ll. 20-22); aiśvaryam api buddhidharmo, yato 
’ṇimādiprādurbhāvaḥ / atrāṇimā ’ṇubhāvo yataḥ śilām api praviśati / laghimā laghubhāvaḥ, yat, 
sūryamarīcīn ālambya sūryalokaṃ yāti / garimā gurubhāvaḥ yato gurur bhavati / mahimā mahato 
bhāvaḥ, yato mahān bhavati / prāptiḥ, yato ’ṅgulyagreṇa spṛśati candramasam / prākāmyam 
icchānabhighāto yato, bhūmāv unmajjati nimajjati ca yathodake / vaśitvam yato bhūtabhautikaṃ 
vaśībhavaty avaśyam / īśitvam yato bhūtabhautikānāṃ prabhavasthitim īṣṭe / yac ca kāmāvasāyitvam 
sā satyasaṅkalpatā, yena yathā ’sya saṅkalpo bhavati bhūteṣu tathaiva bhūtāni bhavanti / anyeṣāṃ 
manuṣyāṇāṃ niścayāḥ niścetavyam anuvidhīyante, yoginas tu niścetavyāḥ padārthāḥ niścayam iti 
(TK on SK 23, p. 95, ll. 16-25). 
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renunciatory traditions, which focus on dispassion or non-attachment as the means to 
liberation, as the YD-kāra points out: 
That which has been said by other teachers—‗the liberation of Consciousness 
is from dispassion or from [a combination of] knowledge and dispassion‘—is 
contradicted.
438
 
 
As discussed above, the YD equates prakṛtilaya with prakṛtibandha, one of the 
results of the condition of ignorance (ajñāna).  The GBh and MV describe 
prakṛtilaya as absorption into the eight productive principles (prakṛti)—that is, into 
primordial Materiality (pradhāna), intellect (buddhi), ego (ahaṃkāra), and the five 
subtle elements (tanmātra)—after death.  This applies to one who is endowed with 
the condition of dispassion but also ignorance.  After this absorption, trangmigration 
continues.  The MV adds that an individual who has attained prakṛtilaya believes 
that he has attained liberation.
439
  The YD and TK also interpret prakṛtilaya as 
dissolution into the eight productive principles, the TK adding that the individual 
worships these principles as the self.
440
  Like the GBh and MV, the TK states that 
one who has attained prakṛtilaya is subsequently reborn.441  Thus, although it is 
passion (rāga) that is said to lead to transmigration (saṃsāra) (SK 45), the 
commentators clarify that its opposite, dispassion (vairāgya), if not accompanied by 
the condition of knowledge (jñāna), is also followed by transmigration after a period 
of dissolution in the productive principles. 
                                                 
438
 yad uktam anyair ācāryaiḥ vairāgyāt puruṣakaivalyam jñānavairāgyābhyāṃ ca iti tatpratiṣiddhaṃ 
bhavati / (YD on SK 44c, p. 235, ll. 20-22). 
439
 yathā kasyacid vairāgyam asti na tattvajñānam / tasmāt ajñānapūrvād vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ, 
mṛto ’ṣṭāsu prakṛtiṣu pradhānabuddhyahaṅkāratanmātreṣu līyate na mokṣaḥ / tato bhūyo ’pi 
saṃsarati / (GBh on SK 45, p. 157, ll. 30-32); yathā kasyacid vairāgyam asti / jitendriyo viṣayebhyo 
virakto na yamaniyamaparaḥ kevalam na tu jñānam asti guṇapuruṣāntarākhyam / tenājñānena 
vairāgyapūrveṇa nāsti mokṣaḥ / kevalam aṣṭāsu prakṛtiṣu layo bhavati pradhānabuddhy-
ahaṅkāratanmātreṣu / tatra līnam ātmānaṃ muktam ity avagacchati / bhūyaḥ saṃsaraṇakāle 
saṃsarati triṣu lokeṣu śarīrotpattir bhavati / tatra vairāgyaṃ nimittaṃ prakṛtilayo naimittikaḥ / (MV 
on SK 45, p. 62, ll. 10-16). 
440
 vairāgyād aṣṭasu prakṛtiṣu layaṃ gacchati / (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, l. 10); vairāgyāt prakṛtilayaḥ 
iti—puruṣatattvānabhijñasya vairāgyamātrāt prakṛtilayaḥ, prakṛtigraheṇa prakṛtimahadahaṅkāra-
bhūtendriyāṇi gṛhyante, teṣv ātmabuddhyopāsyamāneṣu layaḥ / (TK on SK 45, p. 131, ll. 17-19). 
441
 kālāntareṇa ca punar āvirbhavati (TK on SK 45, p. 131, l. 19). 
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Although vairāgya is thus generally considered to hinder liberation through a 
false identification with the productive principles of Materiality, there is also 
evidence in the commentaries that it may eventually lead to the condition of jñāna 
and consequent liberation.  As will be discussed in the following section, the YD 
appears to view both vairāgya and a form of dharma gained through yogic practices 
as potentially cooperative with the production of jñāna. 
As we have seen, the YD provides more information than the other 
commentaries concerning the nature of the bhāva of jñāna.  According to the YD-
kāra, jñāna in the form of liberating knowledge of the tattvas can be attained either 
through the unprecedented (apūrva) means identified with the attainments (siddhi), 
or as a result of the practice of the other sāttvika bhāvas, which themselves are not 
directly related to the acquisition of knowledge.  The siddhis will later be shown to 
be connected with the transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil, thus 
providing key information with regard to the importance of the Sāṃkhya tradition to 
the individual‘s attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas (§IV.9-10, V.1-2).  
The possibility that a seeker of liberation may, on the other hand, independently 
undergo a progressive practice leading to liberating knowledge ‗generated through 
practice‘ (abhyāsaja) will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
§7. Evidence for the production of merit (dharma), dispassion (vairāgya), 
 lordliness (aiśvarya), and knowledge (jñāna) as a progressive process. 
 
Although the Sāṃkhya texts hold that the liberation gained though the condition 
(bhāva) of knowledge (jñāna) is hindered by the other seven conditions, there is 
some evidence in the commentaries that the conditions of merit (dharma), dispassion 
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(vairāgya), and lordliness (aiśvarya) may also be considered conducive to the 
attainment of the condition of knowledge. 
As mentioned above (§IV.6), the YD explains, under SK 23, that a particular 
form of merit (dharma) is conducive to the attainment of the other conditions 
characterised by goodness (sāttvika), including knowledge.  The commentator 
explains that dharma in general is generated by the performance of actions 
prescribed by revelation (śruti) and traditional texts (smṛti) (which are considered by 
the Sāṃkhya commentators to be the two main sources of authoritative testimony 
(see §IV.3)).  The commentator then divides dharma into two forms.  The first form 
brings about the enjoyment of desirable body, faculties, and objects in the worlds of 
Brahmā, etc.—that is, in higher levels of the phenomenal cosmos—and is considered 
secondary or unessential (aṅgabhūta) to knowledge (jñāna), etc.442  The implication 
seems to be that this first form of merit does not lead to the other sāttvika bhāvas.  
The second form of merit, on the other hand, is said to lead to the other sāttvika 
bhāvas (knowledge, etc.) becoming a first step toward elevation (abhyudaya) and 
ultimate bliss (niḥśreyasa).443 
According to the text of the critical edition, the commentator appears to state, 
after his description of the first form of dharma, that the second form of dharma is 
produced by sacrificial oblations and by the performance of restraints (yama) and 
observances (niyama).
444
  However, since the commentator has at this point given no 
explanation of the means by which the first form of merit is cultivated, we might be 
justified in slightly amending the text so that the term agnihotrahavanādi-
kriyānuṣṭhānasādhanaḥ (‗the means to which is the performance of [sacrificial] 
                                                 
442
 tatra śrutismṛtivihitānāṃ karmaṇām anuṣṭhānād buddhyavasthaḥ sattvāvayava āśayabhūto 
dharma ity ucyate / sa tu dvividhaḥ / brahmādisthāneṣv abhipretaśarīrendriyaviṣayopalabhoga-
ni<r>vartako jñānādyaṅgabhūtaś ca prathamaḥ / (YD on 23bc, p. 191, ll. 33-36). 
443
 See n. 422 (§IV.6). 
444
 agnihotrahavanādikriyānuṣṭhānasādhano yamaniyamasādhanaḥ <ca> itaraḥ / (YD on SK 23bc, 
p. 191, ll. 36-37). 
131 
 
actions such as the offering of oblations to the sacrificial fire‘) is read as part of the 
preceding line and therefore descriptive of the first form of merit, while the second 
form (which is conducive to the production of jñāna) is described in terms of the 
performance of the yogic activities of yama and niyama.  This interpretation would 
agree with that of the TK (see below). 
The author of the YD enumerates the restraints (yama) as non-violence 
(ahiṃsā), truth (satya), not stealing (asteya), non-wickedness (akalkatā), and 
chastity (brahmacarya), and the observances (niyama) as non-anger (akrodha), 
service to one‘s teacher (guruśuśrūṣā), purity (śauca), lightness of eating 
(āhāralāghava), and cautiousness (apramāda).445  These differ somewhat from the 
usual lists given by the texts of the Yoga school: non-violence (ahiṃsā), truth 
(satya), not stealing (asteya), chastity (brahmacarya), and non-greed (aparigraha) 
for the restraints,
446
 and purity (śauca), contentment (saṃtoṣa), asceticism (tapas), 
recitation (svādhyaya), and devotion to the Lord (īśvarapraṇidhāna) for the 
observances.
447
  The GBh and MV quote these lists from the YS and include them as 
forms of merit, the GBh adding compassion (dayā) and charity (dāna) as productive 
of merit.
448
 
The TK is similar to the YD in dividing merit into two types.  The first is 
generated by the performance of sacrifice (yāga) and charity (dāna) and leads to 
prosperity (abhyudaya), while the second is generated by the performance of the 
                                                 
445
 tatrāhiṃsā satyam asteyam akalkatā brahmacaryam iti pañca yamāḥ (cf. YS 2.30) / akrodho 
guruśuśrūṣā śaucam āhāralāghavam apramāda iti pañca niyamāḥ / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 191, l. 33 – 
p. 192, l. 6). 
446
 ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ // (YS 2.30, p. 242, l. 27). 
447
 śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāyeśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ // (YS 2.32, p. 247, l. 26). 
448
 tatra dharmo nāma dayādānayamaniyamalakṣaṇaḥ / tatra yamā niyamāś ca pātañjale ’bhihitāḥ / 
ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ (YS 2.30) / śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyayeśvara-
praṇidhānāni niyamāḥ (YS 2.32) / (GBh on SK 23, p. 107, ll. 11-14); tatra dharmo nāma varṇinām 
āśramiṇāṃ ca samayāvirodhena yaḥ prokto yamaniyamalakṣaṇaḥ sa dharma / tatra pañca yamāḥ 
pañca niyamāḥ / ahiṃsāsatyāsteyabrahmacaryāparigrahā yamāḥ / śaucasantoṣatapaḥsvādhyāy-
eśvarapraṇidhānāni niyamāḥ / (MV on SK 23, p. 38, l. 12-15). 
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eightfold yoga (referring again to Patañjali‘s system) and leads to ultimate bliss 
(niḥśreyasa).449  The commentators thus include such yogic practices as productive 
of dharma and, in the case of the YD and TK, as steps toward liberation.  The YD‘s 
explicit identification of the sources of these practices with the main categories of 
authoritative testimony (āptavacana) provides a reference point by which to 
reconstruct the commentator‘s views with regard to the role of such doctrine in the 
generation of liberating knowledge (see §V.1-2). 
As discussed above (§IV.6), the YD also suggests that a particular form of 
liberating knowledge (abhyāsaja, ‗generated through practice‘) is brought about by 
the attainment of dispassion (vairāgya).  This suggestion is complicated by the 
commentator‘s definition of dispassion, also under SK 23, as a ‗clarity of intellect 
brought about by the practice of knowledge‘.450  Evidently, the commentator holds 
the conditions of knowledge and dispassion to be mutually cooperative.  The phrase 
‗practice of knowledge‘ (jñānābhyāsa) suggests that the condition of jñāna itself 
may develop progressively (perhaps in conjunction with the development of dharma 
and vairāgya), rather than arising as a sudden and complete enlightenment as in the 
case of the apūrva form of jñāna (see §IV.6). 
The YD is not alone among the commentaries in suggesting the possibility of 
the progressive development of the condition of jñāna.  The GBh and MV provide a 
specific order of progression of the four sāttvika conditions.  According to these 
texts, in the case of the form of jñāna derived from the products (vaikṛta; see §IV.8), 
one first obtains knowledge from a teacher, which leads to dispassion, then merit, 
                                                 
449
 dharmo ’bhyudayaniḥśreyasahetuḥ tatra yāgadānādyanuṣṭhānajanito dharmo ’bhyudayahetuḥ, 
aṣṭāṅgayogānuṣṭhānajanitaś ca niḥśreyasahetuḥ / (TK on SK 23, p. 93, ll. 31-33). 
450
 virāgas tu rāgapratipakṣabhūto jñānābhyāsopajanito buddheḥ prasādaḥ / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 
192, l. 15). 
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then lordliness.
451
  This progression accords with the above-mentioned statement by 
the YD that dispassion results from the practice of knowledge.  In addition, the fact 
that this progression applies only to one form of jñāna (vaikṛta) and that the bhāvas 
may therefore be produced either progressively or not, can be compared to the YD‘s 
statement that knowledge may be produced suddenly or as the result of a progressive 
practice. 
In summary, the evidence of the GBh, MV, YD and TK suggests that the 
production of the four sāttvika conditions may occur in a progressive manner, though 
this is not always the case.  The YD testifies that knowledge may be unprecedented 
(apūrva) or may result from the practice of the other conditions, while the practice of 
knowledge may lead to the acquisition of other sāttvika conditions (which thus, in 
combination with knowledge, do not result in further transmigration; see §IV.6).  
This evidence will be taken into account throughout the discussions in CHAPTER V of 
the relationship between Sāṃkhya doctrine and practice according to the YD. 
 
§8. The classification of the conditions into innate (sāṃsiddhika), deriving from 
 primordial Materiality (prākṛtika), and deriving from the products 
 (vaikṛta). 
 
The Sāṃkhya commentators‘ views on the manner in which the bhāva of jñāna is 
produced are complicated by another classification of the bhāvas in the SK.  In the 
context of this classification, the commentators make special reference to the ṛṣi 
Kapila, who is singled out from all other beings in terms of the manner in which his 
                                                 
451
 tathā vaikṛtā yathā—ācāryamūrtiṃ nimittaṃ kṛtvā asmadādīnāṃ jñānam utpadyate, jñānād 
vairāgyaṃ, vairāgyād dharmaḥ, dharmād aiśvaryam iti / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 7-8); vaikṛtikā 
yathā—ācaryādimūrtim adhikṛtya utpannā vaikṛtikā ity ucyante / ācaryaṃ nimittaṃ kṛtvā jñānam 
utpadyate / jñānāt vairāgyaṃ, vairāgyād dharmo, dharmād aiśvaryam / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 12-
15). 
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knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas was produced.  The YD‘s discussion of this 
classification of the bhāvas also provides a link between the bhāvas and the 
intellectual creation (pratyayasarga; see §IV.9-10), by extension providing a clearer 
picture of the role of the Sāṃkhya tradition of texts and teachers in the attainment of 
liberating knowledge by individual seekers (see §V.1-2). 
 As mentioned above (§II.5), Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that the conditions (bhāva) are 
threefold: sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, and vaikṛta (SK 43).452  These terms are usually 
translated as ‗innate‘, ‗natural‘, and ‗acquired‘, respectively.  Although I will retain 
the translation of sāṃsiddhika as ‗innate‘, alternative translations of the latter two 
terms, closer to their etymological significance, can be proposed on the basis of the 
commentaries.  This section will highlight the interpretation of these terms by the 
YD in particular, in order to provide context for a discussion of the relationship 
between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga in §IV.10, as well as for further 
discussion in CHAPTER V of the YD‘s views on the production of the bhāva of jñāna 
in relation to Kapila and his role in the initiation of the Sāṃkhya tradition. 
 The commentators all agree that sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, and vaikṛta refer to 
the manner in which the bhāvas are produced, although their interpretations of the 
terms vary slightly.  The argument for revising the translations of these terms must 
be made on the basis of the commentators‘ illustrations of the three modes of 
production of the bhāvas. 
 The GBh and MV give as an example of the sāṃsiddhika variety of the 
conditions the production of the sāttvika conditions of the ṛṣi Kapila (see CHAPTER 
V): Kapila was endowed with merit (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), dispassion 
(vairāgya), and lordliness (aiśvarya) as he was born at the time of the first creation 
                                                 
452
 sāṃsiddhikāś ca bhāvāḥ prākṛtikā vaikṛtāś ca dharmādyāḥ / dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ kāryāśrayiṇaś 
ca kalalādyāḥ // (SK 43). 
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(ādisarga).453  As examples of prākṛtika conditions, Gauḍapāda and Māṭhara give 
the conditions of four sons of Brahmā, named by Gauḍapāda as Sanaka, Sanandana, 
Sanātana, and Sanatkumāra.454  The two commentators state that these four beings 
were endowed with the four sāttvika conditions when their bodies were sixteen years 
of age.  The MV adds that these conditions arose suddenly, ‗like the sight of a 
treasure‘.455  This description suggests that these conditions were latent in the 
individuals, though their manifestation was delayed until a certain age, and justifies 
the usual translation of prākṛtika (or prākṛta) as ‗natural‘.  In contrast, the vaikṛta 
form of the conditions is interpreted by the GBh and MV as applicable to ordinary 
people, who acquire knowledge from a teacher, leading to the production of the other 
three sāttvika conditions (see §IV.7).  Gauḍapāda explains the term vaikṛta by the 
fact that the body of a teacher is a product (vikṛti).456  Although it is clear from these 
texts that the vaikṛta conditions are considered to be ‗acquired‘ rather than latent in 
                                                 
453
 tatra sāṃsiddhikā yathā bhagavataḥ kapilasyādisarge utpadyamānasya catvāro bhāvāḥ 
sahotpannāḥ—dharmaḥ, jñānaṃ, vairāgyaṃ aiśvaryam iti / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 3-5); tatra 
sāṃsiddhikās tāvat yathā kapilasya bhagavataḥ paramarṣer ādisarge utpannasya ime catvāro bhāvāḥ 
sahotpannā dharmo jñānaṃ vairāgyam aiśvaryam iti / ete sāṃsiddhikā ucyante / (MV on SK 43, p. 
60, ll. 6-9). 
454
 These figures also appear in a list of seven ṛṣis, including Kapila, found in MBh 12.327.64-65, a 
variation of which occurs in the GBh: 
sanaḥ sanatkujātaś ca sanakaḥ sasanandanaḥ / 
sanatkumāraḥ kapilaḥ saptamaś ca sanātanaḥ // 
saptaite mānasāḥ proktā ṛṣayo brahmaṇaḥ sutāḥ / 
svayamāgatavijñānā nivṛttaḥ dharmam āsthitāḥ // (MBh 12.327.64-65); 
sanakaś ca sanandanaś ca tṛtīyaś ca sanātanaḥ / 
 āsuriḥ kapilaś caiva voḍhuḥ pañcaśikhas tathā / 
 ity ete brahmaṇaḥ putrāḥ sapta proktā maharṣayaḥ // (GBh on SK 1, p. 35, ll. 16-18). 
It is not clear whether the term brahman in these verses is to be taken as masculine or neuter, but the 
mythological subject matter probably makes a case for the former.  See §V.5 for a discussion of the 
significance of GBh‘s grouping of Kapila with these ṛṣis, in contrast to the YD‘s elevation of Kapila 
to a special status. 
455
 prākṛtāḥ kathyante—brahmaṇaś catvāraḥ putrāḥ sanakasanandanasanātanasanatkumārā 
babhūvuḥ / teṣām utpannakāryakāraṇānāṃ śarīriṇāṃ ṣoḍaśavarṣāṇāṃ ete bhāvāś catvāraḥ 
samutpannāḥ, tasmād ete prākṛtāḥ / (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 5-7); prākṛtikā nāma brahmaṇaḥ 
putrāḥ kila sanakādayo babhūvuḥ / teṣām utpannakāryakāraṇānāṃ śarīravatāṃ ṣoḍaśavarṣāṇām 
evaite catvāro bhāvā akasmād evotpannā / nidhidarśanavat / ete ca prākṛtikā bhāvā ucyante / (MV 
on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 9-12). 
456
 tathā vaikṛtā yathā—ācāryamūrtiṃ nimittaṃ kṛtvā asmadādīnāṃ jñānam utpadyate, jñānād 
vairāgyaṃ, vairāgyād dharmaḥ, dharmād aiśvaryam iti / ācāryamūrtir api vikṛtir iti tasmād vaikṛtā / 
(GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 7-9); vaikṛtikā yathā—ācāryādimūrtim adhikṛtya utpannā vaikṛtikā ity 
ucyante / ācāryaṃ nimittaṃ kṛtvā jñānam utpadyate / jñānāt vairāgyaṃ, vairāgyād dharmo, dharmād 
aiśvaryam / evam ete catvāro bhāvā asmadādiṣv api vartante / tad evaṃ vaikṛtā ity ucyante / (MV on 
SK 43, p. 60, ll. 12-16). 
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the individual (as are the prākṛtika variety), according to Gauḍapāda‘s etymological 
explanation a literal translation of the term would be ‗deriving from a product‘.  
Although Gauḍapāda does not specify the source of this product, according to 
Sāṃkhya cosmology this would ultimately be primordial Materiality (pradhāna).  
Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s classification of the principles (tattva) into sources (prakṛti) and 
products (vikṛti) (SK 3)457 may be relevant to Gauḍapāda‘s interpretation of the term 
vaikṛta, insofar as the gross elements (mahābhūta) that make up a teacher‘s body are 
classed as products (vikṛti). 
In the context of its discussion of these three types of the bhāvas, the YD 
mentions only innate knowledge as possessed by Kapila, although elsewhere the text 
(like the other classical commentaries) mentions that he was endowed also with 
innate merit, dispassion, and lordliness.
458
  In explanation of his sāṃsiddhika jñāna, 
the text explains that since he was not encumbered by wickedness (khalatva), there 
was no hindrance to the production of his knowledge at the same time as the 
manifestation of his psycho-physical body (kāryakaraṇa)459.  The commentator goes 
on to say that for others, due to an obscuration of the constituent quality of goodness 
(sattva), the condition of knowledge results from a ‗flowing‘ (abhiṣyanda) from 
Materiality (prakṛti) after some time; this is the prākṛta variety.460  The assumption 
                                                 
457
 mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta / 
ṣoḍaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ // (SK 3). 
458
 paramarṣir bhagavān sāṃsiddhikair dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryair āviṣṭapiṇḍo viśvāgrajaḥ 
kapilamuniḥ / (YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 13-14). 
459
 The term kāryakaraṇa occurs very frequently in the YD.  In the same context (of the discussion of 
the forms of the bhāvas), GBh appears to gloss utpannakāryakaraṇa as śarīrin (‗embodied‘) (see n. 
455 above).  In the YD, kāryakaraṇa usually occurs in the singular (cf. n. 695 (§V.3)) and appears to 
refer simply to the ‗body‘, but in this passage it also occurs in the dual (p. 234, l. 3; see n. 460 below), 
in which case it would literally translate ‗the effect and the instrument‘.  Presumably, the term refers 
to the combination of the subtle body (the ‗instrument‘) and the physical body (the ‗effect‘).  (Cf. SK 
43cd: ‘[The bhāvas] are seen to be located in the instrument; the embryo, etc., are located in the 
effect.’ (dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ kāryāśrayiṇaś ca kalalādyāḥ).)  I thus use the term ‗psycho-physical 
body‘ here in the sense of the entire intellectual and physical organism. 
460
 tathā cārṣer ūho nopapadyate / pratibandhābhāvāt / na hy asya kāryakaraṇavyūha-
samakālajñānotpattau kaścit pratibandho ’sti / aparivṛtakhalatvād yataḥ kālāntaraṃ pratīkṣeta / 
tasmād asya sahaiva kāryakaraṇābhyāṃ jñānam abhiniṣpadyate pradīpaprakāśavat / ity ataḥ 
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that prakṛti as used in the singular here refers specifically to primordial Materiality 
(mūlaprakṛti; pradhāna) can be supported with reference to the YD‘s application of 
the term prākṛta, later in the commentary on SK 43, to the production of physical 
bodies (see below), in which they are said to arise out of pradhāna.461 According to 
this definition, then, the term prākṛta may be interpreted as ‗deriving from 
primordial Materiality‘. 
The YD also gives several examples of individuals born with innate 
(sāṃsiddhika) conditions other than knowledge, as well as several in whom there 
arose sāttvika conditions deriving from primordial Materiality (prākṛta).  As an 
illustration of the production of prākṛta conditions, the text describes the dispassion 
of Āsuri (Kapila‘s disciple), which arose when he was ‗favoured‘ (anugṛhīta) by a 
‗stream of purity‘ (śuddhisrotas) from prakṛti.462  This description further supports 
the above translation of prākṛta as ‗deriving from primordial Materiality‘. 
In summary, according to the YD, not only do prākṛta conditions arise 
‗naturally‘, but they arise specifically due to a flowing (abhiṣyanda) or stream 
(srotas) from Materiality (prakṛti).  The implications of this definition will be 
discussed further in CHAPTER V.  No explanation of the term vaikṛta is provided by 
the YD, but as in the GBh and MV, the YD states that vaikṛta conditions are 
                                                                                                                                          
sāṃsiddhikam / anyeṣāṃ tu sattvasyāpaṭutvāt kālāntareṇa prakṛtyabhiṣyandād <yad> drāg iti 
bhavati kṛṣṇasarpadarśanavat tat prākṛtam / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 31 – p. 234, l. 5). 
461
 prākṛtaṃ yathā māhātmy<a>śarīrābhi<dhy>ānāt tasya hy abhi<dhy>āno bhavati hatāhaṃ 
putrān <sra>kṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti ye māṃ paraṃ <cāparaṃ> ca jñāsyanti (cf. 239.13) / sa 
yādṛk sargam abhidhyāyati tādṛk pradhānād utpadyate (YD on SK 43d, p. 234, ll. 25-28). This 
assumption can be further supported by reference to another passage of the YD (on SK 39ab, p. 228, 
ll. 11-12), which uses similar terminology in describing the circumstances of the birth of Kapila 
himself; the implications of this terminological link will be discussed in §V.4. 
462
 yathā ca paramarṣer jñānaṃ sāṃsiddhikam evam māhātmyaśarīrasyaiśvaryaṃ bhṛgvādīnāṃ 
dharmaḥ sanakādīnāṃ vairāgyam, adharmo yakṣarakṣaḥprabhṛtīnām, anaiśvaryaṃ ṣaṭsiddhikṣaya-
kālotpannānāṃ mānuṣāṇāṃ tiraścāṃ ca, rāgo ’jñānaṃ <ca> paramarṣivarjyānām / prākṛtās tu 
tadyathā vairāgyaṃ bhagavadāsureḥ / tasya hi paramarṣisambhāvanād utpanno dharmo ’śuddiṃ 
pratidvandvibhāvād apaja<ghāna> / tasyām apahatāyāṃ prakṛteḥ śuddhisrotaḥ pravṛttaṃ 
yenānugṛhīto duḥkhatrayābhighātād utpannajijñāsaḥ pravrajitaḥ / tathā maheśvarasamparkān 
nandina aiśvaryam, nahuṣasyāgastyasamparkād dharma ityādi / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 6-14). 
138 
 
applicable to ordinary people,
463
 and the YD‘s interpretation of the prākṛta 
conditions as ‗deriving from Materiality‘ would accord with the GBh‘s interpretation 
of vaikṛta as ‗deriving from the products‘. 
The YD also outlines the views of two Sāṃkhya teachers preceding 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Pañcādhikaraṇa and Vindhyavāsin,464 with regard to the classification of 
the forms of the conditions.  According to the YD, Pañcādhikaraṇa held a twofold 
division of the conditions, into prākṛtika and vaikṛtika.  He divided the former into 
three types: ‗simultaneous with the principles‘ (tattvasamakāla), ‗innate‘ 
(sāṃsiddhika), and ‗flowing‘ (ābhiṣyandika).  He divided the latter into ‗self-
acquired‘ (svavaikṛta) and ‗acquired from others‘ (paravaikṛta).465 
The YD follows this description of Pañcādhikaraṇa‘s views with those of 
Vindhyavāsin with regard to the forms of the conditions.  The description of the 
latter‘s views, however, is somewhat unclear.  The commentator states that 
Vindhyavāsin rejects knowledge that is simultaneous with the principes (tattvasama) 
and innate (sāṃsiddhika) knowledge and accepts only knowledge that is attained 
(siddha).  This includes even Kapila‘s knowledge, which arises after the 
manifestation of the objects of creation, although Kapila‘s knowledge is of a clearer 
kind than that of others.  The commentator also mentions that, according to 
                                                 
463
 vaikṛtās tu bhāvā asmadādīnām / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, l. 14). 
464
 The views of these two teachers are known only through fragments in later texts; for summaries of 
this evidence, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 129-131, 141-146. 
465
 pañcādhikaraṇasya tāvad dvividhaṃ jñānaṃ prākṛtikaṃ vaikṛtikaṃ ca / prākṛtikaṃ trividhaṃ 
tattvasamakālaṃ saṃhataś ca mahāṃs tattvātmanā mahati ca pratyayo bhavati / utpannakārya-
karaṇasya tu sāṃsiddhikam ābhiṣyandikaṃ ca bhavati / utpannakāryakaraṇasya tu sāṃsiddhikam 
ābhiṣyandikaṃ ca bhavati / sāṃsiddhikaṃ yat saṃhatavyūhasamakālaṃ niṣpadyate yathā 
paramarṣer jñānam / ābhiṣyandikaṃ ca saṃsiddhakāryakaraṇasya kāraṇāntareṇotpadyate / vaikṛtaṃ 
tu dvividham / svavaikṛtaṃ paravaikṛtaṃ ca / svavaikṛtaṃ tārakam / paravaikṛtaṃ siddhyantarāṇi / 
āha ca— 
 tattvasamaṃ vaivartaṃ tatrābhiṣyandikaṃ dvitīyaṃ syāt / 
 vaikṛtam atas tṛtīyaṃ ṣāṭk<au>śikam etad ākhyātam // 
atra tu tattvaiḥ sahotpattyaviśeṣāt sāṃsiddhikam abhedenāha— 
 vaikṛtam api ca dvividhaṃ svavaikṛtaṃ tatra tārakaṃ bhavati / 
 syāt saptavidhaṃ paravaikṛtaṃ <su>tārādi nirdiṣṭam // 
iti / yathā jñānam evaṃ dharmādyo ’pīti / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 233, ll. 6-19). 
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Vindhyavāsin, the vaikṛtika forms of knowledge (tāraka, etc.; see §IV.10) are 
common to everyone.
466
  Since no mention is made in this passage of 
Pañcādhikaraṇa‘s ābhiṣyandika form of knowledge, it is not clear whether 
Vindhyavāsin‘s attained (siddha) form encompasses both the ābhiṣyandika and 
vaikṛtika forms or only the vaikṛta form.  The former seems more likely, though, 
since we are told that Vindhyavāsin rejects tattvasama and sāṃsiddhika but not 
ābhiṣyandika. 
The author of the YD explains that Īśvarakṛṣṇa rejects the possibility of 
knowledge arising simultaneously with the principles (as held by Pañcādhikaraṇa).467  
The YD‘s description of the production of prākṛta knowledge as the result of a 
flowing (abhiṣyanda) from Materiality (prakṛti) (see above) suggests an equivalence 
between Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s prākṛta and Pañcādhikaraṇa‘s ābhiṣyandika. Furthermore, the 
fact that Pañcādhikaraṇa placed innate (sāṃsiddhika) knowledge under the heading 
of natural (prākṛtika), and the YD‘s explanation of the distinction between these two 
types (see above), suggest that sāṃsiddhika knowledge is essentially of the same 
nature as prākṛtika knowledge, except that in Kapila‘s unique case there was no 
hindrance to the production of this condition from Materiality.  Later in this passage, 
the YD-kāra also suggests that Īśvarakṛṣṇa accepts Pañcādhikaraṇa’s division of 
                                                 
466
 vindhyavāsinas tu nāsti tattvasamaṃ sāṃsiddhikaṃ ca / kiṃ tarhi / siddh<a>rūpaṃ niṣpadyate 
yasmād gurumukhābhipratipatteḥ pratipatsyata ity <etad apy> āha siddhaṃ nimittaṃ 
naimittakasyānugrahaṃ kurute nāpūrvam utpādayati iti (cf. YBh on YS 4.12) / nimitta-
naimittikabhāvāc caivam upapadyate / tatra paramarṣeḥ paṭur ūho ’nyeṣāṃ kliṣṭa ity ayaṃ viśeṣaḥ / 
sarveṣām eva tu tārakādyaviśiṣṭam / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 233, ll. 20-26).  In the critical edition, 
Wezler and Motegi have amended the phrase siddhirūpaṃ (in all manuscripts) to siddharūpaṃ (as 
above); the original reading, however, would also make sense if we assume the identity of vaikṛta 
jñāna with siddhi (see §IV.10). 
467
 ācārya āha trividhā bhāvāḥ sāṃsiddhikāḥ prākṛtikā vaikṛtikāś ca (cf. SK 43ab) iti / tatra 
sāṃsiddhikagrahaṇāt tattvasamakālaṃ pratyācaṣṭe naiva tad astīti / katham / yadi hi tathā syāt 
tattvāntarānutpatti<ḥ> / saṅghāto vyūhaś cānarthakaḥ syāt / mahaty utpannaṃ jñānaṃ 
tatraivopalabdham iti kaḥ saṅghātārthaḥ / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 233, ll. 27-31). 
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vaikṛta knowledge into svavaikṛta and paravaikṛta, stating that ‘vaikṛta is twofold, 
as before’.468 
The YD is unique among the commentaries in taking the threefold 
classification into sāṃsiddhika, prākṛtika, and vaikṛta to apply not only to the 
production of the bhāvas but also to the production of the physical body.  SK 43cd 
states that ‘[the bhāvas] are seen to be located in the instrument [i.e., either the 
intellect (buddhi) or the internal instrument plus the faculties
469
]; the embryo, etc., 
are located in the effect [i.e., the body].’470  GBh, MV and TK take the term 
‘embryo, etc.’ (kalalādi) to refer to a series of stages in the development of the 
physical body.
471
  The YD does not mention these stages, discussing instead the 
manner in which the body and its characteristics are produced.  In this connection, 
the YD-kāra takes the threefold division applied to the bhāvas in SK 43ab to apply 
also to ‘the embryo, etc.’  As examples of the sāṃsiddhika category, he mentions the 
bodies of planets, stars, and asterisms,
472
 and the particular innate characteristics of 
species, such as the whiteness of swans and the variegated colours of partridges and 
peacocks. He interprets the prākṛta category to refer to the ability of gods to produce 
                                                 
468
 vaikṛtaṃ tu dvividhaṃ pūrvavat / (YD on SK 43abc, p. 234, ll. 5-6). 
469
 GBh glosses karaṇa as buddhi (GBh on SK 43, p. 153, l.13: buddhiḥ karaṇam tadāśrayiṇaḥ), 
while MV identifies the ‗instruments‘ (karaṇāni) with the sense- and action-faculties and the 
threefold internal instrument of buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and manas (MV on SK 43, p. 60, ll. 19-21: 
karaṇāny ucyante buddhi-karmāntaḥkaraṇabhedāḥ trayodaśa / tāny āśrityāṣṭau bhāvāḥ pravartante 
/); cf. SK 33ab, which presents this division into internal and external instruments: antaḥkaraṇaṃ 
trividhaṃ daśadhā bāhyaṃ trayasya viṣayākhyam. 
470
 dṛṣṭāḥ karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ kāryāśrayiṇaś ca kalalādyāḥ (SK 43cd). 
471
 kāryaṃ dehas tadāśrayāḥ kalalādyāḥ, ye mātṛjā ity uktāḥ / śukraśoṇitasaṃyoge vivṛddhihetukāḥ 
kalalādyā budbudamāṃsapeśīprabhṛtayaḥ, tathā kaumārayauvanasthaviratvādayo bhāvāḥ, 
annapānarasanimittāḥ niṣpadyante / ataḥ kāryāśrayiṇa ucyante annādiviṣayabhoganimittā jāyante / 
(GBh on SK 43, p. 153, ll. 15-18); yathā sūkṣmaśarīram utpattikāle mātur udaraṃ praviśati / mātuḥ 
rudhiraṃ pituḥ śukraṃ tasya sūkṣmaśarīrasyopacayaṃ kurute / kalalabudbudaghanamāṃsapeśī-
garbhakumārayauvanasthāvirādayo ’nnapānarasanimittā utpadyante / (MV on SK 43, p. 60, l. 23 – 
p. 61, l. 3); kāryaṃ śarīraṃ tadāśrayiṇaḥ, tasyāvasthāḥ, kalalabudbudamāṃsapeśīkaraṇḍādyaṅga-
pratyaṅgavyūhāḥ garbhasthasya, tato nirgatasya bālasya bālyakaumārayauvanavārdhakānīti / (TK 
on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 22-24). 
472
 The term vaivarta, literally meaning ‗revolution‘, must refer to ‗revolving heavenly bodies‘ here, 
since it is glossed as grahanakṣatratārādi, ‗planets, asterisms and stars‘.  According to MONIER-
WILLIAMS, the term vivarta is similarly attested as a name of the sky, ‗the revolving one‘, in Vedic 
literature.  Perhaps the bodies of stars and planets are considered innate in the sense that they have 
always existed? 
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bodies that arise directly out of primordial Materiality (pradhāna).  As examples of 
this, he refers to a mythological story (reproduced in full by the YD-kāra in the 
context of his discussion of the pratyayasarga; see §IV.9) in which a 
māhātmyaśarīra (‘body of greatness’) 473 produces sons simply by thinking about 
them, and also to the production of millions of Rudras by Śiva (maheśvara).474  As 
an example of the vaikṛta form of the production of bodies, the commentator 
describes a pregnant woman who gives birth after drinking milk, ‘as described in the 
science of medicine (bhiṣagveda)’.475 
In this passage, the description of the māhātmyaśarīra’s sons as arising out of 
pradhāna supports the translation of prākṛtika as ‘deriving from primordial 
Materiality’ (see above).  Moreover, since milk can be considered a product (vikṛti), 
like the body of a teacher as mentioned by GBh (see above), the translation of 
vaikṛta as ‘deriving from the products’ would be appropriate in this instance as well. 
The TK’s interpretation of the SK’s classification of the forms of the 
conditions (SK 43) differs from that of the other commentaries.  Vācaspati takes the 
                                                 
473
 On the apparent identification of the māhātmyaśarīra with either Brahmā or Śiva, see the review in 
CHAPTER III of BRONKHORST (1983) and the discussion in §V.3. 
474
 Since two separate mythological stories are referenced in this passage, there is no reason to take 
māhātmyaśarīra and maheśvara to refer to the same figure, despite the evidence presented by 
BRONKHORST (1983, p. 152) for the identity of māhātmyaśarīra with Śiva (cf. §V.3). 
475
 yathā caite tathā—kāryāśrayiṇaś ca kalalādyāḥ // (SK 43d) trividhaiveti / kalalādigrahaṇena 
śarīrāṇy āha / teṣām ākṛtivaiśvarūpyaṃ caturdaśavidhe saṃsāre trividham / tatra sāṃsiddhikas tāvat 
vaivartānāṃ grahanakṣatratārādīnām / jātikṛtaś ca viśeṣaḥ <yathā(?)> haṃsānāṃ śauklyaṃ 
tittirimayūrādīnāṃ citracchadatvam iti / prākṛtaṃ yathā māhātmy<a>śarīrābhi<dhy>ānāt tasya hy 
abhi<dhy>āno bhavati hantāhaṃ putrān <sra>kṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti ye māṃ paraṃ 
<cāparaṃ> ca jñāsyanti (cf. 239.13) / sa yādṛk sargam abhidhyāyati tādṛk pradhānād utpadyate 
tadyathā maheśvarasya rudrakoṭisṛṣṭau iti / vaikṛtās tu kalalādyā yathā bhiṣagvede ’bhihitaṃ kṣīraṃ 
pītvā garbhiṇī gauraṃ putraṃ janayati (cf. Bṛh. U. 6.4.14) iti / (YD on SK 43d, p. 234, l. 20 – p. 235, 
l. 2).  LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 60) appear to have fundamentally misinterpreted this 
passage by correlating the three forms of the production of bodies with the possession of the three 
forms of the bhāvas: ‗The author of the Yuktidīpikā, in explaining the adjectives “sāṃsiddhika,‖ 
―prākṛta‖, and ―vaikṛta‖ as modifiers of the term ―bhāva‖ in verse 43 of the Kārikā [...] comments 
that those beings endowed with ―modified‖ (vaikṛta) predispositions transmigrate in the usual fashion 
through a continuing process of rebirth, (b) those beings endowed with ―inherently powerful‖ 
(prākṛta) predispositions (namely, the māhātmyaśarīras, or Great Beings) can generate whatever 
bodies they wish; and (c) those beings endowed with ―innate‖ (sāṃsiddhika) or perfect 
predispositions have subtle bodies that transmigrate among ―the planets, the lunar mansions, and the 
stars‖ (grahaṇakṣatratārādi).‘ 
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term sāṃsiddhika as a gloss on prākṛtika, thus making the classification twofold: 
prākṛtika and vaikṛtika.  He describes the prākṛtika variety as ‘natural’ (svābhāvika) 
and ‘innate’ (sāṃsiddhika) and offers the stock example of Kapila’s innate merit, 
knowledge, dispassion, and lordliness.
476
  Although this equivalence of prākṛtika and 
sāṃsiddhika is clearly a departure from the views of the earlier commentators, it 
does call to mind the essential similarity between the two suggested by the YD.  
Vācaspati explains the vaikṛtika variety as being brought about after the individual’s 
birth, by means of the performance of activities such as the worship of deities.  As an 
example of vaikṛtika conditions, he mentions the sāttvika conditions of the great 
seers (maharṣi) such as Prācetasa477.478  It is significant that, following the general 
trend of the earlier commentators, Vācaspati distinguishes between Kapila and other 
ṛṣis in this respect (see CHAPTER V). 
In summary, the YD provides a more elaborate interpretation of the nature of 
the sāṃsiddhika and prākṛtika forms of the bhāvas than do the other commentaries.  
This interpretation is compatible with the explanations of GBh and MV.  The 
evidence of the YD suggests that prākṛtika conditions are the result of a flowing 
(abhiṣyanda) or stream (srotas) from Materiality (prakṛti), that the term prākṛtika 
thus be translated as ‘deriving from primordial Materiality’, and that sāṃsiddhika 
conditions are also of a prākṛtika nature but differ in being produced at the birth of 
an individual.  The fact that, according to the YD’s interpretation of the term 
prākṛtika, physical bodies, like the bhāvas, can be produced directly from pradhāna, 
will be discussed further in §V.4, in connection with the circumstances surrounding 
                                                 
476
 vaikṛtikāḥ naimittikāḥ puruṣasya jātasyottarakāladevatārādhanādinotpannāḥ / prākṛtikāḥ 
svābhāvikā bhāvāḥ sāṃsiddhikāḥ / tathā hi—sargādāv ādividvān atra bhagavān kapilo mahāmunir 
dharmajñāna-vairāgyaiśvaryasampannaḥ prādurbabhūveti smaranti / (TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 1-4) 
477
 Jha (Tattvakaumudī (2004), p. 128) identifies prācetasa as an epithet of Vālmīki, although it could 
also refer to Manu or (perhaps less likely) Dakṣa. 
478
 vaikṛtāś ca bhāvā asāṃsiddhikāḥ, ye upāyānuṣṭhānen-otpannāḥ, yathā prācetasaprabhṛtīnām 
maharṣīṇām / evam adharmājñānāvairāgyānaiśvaryāṇy api / (TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 5-7). 
143 
 
the birth of Kapila himself.    The GBh’s explanation of the term vaikṛta suggests 
that it be similarly interpreted as ‘deriving from the products’, which accords with 
the YD’s interpretation of the vaikṛta production of physical characteristics.  The 
TK, like the other commentaries, affords a special status to Kapila in terms of the 
production of his bhāvas.  However, the TK differs fundamentally from the other 
commentaries in its classification of the forms of the conditions, suggesting a break 
in the tradition of interpretation. 
Although, as discussed in §IV.6-7, in the context of SK 23 the YD-kāra 
explains that liberating knowledge may either be produced suddenly (apūrva) 
through the attainments (siddhi) or may be generated through practice (abhyāsaja), 
we have seen that under SK 43 the commentator also allows for the ‘flowing’ of this 
knowledge directly from primordial Materiality, which in the case of Kapila 
occurred at the time of his birth.  It would seem logical to assume that the 
sāṃsiddhika and prākṛtika modes of production of jñāna apply only to the kind of 
extraordinary individuals who are mentioned by the YD-kāra in this context, while 
most seekers are considered capable of attaining only vaikṛta jñāna either in a 
sudden fashion or through progressive practice.  One would expect the Sāṃkhya 
texts themselves to play a prominent role in informing such ordinary individuals of 
the existence of the Sāṃkhya tattvas.  The commentator’s discussion of the modes of 
production of the bhāvas does not tell us much about the role of the Sāṃkhya 
tradition in the production of jñāna.  However, as will be shown in §IV.10, this 
discussion does provide a link to the Sāṃkhya paradigm of the pratyayasarga, which 
directly concerns the transmission of knowledge through teacher and text. 
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§9. The commentators’ interpretations of the intellectual creation 
 (pratyayasarga). 
 
The manner in which the condition (bhāva) of knowledge (jñāna) is attained by 
ordinary seekers of liberation, and the role of the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and 
teachers in producing such knowledge, can be clarified by reference to the YD‘s 
treatment of the related Sāṃkhya paradigm of the intellectual creation 
(pratyayasarga). 
 The commentators‘ interpretations of the four categories and fifty 
subcategories of the pratyayasarga follow the classifications given in SK 46-51 (see 
§II.5), although these interpretations vary.  After a discussion of the commentators‘ 
views on the general nature of the pratyayasarga, this section will focus specifically 
on the commentators‘ explanations of the forms of attainment (siddhi), one of the 
four main divisions of the pratyayasarga.  Attainment is associated by the 
commentators with the production of knowledge leading to liberation (mokṣa, 
kaivalya) and with the transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil.  The 
discussion of attainment, particularly in the YD, thus provides some key information 
with regard to the nature of Kapila‘s knowledge and the importance of his authority 
in the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 GBh, MV and TK are unanimous in glossing the term pratyaya as buddhi 
(intellect) and explaining the term pratyayasarga as thus ‗the creation of the 
intellect‘.479  The YD offers three alternative explanations of the term.  First, the 
commentator gives padārtha and lakṣaṇa as synonyms of pratyaya, indicating that 
pratyayasarga refers to the ‗creation of categories [i.e. of the fifty categories 
                                                 
479
 pratyayo buddhir ity uktā, adhyavasāyo buddhir dharmo jñānam ity ādi / (GBh on SK 46, p. 160, 
l. 4); pratyayāt buddher utpanno yasmāt tasmāt pratyayasarga ity ucyate / (MV on SK 46, p. 63, ll. 8-
9); pratīyate ’neneti pratyayo buddhiḥ, tasya sargaḥ / (TK on SK 46, p. 133, l. 1). 
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(padārtha)480]‘.  The second explanation corresponds to that of the GBh, MV and 
TK, but the YD adds that sarga (creation) refers to the effect or function of the 
intellect.  Lastly, the commentator suggests that the term could be interpreted as ‗the 
creation caused by an intellect‘.481 
 In connection with the third explanation of the term pratyayasarga, the YD-
kāra quotes a passage (arguably from the pre-classical Sāṃkhya text Ṣaṣṭitantra)482 
relating a mythological story in which a māhātmyaśarīra (‗body of greatness‘)483, 
referred to by the YD-kāra as Brahmā, produces as his sons, by means of his thought 
alone, a series of gods (deva) associated with particular streams (srotas): five gods 
having ‗primary streams‘ (mukhyasrotas), twenty-eight having ‗horizontal streams‘ 
(tiryaksrotas), nine having ‗upward streams‘ (ūrdhvasrotas), and eight having 
‗downward streams‘ (arvāksrotas).  The YD-kāra equates these with the five forms 
of error (viparya), the twenty-eight forms of incapacity (aśakti), the nine forms of 
contentment (tuṣṭi), and the eight forms of attainment (siddhi), respectively.484  
Elsewhere, he mentions that the māhātmyaśarīra‘s sons arise out of primordial 
                                                 
480
 As outlined in §II.5, the pratyayasarga is divided into four main categories—error (viparyaya), 
incapacity (aśakti), contentment (tuṣṭi) and attainment (siddhi)—which are subdivided into fifty 
categories (padārtha). 
481
 pratyayasarga iti pratyayaḥ padārtho lakṣaṇam iti paryāyāḥ / pratyayānāṃ sargaḥ 
pratyayasargaḥ padārthasargo lakṣaṇasarga ity arthaḥ / athavā pratyayo buddhiḥ niścayo 
’dhyavasāya iti paryāyāḥ / tasya sargo ’yam, ataḥ pratyayasargaḥ pratyayakāryaṃ pratyayavyapāra 
ity arthaḥ / athavā pratyayapūrvakaḥ sargaḥ pratyayasargaḥ / buddhipūrvaka ity uktaḥ / (YD on SK 
46ab, p. 239, ll. 6-10). 
482
 On the apparent origin of this passage in the Ṣaṣṭitantra, see the reviews in CHAPTER III of 
FRAUWALLNER (1973) and OBERHAMMER (1961). 
483
 On the identification of the māhātmyaśarīra with either Brahmā or Śiva, see the review in 
CHAPTER III of BRONKHORST (1983) and further discussion in §V.3. 
484
 evaṃ hi śāstraṃ mahadādiviśeṣāntaḥ sargo buddhipūrvakatvāt / utpannakāryakaraṇas tu 
māhātmyaśarīra ekākinam ātmānam avekṣyābhidadhyau hantāhaṃ putrān srakṣye ye me karma 
kariṣyanti / ye māṃ paraṃ cāparaṃ ca jñāsyanti / tasyābhidhyāyataḥ pañca mukhyasrotaso devāḥ 
prādurbabhūvuḥ / teṣūtpanneṣu na tuṣṭiṃ lebhe / tato ’nye tiryaksrotaso ’ṣṭāviṃśatiḥ prajajñe / teṣv 
apy asya matir naiva tasthe, athāparena vordhvasrotaso devāḥ prādurbabhūvuḥ / teṣv apy utpanneṣu 
naiva kṛtārtham ātmānaṃ mene / tato ’nye ’ṣṭāv arvāksrotasa utpeduḥ / evaṃ tasmād brahmaṇo 
’bhidhyānād utpannaḥ, tasmāt pratyayasargaḥ / sa viparyayākhyo ’śaktyākhyas tuṣṭyākhyaḥ 
siddhyākhyaś ceti / (YD on SK 46ab, p.239, ll. 11-20). 
146 
 
Materiality (pradhāna) (see §IV.8).485  Moreover, in his discussion of the function of 
siddhi in particular, the commentator states: ‗The stream of attainment (siddhisrotas) 
which is always issuing out of primordial Materiality (pradhāna) does not function 
in all beings, on account of the interference of error, incapacity, and contentment.‘486  
As discussed by OBERHAMMER (1961)
487
, it is significant that thus, according to the 
YD, the categories of the pratyayasarga, like the prākṛtika variety of the bhāvas (see 
§IV.8), arise as a stream out of pradhāna.  This and other evidence in the YD of the 
relationship between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga will be discussed in §IV.10. 
 In his commentary on SK 51, the YD-kāra correlates the four streams 
mentioned above to four classes of beings.  Inanimate objects (sthāvara) have 
‗primary streams‘ (mukhyasrotas) and are thus characterised by error (viparyaya).  
Animals (tiryañc) have ‗horizontal streams‘ (tiryaksrotas) and are thus characterised 
by incapacity (aśakti).  Gods (deva) have ‗upward streams‘ (ūrdhvasrotas) and are 
thus characterised by contentment (tuṣṭi).  Human beings (māṇuṣa) have ‗downward 
streams‘ (arvāksrotas) and are thus characterised by attainment (siddhi).  Human 
beings therefore progress toward attainment but are hindered by error, incapacity, 
and contentment.
488
  The GBh, however, appears to conflict with this scheme by 
defining siddhi as ‗knowledge characterised by the constituent quality of goodness 
(sāttvika) in one with an upward stream (ūrdhvasrotas)‘.489  It is unclear whether 
Gauḍapāda holds gods rather than human beings to be capable of attainment, or 
                                                 
485
 prākṛtaṃ yathā māhātmy<a>śarīrābhi<dhy>ānāt tasya hy abhi<dhy>āno bhavati hantāhaṃ 
putrān <sra>kṣye ye me karma kariṣyanti ye māṃ paraṃ <cāparaṃ> ca jñāsyanti (cf. 239.13) / sa 
yādṛk sargam abhidhyāyati tādṛk pradhānād utpadyate tadyathā maheśvarasya rudrakoṭisṛṣṭau iti / 
(YD on SK  43d, p. 234, ll. 25-29). 
486
 nityapravṛttasyāpi pradhānāt siddhisrotaso viparyayāśaktituṣṭipratibandhāt sarvaprāṇiṣv 
apravṛttir bhavati / (YD on SK 51d, p. 252, l. 30 – p. 253, l. 1). 
487
 OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 139-140. 
488
 viparyayāt tāvat sthāvareṣu / te hi mukhy<a>srotaso viparyayātmānaḥ / aśaktes tiryakṣu / te hi 
tiryaksrotaso ’śaktyātmānaḥ / tuṣṭer deveṣu / te hy ūrdhvasrotasas tuṣṭyātmānaḥ / mānuṣās tv 
arvāksrotasaḥ saṃsiddhyātmānaḥ / tasmāt ta eva tārakādiṣu pravartante sattvarajastamasāṃ 
cāṅgāṅgibhāvāniyamād viparyayāśaktituṣṭibhiḥ pratihanyanta iti na sarveṣām sarvadā siddhir 
bhavati / (YD on SK 51, p. 253, ll. 1-6). 
489
 tathā aṣṭavidhā siddhiḥ / sāttvikāni jñānāni tatraivordhvasrotasi / (GBh on SK 47, p. 162, l. 16). 
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rather holds human beings rather than gods to be characterised by upward streams.  
There is no evidence available to explain this discrepancy between the evidence of 
the GBh and the YD.  The YD, however, provides a more complete and elaborate 
picture of the relation of the categories of the pratyayasarga to the four classes of 
beings. 
 In summary, the pratyayasarga can be defined as a creation of fifty 
categories, representing the various effects or functions of the intellect, and 
applicable in different degrees to different classes of beings.  The mythological 
dimension of the production of these categories, added by the YD, is representative 
of a general tendency on the part of the YD-kāra—a tendency, at least in this 
instance, which seems to be carried on from the Ṣaṣtitantra490—to incorporate 
figures of divine authority or prominence into discussions of Sāṃkhya doctrine (see 
§V.3-5). 
 With regard to the four divisions of the pratyayasarga, GBh and MV 
illustrate the relationship between them with an example involving the perception of 
a post (sthāṇu).  In this situation, error (viparyaya) is described as a doubt as to 
whether it is a post or a person.  Incapacity (aśakti) is the inability to dispel this 
doubt, even when the post is seen clearly.  Contentment (tuṣṭi) applies to one who 
does not care about knowing whether it is a post or not.  Attainment (siddhi) is the 
realisation that it is in fact a post, when one sees a creeper or a bird upon it.
491
 
                                                 
490
 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 260: ‗Religious sects present their theories not in the abstract 
objective form like the philosophical schools.  They would rather like to clothe them in the form of 
stories and they especially give them a drapery of myths. [...]  The influence of such a myth-making 
kind shows itself in many parts of the Sāṃkhya theory of the old school of Vṛṣagaṇa.‘ 
491
 tatra saṃśayo ’jñānaṃ viparyayaḥ / yathā sthāṇudarśane sthāṇur ayaṃ puruṣo veti saṃśayaḥ / 
aśaktir yathā—tam eva sthāṇuṃ samyag dṛṣṭvā saṃśayaṃ chettuṃ na śaknotīty aśaktiḥ / eva tṛtītyas 
tuṣṭyākhyo yathā—tam eva sthāṇuṃ jñātuṃ saṃśayituṃ vā necchati, kim anenāsmākam ity eṣā tuṣṭiḥ 
/ caturthaḥ siddhyākhyo yathā—ānanditendriyaḥ sthāṇum ārūḍhāṃ valliṃ paśyati śakuniṃ vā, tasya 
siddhir bhavati sthāṇur ayam iti / (GBh on SK 46, p. 160, ll. 5-10); saṃśayabuddhir viparyayaḥ 
sthāṇur ayaṃ puruṣo veti / bhūyo ’pi sthāṇuṃ prasamīkṣya na śaknoty antaraṃ gantum evam 
asyāśaktir utpannā / tatas tṛtīyaḥ tam eva sthāṇuṃ jñātuṃ saṃśayituṃ vā necchati kim anenāsmākam 
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 In a similar manner, YD uses the example of the attainment of merit 
(dharma) to illustrate the categories of the pratyayasarga.  When one engaged in the 
pursuit of dharma, abandoning sacrifices like the agniṣṭoma, creates confusion 
(saṃkara)492, this is considered error (viparyaya).  In this context, incapacity (aśakti) 
is the inability [to perform sacrifice] due to a deficiency in the means [of sacrifice].  
Contentment (tuṣṭi) is satisfaction with merely lighting [the sacred fire] (ādhāna).  
Attainment (siddhi) is the performance of the particular [sacrificial] act in its 
entirety.  The commentator adds that these categories are applicable in the same way 
to the pursuit of other objects.
493
  In his commentary on SK 51, the YD-kāra 
describes siddhi as the attainment of abhipretam artham.
494
  The significance of this 
phrase is not clear from the context, but in its broadest, most literal sense it translates 
as ‗an intended object‘.495 
 These passages suggest that the categories of the pratyayasarga describe 
potentially any situation in which the attainment of an object is considered to be 
hindered by error, incapacity and contentment (cf. SK 51d
496
).  However, the 
                                                                                                                                          
ity eṣā tuṣṭiḥ / bhūyaś caturtho (dṛṣṭaṃ yasmin) sthāṇvādirūḍhāṃ valliṃ paśyati śakuniṃ vā / tato 
’sya niścaya utpadyate sthāṇur ayam ity eṣā siddhiḥ / (MV on SK 46, p. 63, ll. 11-16). 
492
 The term saṃkara usually refers to the intermixture of castes through indiscriminate marriage, but 
it could alternatively refer simply to confusion of the elements of the ritual act.  Kumar and Bhargava 
(Yuktidīpikā (1990-1992), p.322) follow the former interpretation, while KENGHE (1968, p. 366) 
follows the latter.  KENGHE‘s interpretation seems more likely, given the context of the performance 
of ritual. 
493
 tadyathā dharmārthapravṛtto ’gniṣṭomādīn parityajya saṃkaraṃ kurvīta so ’sya viparyayaḥ, 
sādhanavaikalyād asāmarthyam aśaktiḥ, ādhānamātrasantoṣas tuṣṭiḥ, kṛtsnasya kriyā-
viśeṣasyānuṣṭhānaṃ siddhiḥ / evam <anyā>rthādiṣu yojyam / yaś cāyaṃ caturvidhaḥ phalaviśeṣo 
viparyayādir ākhyataḥ (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, l. 22 – p. 240, l. 2).  My interpretation follows the 
emendation of the text by Wezler and Motegi.  The phrase arthādiṣu in all manuscripts, coming after 
the illustration of dharma, could alternatively suggest that the passage refers to the traditional four 
‗goals of man‘ (puruṣārtha): dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa. 
494
 tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam arthaṃ vicāraṇābalenaiva 
pratipadyate sādyā siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 251, ll. 12-13); etāsāṃ 
saṃśrayeṇābhipretam arthaṃ yataḥ saṃsādhayantīty ataḥ pūrvācāryagataṃ mārgam ārurukṣus 
tatpravaṇaḥ syād iti / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 252, ll. 22-24). 
495
 For a possible alternative explanation of the phrase abhipretam artham, see §V.1. 
496
 siddheḥ pūrvo ’ṅkuśas trivividhaḥ / (SK 51d): ‘The previous are the threefold curb to attainment.’  
GBh, MV, and TK explain the term aṅkuśa (literally, ‘hook’) using the metaphor of an elephant 
which is restrained by a hook; e.g.: yathā hastī gṛhītāṅkuśena vaśo bhavati, evaṃ 
viparyayāśaktituṣṭibhir gṛhīto loko ’jñānaṃ prāpnoti / (GBh on SK 51, p. 171, ll. 19-20). 
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commentators generally discuss siddhi in terms of the attainment of Sāṃkhya 
knowledge and stress that, like the condition of jñāna (see §IV.6), siddhi leads 
ultimately to the attainment of liberation (kaivalya).  For instance, YD refers to 
liberation as the ‗highest attainment‘.497  GBh and MV say that siddhi leads to 
knowledge of the principles (tattva), which in turn results in liberation.
498
  Given this 
concern with the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge in particular, it is possible that 
the term abhipretārtham in the YD refers more specifically to the ‗intended goal‘ of 
Sāṃkhya—that is, to liberation through knowledge. 
 Similarly, the commentators‘ explanations of the subdivisions of viparyaya, 
aśakti, and tuṣṭi generally focus upon their role as hindrances to the production of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge.  For a discussion of the views of GBh, YD, JM and TK (with a 
focus on the YD) on these subdivisions, see KENGHE (1968).  KENGHE has 
demonstrated the relation of the categories of viparyaya and tuṣṭi to the doctrines of 
Pātañjalayoga (see CHAPTER III). Moreover, OBERHAMMER (1961) has suggested that 
the categories of the pratyayasarga had their origins as ‗meditative existential 
attitudes‘ in ‗circles connected with Yoga‘.499  Accordingly, the YD‘s explanation of 
the way in which siddhi eliminates viparyaya, aśakti, and tuṣṭi seems to reflect a 
view of siddhi as the result of yogic practice.  The YD-kāra explains that because 
siddhi results in unrestricted knowledge, it eliminates error.  Similarly, because 
siddhi results in non-obstruction with regard to things past, present and future, things 
near and remote, and things grasped by the senses and suprasensuous (atīndriya), it 
eliminates incapacity.  These abilities recall the supernormal powers termed siddhi in 
                                                 
497
 eteṣāṃ mārge’vasthāpanāt parāṃ siddhiṃ kaivalyalakṣaṇām acireṇa prāpnoti / (YD on SK 51d, 
p. 253, ll. 12-13). 
498
 sasiddhes tattvajñānam utpadyate / tasmāt mokṣa iti / (GBh on SK 51, p. 171, l. 21); siddhes 
tattvajñānaṃ tasmāc ca mokṣa iti (MV on SK 51, p. 69, l. 19). 
499
 OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 162-163. 
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Yoga and associated with aiśvarya (also said to result in non-obstruction500) in 
Sāṃkhya (see §IV.6), as well as the fact that yogins are said to be able to perceive 
suprasensuous objects (see §IV.1).  Moreover, the YD continues, because siddhi 
leads to knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness, it 
dispels contentment (tuṣṭi) with any lesser stage of accomplishment (bhūmi).  This 
accords with KENGHE‘s501 comparison of tuṣṭi with the notion of alabdhabhūmikatva 
(‗the state of not having attained a stage‘) in Yoga.502 
 It thus seems reasonable to conclude that this passage of the YD reflects, in 
some sense, the original association of the categories of the pratyayasarga with 
stages of yogic practice.  However, the commentators‘ descriptions of the 
subdivisions of siddhi do not mention the practices of Yoga but rather deal largely 
with the production and transmission of knowledge.  As KENGHE notes,
503
 the notion 
of siddhi in Sāṃkhya can thus be sharply contrasted with the notion of siddhi or 
aiśvarya in Pātañjalayoga, which is generally held by the Sāṃkhya texts to be a 
hindrance to liberation through knowledge (see §IV.6).  The Sāṃkhya 
commentators‘ association of siddhi with the attainment of knowledge, rather than of 
supernatural abilities, reflects the system‘s emphasis on knowledge as the sole means 
to liberation.  The remainder of this section will be devoted to a discussion of the 
subdivisions of siddhi and their relation to the production and transmission of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge. 
 As outlined in §II.5, SK 51 lists the eight varieties of siddhi as reflection 
(ūha), speech (śabda), study (adhyayana), the three removals of pain 
                                                 
500
 SK 45c: aiśvaryād avighāto. 
501
 KENGHE (1968), p. 369. 
502
 yathā ca siddheḥ viparyayāśaktituṣṭayaḥ pratipakṣā evaṃ siddhir api viparyayādīnām / sā hy 
utpannā sarvān etān nivartayati / katham / aviparītajñānaṃ viparyayam, atītānāgatavartamāneṣu 
sannikṛṣṭeṣu viprakṛṣṭeṣv indriyagrāhyeṣv atīndriyeṣu cāpratighātād aśaktim, puruṣasya 
prakṛtivikāravyatiriktasya darśānāt sarvāsu bhūmiṣu tuṣṭim / (YD on SK 51d, p. 253, ll. 7-11). 
503
 KENGHE (1968), p. 373. 
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(duḥkhavighāta), attainment of/from friends (suhṛtprāpti), and charity (dāna).  GBh 
explains each of these as a distinct means of attaining liberation.  Reflection (ūha) is 
described as the reflection by an individual on the questions: ‗What is the truth here?  
What is the highest?  What leads to the ultimate?  Doing what will I have attained 
my goal?‘  This reflection leads to the knowledge of the distinctions between the 
principles (tattva) and resultant liberation.  Knowledge gained through speech or 
language (śabda) produces the same knowledge of the principles and liberation. 
Likewise, study (adhyayana) of texts (śāstra) such as the Veda leads to the same 
result.  (This point is surprising, given Sāṃkhya‘s rejection of scriptural 
(ānuśravika) means to liberation (SK 2; see §II.3).)  The three pains are listed as 
personal (ādhyātmika), external (ādhibhautika) and divine (ādhidaivika), which are 
explained by the commentators under SK 1 in connection with the reason given for 
initiating the Sāṃkhya enquiry.504  These pains motivate one to approach a teacher 
(guru), from whose teachings one attains liberation.  The seventh siddhi, suhṛtprāpti, 
is described simply as the attainment of knowledge from a friend, which likewise 
leads to liberation.  Lastly, charity (dāna) is the attainment of liberating knowledge 
from a holy man (bhagavat) whom one has given gifts such as shelter, medicine, 
staff, bowl, food or clothing.
505
  Although Gauḍapāda thus explains each of these 
                                                 
504
 E.g., GBh on SK 1, p. 36, ll. 1-6: tatra duḥkhatrayam—ādhyātmikam, ādhibhautikam, 
ādhidaivikaṃ ceti / tatrodhyātmikaṃ dvividham—śārīraṃ, mānasaṃ ceti / śārīraṃ 
vātapittaśleṣmaviparyayakṛtaṃ jvarātīsārādi / mānasaṃ priyaviyogāpriyasaṃyogādi / ādhibhautikaṃ 
caturvidhabhūtagrāmanimittaṃ manuṣyapaśumṛgapakṣisarīsṛpadaṃśamaśakayūkāmatkuṇamatsya-
makaragrāhasyāvarebhyo jarāyujāṇḍajasvedajodbhijjebhyaḥ sakāśād upajāyate / ādhidaivikam—
devānām idaṃ daivam, divaḥ prabhavatīti vā daivam /. 
505
 ūho yathā kaścin nityam ūhate—kim iha satyaṃ, kiṃ paraṃ, kiṃ naiḥśreyasaṃ, kiṃ kṛtva 
kṛtārthaḥ syām—iti cintayato jñānam utpadyate pradhānād anya eva puruṣa iti, anyā buddhiḥ, 
anyo ’haṅkāraḥ, anyāni tanmātrāṇīndriyāṇi pañca mahābhūtānīty evaṃ tattvajñānam utpadyate yena 
mokṣo bhavati / eṣā ūhākhyā prathamā siddhiḥ / tathā śabdajñānāt pradhānapuruṣabuddhy-
ahaṅkāratanmātrendriyapañcamahābhūtaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ bhavati, tato mokṣa ity eṣā śabdākhyā 
siddhiḥ / adhyayanād vedādiśāstrādhyayanāt pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ prāpya mokṣaṃ yāti, ity eṣā 
tṛtīyā siddhiḥ / duḥkhavighātatrayam / ādhyātmikādhibhautikādhidaivikaduḥkhatrayavighātāya 
guruṃ samupagamya tata upadeśān mokṣaṃ yāti / eṣā caturthī siddhiḥ / eṣaiva duḥkhatrayabhedāt 
tridhā kalpanīyā / iti ṣaṭ siddhayaḥ / tathā suhṛtprāptiḥ / yathā kaścit suhṛjjñānam adhigamya 
mokṣaṃ gacchati / eṣā saptamī siddhiḥ / dānam / yathā kaścid bhagavatāṃ pratyāśrayauṣadhi-
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siddhis in terms of a separate means of attaining liberating knowledge, he does not 
explain the specific nature of śabda, and it seems as though duḥkhavigāta, 
suhṛtprāpti, dāna, and perhaps adhyayana would fall under the general category of 
śabda, given that they all involve the transmission of knowledge through the 
medium of language. 
 The explanation of the siddhis given by MV includes some elements found in 
GBh but differs in important respects.  Māṭhara also mentions the questions 
considered by one engaged in reflection (ūha), but adds that thinking thus, one 
obtains knowledge from oneself, from a teacher (guru), or from a text (śāstra).  The 
second siddhi is explained as the attainment of liberating knowledge upon hearing 
the words (śabda) of someone reciting [a text].  One obtains this knowledge through 
study (adhyayana) when by serving a guru one is able to study and understand 
Sāṃkhya knowledge.  In contrast to GBh, MV treats the three removals of pain 
(duḥkhavighāta) as preliminary steps to attaining knowledge through one of the first 
three siddhis.  In explanation of attainment of/from friends (suhṛtprāpti), Māṭhara 
says that someone who is foolish does not come to understand through the presence 
of a guru, and that suhṛtprāpti is when such a person is taught Sāṃkhya knowledge 
by a compassionate friend using language that is easy to understand, so that ‗even 
stones would understand‘.  MV‘s explanation of charity (dāna) accords with that of 
GBh: one attains Sāṃkhya knowledge by propitiating gurus by means of various 
gifts.
506
 
                                                                                                                                          
tridaṇḍakuṇḍikādīnāṃ grāsācchādanādīnāṃ ca dānenopakṛtya, tebhyo jñānam avāpya mokṣaṃ yāti / 
eṣā aṣṭamī siddhiḥ / (GBh on SK 51, p. 170, l. 27 – p. 171, l. 9). 
506
 tatra ūho nāma yathā kaścit cintayati, kiṃ paraṃ yathātmyaṃ, kiṃ niḥśreyasam, kiṃ kṛtvā sukhaṃ 
prāpyate / evam asya cintayato jñānam utpadyate svataḥ śāstrato guruto vā / yat pradhāna-
buddhyahaṅkāratanmātrendriyabhūtāny anyāni aham anya iti tato mokṣaṃ gacchati eṣā ūhasiddhiḥ 
prathamā / caurasādhutadanugāmisvāmipathikasaṃyogādivat prakṛtipuruṣaśiṣyagurukramajñānam / 
tad yathā grāmam ācchidya caurā yānti / tatsārthamadhye sādhur eko gacchati / tadanugāmī ca 
svāmī / caturthaḥ pathikas tadabhijñaḥ / pathikacauramadhye sādhur api cauraguṇāspṛṣṭo ’pi 
tadanugāminā cauratayā pratītas tādṛggaṇanāyāṃ (pratītaḥ) tadabhijñena pathikena svāmī 
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 Insofar as the MV includes attainment from oneself, from a guru, and from a 
śāstra in its definition of ūha, there seems to be some overlap in terms of the nature 
of the various siddhis, as was also apparent in GBh.  In general, both texts emphasize 
the role of a guru and the power of language in the transmission of Sāṃkhya 
knowledge.  The MV suggests that even a foolish person may attain such knowledge 
with the help of a compassionate friend who is willing to use simple language.   
 In contrast to these texts, the YD does not define the siddhis in terms of the 
attainment specifically of Sāṃkhya knowledge, but it does offer a clearer 
explanation of the differences in the functions of the siddhis in relation to the 
transmission of knowledge.  Reflection (ūha) is explained as the attainment of the 
intended object (abhipretam artham) through the power of reflection (vicāraṇa) 
without recourse to perception, inference, or doctrine (the normal means of 
knowledge (pramāṇa); see §II.4, IV.1-5).507  Both ūha and vicāraṇa usually indicate 
a process of logical reasoning, which here must nevertheless function independently 
of the pramāṇa of inference (anumāna).  This ceases to be a problem when we 
                                                                                                                                          
sambodhito yad ahaṃ sarvaṃ jānāmi amī caurā ayaṃ sādhur eva tatārthānuvartīti / evaṃ 
caurasthānīyo buddhyahaṅkāratanmātrendriyabhūtasamavāyaḥ, sādhusthānīyaś ca puruṣaḥ, 
tadanugāmisthānīyaḥ śiṣyo, bhedena boddhyāḥ / pathikasthānīyo guruḥ / tasmāj jñānaṃ 
pratīkatrayenaivāvagamyate—gurutaḥ, śāstrataḥ, svataḥ ity ūhasiddhiḥ prathamoktā / śabdo nāma 
yathā kasyacit paṭhataḥ (tam asya janaṃ) śabdaṃ śrutvā ’nyat pradhānam anyo ’ham iti 
tanmārgapravṛttiprabuddho mokṣaṃ gacchati evam eṣā dvitīyā siddhiḥ śabdata utpannā / kaścit 
gurūpāsanayā tato ’dhītyāvagamya sakalaṃ jñānam āpnoti / tṛtīyādhyayanasiddhiḥ sāṅkhyajñānam 
adhītya sañjātā / evam etās tisraḥ siddhayaḥ / śeṣā vyākhyāyante / duḥkhavighātatrayam iti / yathā 
kaścid ādāv abhihitādhyātmikādi-duḥkhatrayeṇābhibhūto ’sya pratīkārāya ūhaṃ śabdam 
adhyayanaṃ vā pratipadya jñānam adhigamya mokṣaṃ yātīti duḥkhavighātāya yatrohāditrayam 
adhikurute tad api siddhitrayam / evaṃ ṣaṭ siddhayaḥ / kaścid dūrmedhā guroḥ sakāśāt 
nāvadhārayati / tat kenacit pratyupakārānapekṣeṇa suhṛdā tasmāt saṃsārakūpāt ujjihīrṣuṇā 
tadanukūlatayā kṛpāvatā sugamavacobhir vairāgyapūrvakaṃ guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhirūpaṃ 
sāṅkhyajñānam upadiśatā samuddhṛtam ālokyāha bhagavān śāstrakāraḥ suhṛtprāptir iti / te hi 
suhṛdas tathopadiśanti suhṛttayā yathā pāṣāṇā ’py avabudhyate / uktaṃ ca— 
 eṣa āturacittānāṃ mātrāsparśecchayā vibhuḥ / 
 bhavasindhuplavo dṛṣṭo yad ācāryānuvartanam // 
eṣā saptamī siddhiḥ / kaścid āvāhanasaṃvāhanabhikṣāpātravastracchatrakamaṇḍaluprabhṛtidānena 
gurūn ārādhya sāṅkhyam adhigamya mokṣaṃ gacchatīty eṣā ’ṣṭamī siddhiḥ dānādibhir upāyair 
niṣpannā / (MV on SK 51, p. 67, l. 20 – p. 69, l. 7). 
507
 taroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam arthaṃ vicāraṇābalenaiva 
pratipadyate sādyā siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate / tārayati saṃsārārṇavād iti tārakam / (YD on SK 
51, p. 251, ll. 12-14). 
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consider that inference is generally presented by the YD as an aid in the 
communication of knowledge to another (see §IV.2).  Ūha must, in contrast, 
represent some sort of independent mental activity. 
 Speech (śabda) is explained by the YD as attainment from the teaching of a 
guru by one who is frustrated from attaining the object oneself.  Study (adhyayana) 
is similarly a means of attainment for one who is unable to attain even from 
another‘s teaching.508  The YD-kāra says that beings up to Brahmā attain the 
intended object (abhipretam artham) through these three means of attainment.
509
  He 
then quotes a passage from the Nirukta (NU), apparently to illustrate the nature of 
these three siddhis (see below).
510
  Like the MV, the YD treats the three removals of 
pain (duḥkhavighāta) as preliminary steps to attainment through one of the first three 
siddhis.  The YD describes attainment of/from friends (suhṛtprāpti) as the removal 
of doubts after recourse to a good friend who is endowed with happiness.  The final 
siddhi is described as attainment through one of the first three siddhis after 
overcoming misfortune through charity (dāna).511  The commentator closes this 
                                                 
508
 yadā tu svayaṃ pratipattau pratihanyamāno gurūpadeśāt pratipadyate sā dvitīyā siddhiḥ sutāram 
ity apadiśyate / katham / sukham anenādyatve ’pi bhavasaṃkaṭāt tarantīti / yadā tv anyopadeśād apy 
asamarthaḥ pratipattum adhyayanena sādhayati sā tṛtīyā siddhis tārayantam ity apadiśyate / tad etat 
tāraṇakriyāyā adyatve ’py avyāvṛttatvān mahāviṣayatvāt tārayantam ity apadiṣṭam / (YD on SK 51, 
p. 251, ll. 15-21). 
509
 ta ete trayaḥ sādhanopā<yā>yair ā brahmaṇah prāṇino ’bhipretam arthaṃ prāpnuvanti / (YD on 
SK 51, p. 251, ll. 21-22). 
510
 āha ca sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ / te’parebhyo ’sākṣātkṛtadharmebhya upadeśena 
mantrān samprāduḥ / upadeśāya glāyanto ’pare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣur 
vedaṃ ca vedāṅgāni ca (Nir. 1.20) iti / bilmaṃ bhāsanaṃ saṃyakpratibhāsāya viśiṣṭaḥ saṃketa uktaḥ 
/ (YD on SK 51, p. 251, l. 22 – p. 252, l. 2). 
511
 eṣāṃ tu sādhanopāyānāṃ pratyanīkapratiṣedhāya duḥkhavighātatrayam / duḥkhāni trīṇy 
ādhyātmikādīni / tatra cādhyātmikānāṃ vātādīnāṃ siddhipratyanīkānām āyurvedakriyānuṣṭhānena 
vighātaṃ kṛtvā pūrveṣāṃ trayāṇām anyatamena sādhayati sā caturthī siddhiḥ pramodam ity 
abhidhīyate / katham / nivṛttarogā hi prāṇinaḥ pramodayanta iti kṛtvā / yadā tv ādhibhautikānāṃ 
mānuṣādinimittānāṃ siddhipratyanīkānāṃ sāmādinā yatidharmānuguṇena vopāyena pūrveṣāṃ 
trayāṇām anyatamena sādhayati sā pañcamī siddhiḥ pramuditam ity abhidhīyate / katham / 
anudvigno hi pramudita iti kṛtvā / yadā tu śītādīny ādhidaivikāni dvandvāni siddhipratyanīkāni 
svadharmānurodhena pratihatya pūrveṣāṃ trayāṇām anyatamena sādhayati sā ṣaṣṭhī siddhir 
modamānam ity abhidhīyate / katham / dvandvānupahatā hi prāṇiṇo modanta iti kṛtvā / suhṛtprāptiḥ / 
yadā tu kuśalasaṃspṛṣṭaṃ sanmitram āśritya sandehanivṛttiṃ labhate sā ramyakam iti saptamī 
siddhir apadiśyate / ramyo hi loke sanmitrasamparkaḥ / tasya saṃjñāyāṃ (cf. Pāṇ. 4.3.147) ramyam 
eva ramyakam / dānam / yadā tu daurbhāgyaṃ dānenātītya pūrveṣāṃ trayāṇām anyatamena 
sādhayati sāṣṭamī siddhiḥ sadāpramuditam ity abhidhīyate / subhago hi sadāpramudito bhavati / 
155 
 
discussion with the following statement: ‗Since [people] accomplish the intended 
object by recourse to these [siddhis], one desirous to advance upon the path travelled 
by previous teachers (ācārya) should be intent upon them.‘512 
 Since the YD-kāra states that all beings attain the intended object through 
one of the first three siddhis, it seems reasonable to assume that suhṛtprāpti, like 
duḥkhavigāta and dāna, is considered a preliminary step to attainment through one 
of the first three siddhis.  Thus, according to the YD, the three primary siddhis are 
reflection (ūha), speech (śabda), and study (adhyayana).  The nature of these three 
siddhis, and the commentator‘s statement that the siddhis allow one to follow the 
path travelled by previous teachers, suggest that these three primary siddhis describe 
the process by which knowledge has been produced and transmitted from guru to 
disciple.  Moreover, the term ācārya (‗teacher‘) usually refers to Sāṃkhya teachers 
(especially Īśvarakṛṣṇa) in the YD.513  The use of this term here could thus be taken 
to imply that the siddhis are important primarily insofar as they describe the 
transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge.  This supposition may be supported by 
reference to the commentator‘s classification of the forms of knowledge under SK 
23, in which he refers to the first three siddhis as the means to unprecedented 
(apūrva) knowledge of the distinction between Materiality and Consciousness.514  
The distinction in the same passage between this apūrva form of knowledge and 
knowledge attained by means of the usual pramāṇas accords with the commentator‘s 
definition of ūha. 
                                                                                                                                          
tasmād daurbhāgyanivṛttiḥ sadāpramuditam / ity evam etāḥ siddhayo ’ṣṭau vyākhyātāḥ / (YD on SK 
51, p. 252, ll. 2-22). 
512
 etāsāṃ saṃśrayeṇābhipretam arthaṃ yataḥ saṃsādhayantīty ataḥ pūrvācāryagataṃ mārgam 
ārurukṣus tatpravaṇaḥ syād iti / (YD on SK 51, p. 252, ll. 22-24). 
513
 Cf., for example, the YD‘s discussion of the forms of the bhāvas, in which ācārya is used to refer 
both to Sāṃkhya teachers in general (YD on SK 43, p. 23, ll. 5-6: tatrācāryāṇāṃ vipratipattiḥ) and to 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa in particular (YD on SK 43, p. 23, ll. 27-28: ācārya āha trividhā bhāvāḥ sāṃsiddhikāḥ 
prākṛtikā vaikṛtikāś ca (cf. SK 43ab) iti /).  The commentator also refers to Kapila himself as an 
ācārya in the context of SK 70 (see §V.4, n. 754). 
514
 YD on SK 23, p. 192, ll. 7-11; see §IV.6, n. 415. 
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 More information on the nature of these three primary siddhis can be 
ascertained from the YD-kāra‘s use of the NU quotation.  In its original context, this 
passage
515
 occurs in a section of the NU devoted to the praise of those who know the 
proper, etymological meanings of words.  WEZLER (2001) argues that this passage 
thus ‗also deals with the praise of those who know the meaning—of course of the 
Veda—and the censure of those who do not.‘516  The passage in question is also 
notably quoted in the Vākyapadīyavṛtti (VPV).517  AKLUJKAR (2009) offers a 
translation of the NU passage, based on interpretative information obtained largely 
from the context of the VPV in which it is quoted: 
There came about (or there were) (at a distant time) seers who had discovered 
the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things.  Through instruction, they 
have entrusted materially effective speech formations to others who had not 
discovered the (ordinarily imperceptible) properties of things.  The others 
experiencing fatigue toward instruction, have set down for transmission this 
corpus (i.e., the commentandum of the Nirukta, the Nighaṇṭus etc...) and the 
Veda and the Veda ancillaries in order to grasp the image.  (The word) bilma is 
(to be thought of as) bhilma or (as) bhāsana.518 
 
The YD-kāra‘s use of this quotation reflects his tendency to appropriate the Vedic 
model of transmission when discussing the manner in which Sāṃkhya knowledge is 
produced and transmitted (see §V.1-2).  Evidently, the YD-kāra views reflection 
(ūha) as comparable to the abilities of the ‗seers who had discovered the (ordinarily 
                                                 
515
 sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ / te ’varebhyo ’sākṣātkṛtadharmabhya upadeśena mantrān 
saṃprāduḥ / upadeśāya glāyanto ’vare bilmagrahaṇāyemaṃ granthaṃ samāmnāsiṣuḥ / vedaṃ ca 
vedāṅgāni ca / bilmaṃ bhilmaṃ bhāsanam iti vā / (NU 1.20, p. 41, l. 17 – p. 42, l. 2).  YD (see n. 
510), like the Vṛtti on Vākyapadīya 1.5 (p.24, l. 5 – p. 25, l. 1) has ’parebhyo and ’pare for ’varebhyo 
and ’vare.  WEZLER (2001, p. 218, n. 19) observes that ‗apara is not semantically clearer than avara, 
and both words mean ―low, inferior‖‘ and suggests that ‗[t]he secondarily attested reading, not found 
in mss. of the Nir. itself, is hence most probably due to a scribal mistake.‘  However, AKLUJKAR 
(2009, p. 85-86) argues: ‗avara has a strong association with ―later‖ and ―inferior‖...whereas apara 
does not.  One would thus be justified in suspecting that the avara: apara variation reflects a 
consciously and/or carefully maintained tradition.‘ 
516
 WEZLER (2001), p. 217. 
517
 VPV 1.5, p.24, l. 5 – p. 25, l. 1. 
518
 AKLUJKAR (2009), pp. 25-26.  With regard to the meaning of the obscure term bilma, glossed by 
the YD as ‗a particular hint for a complete similitude‘ (saṃyakpratibhāsāya viśiṣṭaḥ saṃketaḥ; see n. 
510 above), AKLUJKAR argues (pp. 23-24): ‗The entity it refers to must either consist of the mantras 
or be a means to the mantras.  Under the first alternative, it would be a collection, recasting 
(rearrangement, redaction, etc.) or reflection of the mantras (the entity received by or revealed to the 
s-k-d ṛṣis); under the second, at least, something that follows the lead or determining status of the 
mantras.‘ 
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imperceptible) properties of things‘ (sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayaḥ), speech (śabda) as 
comparable to the instruction and transmission (i.e. to a pupil by a 
sākṣātkṛtadharman ṛṣi) of ‗materially effective speech formations‘ (mantra),519 and 
study (adhyayana) (i.e. of Sāṃkhya texts) as comparable to study of the Veda (i.e. 
the collected and organised mantras) and the Vedāṅgas (including the NU).520  The 
significance of this understanding of the siddhis in relation to the knowledge of 
Kapila and the tradition initiated by him must be considered in the light of the YD-
kāra‘s apparent view of the relationship between the siddhis and the bhāvas, to be 
discussed below (§IV.10). 
 The TK‘s treatment of the siddhis differs substantially from those of the 
earlier commentators.  Vācaspati presents the three removals of pain (duḥkha-
vighāta) as the three primary siddhis, and offers two alternative explanations of the 
other five.  According to the first interpretation, they are progressive steps to the 
removals of pain.  Study (adhyayana) of philosophical texts with a guru leads to 
‗speech‘ (śabda), which Vācaspati interprets as the knowledge of  the meaning [of 
the texts studied] gained from the speech [of the guru].  These two siddhis, 
adhyayana and śabda, are grouped together as ‗hearing‘ (śravaṇa).  Reflection (ūha) 
is described as an investigation into the meaning of doctrine (āgama) through logic 
(nyāya) that is not inconsistent with the doctrine itself, in order to establish a 
conclusion (uttarapakṣa) by removing doubts (saṃśaya) and objections 
                                                 
519
 WEZLER (2001, pp. 232-233) suggests that upadeśena in the NU passage (n. 515) be taken as a 
‗comitative instrumental‘—i.e. that ‗―oral instruction‖ accompanied the delivering over of the 
mantras by the ―seers‖‘—and that ‗what is meant by upadeśa is ―a method of teaching students‖ [...] 
which aims at a correct and full understanding of the wording of a mantra, the syntax and the 
semantics at least of some of the expressions used, and above all, of the meaning of the mantra as a 
whole‘. 
520
 With regard to the discontinuation of ‗oral instruction‘, WEZLER (2001, p. 233) observes: ‗That the 
avare failed to continue the sacred tradition in this regard is tantamount to the contention, i.e. 
awareness, or feeling, of an important loss in this sacred tradition.  But it does not imply that there are 
no means at all that would enable a student to find out the ―meaning of the Veda‖; it is however of an 
essentially different nature: not an ―oral instruction‖ which can be traced back to the 
sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo themselves [...] but ancillary texts only, the Vedāṅgas, compiled by human 
beings [...].‘ 
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(pūrvapakṣa).  According to Vācaspati, ūha is also known as manana (‗thought‘ or 
‗reflection‘).  Suhṛtprāpti  is interpreted as the acquisition of friends (such as a guru, 
pupils, and fellow students) with whom one can discuss the conclusions drawn 
through ūha.  Dāna is glossed as ‗purity‘, specifically ‗purity of discriminative 
knowledge‘, as the result of a long period of practice (abhyāsa), which leads to the 
removal of the three forms of pain.
521
 
 The TK‘s second explanation of the five secondary siddhis basically accords 
with the MV‘s interpretations of these siddhis, with the exception of ūha.  According 
to this scheme, Vācaspati interprets ūha as the ascertainment of truth without 
instruction, etc., as the result of practice (abhyāsa) undertaken in previous lives.522  
Of course, this scheme also differs from that of the MV in that the three removals of 
pain are considered primary rather than secondary attainments. 
 Following his presentation of these alternative explanations of the siddhis, 
Vācaspati makes a remark that reflects his distance and detachment from the issues 
under discussion: 
                                                 
521
 ūha iti / vihanyamānasya duḥkhasya tritvāt tadvighātās traya itīmā mukhyās tisraḥ siddhayaḥ, 
tadupāyatayā tv itarā gauṇyaḥ pañca siddhayaḥ, tā api hetuhetumattayā vyavasthitāḥ / tatrādyā 
’dhyayanalakṣaṇā siddhir hetur eva / mukhyās tu siddhayo hetumatya eva / madhyamās tu 
hetuhetumatyaḥ / vidhivad gurumukhād adhyātmavidyānām akṣarasvarūpagrahaṇam adhyayanam 
prathamā siddhis tāram ucyate / tatkāryam śabdaḥ, śabdaḥ iti padam śabdajanitam arthajñānam 
upalakṣayati, kāryaṃ kāraṇopacārāt / sā dvitīyā siddhiḥ sutāram ucyate / pāṭ[h]ārthābhyān tad idan 
dvidhā śravaṇam / ūhaḥ tarkaḥ āgamāvirodhinyāyenāgamārthaparīkṣaṇam / parīkṣaṇañ ca 
saṃśayapūrvapakṣanirākaraṇenottarapakṣavyavasthāpanam / tad idam mananam ācakṣate 
āgaminaḥ / sā tṛtīyā siddhis tāratāram ucyate / suhṛtprāptiḥ / nyāyena svayamparīkṣitam apy arthaṃ 
na śraddadhāte; na yāvad guruśiṣyasabrahmacāribhis saha saṃvādyate / ataḥ suhṛdāṃ 
guruśiṣyasabrahmacāriṇāṃ saṃvādakānāṃ prāptiḥ suhṛtprāptiḥ sā siddhiś caturthī ramyaka ucyate / 
dānaṃ ca śuddhir vivekajñānasya, daip śodhane [Pāṇini 6.4.68] ity asmād dhātor 
dānapadavyutpatteḥ / yathāha bhagavān patañjaliḥ—vivekakhyātir aviplavo duḥkhatrayasya 
hānopāyaḥ iti [Yogasūtra 2.26] aviplavaḥ śuddhiḥ sā ca savāsanasaṃśayaviparyāsānāṃ parihāreṇa 
vivekasākṣātkārasya svacchapravāhe ’vasthāpanam / sā ca na vinā’’daranairantarya-
dīrghakālasevitābhyāsaparipākād bhavatīti dānena (vivekakhyātyāḥ kāryeṇa) so ’pi saṃgṛhītaḥ / 
seyam pañcam siddhis sadāmuditam ucyate / tisraś ca mukhyāḥ siddhayaḥ pramodamudita-
modamānā, ity aṣṭau siddhayaḥ / (TK on SK 51, p. 143, l. 14 – p. 145, l. 22). 
522
 anye vyācakṣate—vinopadeśādinā prāgbhāvīyābhyāsavaśāt tattvasya svayamūhanaṃ yat sā 
siddhir ūhaḥ / yasya sāṃkhyaśāstrapāṭham anyadīyam ākarṇya tattvajñānam utpadyate sā siddhiḥ 
śabdaḥ, śabdapāṭhād anantaram bhāvāt / yasya śiṣyācāryasambandhena sāṃkhyaśāstraṃ granthato 
’rthataś cādhītya jñānam utpadyate sā ’dhyayanahetukā siddhir adhyayanam / suhṛtprāptir iti 
yasyādhigatatattvaṃ suhṛdaṃ prāpya jñānam utpadyate sā jñānalakṣaṇā siddhis tasya suhṛtprāptiḥ / 
dānañ ca siddhihetuḥ, dhanādidānenārādhito jñānī jñānam prayacchati / (TK on SK 51, p. 145, ll. 
28-34). 
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We, who are concerned with the explanation merely of settled opinions 
(siddhānta), with disregard for the faults of others, say that the propriety or 
impropriety of this should be judged only by the learned.
523
 
 
This approach can be contrasted to that of the YD-kāra, who, when presenting 
alternative interpretations of a particular doctrine, usually makes a point of 
specifying the view established by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the SK,524 which he regards as the 
definitive expression of Sāṃkhya doctrine (see §V.2).525  This difference in attitude, 
generally apparent when comparing the YD and TK, reflects the fact that, as 
suggested by JACOBSEN (2008), ‗the Sāṃkhya tradition had lost much of its 
independence by the ninth century‘.526  Vācaspati himself, as is well known, was a 
Vedāntin, and he seems to have maintained an interpretative distance in his 
discussions of Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 While there is thus a great deal of divergence in the classical commentators‘ 
interpretations of the siddhis, they are unanimous in providing a series of alternative 
names for the siddhis, although these names vary slightly from text to text.  
According to GBh, ūha, śabda, adhyayana, ādhyātmikaduḥkhavighāta, 
ādhibhautikaduḥkhavighāta, ādhidaivikaduḥkhavighāta, suhṛtprāpti, and dāna are 
‗in another text (śāstra)‘ respectively named tāra, sutāra, tāratāra, pramoda, 
pramudita, pramodamāna, ramyaka, and sadāpramudita.527  The MV gives the same 
names, with the exception of mohana instead of pramodamāna for the sixth 
siddhi.
528
  The YD‘s list contains several variations: tāraka, sutāra, tārayanta, 
                                                 
523
 asya ca yuktāyuktatve sūribhir evāvagantavye iti kṛtam paradoṣodbhāvanena naḥ siddhāntamātra-
vyākhyānapravṛttānām iti / (TK on SK 51, p. 146, ll. 1-2). 
524
 E.g., the presentation of alternative views on the forms of the bhāva of jñāna (YD on SK 43, p. 
233, l. 4 – p. 234, l. 19); see §IV.8, nn. 464-467. 
525
 The YD-kāra holds the SK to be ‗just like an image in a mirror of the tantra of the supreme ṛṣi‘: 
pāramarṣasya tantrasya bimbam ādarśagaṃ yathā (YD Intro., p. 3, l. 3).  See further discussion in 
§V.2. 
526
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 36. 
527
 āsām aṣṭānāṃ siddhīnāṃ śāstrāntare saṃjñāḥ kṛtāḥ—tāram, sutāram, tāratāram, pramodam, 
pramuditam, pramodamānam, ramyakam, sadāpramuditam iti / (GBh on SK 51, p. 171, ll. 10-11). 
528
 āsām aṣṭānāṃ pūrvavan nāmāntarāṇi / tāraṃ sutāraṃ tāratāraṃ pramodaṃ pramuditaṃ 
mohanaṃ ramyakaṃ sadāpramuditam iti / (MV on SK 51, p. 69, ll. 7-9). 
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pramoda, pramudita, modamāna, ramyaka, and sadāpramudita.529  The YD also 
provides explanations of the significance of these names.  For example, ūha is 
known as ‗carrying over‘ (tāraka) because it ‗carries one over (tārayati) the ocean of 
transmigration (saṃsāra)‘.530  The TK provides similar names in the course of its 
first alternative explanation of the siddhis: tāratāra, sutāra, tāra, pramoda, mudita, 
modamāna, ramyaka, and sadāmudita.531  Evidently, Vācaspati was familiar with a 
list basically the same as those used by the other commentators but was unsure as to 
which name correlated with which particular siddhi, so that in changing the order of 
the first three siddhis he confused their corresponding names.  Overall, the variations 
among the commentators with regard to these names suggest that they represent an 
older stratum of tradition.  FRAUWALLNER (1973) argues that the explanations of 
these names provided by the YD-kāra reflect a ‗sectarian terminology‘ apparent in 
the doctrines of the Ṣaṣṭitantra.532 
 Whatever the origins of these alternative names for the siddhis, the fact that 
they are well-established in the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries is significant for 
our present purpose, for they provide a link in the YD between this paradigm and 
that of the conditions (bhāva) of the intellect.  The following section (§IV.10) will 
present this and other evidence in the commentaries of the relationship between the 
bhāvas and the pratyayasarga.  Ultimately, this will serve to clarify the applicability 
of the YD‘s version of the siddhi model to the production and transmission of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge, and the role of Kapila in terms of this model. 
 
 
                                                 
529
 See nn. 507, 508, 511 above. 
530
 tārayati saṃsārārṇavād iti tārakam / (YD on SK 51, p. 251, ll. 13-14). 
531
 See n. 521 above. 
532
 FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 260; see CHAPTER III and §V.3. 
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§10. The relationship between the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual 
 creation (pratyayasarga), according to the commentaries. 
 
The discussions in the preceding sections have shown that the condition (bhāva) of 
knowledge (jñāna) represents the primary goal of the Sāṃkhya path, that the 
evidence of the YD clarifies the ways in which this condition is produced in both 
extraordinary and ordinary individuals, and that the YD-kāra considers the paradigm 
of the attainments (siddhi), a part of the intellectual creation (pratyayasarga), to be 
descriptive of the acquisition of Sāṃkhya knowledge by individuals with 
extraordinary insight and the transmission of this knowledge to later generations 
through direct teaching and the formulation of written texts.  The relation of the 
process of transmission through siddhi to the modes of production of jñāna, and thus 
the importance of the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers and texts to the acquisition of 
Sāṃkhya knowledge by successive generations of seekers, remains to be clarified. 
 The relationship between the two paradigms of the bhāvas and the 
pratyayasarga is unclear from the text of the SK and has generated much discussion 
among scholars.  As outlined in CHAPTER III, FRAUWALLNER (1973)
533
 and 
OBERHAMMER (1961)
534
 view the bhāvas as a newer doctrine playing the same role 
in the system as the pratyayasarga.  FRAUWALLNER observes that thus ‗the 
explanations which the commentaries give for their juxtaposition are unsatisfactory 
and forced‘.535  However, the evidence of the YD has more recently been shown to 
suggest a more satisfactory and more elaborate interpretation of this relationship. 
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 FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 269. 
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 CHAKRAVARTI (1975)
536
, KENGHE (1968)
537
, and LARSON (1984)
538
 have all 
rightly observed that the YD treats the principles (tattva) as the forms of manifest 
Materiality, the bhāvas as descriptive of its activity, and the pratyaysarga as the 
phenomenal result of this activity.  LARSON‘s interpretation of this relationship 
became the basis for LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)‘s treatment of these 
paradigms, in which the tattvas are presented as the ‗constitutive dimension‘ of the 
Sāṃkhya system, the bhāvas as the ‗projective dimension‘, and the pratyayasarga as 
the ‗consequent dimension‘.539  LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA compare these three 
dimensions, respectively, to the ‗hardware‘ of a computer, the ‗software‘, and the 
‗printout of the functioning system‘.540  With regard to the relationship between the 
condition of knowledge (jñāna, a component of the second ‗dimension‘) and the 
attainments (siddhi, a component of the third ‗dimension‘), they interpret the 
evidence of the YD to suggest that ‗the predisposition toward knowledge (jñāna) 
generates the spiritual attainments (siddhi) conducive to final discrimination and 
release‘.541  However, as I will argue in the present section, further evidence in the 
YD linking the concepts of jñāna and siddhi complicates this interpretation of the 
relationship between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga. 
 Before moving on to a consideration of the evidence of the YD with regard to 
this relationship, it will be helpful to examine the other commentators‘ attempts to 
connect the two paradigms, in order to provide some context for this discussion.  The 
GBh and MV suggest that the pratyayasarga explains the nature of the eight 
instrumental causes (nimitta, i.e. the bhāvas) and their eight phenomenal effects 
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 CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 302. 
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 KENGHE (1968), p. 366. 
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 LARSON (1984), pp. 63-64. 
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 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 64. 
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 Ibid., p. 65. 
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(naimittika, i.e. ‗upward movement‘, etc.; see SK 44-45 and §IV.6).542  In other 
words, the pratyayasarga is presented as, in some sense, a reclassification of the 
bhāvas and their results, but no further explanation of this relationship or correlation 
between the bhāvas and the categories of the pratyayasarga is given in these texts.  
The TK refers to the pratyayasarga as a description of the eight bhāvas543 and 
specifies that the bhāva of knowledge (jñāna) is included in attainment (siddhi), 
while the other seven bhāvas—merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), ignorance 
(ajñāna), dispassion (vairāgya), passion (avairāgya), lordliness (aiśvarya), and non-
lordliness (anaiśvarya)—are included in error (viparyaya), incapacity (aśakti), and 
contentment (tuṣṭi).544  Vācaspati, however, does not provide any more specific 
correlation between these sets of categories, and the nature of this equivalence is 
unclear.  Does this scheme imply that the process of siddhi is identical with jñāna, or 
does siddhi lead to jñāna, or vice versa? 
 As has become evident, the YD‘s basic view of the relationship between the 
bhāvas and the pratyayasarga differs fundamentally from the simple equivalence 
suggested by the other commentators.  The YD‘s view, as discussed by 
CHAKRAVARTI (1975), KENGHE (1968) and LARSON (1984), is made apparent at the 
end of the commentary on SK 45, preceding the discussion of the pratyayasarga, in 
which the YD-kāra equates the tattvas with the forms (rūpa) of the manifest (vyakta) 
and the bhāvas with the activity (pravṛtti) of the manifest, and states that the result 
                                                 
542
 eṣa nimittaiḥ saha naimittikaḥ ṣoḍaśavidhoḥ vyākhyātaḥ, sa kimātmaka ity āha—eṣa pratyaya-
sargo viparyayāśaktituṣṭisiddhyākhyaḥ / guṇavaiṣamyavimarddena tasya bhedās tu pañcāśat //46// 
yathā eṣa ṣoḍaśavidho nimittanaimittikabhedaḥ vyākhyātaḥ, eṣa pratyayasarga ucyate / (GBh on SK 
46, p. 159, l. 28 – p. 160, l. 4); nanu nimittanaimittikaprasaṅgaḥ kimātmaka iti ? atrocyate—eṣa 
pratyayasargo viparyayāśaktituṣṭisiddhyādhyaḥ / guṇavaiṣamyavimardena tasya bhedās tu pañcāśat 
//4[6]// eṣa iti / āryādvayena ṣoḍaśavidho naimittikaḥ sarga uktaḥ / pratyayasarga ucyate / (MV on 
SK 46, p. 63, ll. 4-8). 
543
 buddhidharmān dharmādīn aṣṭau bhāvān samāsavyāsābhyāṃ mumukṣūṇāṃ heyopādeyān 
darśayituṃ prathaman tāvat samāsam āha— (TK on SK 46, p. 132, ll. 20-21). 
544
 tatra viparyayāśaktituṣṭiṣu yathāyogaṃ saptānāñ ca dharmādīnāṃ jñānavarjam antarbhāvaḥ, 
siddhau ca jñānasyeti / (TK on SK 46, p. 133, ll. 4-5). 
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(phala) of the manifest is about to be described.
545
  A slightly different scheme is 
laid out in the commentary on SK 2: 
Of these [the manifest, the unmanifest, and the knower], the manifest is 
characterised by form, activity, and result.  The form is the intellect, ego, the 
five subtle elements, the eleven faculties, and the five gross elements.  
Generally, the activity is twofold: [activity] the purpose of which is desire for 
what is beneficial, and [activity] the purpose of which is prevention of what is 
unbeneficial.  Specifically, [activity] is the five sources of action 
(karmayoni)—perseverance, etc.—and the five vital breaths (vāyu)—prāṇa, 
etc.  The result is twofold: perceptible and imperceptible.  Of these, the 
perceptible [result] is defined as attainment, contentment, incapacity, and error, 
and the imperceptible [result] is the obtaining of a body in the cycle of 
transmigration (saṃsāra), from Brahmā down to a tuft of grass.546 
 
While this passage does not mention the bhāvas in connection with the activity of 
the manifest, it does allude to their results, in terms of the trajectory of an individual 
in the cycle of transmigration (see §IV.6).  Evidently, both this trajectory and the 
categories of the pratyayasarga are considered aspects of the result of the activity of 
the manifest.  LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987) discuss the role of the sources of 
action (karmayoni) and vital breaths (vāyu) according to the YD and group them 
with the bhāvas as a part of the ‗projective dimension‘ of the manifest.547  While the 
relations among these various aspects of the system presented by the YD are not 
entirely clear, it is clear that the bhāvas are considered at least an aspect of the 
activity of the manifest, while the pratyayasarga is considered at least an aspect of 
the result of this activity. 
 Some passages of the YD could be taken to indicate a simple equivalence 
between the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga, similar to that suggested by the other 
                                                 
545
 evam eṣa tattvasargo bhāvasargaś ca vyākhyātaḥ / etac ca vyaktasya rūpaṃ pravṛttiś ca 
parikalpyate / phalam idānīṃ vakṣyāmaḥ // (YD on SK 45d, p. 237, ll. 26-27) 
546
 tatra rūpapravṛttiphalalakṣaṇaṃ vyaktam / rūpaṃ punar mahān ahaṃkāraḥ pañca tanmātrāṇy 
ekādaśendriyāṇi pañca mahābhūtāni / sāmānyataḥ pravṛttir dvividhā hitakāmaprayojanā cāhita-
pratiṣedhaprayojanā ca / viśeṣataḥ pañca karmayonayo <dh>ṛtyādyāḥ / prāṇādyāś ca pañca 
vāyavaḥ / phalaṃ dvividham / dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭaṃ ca / tatra dṛṣṭaṃ siddhituṣṭyaśaktiviparyayalakṣaṇam 
adṛṣṭaṃ brahmādau stambaparyante saṃsāre śarīrapratilambha ity etad vyaktam / (YD on SK 2d, p. 
49, ll. 8-14) 
547
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 54-56, 64-65. 
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commentaries.  As mentioned in §IV.6, under SK 23 the YD-kāra associates the 
unprecedented (apūrva) form of the bhāva of jñāna with the siddhis,548 while under 
SK 45 he mentions that vairāgya falls under the heading of tuṣṭi.549  An (at least 
partial) equivalence between vairāgya and tuṣṭi is also suggested by the YD-kāra‘s 
explanation of the first form of tuṣṭi, which results in dissolution in Materiality 
(prakṛtilaya),550 also held to be the result of vairāgya (SK 45; see §IV.6). 
These statements, however, do not preclude the possibility that a cause-effect 
relationship is implied.  Rather, since the siddhis are referred to as ‗means of 
knowledge‘ (pramāṇa) in the passage on SK 23, it seems reasonable to assume that 
they lead to the condition of jñāna.  This would be an instance of the ‗result‘ realm 
affecting the ‗activity‘ realm.  Similarly, the YD-kāra‘s descriptions of tuṣṭi as the 
result of a yogin‘s activity in the phenomenal realm of experience551 would seem to 
suggest that this contentment results in the production of the condition of vairāgya in 
the intellect (see SK 43, §IV.8) which in turn leads to such results as dissolution in 
prakṛti. 
This interpretation of the function of siddhi and tuṣṭi in relation to the 
production of the bhāvas suggests that LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987)‘s 
interpretation of the relationship between the pratyayasarga and the bhāvas must be 
revised.  Although the pratyayasarga is considered, in some sense, to be the result 
(phala) of the activity (pravṛtti) described by the bhāvas, nevertheless at least some 
                                                 
548
 jñānaṃ dvividhaṃ śabdādyupalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ ca / tatra 
śabdādyupalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ pratyakṣānumānāgamarūpam / guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ ca 
dvividham apūrvam abhyāsajaṃ ca / tayor apūrvam ūhaḥ śabdo ’dhyayanam (SK 51a) iti siddhi-
kāṇḍānupatitāni pramāṇāni / (YD on SK 23bc, p. 192, ll. 7-11). 
549
 vairāgyaṃ tuṣṭikāṇḍānupatitaṃ (YD on SK 45a, p. 236, l. 17). 
550
 sa khalv ayaṃ yogī pradhānalakṣaṇāṃ bhūmim avajitya tanmahimnā ca <jagad> aśūnyaṃ dṛṣṭvā 
vyatiriktasya padārthāntarasyābhāvaṃ manyamānas tām eva bhūmiṃ kaivalyam iti gṛhṇāti / bhinne 
ca dehe prakṛtau layaṃ gacchati tataś ca punar āvartate / (YD on SK 50ab, p. 244, ll. 16-19). 
551
 Cf., for example, the description of the production of the first tuṣṭi (n. 550 above).  As mentioned 
in §IV.9, KENGHE (1968) has documented the YD‘s association of the tuṣṭis with stages of yogic 
practice. 
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of the categories of the pratyayasarga are also able to lead to the production of new 
bhāvas.  The possibility that the YD-kāra thus considers these two realms to be 
mutually determinative finds further support elsewhere in the text. 
 As discussed in §IV.8, according to the YD, the prākṛtika form (and probably 
by implication the sāṃsiddhika form) of the bhāvas arises as a stream from 
primordial Materiality (prakṛti, pradhāna), in contrast to the vaikṛta form, which 
pertains to ‗ordinary people‘552 and is either ‗self-acquired‘ (svavaikṛta) or ‗acquired 
from others‘ (paravaikṛta).553  Like prākṛtika bhāvas, the categories of the 
pratyayasarga are described as arising in streams from Materiality (§IV.9).
554
  
OBERHAMMER (1961) takes the similarity in the mode of production of prākṛtika 
bhāvas and the pratyayasarga as an indication that the two paradigms have the same 
function, and suggests that the categories of the pratyayasarga, like the bhāvas, are 
partly pre-determined and partly acquired: 
[We] can suppose that the Pratyaya-s are, like the Bhāva-s, innate, i.e. 
conditioned by Karma, and thus condition the historical existence of beings.  
On the other hand, they are acquired as ‗habitus‘, and thus they lead to 
salvation.
555
 
 
OBERHAMMER recognizes that the categories of the pratyayasarga must, in some 
way, be considered both determined and determining, but he fails to take into 
account another statement by the commentator which clarifies the relationship 
between the pratyayasarga and the bhāvas. 
 Again, as discussed in §IV.8, according to the YD‘s commentary on SK 43, 
the Sāṃkhya teacher Pañcādhikaraṇa held the vaikṛta form of the bhāva of jñāna to 
be twofold: ‗self-acquired‘ (svavaikṛta), and ‗acquired from others‘ (paravaikṛta),556 
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 See n. 463 (§IV.8). 
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 See nn. 465, 468 (§IV.8). 
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 See nn. 484, 485, 486 (§IV.9). 
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 OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 140, n. 1. 
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 vaikṛtaṃ tu dvividham / svavaikṛtaṃ paravaikṛtaṃ ca / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 12). 
167 
 
and Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s system agrees with this classification.557  In the same passage, the 
YD-kāra equates the svavaikṛta form with tāraka and the paravaikṛta form with ‗the 
other siddhis‘.558  The commentator then quotes a verse (perhaps to be taken as 
attributed to Pañcādhikaraṇa himself) that equates svavaikṛta with tāraka and states 
that paravaikṛta is ‗seven-fold—sutāra, etc.‘.559  As shown in §IV.9, the terms 
tāraka, etc., are well-established in the Sāṃkhya tradition as alternative names for 
the eight siddhis listed in SK 51.  According to this scheme, then, ūha is svavaikṛta 
jñāna, while the other siddhis are paravaikṛta jñāna.  This classification agrees with 
the YD-kāra‘s description of the siddhis, insofar as ūha is attainment [by oneself] 
‗through the power of reflection‘, while the other two primary siddhis involve 
attainment from others through direct teaching (śabda) or study of transmitted texts 
(adhyayana), the secondary siddhis also involving interaction with others.
560
 
 The YD‘s exposition of Pañcādhikaraṇa‘s classification of the bhāvas ends 
with the statement that, ‗as is the bhāva of jñāna, so are the other bhāvas—dharma, 
etc.‘561  This does not necessarily mean that the siddhis also describe the attainment 
of other vaikṛta bhāvas than jñāna.  As we have seen, the production of vairāgya 
seems to be associated with tuṣṭi rather than siddhi, in which case tuṣṭi might 
represent vaikṛta vairāgya, in contrast, for instance, to the prākṛta vairāgya of 
Kapila‘s disciple Āsuri.562  On the other hand, the commentator‘s use of the 
attainment of dharma to illustrate the categories of the pratyayasarga,
563
 as well as 
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 vaikṛtaṃ tu dvividhaṃ pūrvavat / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 5-6). 
558
 svavaikṛtaṃ tārakam / paravaikṛtaṃ siddhyantarāṇi / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, ll. 12-13). 
559
 vaikṛtam api ca dvividhaṃ svavaikṛtaṃ tatra tārakaṃ bhavati / syāt saptavidhaṃ paravaikṛtaṃ 
<su>tārādi nirdiṣṭam // (YD on SK 43, p. 233, ll. 17-18). 
560
 See nn. 507, 508, 511 (§IV.9). 
561
 yathā jñānam evaṃ dharmādayo ’pīti / (YD on SK 43, p. 233,  l. 19). 
562
 See n. 462 (§IV.8). 
563
 tadyathā dharmārthapravṛtto ’gniṣṭomādīn parityajya saṃkaraṃ kurvīta so ’sya viparyayaḥ, 
sādhanavaikalyād asāmarthyam aśaktiḥ, ādhānamātrasantoṣas tuṣṭiḥ, kṛtsnasya kriyā-
viśeṣasyānuṣṭhānaṃ siddhiḥ / evam <anyā>rthādiṣu yojyam / yaś cāyaṃ caturvidhaḥ phalaviśeṣo 
viparyayādir ākhyataḥ (YD on SK 46ab, p. 239, l. 22 – p. 240, l. 2). 
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his reference simply to an ‗intended object‘ (abhipretam artham)564 as the object of 
siddhi (§IV.9), might suggest that siddhi does describe the attainment of at least 
some other bhāvas.  The commentator‘s position on this issue is never clarified, and 
it seems not to be a concern in the text.  Rather, the YD-kāra focuses his discussion 
of the production of the bhāvas mainly on jñāna, and his discussion of the siddhis 
also seems to reflect a concern with the production and transmission of knowledge. 
 For our present purposes, then, it can be said with some certainty that the 
YD-kāra views siddhi as the vaikṛta form of jñāna.  How does this form of jñāna 
differ from the sāṃsiddhika and prākṛta forms?  Since it is clear that siddhi is part of 
the ‗perceptible result‘565 of the activity of manifest Materiality, we can conclude 
that this vaikṛta jñāna is produced in the phenomenal realm of ordinary experience, 
in contrast to the sāṃsiddhika and prākṛta forms of jñāna, which are produced 
directly from primordial Materiality (pradhāna).  This conclusion agrees with the 
interpretation, suggested by the GBh, of the term vaikṛta as ‗deriving from the 
products‘,566 i.e. deriving from the phenomenal (vaikṛta) realm of manifest 
Materiality.  Further support for this conclusion is provided by the YD-kāra‘s 
statement that the vaikṛta bhāvas are applicable to ordinary people.567  This suggests 
that for those without special, direct access to the stream flowing from pradhāna, 
jñāna must be attained in the vaikṛta realm.  In this ordinary, phenomenal realm of 
                                                 
564
 tatroho nāma yadā pratyakṣānumānāgamavyatirekeṇābhipretam arthaṃ vicāraṇābalenaiva 
pratipadyate sādyā siddhis tārakam ity apadiśyate / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 251, ll. 12-13); etāsāṃ 
saṃśrayeṇābhipretam arthaṃ yataḥ saṃsādhayantīty ataḥ pūrvācāryagataṃ mārgam ārurukṣus 
tatpravaṇaḥ syād iti / (YD on SK 51abc, p. 252, ll. 22-24).  For a possible alternative explanation of 
the phrase abhipretam artham, see §V.1. 
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 See n. 546 above. 
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 See n. 456 (§IV.8). 
567
 vaikṛtās tu bhāvā asmadādīnām / (YD on SK 43, p. 234, l. 14). 
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experience, the ‗stream of attainment from Materiality‘ is obstructed by error, 
incapacity and contentment.
568
 
 With regard to the nature of Kapila‘s knowledge and his role in the 
transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine, this equivalence of siddhi with vaikṛta jñāna 
holds an important implication.  The production of Kapila‘s sāṃsiddhika jñāna must 
be removed from the context of siddhi, as the YD-kāra makes clear: 
And thus ūha is not applicable to the ṛṣi, because of an absence of hindrance.  
There is no hindrance to the production of his jñāna at the same time as the 
manifestation of his body.
569
 
 
Although the term ṛṣi, rather than paramarṣi (‗supreme ṛṣi‘), is used in this passage, 
the context suggests that Kapila alone is meant, since only he is said to have been 
born with innate jñāna, while everyone else is born with innate ajñāna.570 Thus, the 
process of the production of knowledge as described by ūha does not apply to 
Kapila‘s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine.  This is despite the fact that ūha, 
like Kapila‘s knowledge,571 is said to occur in the absence of the usual pramāṇas of 
perception, inference, or authoritative testimony,
572
 and also despite the fact that the 
YD-kāra seems to compare ūha to the abilities of the sākṣātkṛtadharman ṛṣis in NU 
1.20.
573
  Evidently, if the YD-kāra does see ūha as applicable to ṛṣis, it must be to 
lesser ṛṣis than Kapila. 
 Of course, the distinction between ūha and Kapila‘s sāṃsiddhika jñāna does 
not mean that Kapila might not have transmitted his knowledge to Āsuri by means of 
the second siddhi, śabda, or even that someone else might not attain the same 
knowledge through ūha.  It is also likely, based on the content of the NU passage 
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 nityapravṛttasyāpi pradhānāt siddhisrotaso viparyayāśaktituṣṭipratibandhāt sarvaprāṇiṣv 
apravṛttir bhavati / (YD on SK 51d, p. 252, l. 30 – p. 253, l. 1). 
569
 tathā carṣer ūho nopapadyate / pratibandhābhāvāt / na hy asya kāryakaraṇavyūhasamakāla-
jñānotpattau kaścit pratibandho ’sti / (YD on SK 43, p. 233, l. 31 – p. 234, l. 1). 
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 See n. 462 (§IV.8). 
571
 See n. 390 (§IV.4). 
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 See n. 507 (§IV.9). 
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 See nn. 510, 518 (§IV.9). 
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quoted in this connection, that the YD-kāra views the third siddhi, adhyayana, as the 
consequence of the transition from direct guru-disciple transmission of Sāṃkhya 
doctrine to the composition of Sāṃkhya texts like the SK.  The YD-kāra‘s apparent 
view of the nature of the SK in relation to Kapila‘s original formulation of Sāṃkhya 
doctrine will be discussed further in §V.2.  The implications of the special status 
assigned to Kapila‘s knowledge as a direct product of unmanifest prakṛti will be 
considered in §V.4. 
 
The discussions in this chapter have clarified several points with regard to the 
process by which liberating Sāṃkhya knowledge is produced and transmitted, 
according to the Sāṃkhya commentaries in general and the YD in particular.  In the 
context of the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) accepted by Sāṃkhya, inference 
(anumāṇa) is generally emphasized by the commentators as a means of establishing 
the existence of the Sāṃkhya principles (tattva).  This might suggest that 
independent reasoning is privileged over received knowledge in Sāṃkhya.  The YD, 
however, treats inference as a tool in the exposition of philosophical texts (śāstra) to 
ordinary seekers.  The maintenance of the traditions of transmission of such śāstras 
is provided for by the YD‘s definition of the pramāṇa of authoritative testimony 
(āptavacana).  Thus, inference and authoritative testimony seem to work together in 
the transmission of Sāṃkhya knowledge from guru to disciple.  That is, logic is used 
to validate Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 In addition, the YD, like the other Sāṃkhya commentaries, allows for the 
direct perception (dṛṣṭa, pratyakṣa) of the subtle elements (tanmātra) by gods and 
yogins.  The YD specifies that the perception of these normally suprasensuous 
tattvas is enabled either by progressive yogic practice or, in the case  of the gods, by 
the accumulation of merit (dharma).  This extraordinary perception, in contrast to the 
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YD‘s portrayal of inference, would appear to function independently of authoritative 
testimony and the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 The YD‘s exposition of the modes of production of the condition (bhāva) of 
knowledge (jñāna), which is held by the Sāṃkhya texts to result in liberation, 
suggests that this condition may arise in extraordinary individuals as the result of a 
direct stream (srotas, abhiṣyanda) from primordial Materiality (prakṛti, pradhāna), 
and that in the case of the ṛṣi Kapila this condition was manifested from prakṛti at 
the time of his birth.  In the case of ordinary individuals, the condition of jñāna is 
attained in the phenomenal (vaikṛta) sphere of experience, either suddenly (apūrva) 
through the attainments (siddhi), which are associated with the transmission of 
knowledge through teaching and texts, or as the result of a progressive practice 
(abhyāsaja), which involves the yogic practices of the restraints (yama) and 
observances (niyama) and consequently the attainment of merit (dharma) and 
dispassion (vairāgya).  The latter mode of production can be compared to the text‘s 
suggestion that the perception of the subtle elements is enabled through yogic 
practice and the accumulation of merit, while inference and authoritative testimony, 
like the siddhis, are connected with the transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 We can thus conclude that, according to the evidence of the YD, the texts of 
the Sāṃkhya tradition and the explanation of these texts through the traditional guru-
disciple relationship are considered to play an important role in the production of 
liberating knowledge in ordinary seekers.  While the YD does admit the possibility 
of attaining this knowledge independently of the Sāṃkhya tradition, this would not 
seem to involve independent logical thought but rather the performance of yogic 
practices as a means of developing merit and dispassion as steps to the attainment of 
knowledge.  The ṛṣi Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya tradition, is unique in being 
exempt from the need to acquire knowledge of the tattvas either through the siddhis 
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or through independent yogic practice.  The following chapter will discuss in more 
detail the YD‘s view of the nature and origin of Kapila and the importance of his 
original formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge to the continued maintenance of the 
Sāṃkhya tradition. 
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CHAPTER V: The Soteriological Role of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā. 
 
 
As outlined in the preceding chapter, the evidence of the YD appears to resolve 
several interpretative issues apparent in the classical Sāṃkhya system.  The 
commentator‘s definition of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) makes a provision 
for the maintenance of every śāstra (§IV.3).  The YD also appears to treat inference 
(anumāna) primarily as a tool for the transmission of doctrine through the 
elucidation of śāstra (§IV.2).  The text suggests a novel interpretation of the three 
forms of the conditions (bhāva) as ‗innate‘ (sāṃsiddhika), ‗deriving from primordial 
Materiality‘ (prākṛtika) and ‗deriving from the products‘ (vaikṛta) (§IV.8).  A 
connection between the condition of knowledge (jñāna) and the attainments (siddhi) 
is apparent in the text, which allows for a clearer conception of the relationship 
between the Sāṃkhya paradigms of the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual 
creation (pratyayasarga) (§IV.10).  According to this relationship, Kapila, whose 
jñāna is produced directly from pradhāna at the time of his birth, is unique in being 
exempt from the need to attain knowledge through one of the siddhis.  This chapter 
will explore the implications of all of these points with regard to the YD’s view of 
the process of the production and transmission of knowledge (§1), the importance of 
Kapila’s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine (§2), and the nature and origin of 
Kapila and his knowledge (§3-5). 
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§1. The YD-kāra’s attitude to received knowledge. 
 
As has become apparent in the course of the preceding chapter, many passages of the 
YD contain evidence of the author‘s view of the process by which knowledge is 
produced and transmitted.  In general, the YD places more importance upon the 
continuity of tradition than do the other classical commentaries.  This emphasis on 
continuity is apparent with regard both to the Sāṃkhya tradition in itself and to the 
relationship of the Sāṃkhya tradition to the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, 
particularly to the Vedas.  The first section of this chapter will examine the passages 
in which this emphasis on continuity is apparent and will consider the interpretative 
strategies employed by the commentator to account for the uninterrupted 
transmission of knowledge. 
 As discussed by MOTEGI (2006), the YD attempts to reconcile Sāṃkhya 
doctrine with the Vedas and to acknowledge their authority.  MOTEGI analyses a 
lengthy debate on the nature of the Vedas, presented in the commentary on SK 2,
574
 
in which the YD-kāra argues ‗that there are no inconsistencies in the scriptural 
statements of the Vedas‘ and ‗that liberation by means of knowledge is supported by 
the Vedic scriptures‘.575  That is, according to the YD-kāra, although the Vedas 
prescribe ritual activity leading to rebirth at a higher level of the phenomenal 
cosmos,
576
 they also prescribe the preferable path of knowledge leading to 
liberation.
577
 
                                                 
574
 YD on SK 2, p. 31, l. 14 – p. 54, l. 16; see MOTEGI (2006), pp. 48-52. 
575
 MOTEGI (2006), p. 51. 
576
 E.g., YD on SK 2b, p. 34, ll. 13-15: ‗Though it is a cause of attaining heaven, the performance of 
[ritual] action prescribed by the Vedas is not possible without injury to living beings, so it is 
disregarded by those desirous of benefitting [living beings].‘ (sati svargaprāptinimittatve 
vedavihitasya karmaṇaḥ samanuṣṭhānaṃ prāṇi<ṇā>m upaghātam antareṇa na sambhavatīti 
hitakāmair apy upekṣyate /). 
577
 E.g., YD on SK 2d, p. 50, ll. 13-14: ‗This goal, liberation through knowledge, is supported by the 
Vedas, not unfounded.‘ (āmnāyanibandhano hy ayam artho jñānān mokṣa iti na yādṛcchikaḥ /). 
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As also noted by MOTEGI,
578
 this tendency to acknowledge the authority of 
the Vedas is also evident in the YD‘s definition of the pramāṇa of authoritative 
testimony (āptavacana), which includes the Vedas as authoritative by nature, as well 
as the statements of authoritative persons (āpta), which include the traditional texts 
(smṛti) of the Brāhmaṇical tradition.579  In terms of authoritative sources of doctrine, 
this definition puts the Vedic texts on a par with the texts of the Sāṃkhya tradition.  
With regard to Sāṃkhya teachers, we can assume that the commentator‘s mention of 
īśvaramaharṣis as authoritative figures (āpta) 580 would include at least Kapila, the 
paramarṣi (see §IV.3, V.3).  Sāṃkhya texts composed by later teachers would be 
implicitly included in āptavacana by the YD-kāra‘s provision for the maintenance of 
every body of knowledge (śāstra).581 
 In addition to this continuity of doctrinal authority between the Vedic 
tradition and the Sāṃkhya tradition, the YD reflects a Vedic influence in its 
conception of the nature of tradition itself.  The commentator appears to model his 
presentation of the process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is produced and 
transmitted upon the process of Vedic revelation and transmission.  This is apparent 
in the commentator‘s use of the quotation from NU 1.20 to illustrate the nature of the 
three primary siddhis,
582
 which are associated with the unprecedented (apūrva) 
production of Sāṃkhya knowledge.583  According to this interpretation of the 
siddhis, some extraordinary individuals have the ability to independently attain 
Sāṃkhya knowledge through mental reflection (ūha, vicāraṇa), without the use of 
the means of knowledge (pramāṇa) by which knowledge is ordinarily attained.  This 
is compared to the ability of the Vedic ṛṣis who have intuitive insight into the 
                                                 
578
 MOTEGI (2006), p. 53. 
579
 See n. 364 (§IV.3). 
580
 See n. 367 (§IV.3). 
581
 See n. 367 (§IV.3). 
582
 See nn. 510, 518, 519, 520 (§IV.9). 
583
 See n. 425 (§IV.6). 
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properties of things (sākṣātkṛtadharman ṛṣi).  The teaching of Sāṃkhya knowledge 
to others by those who have attained it through ūha is compared to the transmission 
of Vedic mantras through teaching (upadeśa).  The formulation of Sāṃkhya texts for 
the transmission of knowledge through study (adhyayana) is compared to the 
formulation of the collected and assembled Vedas and Vedāṅgas, which, as we have 
seen, have the same authoritative status as Sāṃkhya texts. 
 Although Kapila‘s innate knowledge is distinguished from the knowledge 
attained through ūha,584 these two forms of knowledge appear to share some 
characteristics.  Like the knowledge attained through ūha, Kapila‘s knowledge does 
not require any pramāṇa.585  Both forms of knowledge have the same object, insofar 
as both are identified with forms of the bhāva of jñāna, which is described primarily 
in terms of Sāṃkhya knowledge leading to liberation.586  Kapila‘s initiation of a 
tradition by imparting his knowledge to Āsuri587 can be compared to the 
transmission of knowledge through the second siddhi, śabda.  Thus, although Kapila 
is singled out (apparently even from other ṛṣis) in terms of the production of his 
knowledge, the tradition of knowledge initiated by him can be compared to the 
paradigm of the siddhis, and therefore to the process of Vedic revelation and 
transmission. 
Another possible connection can be drawn between the YD‘s presentation of 
the siddhis and Kapila‘s initial formulation of Sāṃkhya knowledge.  As mentioned 
in §IV.9, the NU passage quoted in connection with the siddhis
588
 originally occurs 
in a section of the NU devoted to the praise of those who know the proper, 
etymological meanings of words.  A similar concern is reflected in a passage of the 
                                                 
584
 See n. 569 (§IV.10). 
585
 See n. 390 (§IV.4); n. 507 (§IV.9). 
586
 See nn. 425 (§IV.6); 558, 559 (§IV.10); cf. SK 44c: jñānena cāpavargaḥ /. 
587
 SK 70ab: etat pavitram agryaṃ munir āsuraye ’nukampayā pradadau /. 
588
 See nn. 510, 418, 519, 520 (§IV.9). 
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YD, in which the commentator emphasizes the fact that Kapila‘s initial articulation 
of Sāṃkhya doctrine involved only etymologically significant names for the tattvas.  
These names are considered arthanibandha, ‗dependent on meaning‘, rather than 
svarūpabandha, ‗dependent on their own form‘ or ‗conventional‘: 
A name (saṃjñā) is a word (śabda) the purpose of which is the conveyance of 
what is signified (saṃjñin).  This is twofold: dependent on meaning 
(arthanibandha) and conventional (svarūpanibandha). [...] There is no 
conventional word of the glorious supreme ṛṣi, who, having diligently 
ascertained the inherent form of all the principles (tattva) by means of ārṣa589 
knowledge, bestowed names.  For example, primordial Materiality (pradhāna): 
‗the products are put forth (pradhīyante) in it‘; Consciousness (puruṣa): ‗in the 
body (pur) it lies (śete)‘; and so on.  Also for the teachers (ācārya) who follow 
his views, there is no regard for the assignment of new names, on account of 
the complete communication through these same [names].
590
 
 
The efficacy of Kapila‘s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine is established 
here in terms of his concern for linguistic precision.  Given this concern with the 
meanings (artha) of the names of the tattvas, it is possible that the phrase 
abhipretam artham as it occurs in the YD‘s explanation of the siddhis,591 refers not 
simply to an ‗intended object‘ but more specifically to ‗approved meaning‘—that is, 
to the etymological meanings behind the names of the tattvas. 
According to this interpretation, which is only a possibility, the names of the 
tattvas would be viewed as the essence of the Sāṃkhya system.  For those without 
direct access—through ūha or ārṣa jñāna (in the case of Kapila)—to the objects of 
knowledge behind these names, either teaching (śabda) by a guru or study 
(adhyayana) of Sāṃkhya śāstra would serve to clarify them.  This interpretation 
                                                 
589
 The term ārṣa (‗pertaining to ṛṣis‘) is also used to refer to Kapila‘s innate knowledge in the context 
of the YD‘s discussion of the pramāṇas (§IV.4, n. 390). 
590
 saṃjñipratyāyanārthaḥ śabdaḥ samjñā (cf. MBhāṣya I.38.20) / sā ca dvividhā / arthanibandhanā 
svarūpabandhanā ca / (YD Intro., p. 7, ll. 16-17); prayatnato bhagavataḥ paramarṣer ārṣeṇa jñānena 
sarvatattvānāṃ svarūpam upalabhya saṃjñāṃ vidadhato nāsti svarūpanibandhanaḥ śabdaḥ / 
tadyathā pradhīyante ’tra vikārā iti pradhānam / “puri śete” (cf. e.g. Gop. Br. 1.1.39)  iti puruṣa 
ityādi / tanmatānusāriṇām apy ācāryāṇāṃ tābhir eva saṃvyavahārān nāsty apūrvasaṃjñāvidhānaṃ 
praty ādaraḥ / (YD Intro., p. 7, ll. 23-27).  The use of the feminine tābhiḥ (‗through these‘) in the last 
line must refer to saṃjñā rather than to the masculine śabda. 
591
 See nn. 507, 509 (§IV.9). 
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would agree with WEZLER (2001)‘s interpretation of the significance of the NU 
passage as a description of the process by which knowledge of the meaning of the 
Vedic mantras is transmitted.
592
  The ṛṣis who initially formulate the mantras (or in 
our case, the names of the tattvas), do so based upon their direct knowledge of the 
principles underlying reality, as AKLUJKAR (2009) explains: ‗The sākṣāt-kṛta-
dharmatva of the seers means direct, undistorted and extraordinary knowledge of 
those properties and actions or processes which make the world what it is.‘593  For 
later generations, without direct knowledge of these principles, an understanding of 
the meaning (artha) of the mantras (or of the names of the tattvas) would serve to 
produce the same knowledge. 
 The above discussion of the etymological significance of Kapila‘s names for 
the tattvas also demonstrates the importance placed by the YD on the linguistic 
conformity of subsequent Sāṃkhya teachers to Kapila‘s original śāstra.  The names 
of the tattvas are considered the core of Kapila‘s system, to which all subsequent 
Sāṃkhya teachers have appealed.  In this and other respects, the commentator shows 
a concern for establishing the conformity of the SK, in particular, to Kapila‘s 
original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine. 
 
§2. The YD-kāra’s view of the nature of the Sāṃkhyakārikā. 
 
At many points in the YD, the commentator shows a concern for establishing the 
efficacy of the SK to produce Sāṃkhya knowledge.  In effect, the commentator 
seeks to show that study (adhyayana) of this text is a valid means of attaining the 
                                                 
592
 WEZLER (2001), p. 232-233; see nn. 516, 519, 520 (§IV.9) 
593
 AKLUJKAR (2009), p. 17. 
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knowledge originally formulated by Kapila and passed down to others originally 
through direct teaching (upadeśa, śabda). 
 In the introductory verses of the text, the commentator discusses the process 
of transmission by which the system founded by Kapila came to be summarised in 
the SK.  The first stage of this development describes the transition from direct 
teaching (from Kapila to his disciple) to the composition of a fixed Sāṃkhya text: 
Thinking that, on account of its immensity, it would not be possible, even in 
hundreds of years, to complete the learning of that great philosophical system 
(tantra) for the cessation of the three pains, which the sage (muni) proclaimed 
to the wise Āsuri, who desired to know the truth, sages whose intellects were 
subtle and whose wisdom was flawless, summarising it by means of a short 
text (grantha), set down
594
 that ārṣa teaching out of a desire for the welfare of 
pupils (śiṣya).595 
 
This ‗short text‘ represents the first fixed formulation of Kapila‘s original system.  
The next stage in the development of the Sāṃkhya tradition describes the expansion 
of this original formulation by later teachers: 
But the proponents of the theories of Consciousness (puruṣa), the Lord (īśa), 
or atoms (aṇu) [as the source of the universe]596, and the Buddhists 
(vaināśika),597 materialists (prākṛtika),598 and perverted people 
(vikārapuruṣa)599 were opponents of that [system].  For the sake of thwarting 
                                                 
594
 The term nibaddha must be used here in the sense ‗composed‘ or ‗set down‘, though this does not 
necessarily mean ‗written down‘.  Likewise the term grantha (‗text‘) does not necessarily refer to a 
written text, but rather to a fixed, formulated composition. 
595
 tattvaṃ jijñāsamānāya viprāyāsuraye muniḥ / 
     yad uvāca mahat tantraṃ duḥkhatrayanivṛttaye /2/ 
     na tasyādhigamaḥ śakyaḥ kartuṃ varṣaśatair api / 
     bhūyastvād iti saṃcintya munibhiḥ sūkṣmabuddhibhiḥ /3/ 
     granthenālpena saṃkṣipya tad ārṣam anuśāsanam / 
     nibaddham amalaprajñaiḥ śiṣyāṇāṃ hitakāmyayā /4/ (YD Intro., p. 1, l. 7 – p. 2, l. 1). 
596
 Cf. the YD‘s use of indirect (avīta) inference to establish pradhāna as the source of the universe 
(§IV.2, n. 334).  Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidīpikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) identify the 
puruṣavādins as ‗non-dualists‘, the īśavādins as ‗theists‘, and the aṇuvādins as ‗the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika‘. 
597
 Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidīpikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term vaināśikāḥ as 
‗nihilists‘ and specify that this refers to the Buddhists. 
598
 Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidīpikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term prākṛtikāḥ as 
‗materialists‘ and specify that this refers to the Cārvākas, although this does not seem to be an attested 
sense of the term.  Presumably the term refers to those who hold prakṛti to be the only real entity. 
599
 Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidīpikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term vikārapuruṣāḥ as 
‗perverted persons‘, apparently taking vikāra in the same sense as vikārita, but it is not clear precisely 
to whom this refers.  Given the usual technical use of the terms vikāra and puruṣa in Sāṃkhya, 
perhaps another alternative would be that the term refers to vikārapuruṣavādins—that is, to those who 
hold that the puruṣa is a product (vikāra) of prakṛti—but more evidence would be required to 
establish this. 
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the desires of those [opponents], thickets
600
 of logic (tarka), difficult to 
traverse, were fashioned by teachers (ācārya), whose intellects were subtle, in 
their own philosophical systems (tantra).
601
 
 
At this stage, the Sāṃkhya system takes the form of a school represented by various 
teachers in debate with other schools.  The commentator next identifies the SK as a 
summary of the various arguments put forward by these teachers, which are 
classified according to a system of sixty categories of discussion: 
These [thickets of logic] are inaccessible to those pupils whose intellects are 
confused with regard to the truth.  Therefore, this handbook (prakaraṇa)—or 
even complete treatise (śāstra)—its meaning condensed, called the ‗Seventy 
[Verses]‘ (saptati), was composed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, on the basis of which, all of 
the categories (padārtha) will be explained in this [commentary].  The 
existence of primordial Materiality (pradhāna), oneness, purposefulness, 
difference, subservience to another, plurality, disjunction, conjunction, 
continuation of the remaining [body after discrimination], and non-agency, 
have been handed down as the ten fundamental topics (cūlikārtha).602  Error 
(viparyaya) is five-fold, and there are said to be nine contentments (tuṣṭi).  
Incapacity (asāmarthya) of the instruments is considered twenty-eight-fold.  
Along with the eight attainments (siddhi), these sixty categories (padārtha) 
will be fully explained by definition and in due succession in this 
[commentary].  Hence, this treatise (śāstra) is adequate for establishing 
multiplicity
603
.
604
 
                                                 
600
 Kumar and Bhargava (Yuktidīpikā (1990-1992, Vol. 1, p. 2)) translate the term gahvarāḥ as 
‗ditches‘, but the usual sense of the term is ‗thicket‘, which would agree with the imagery of the first 
introductory verse of the text, which in some manuscripts is repeated after the present verse: ‗Insults 
to the elephant of Sāṃkhya, whose tusks are the direct and indirect [inferences], who inhabits the 
forest of debate, are as flimsy as a thicket of sallakī trees.‘ (vītāvītaviṣāṇasya pakṣatāvanasevinaḥ / 
pravādāḥ sāṃkhyakariṇaḥ sallakīṣaṇḍabhaṅgurāḥ // (YD Intro., p. 1, ll. 3-4; p. 2, ll. 6-7). 
601
 pratipakṣāḥ punas tasya puruṣeśāṇuvādinaḥ / 
    vaināśikāḥ prākṛtikā vikārapuruṣās tathā /5/ 
    teṣām icchāvighātārtham ācāryaiḥ sūkṣmabuddhibhiḥ / 
    racitāḥ sveṣu tantreṣu viṣamās tarkagahvarāḥ /6/ (YD Intro., p. 2, ll. 2-5). 
602
 For an overview of the significance of these ten fundamental topics, usually known as mūlikārtha 
(cf. TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-18), see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 93-94.  Marginal 
notes in two of the YD manuscripts gloss cūlātva with prādhānya (‗prevalance‘ or ‗supreme 
importance‘) explain that the ten topics are called cūlikārtha because they are similar to a cūlikā, 
which usually refers to a bird‘s crest (YD Intro., p. 2, n.1). 
603
 This ‗multiplicity‘ (nānātva) probably refers to the distinctions between the manifest (vyakta), the 
unmanifest (avyakta), and Consciousness (puruṣa) (cf. SK 2). 
604
 śiṣyair duravagāhās te tattvārthabhrāntabuddhibhiḥ / 
    tasmād īśvarakṛṣṇena saṃkṣiptārtham idam kṛtam /7/ 
    saptatyākhyaṃ prakaraṇaṃ sakalaṃ śāstram eva vā / 
    yasmāt sarvapadārthānām iha vyākhyā kariṣyate /8/ 
    pradhānāstitvam ekatvam arthavattvam athānyatā / 
    pārārthyaṃ ca tathānaikyaṃ viyogo yoga eva ca /9/ 
    śeṣavṛttir akartṛtvaṃ cūlikārthāḥ smṛtā daśa / 
    viparyayaḥ pañcavidhas tathoktā nava tuṣṭayaḥ /10/ 
    karaṇānām asāmarthyam aṣṭāviṃśatidhā matam / 
    iti ṣaṣṭiḥ padārthānām aṣṭābhiḥ saha siddhibhiḥ /11/ 
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These sixty topics form the basic framework of the Ṣaṣṭitantra (‗System of Sixty 
[Categories]‘).605  From these verses, it is not clear whether the YD-kāra views these 
categories as an aspect of Kapila‘s original system or as a product of the later 
teachers mentioned in the previous verses.  Elsewhere, however, the commentator 
mentions that Kapila had innate knowledge of ‗all categories‘.606  As suggested by 
LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987),
607
 it appears that the YD thus views the 
Ṣaṣṭitantra as a system initiated by Kapila himself and reflected in Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s 
summary of Sāṃkhya doctrine.608  Thus, Kapila‘s original system (apparently 
featuring sixty categories), after being summarised in a fixed composition and then 
expanded upon by later teachers in debate with other schools, was re-summarised by 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the SK. 
In the last of the YD‘s introductory verses, the commentator explicitly asserts that 
the SK is an authoritative expression of the system founded by Kapila, and explains 
his own function as a commentator: 
[This] short text, not short in meaning, is possessed of all the characteristics of 
a philosophical system (tantra), just like an image in a mirror of the 
philosophical system of the supreme ṛṣi.  I will undertake an explanation of it 
for the sake of justification according to logic.  May wise men receive it well, 
out of compassion even if it is incorrect.
609
 
                                                                                                                                          
    yathākramaṃ lakṣaṇataḥ kārtsnyenehābhidhāsyate / 
    tasmād ataḥ śāstram idam alaṃ nānātvasiddhaye /12/ (YD Intro., p. 2, l. 8 – p. 3, l. 1).  Verses 9 
through 11 above are quoted directly by the TK (on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-17; cf. n. 758, §V.5). 
605
 For a discussion of the issues surrounding the possible authorship and date of the Ṣaṣṭitantra, as 
well as the question as to whether the term refers to a single text or group of texts, or just a general 
framework for treating Sāṃkhya, see LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 125-128. 
606
 asty ārṣo hi dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa sarvapadārtheṣu sāṃsiddhikaḥ pratyayaḥ sa prātibho bhaviṣyatīti / 
(YD on SK 4, p. 75, ll. 19-21). 
607
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 127) seem to oversimplify in their interpretation of these 
opening verses: ‗The Yuktidīpikā indicates in its introductory verses that the scheme [the Ṣaṣtitantra] 
was handed down by Kapila himself and that it involved a huge treatise that could not be mastered 
even in a hundred years; hence, the need for Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s summary.‘  Rather, as has become evident, 
Kapila‘s system went through an initial summarisation, then a period of expansion by later teachers, 
then a re-summarisation by Īśvarakṛṣṇa.  There is no explicit direct connection in these verses 
between the sixty topics and Kapila‘s original treatise. 
608
 This does not preclude the possibility that, as argued by OBERHAMMER (1961), there was also a 
single text treating these sixty topics, composed by Vṛṣagaṇa, and referred to as the śāstra in the YD 
(see CHAPTER III). 
609
 alpagrantham analpārthaṃ sarvais tantraguṇair yutam / 
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The commentator sees his task as to prove the authoritative status of the SK as a 
complete tantra, to ‗unpack‘ the meaning behind the verses through logical argument 
and thereby to demonstrate the continuity between Kapila‘s original system and 
Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s summary.  The reference to the SK as ‗an image in a mirror‘ in this 
passage can be compared to SK 73, a verse added to the end of the SK by the MV: 
‗Thus, this brief śāstra is not deficient with respect to meaning, and is just like an 
image reflected in a mirrror of the great body of the tantra.‘610 However, the YD‘s 
explicit statement of purpose, and its realisation in the YD-kāra‘s lengthy dialogical 
debates in defence of what he perceives as Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s views, have no parallel in 
any of the other classical commentaries.  At the opposite extreme from the YD-
kāra‘s attitude lies the detached reporting of Vācaspatimiśra.611 
 The remainder of the introductory section of the YD is devoted to an 
explanation in prose of the characteristics of a proper tantra,
612
 which include proper 
‗naming‘ (saṃjñā) according to etymological significance.  As discussed above 
(§V.1), the commentator views Kapila‘s names for the tattvas as a point of 
continuity in the Sāṃkhya tradition.613  Thus, the SK conforms to Kapila‘s original 
system both in its utilisation of the sixty categories (padārtha) for the discussion of 
doctrine and in its preservation of the key technical terminology of the system.  The 
other key characteristics of a tantra discussed by the commentator are adequacy of 
aphorisms (sūtra), adequacy of means of knowledge (pramāṇa), adequacy of the 
                                                                                                                                          
    pāramarṣasya tantrasya bimbam ādarśagaṃ yathā /13/ 
    tasya vyākhyāṃ kariṣyāmi yathānyāyopapattaye / 
    kāruṇyād apy ayuktāṃ tāṃ pratinandantu sūrayaḥ /14/ (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 1-4). 
610
 MV, p. 85, ll. 12-13: tasmāt samāsadṛṣṭaṃ śāstram idaṃ nārthataś ca parihīnam / tantrasya ca 
bṛhanmūrter darpaṇasaṅkrāntam iva bimbam //73//.  MV (p. 85, ll. 19-20) explains that tantra refers 
to the ṣaṣṭitantra: ‗Thus, in [this] short text, the manifestation of the entire system of sixty [topics] is 
effected.  This is the sense [of the verse].‘ (evam alpaśāstre ṣaṣṭitantrasya kṛtsnasyāpi vyaktir 
abhihitety arthaḥ /). 
611
 Vācaspati says that he is ‗concerned with the explanation merely of settled opinions (siddhānta), 
with disregard for the faults of others‘ (see §IV.9, n. 523). 
612
 YD Intro., p. 3, l. 6 – p. 8, l. 16. 
613
 See n. 590 (§V.1). 
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members [of formal inference] (avayava),
614
 completeness (anyūnatā), statement of 
uncertainty and determination (saṃśayanirṇayokti), brief statement (uddeśa), 
detailed statement (nirdeśa), succession [of categories discussed] (anukrama), and 
instruction (upadeśa).615 
 With regard to the form of the SK, the YD breaks up the kārikās (verses) of 
the text and treats them as sūtras (short aphorisms).  In their criticial edition of the 
YD, Wezler and Motegi have established that the text of the YD itself consists of a 
short vārttika text with a bhāṣya text layered around it, but that both are the product 
of the same author, ‗who wanted thus to follow the model of Patañjali‘s Mahābhāṣya 
embodying the work of Kātyāyana, and hence ultimately to create a kind of 
counterpart, within the tradition of Sāṃkhya, to the works of the famous trimunis of 
Vyākaraṇa, thus raising the Sāṃkhya-kārikā to the status of a Sūtra‘.616  The YD-
kāra‘s use of the NU passage in explaining the siddhis,617 his concern for the 
etymological significance of the names of the tattvas,
618
 and his frequent 
interpretative analysis of Sanskrit compounds
619
 could also be taken to reflect his 
emulation of the Grammarian tradition.
620
 
 The commentator‘s interest in etymology is also displayed in his explanation 
of the term sūtra.  First he suggests that a sūtra ‗indicates‘ (sūcayati) particular 
objects, illustrating this with an example from the SK.
621
  Secondly, he suggests that, 
                                                 
614
 See nn. 322-324 (§IV.2). 
615
 The commentator lists these characteristics in a verse (perhaps to be taken as a quotation) before 
explaining them in detail: sūtrapramāṇavayavopapattir anyūnatā saṃśayanirṇayoktiḥ / 
uddeśanirdeśam anukramaś ca saṃjñopadeśāv iti tantrasampat // (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 10-11). 
616
 YD, p. xxii. 
617
 See nn. 510, 515, 518, 519, 520 (§IV.9). 
618
 See n. 590 (§V.1). 
619
 Cf. n. 312 (§IV.1), n. 364 (§IV.3). 
620
 LARSON (1979, p. 281) observes that ‗one has the impression that the author of the Yuktidīpikā was 
a grammarian rather than a philosopher since many passages of the text deal with the analysis of 
Sanskrit compounds together with references to Patañjali‘s Mahābhāṣya.‘  As MOTEGI (2006, p. 54) 
suggests, an analysis of this aspect of the YD deserves a separate study. 
621
 āha: atha sūtram iti kasmāt / ūcyate: sūcanāt sūtram / sūcayati tāṃs tān arthaviśeṣān iti sūtram / 
tadyathā kāraṇam asty avyaktam (SK 16a) bhedānaṃ parimāṇāt (SK 15a) iti / atra pratijñāhetū 
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more specifically, a sūtra ‗indicates the knowledge (buddhi) of a mendicant (bhikṣu) 
whose outer and inner organs
622
 have been withdrawn, with regard even to various 
suprasensuous (atīndriya) objects, such as primordial Materiality (pradhāna)‘.623  
This knowledge corresponds to that of the figures known as īśvaramaharṣi624 from 
the passage of the YD that deals with the definition of authoritative figures (āpta),625 
‗who are free from faults such as passion, of undoubted intelligence, and who have 
seen suprasensuous (atīndriya) objects‘.626  As discussed in §IV.3, this passage also 
makes a provision for the maintenance of each śāstra by individuals recognised as 
authorities in their own fields of learning.
627
  The commentator‘s definition of the 
term sūtra thus provides a link between his view of the SK and his definition of 
authoritative testimony (āptavacana).  The SK can be considered to fall under the 
category of authoritative testimony insofar as it provides a means for later 
generations to access Kapila‘s firsthand knowledge of the suprasensuous tattvas. 
 The commentator‘s inclusion of ‗adequacy of the members [of formal 
inference]‘ (avayavopapatti)628 in the characteristics of a proper tantra is also 
significant with regard to his view of the function of the SK.  The commentator 
specifies that this refers to the ten members (avayava) of formal inference, including 
the five ‗members of explanation‘ (vyākhyāṅga) and the five ‗members of teaching 
                                                                                                                                          
kaṇṭhoktau / tayor upayogi dṛṣṭāntaṃ sādhyasiddhaye samartham iti kṛtvā mūlaśakalāda<yo> 
’trāntar anabhihitā apy etasmād avasīyante / (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 20-25). 
622
 See §II.4 and SK 33, 35. 
623
 athavā bhikṣor upasaṃhṛtabahiṣkaraṇāntaḥkaraṇasya teṣu teṣv atīndriyeṣv api pradhānādiṣv 
artheṣu buddhiṃ sūcayatīti sūtram / (YD Intro., p. 3, ll. 25-26). 
624
 See §V.3 on the significance of this term. 
625
 See n. 367 (§IV.3). 
626
 vyapagatarāgādidoṣāṇām asandigdhamatīnām atīndriyārthadṛśvanām īśvaramaharṣīṇām 
āptatvam ācakṣmahe na sarveṣām / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 4-5). 
627
 svaviṣaye ca tatprāmāṇyasyādoṣavattvāt / yasya khalv api[ ]yo viṣayas tasya tasmin viṣaye vaco 
’ntareṇāpi sādhanaṃ pramāṇam ity avaśyam abhyupagantavyam / itarathā pratiśāstram 
ācārasthitiniyamānām adṛṣṭārthānām apratipattiḥ syāt / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 7-10). 
628
 See above, nn. 612, 615. 
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to others‘ (parapratipādanāṅga).629  As discussed in §IV.2, these ten members 
constitute the direct (vīta) inference630 and are considered necessary because ‗it is 
impossible to transmit meaning (artha) to another intellect (buddhi) without [the use 
of] a statement (vākyam).‘631  In particular, the commentator argues that the members 
of explanation (vyākhyāṅga) are necesssary for the sake of the favour (anugraha) of 
those of ordinary intellect, which is considered the reason for the explanation of 
śāstra.632 
The commentator defends his attribution of these ten members of inference to 
the SK in a series of exchanges with an opponent,
633
 in which he argues that 
although they are not mentioned in the SK, their use is implied by Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s 
mention of inference (anumāna)634 and demonstrated by his doctrinal statements.635  
As discussed by HARZER (2006), the commentator thus treats the so-called sūtras of 
the SK as ‗arguments in accordance with the rules of forming an inference‘.636  As 
discussed in §IV.2,  the YD-kāra demonstrates the use of not only direct (vīta) 
inference, but also indirect (avīta) inference and inference from general correlation 
                                                 
629
 avayavāḥ punar jijñāsādayaḥ pratijñādayaś ca / tatra jijñāsādayo vyākhyāṅgaṃ pratijñādayaḥ 
parapratyāyanāṅgam / tān uttaratra vakṣyāmaḥ (89.16f.) / (YD Intro., p. 4, ll. 6-8).  Cf. nn. 322, 324 
(§IV.2). 
630
 See n. 333 (§IV.2). 
631
 vākyam antareṇārthasya buddhyantare saṃkrāmayitum aśakyatvāt (YD on SK 6ab, p. 89, ll. 14-
15). 
632
 ‗The favour of all should be effected.  For this purpose, the explanation of śāstra is practiced by 
the learned, not for their own sake or for the sake of those with intellects similar to their own.‘  
(sarvasya cānugrahaḥ kartavya ity evamarthaṃ śāstravyākhyānaṃ vipaścidbhiḥ pratāyate na 
svārthaṃ svasadṛśabuddhyarthaṃ vā / (YD on SK 6, p. 93, ll. 15-16).)  For context, see n. 331 
(§IV.2). 
633
 YD Intro., p. 4, l. 9 – p. 6, l. 11. 
634
 ucyate: pramāṇāntarbhāvāt / pramāṇeṣv antarbhāva eṣām ity ayam upadiṣṭo hetur asmābhiḥ / 
anumānāṅgaṃ hi jijñāsādayaḥ / tasmāt tadantarbhūtās ta iti na pṛthag upadiśyante / (YD Intro., p. 5, 
ll. 4-6). 
635
 naitad yuktam anupadeśān na santi jijñāsādayaḥ / kiṃ tarhi / anupadiṣṭam apy eṣām astitvaṃ 
liṅgāt pratipadyāmahe yad ayam ācāryaḥ—duḥkhatrayābhighātāj jijñāsā tadapaghātake hetau / (SK 
1ab) iti jijñāsanam ācaṣṭe / kāraṇam asty avyaktam (SK 16a) iti pratijñāṃ karoti / bhedānāṃ 
parimāṇāt (SK 15a) iti hetuṃ vyapadiśati / naṭavad vyavatiṣṭhate liṅgam (SK 42d) iti dṛṣṭāntaṃ 
dyotayati / kṣīrasya yathā tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya (SK 57b’d) ity upasaṃharati / tasmāt 
trividhaṃ karaṇaṃ dvāri (SK 35cd) iti nigamayati / na cānabhipretair ācāryāṇāṃ śāstre vyavahāro 
lakṣyate / tena vayaṃ liṅgāt pratipadyāmahe santi jijñāsādayo ’vayavāḥ śāstra iti / (YD Intro., p. 4, 
ll. 16-26). 
636
 HARZER (2006), p. 17. 
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(sāmānyatodṛṣṭa), in establishing the doctrines laid out in the SK.637  The 
commentator‘s primary concern is thus to show that the SK illustrates the processes 
of inference by which the Sāṃkhya tattvas are established. 
As discussed in §IV.3, the YD leaves room for the transmission through 
authoritative testimony (āptavacana) of objects of knowledge also knowable through 
perception or inference.
638
  Evidently, the commentator views the communication of 
Sāṃkhya doctrine, through the medium of formal inference, as the function of the 
SK as an authoritative tantra.  In other words, we might say that the SK is treated as 
a manual for the inference of Sāṃkhya knowledge.  Although the pramāṇa of 
inference is treated as a key tool for establishing Sāṃkhya doctrine, the pramāṇa of 
authoritative testimony is required to demonstrate the inference of this doctrine to 
those of ordinary cognitive capacity.  Those individuals of extraordinary cognitive 
capacity may be able to grasp this doctrine independently through reflection (ūha).  
Although ūha is said to occur independently of the pramāṇas,639 it can perhaps be 
thought of as a kind of independent inferential process, since the pramāṇa of 
inference is rather treated in terms of the formulation and communication of an 
inferential statement. 
The YD‘s view of the relationship between the SK and Kapila‘s original 
tantra seems to fit a model identified by POLLOCK (1985) as prevalent in the classical 
period of Indian śāstra.  POLLOCK illustrates the widespread assumption, in the texts 
of this period, of the primordial existence of valid doctrine.  He characterises the 
initial apprehension and articulation of a body of doctrine by a qualified individual 
as ‗the necessary commencement of the tradition‘.640  Subsequently, the learning of 
                                                 
637
 See nn. 323, 334, 335, 341 (§IV.2). 
638
 See n. 369 (§IV.3). 
639
 See n. 507 (§IV.6). 
640
 POLLOCK (1985), p. 507. 
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this śāstra ‗serves to enhance the efficacy of the practice‘ of which it treats.641  Such 
a text is considered the ideal prototype for future treatments of its subject.  Tradition 
thus takes the form of a perpetual appeal to this prototype, which is viewed as the 
vital substance of a particular system of knowledge.
642
 
As we have seen, the YD treats the names of the tattvas as an essential point 
of continuity in the Sāṃkhya tradition.  Insofar as these names conform to the 
significance (artha) of the tattvas themselves—in other words, to the fundamental 
properties (dharman) of reality
643—they can be considered to exist primordially in a 
potential form.  According to this interpretation, Kapila‘s initial manifestation of the 
primordial Sāṃkhya śāstra corresponds to POLLOCK‘s ‗commencement of the 
tradition‘, while Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s conformity to that original śāstra ‗serves to enhance 
the efficacy of the practice‘ of the inference of the Sāṃkhya tattvas by later 
individuals.  In this sense, the authoritative testimony given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa serves as 
a blueprint for the attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge.  The suggestion that other ṛṣis 
may attain the same knowledge independently through ūha conforms with 
POLLOCK‘s observation that an original śāstra may be made accessible to later 
generations either ‗through faithful intermediaries‘ or ‗by sudden revelation‘.644 
Moreover, POLLOCK observes that this view of the origination and 
transmission of knowledge stems from the notion that the Vedas are primordially 
existent
645
 and may be related to the doctrine of the pre-existent effect 
(satkāryavāda).646  As we have seen (§V.1), the YD-kāra appears to emulate the 
                                                 
641
 Ibid., p. 507. 
642
 Similarly, AKLUJKAR (2009, p. 11) notes that ‗almost all accounts of getting back a lost 
fundamental teaching have reference to that teaching‘s survival somewhere in a hidden or 
unidentified form.  The very logic of the situation can be said to demand the assumption of a lost yet 
not-completely-lost original.‘ 
643
 Cf. the YD‘s use of NU 1.20: nn. 510, 515, 518, 519, 520 (§IV.9). 
644
 POLLOCK (1985), p. 512. 
645
 Ibid., p. 519. 
646
 Ibid., pp. 517-518. 
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model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the Sāṃkhya tradition.  The notion of 
satkāryavāda is also a key doctrine in the Sāṃkhya system, used to account for the 
creation of the manifest tattvas out of primordial Materiality (pradhāna).647  It seems 
plausible that the YD-kāra would assume that just as a fixed number of tattvas pre-
exist in pradhāna, so does the knowledge of these tattvas pre-exist in a fixed 
formulation.  We will find support for this interpretation in connection with the 
origination of Kapila and his knowledge in §V.4. 
This view of the function of the SK would resolve a potential tension 
between Sāṃkhya doctrine and its legitimising mechanism, between the fact that the 
tattvas may presumably be inferred by any individual and the fact that they were 
originally intuited by an individual with extraordinary abilities.  According to the 
view implicit in the YD‘s treatment of the SK, these two facts mutually validate one 
another.  Īśvarakṛṣṇa‘s conformity to Kapila‘s original śāstra serves to assist later 
generations in the practice of Sāṃkhya, while at the same time, the practice of 
Sāṃkhya inference, as embodied in the SK and demonstrated by the YD, serves to 
validate the assertion of the universal reality of the tattvas and thus the universal 
applicability of Kapila‘s śāstra. 
The YD‘s view of the origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine thus 
conforms to a model prevalent in the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, emulating the 
model of the Vedic ṛṣis in its conception of Kapila‘s role in the initiation of the 
Sāṃkhya tradition.  However, the YD also clearly elevates Kapila above other ṛṣis.  
                                                 
647
 SK 9:  ‗Because of the non-production of a non-existent thing, because of the relation of a cause 
[to its instruments], because of the absence of origination from everything, because of the production 
of that which it is possible [to produce from a particular cause] by that which is capable [of producing 
that particular effect], and because of the state of being a cause, the effect is [pre-]existent [in the 
cause].‘ (asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt / śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt 
kāraṇabhāvāc ca sat kāryam //).  The commentators use this doctrine to prove that the manifest 
tattvas exist in pradhāna in an unmanifest form; e.g., YD on SK 9, p. 109, ll. 12-13: ‗We assert that 
there would be no manifestation of the products, beginning with the intellect, out of primordial 
Materiality if they were non-existent.‘ (nāvidyamānasya mahadāder vikārasya pradhānād āvirbhāva 
iti pratijānīmahe /) 
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Kapila is treated as the only ṛṣi born with innate (sāṃsiddhika) Sāṃkhya knowledge 
and as therefore exempt from the need even to grasp this knowledge through 
reflection (ūha).648  The YD recognises the existence of other ṛṣis, as well as of 
yogins, devas, and the Lord (īśvara).  The following section will present an overview 
of the evidence in the YD with regard to the nature and status of these figures, in 
order to provide some context for a discussion of the significance of the special 
status afforded Kapila (§V.4-5). 
 
§3. Īśvara, devas, yogins and ṛṣis in the Yuktidīpikā. 
 
References to several classes of extraordinary or divine beings occur in the YD.  In 
large part, the subject matter discussed in connection with these figures is peripheral 
to the concerns of the Sāṃkhya system as presented in the SK.  As we have seen, 
rebirth in the realms of deities (deva), at higher levels of the phenomenal cosmos, is 
considered a possibility as the result of the condition of merit (dharma), but this is 
considered inferior to the goal of liberation through the condition of knowledge 
(jñāna) (§IV.6).  In general, the commentators hold that devas and yogins are able to 
directly perceive the subtle elements (tanmātra) (§II.4, IV.1), although this fact is 
not discussed in connection with the pursuit of liberation through Sāṃkhya 
knowledge.  Kapila, the founder of Sāṃkhya, is known as the supreme ṛṣi 
(paramarṣi), and occasional references to other ṛṣis are found in the 
commentaries.
649
  The nature of ṛṣis and the relative status of Kapila, however, are 
not discussed in detail in the commentaries. 
                                                 
648
 See n. 569 (§IV.10). 
649
 E.g., GBh‘s mention of the seven ṛṣis who are sons of Brahmā (§IV.8, n. 454), YD‘s plural use of 
the term īśvaramaharṣi (§IV.3, n. 367), and YD‘s quotation of NU 1.20 (§IV.9, n. 510).  See further 
discussion below. 
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Of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, the YD contains the most evidence 
regarding the nature and status of such extraordinary figures.  As apparent in some of 
the passages analysed in CHAPTER IV, the YD reveals a mythological orientation in 
its explanation of certain doctrines.  In particular, the YD incorporates figures of 
cosmological prominence into the Sāṃkhya discussion more often than do the other 
commentaries.  This is apparent, for example, in the commentator‘s repeated 
references to a māhātmyaśarīra (‗body of greatness‘). 
FRAUWALLNER (1973) argues that the passage, quoted by the YD, relating the 
māhātmyaśarīra‘s production of the categories of the pratyayasarga as his sons,650 
reflects a mythological orientation apparent in the doctrines of Vṛṣagaṇa‘s 
Ṣaṣṭitantra,651 stemming from the influence of ‗religious sects‘ on early Sāṃkhya.652  
OBERHAMMER (1961) attributes eleven quotations found in the YD to the 
Ṣaṣṭitantra,653 although it is not clear whether the Ṣaṣṭitantra is in fact a single text, a 
group of texts, or just a general framework for the discussion of Sāṃkhya 
doctrine.
654
  Given the YD-kāra‘s apparent familiarity with the Ṣaṣṭitantra—or, at 
any rate, with earlier sources of Sāṃkhya doctrine—it is possible that the YD‘s 
presentation of divine figures in general reveals elements of earlier Sāṃkhya 
tradition not found in the other classical commentaries.
655
 
As discussed in §IV.9, the YD-kāra refers to the māhātmyaśarīra as 
Brahmā656 and elsewhere states that his sons arose out of primordial Nature 
                                                 
650
 See n. 484 (§IV.9). 
651
 On the identification of this passage as a quotation from  Vṛṣagaṇa‘s Ṣaṣṭitantra, see the reviews in 
CHAPTER III of FRAUWALLNER (1973) and OBERHAMMER (1961). 
652
 FRAUWALLNER (1973), pp. 259-260. 
653
 OBERHAMMER (1961), pp. 165-170. 
654
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 125-128.  Cf. the YD‘s presentation of the sixty 
categories (§V.2, nn. 604, 608). 
655
 The other commentators, for example, class such statements as ‗Indra is king of the gods‘ in the 
category of authoritative testimony (āptavacana) (§IV.3, nn. 354, 356), which they present as 
practically unimportant in the context of the Sāṃkhya inquiry, while the YD, as we shall see below, 
discusses divine figures in connection with several aspects of the system. 
656
 See n. 484 (§IV.9). 
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(pradhāna), an instance of the prākṛtika form of the production of physical 
bodies.
657
  More information on the māhātmyaśarīra is found in another passage of 
the YD, in which the commentator clarifies his position on the nature of the Lord 
(īśvara), in response to arguments for the Lord‘s role as creator, as held by the 
Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas, who serve as opponents to the Sāṃkhya viewpoint in this 
passage:
658
 
[Opponent:] And the scripture (śruti) also describes [the Lord‘s] embodiment 
(mūrti)659 ‗clothed in skins, trident in hand, bow stretched, having black locks 
of hair‘, and so on.  If [it is argued that] because of admitting to this, there is 
the relinquishment of your position, [this] would be the idea: if, due to the 
statments of scripture, the Lord (īśvara) is regarded as having embodiments 
(mūrtimat), by this his existence is established. 
[Proponent:] Why? 
[Opponent:] Because the quality of having embodiments is not applicable to a 
non-existent thing. 
[Proponent:] This is also irrelevant. 
[Opponent:] Why? 
[Proponent:] On account of [your] non-understanding of [our] intention.  For 
we do not reject the particular power of the glorious one (bhagavat)
660
 
absolutely, on account of [his] acquisition of a body of greatness 
(māhātmyaśarīra), etc.  This is our intention: there is no initiator (prayoktṛ) of 
primordial Materiality (pradhāna) and Consciousness (puruṣa) that is distinct 
from the two, as you have said.
661
 
 
                                                 
657
 See n. 485 (§IV.9). 
658
 āha: asty evam īśvara iti pāśupatavaiśeṣikāḥ / kasmāt / kāryaviśeṣasyātiśayabuddhipūrvakatvāt / 
(YD on SK 15, p. 157, ll. 13-14). 
659
 The concept of ‗embodiment‘ (mūrti) should be distinguished from that of the ‗incarnations‘ or 
‗descents‘ (avatāra) of Viṣṇu, who is not mentioned in the text.  As will become clear below, īśvara‘s 
embodiment consists in his appropriation of a psycho-physical body (kāryakaraṇa) composed of the 
tattvas of prakṛti.  The use of the term mūrti does not imply that īśvara takes on such a body in order 
to fulfill any specific purpose as in the case of Viṣṇu‘s avatāras. 
660
 It is unlikely that bhagavat is used specifically as an epithet of Kṛṣṇa/Viṣṇu here, since nowhere 
else in the text does Viṣṇu appear to be mentioned, nor are the embodiments of īśvara ever termed 
avatāra, and elsewhere bhagavat is used simply as an adjective applied to figures such as Kapila and 
Āsuri (cf. n. 462 (§IV.8) and n. 754 (§V.4)). 
661
 śrutir api cāsya mūrtim ācaṣṭe “kṛttivāsāḥ pinākahasto vitatadhanvā nīlaśikhaṇḍī” 
(cf.Tai.S.1.8.6.2) ityādi / tadabhyupagamāt svapakṣahānir iti cet / syān matam / yadi tarhi 
śrutivacanān mūrtimān īśvaraḥ parigṛhyate tena siddham asyāstitvam / kasmāt / na hy asato 
mūrtimattvam upapadyata iti kṛtvā / etad apy ayuktam / <kasmāt> / abhiprāyānavabodhāt / na hy 
ekāntena vayaṃ bhagavataḥ śaktiviśeṣaṃ pratyācakṣmahe māhātmyaśarīrādiparigrahāt / yathā [tu] 
bhavatocyate / pradhānapuruṣavyatiriktas tayoḥ prayoktā nāstīty ayam asmadabhiprāyaḥ / (YD on 
SK 15, p. 159, 19-27). 
192 
 
As noted by BRONKHORST (1983),
662
 the characteristics of Śiva are attributed to 
īśvara‘s embodiment here.  This apparent association of the māhātmyaśarīra with 
Śiva would appear to conflict with the commentator‘s reference to the 
māhātmyaśarīra as Brahmā (see above).  Moreover, in the passage of the YD 
dealing with the prākṛtika production of physical bodies, Śiva is referred to as 
maheśvara (‗Great Lord‘) but mentioned separately from the māhātmyaśarīra.663  
Perhaps we are to understand an implicit identity between Śiva and Brahmā, or 
rather that māhātmyaśarīra refers to an incarnation of īśvara in the form of either 
Śiva or Brahmā (that is, both are possessors of a ‗body of greatness‘).  This would 
agree with the interpretation of CHAKRAVARTI (1975), who assumes a plurality of 
māhātmyaśarīras.664  Alternatively, since only the opponent refers to Śiva in the 
above passage, perhaps the proponent rather accepts only Brahmā (equated with the 
māhātmyaśarīra) as a form of īśvara.  This would be consistent with the fact that the 
opponent represents a Pāśupata viewpoint, while elsewhere in the text only Brahmā 
is associated with the māhātmyaśarīra.  Whatever the explanation, it is perhaps 
significant that Viṣṇu is never associated with īśvara in the YD, while in later 
Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts an explicit identification is made between īśvara and Viṣṇu 
(see §V.5).  Since the term māhātmyaśarīra never occurs in the plural, I will assume 
in the following that only one māhātmyaśarīra is referred to in the YD.  The above 
passage does suggest, though, that īśvara takes on not only the form of the 
māhātmyaśarīra, but other forms as well. 
As apparent from the passage quoted above, the YD accepts the existence of 
īśvara but denies him any role in the process of creation, such as that attributed to 
him by the Pāśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas.  BRONKHORST (1983) observes that, in fact, 
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 BRONKHORST (1983), p. 152. 
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 See nn. 474, 475 (§IV.8). 
664
 CHAKRAVARTI (1975), p. 222. 
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‗no Sāṃkhya texts of the first millennium deny God‘s existence‘, and that ‗more 
often than not they give us the impression that they accept God‘s existence as a 
matter of course, but do not accept His causal agency with respect to the world‘.665 
With regard to the evidence in the YD for this view of īśvara, BRONKHORST 
draws attention to the fact that the commentator treats īśvara as a form of pure 
consciousness, like puruṣa, and therefore passive:666 
We will establish the non-agency of Consciousness (puruṣa) in [the verse]: 
‗And from that opposition…‘ [SK 19a].667  This same rule is to be observed in 
the negation of the causality of the Lord also, on account of non-difference 
with regard to consciousness.
668
 
 
The YD thus accepts the existence of īśvara, but denies him any activity, including 
any role in the creation of the cosmos.
669
  This corresponds to the view of īśvara in 
the YS, where he is presented as a particular puruṣa who serves as a model for the 
aspiring yogin: 
Or [absorption (samādhi) can be attained]670 through devotion to the Lord 
(īśvarapraṇidhāna). The Lord is a particular puruṣa, untouched by the stores 
of affliction, action, and fruition.  In him is the pre-eminent seed of 
omniscience (sarvajñabīja).  [He is] the guru even of earlier [gurus]671, on 
account of not being limited by time.
672
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 BRONKHORST (1983), p. 155. 
666
 Ibid., p. 149. 
667
 SK 19: ‗And from that opposition [of puruṣa and prakṛti], the puruṣa‘s state of being a witness, 
isolation, indifference, state of being an observer, and non-agency are established.‘ (tasmāc ca 
viparyāsāt siddham sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya / kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaś 
ca //). 
668
 “tasmāc ca viparyāsāt” (SK 19a) ity atra puruṣasyākartṛtvam upapādayiṣyāmaḥ / caitanyāviśeṣād 
īśvarasyāpi sa eva vidhiḥ kāraṇatvapratiṣedhe boddhavyaḥ / (YD on SK 15, p. 157, 10-12). 
669
 Cf. TK on SK 56, p. 152: ‗It is not from Materiality superintended by the Lord, on account of the 
absence of the superintendence of one who is inactive.  For an inactive carpenter does not superintend 
his axe, etc.‘  (neśvarādhiṣṭhitaprakṛtikṛto nirvyāpārasyādhiṣṭhātṛtvāsambhavāt / na hi nirvyāpāras 
takṣā vāsyādy adhitiṣṭhati /). 
670
 VBh on YS 1.23, p. 65, ll. 6-7: kim etasmād evāsannataraḥ samādhir bhavati / athāsya lābhe 
bhavaty anyo ’pi kaścid upāyo na veti / 
671
 VBh on YS 1.26, p. 81, ll. 5-6: pūrve hi guravaḥ kālenāvacchidyante / yatrāvacchedārthena kālo 
nopāvartate sa eṣa pūrveṣām api guruḥ / 
672
 īśvarapraṇidhānād vā //23// 
kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṛṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ //24// 
tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam //25// 
purveṣām api guruḥ kālenānavacchedāt //26// (YS 1.23-26). 
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The YS‘s characterisation of īśvara as a guru associated with omniscience places 
him in the category of figures of doctrinal authority and calls to mind the YD‘s 
portrayal of Kapila, who was born with ‗innate knowledge of all categories‘.673  The 
VBh, a text roughly contemporary with the YD, makes this association explicit: 
Even in the absence of his own favour (anugraha), the favour (anugraha) of 
beings is his motive: ‗I will lift up the transmigrating puruṣas through the 
teaching of knowledge (jñāna) and merit (dharma) in the ages (kalpa), 
dissolutions (pralaya), and great dissolutions (mahāpralaya).‘  And thus it has 
been said: ‗The first knower (ādividvas), the glorious supreme ṛṣi, taking 
control of a transformation-mind (nirmāṇacitta)674, out of compassion taught 
the philosophical system (tantra) to Āsuri, who desired to know.‘675 
 
This passage explicitly associates īśvara with Kapila, who was prompted to take on a 
created mind (as an aspect of prakṛti) and to impart the Sāṃkhya system out of 
compassion for other beings.  Although the YD does not explicitly associate īśvara 
with Kapila or even refer to īśvara as a guru, the general similarity between the 
YD‘s view of īśvara and that of the Yoga school could be taken to suggest that, 
according to the YD, the other forms taken on by īśvara (besides the 
māhātmyaśarīra) might include Kapila. 
BRONKHORST‘s article argues that the YD-kāra does appear to view Kapila as 
an embodiment of īśvara, primarily on the basis of the commentator‘s use of the 
term īśvaramaharṣi676 in describing authoritative individuals (āpta).677  The term 
īśvaramaharṣi occurs twice in the text, both times in the context of the YD‘s 
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 asty ārṣo hi dṛṣṭādivyatirekeṇa sarvapadārtheṣu sāṃsiddhikaḥ pratyayaḥ sa prātibho bhaviṣyatīti / 
(YD on SK 4, p. 75, ll. 19-21). 
674
 CHAKRAVARTI (1975, p. 85) points out the similarity of the concept of nirmāṇacitta to the 
Buddhist concept of nirmāṇakāya (‗transformation-body‘) as it occurs in Dīgha Nikāya 2.86: ‗Buddha 
also speaks of nirmāṇa-kāya i.e. the calling up of a mental image while describing the immediate 
fruits of the life of a recluse who has entered into and abides in the supreme meditation.‘ 
675
 tasyātmānugrahābhāve ’pi bhūtānugrahaḥ prayojanam / jñānadharmopadeśena kalpapralaya-
mahāpralayeṣu saṃsāriṇaḥ puruṣān uddhariṣyāmīti tathā coktam / ādividvān nirmāṇacittam 
adhiṣṭhāya kāruṇyād bhagavān paramarṣir āsuraye jijñāsamānāya tantraṃ provāceti // (VBh on YS 
1.25, p. 46).  Vācaspati attributes the quoted passage to the early Sāṃkhya teacher Pañcaśikha (TV on 
VBh 1.25, p. 78, l. 18: tathā coktam iti / pañcaśikhācāryeṇa iti śesaḥ /). 
676
 See n. 367 (§IV.3). 
677
 BRONKHORST (1983), pp. 152-155. 
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discussion of authoritative individuals and both times in the plural.
678
  The term 
could mean either ‗the Lord and great ṛṣis‘ (as a dvandva compound) or ‗great ṛṣis 
who are the Lord‘ (as a karmadhāraya compound).679  BRONKHORST prefers the 
latter interpretation, arguing that, given the YD‘s view of īśvara as passive 
consciousness, the term īśvara alone cannot refer to an authoritative figure, ‗for pure 
awareness does not possess authoritativeness or opinions‘.680  BRONKHORST further 
supports his preference for the interpretation ‗great ṛṣis who are īśvara‘ by 
suggesting that it is unlikely that īśvara here refers to an embodiment of the Lord in 
the form of a māhātmyaśarīra, since the term īśvara does not appear to designate a 
māhātmyaśarīra anywhere else in the YD.681 
BRONKHORST finds support for his argument that īśvaramaharṣi refers to ‗the 
great seers who are [incorporations of] God‘682 in two passages of the MV.683  The 
first of these passages is the opening verse of the MV, where we find that Kapila is 
explicitly connected with īśvara: 
I bow down, with the highest devotion, to the Lord, the light of Kapila, the 
bestower of all knowledge, who abides in the sun, eternal.
684
 
 
As BRONKHORST suggests, the equation of īśvara with the ‗light‘ of Kapila agrees 
with the fact that in Sāṃkhya and Yoga īśvara usually designates a particular 
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 YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 4-5 (see n. 367 (§IV.3)) and about twenty lines later in an objection to the 
proponent‘s position: ‗[Opponent:] On account of the similarity of authoritative statements and 
incontrovertible statements.  Just as the statements of authorities such as a goldsmith are unfailing, so 
are īśvaramaharṣis authoritative.  Therefore, their statements are also unfailing.  Here, the quality of 
being similar objects can be supposed.  Thus, doctrine is only inference.‘  (āha: āpta-
v<ādā>visaṃvādasāmānyāt / yathā hairaṇyakaprabhṛtīnām āptānāṃ vākyam avyabhicāry evam 
īśvaramaharṣayo ’pi cāptāḥ / tasmād eṣām api vākyam avyabhicārīti śakyam atrāpi sāmānya-
viṣayatvaṃ kalpayitum / evam anumānam evāgama iti / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, l. 22 – p. 101, l. 3)). 
679
 BRONKHORST (1983, p. 153, n. 6) argues that a third possibility, ‗the seers, who are Gods‘, is ruled 
out by the YD‘s ‗consistent use of singular endings after īśvara...and bhagavat‘. 
680
 BRONKHORST (1983), p. 153. 
681
 BRONKHORST (1983), p. 153. 
682
 Ibid., p. 153. 
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 Ibid., pp. 156-157. 
684
 sarvavidyāvidhātāram ādityasthaṃ sanātanam / 
nato ’smi parayā bhaktyā kāpilaṃ jyotir īśvaram // (MV Intro., p. 1, ll. 3-4). 
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puruṣa—according to this passage, the puruṣa belonging to Kapila.685  In other 
words, the MV suggests that īśvara becomes associated with Kapila in the same way 
that other puruṣas become associated with subtle and physical bodies due to 
conjunction with prakṛti (see §II.2).  This is confirmed by the other passage of the 
MV to which BRONKHORST refers, which presents a mythological account of the 
circumstances of Kapila‘s birth: 
For the glorious maharṣi, endowed with innate merit (dharma), knowledge 
(jñāna), dispassion (vairāgya), and power (aiśvarya), an incarnation (avatāra) 
of the glorious ancient puruṣa, out of a desire to show kindness to the world, 
the son of Prajāpati Kardama, named Kapila, came here in Devahūti, the 
daughter of Svāyambhuva Manu.686 
 
The suggestion in this passage that Kapila did not merely transmit the Sāṃkhya 
doctrine out of compassion, as the SK itself testifies,
687
 but actually incarnated solely 
for this purpose, provides an answer to the question of the reason for Kapila‘s 
incarnation with innate Sāṃkhya knowledge.  We will return to this passage in the 
discussions in §V.4-5 of the YD‘s view of the soteriological purpose behind Kapila‘s 
incarnation and the relation of this view to the evidence of the other classical 
Sāṃkhya commentaries. 
 BRONKHORST suggests that the ‗glorious ancient puruṣa‘ to whom Māṭhara 
refers ‗is, of course, God (īśvara)‘688 and takes the passage as confirmation of the 
assumption that Kapila is one of the īśvaramaharṣis to whom the YD ascribes 
authority.  However, there is nothing in either of the MV passages to suggest that 
īśvara incarnates in the bodies of other maharṣis than Kapila. 
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 BRONKHORST (1983), p. 157: ‗God is the light of Kapila.  What this means is clear: God is the Self 
which resides, shines, in Kapila.‘ 
686
 iha hi bhagavān maharṣiḥ sāṃsiddhikadharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryasampanno bhagavataḥ 
purāṇa-puruṣasyāvatāro jagadanujighṛkṣayā prajāpateḥ kardamasya putraḥ svāyambhuvasya manor 
duhitari devahūtyāṃ kapilo nāma babhūva / (MV on SK 1, p. 1, ll. 14-17). 
687
 SK 70ab: ‗The sage transmitted this purifying, foremost [knowledge] to Āsuri out of compassion.‘  
(etat pavitram agryaṃ munir āsuraye ’nukampayā pradadau /). 
688
 BRONKHORST (1983), p. 156. 
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 Two possible alternatives to BRONKHORST‘s interpretation of the 
term īśvaramaharṣi can be proposed.  Firstly, given the fact that the YD clearly 
elevates Kapila above other ṛṣis in terms of his possession of innate (sāṃsiddhika) 
knowledge,
689
 īśvaramaharṣi could be taken as a dvandva compound.  According to 
this interpretation, ‗the Lord (in the form of Kapila) and the (other) great ṛṣis‘ would 
be considered firsthand authorities on suprasensuous matters. 
 This interpretation is supported by the fact that Kapila and Brahmā are given 
equal cosmological status in the YD, as apparent in a passage describing the bodies 
of the various classes of beings: 
Of these, the bodies of gods (deva) are of four kinds: due to the favour 
(anugraha) of primordial Materiality (pradhāna), like those of the supreme ṛṣi 
and Brahmā (viriñca)690; due to their attainments (siddhi),691 like those of 
Brahmā‘s sons and grandsons;692 from mother and father, like those of the sons 
of Aditi and Kaśyapa; or only from fathers, like that of Vasiṣṭha from Mitra 
and Varuṇa.693 
 
This passage suggests that because Kapila‘s body is produced in the same manner as 
that of  Brahmā (i.e. the māhātmyaśarīra), he is also likely to be considered an 
incarnation of īśvara.  The significance of the fact that the bodies of Kapila and 
Brahmā were created out of the ‗favour‘ (anugraha) of pradhāna will be discussed 
in the following section.  While Kapila is here classed as a deva and mentioned 
alongside Brahmā, there is no evidence to suggest that other ṛṣis might be given the 
same status. 
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 See n. 569 (§IV.10). 
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 The term viriñca usually refers to Brahmā, but it may also be applied to Viṣṇu or Śiva, according 
to MONIER-WILLIAMS.  The fact that Brahmā is mentioned later in this passage, as well as elsewhere 
in the text (cf. §V.4, n. 729), suggests that the same figure is meant here.  JACOBSEN (2008, p. 48) 
likewise assumes that viriñca refers to Brahmā. 
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 The nature of the siddhis whereby bodies are produced will be discussed in the following section; 
see n. 735 (§V.4). 
692
 See §V.5 for a discussion of the identity of Brahmā‘s sons and grandsons. 
693
 tatra devānāṃ caturvidhaṃ śarīraṃ pradhānānugrahād yathā paramarṣer viriñcasya ca, 
tatsiddhibhyo yathā brahmaṇaḥ putrāṇāṃ tatputraputrāṇāṃ ca, mātāpitṛto yathāditeḥ kaśyapasya ca 
putrāṇāṃ kevalād vā yathā pitṛto mitrāvaruṇābhyāṃ vasiṣṭhasya / (YD on SK 39, p. 228, ll. 12-15). 
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 The differences between Kapila and the māhātmyaśarīra are made clear in 
two passages of the YD. The first passage describes the make-up of their bodies in 
terms of the three constituent qualities (guṇa): 
Of these, he whose psycho-physical body (kāryakaraṇa)694 is primarily 
goodness (sattva) is the supreme ṛṣi.  He whose [psycho-physical body] is 
abundant in goodness (sattva) and activity (rajas) is the māhātmyaśarīra.695 
 
The implications of this distinction with regard to the intellectual characteristics of 
each of these figures are made clear in the YD‘s illustration of the innate 
(sāṃsiddhika) variety of the conditions (bhāva): 
And just as the knowledge (jñāna) of the supreme ṛṣi is innate, so is the 
lordliness (aiśvarya) of the māhātmyaśarīra.696 
 
This makes it clear that Kapila would be more likely than the māhātmyaśarīra (who 
is possessed of the powers of lordliness rather than knowledge) to be considered an 
authoritative figure by the author of the YD.  Kapila thus shares the 
māhātmyaśarīra‘s cosmological status but is unique in his possession of innate 
Sāṃkhya knowledge. 
 Given the evidence of the YD, the VBh and the MV, it seems likely that 
Kapila would be considered an embodiment of īśvara by the YD-kāra, although this 
cannot be established definitively.  However, there is nothing in any of these texts to 
suggest that other great ṛṣis might also be considered embodiments of īśvara, and the 
unique position afforded Kapila in terms of his cosmological status and his 
possession of innate jñāna suggests that the association with īśvara would be 
confined to the supreme ṛṣi alone.  As discussed in §V.1, the YD‘s treatment of the 
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 BRONKHORST (1983, pp. 152-154) notes this passage and translates the term kāryakaraṇa as 
‗instrument for effects‘, arguing that it refers simply to ‗an instrument of understanding (buddhi), 
etc.‘.  However, cf. n. 459 (IV.8).  WEZLER (1970, p. 258)‘s translation, ‗Körper und psychischen 
Organe‘, agrees with my interpretation. 
695
 tatra yasya sattvapradhānaṃ kāryakaraṇaṃ sa paramarṣiḥ / yasya sattvarajobahulaṃ sa 
māhātmyaśariraḥ / (YD on SK 15, p. 161, ll. 17-18). 
696
 yathā ca paramarṣer jñānaṃ sāṃsiddhikam evam māhātmyaśarīrasyaiśvaryaṃ (YD on SK 43, p. 
234, ll. 6-7). 
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siddhis suggests that other ṛṣis might attain through reflection (ūha) the same 
knowledge that was innate in Kapila.  According to the interpretation of 
īśvaramaharṣi as a dvandva, then, these maharṣis would equally be considered 
sources of authoritative testimony, though distinguished from Kapila as an 
embodiment of īśvara. 
 The other alternative interpretation of the term īśvaramaharṣi is suggested by 
MOTEGI (2006)‘s translation of the term as ‗great seers of lord-like power‘.697  
Presumably, MOTEGI takes īśvara in its adjectival sense, meaning ‗capable‘ or 
‗powerful‘.  Despite the fact that elsewhere in the YD the term īśvara always seems 
to be used as a noun referring specifically to ‗the Lord‘,698 this reading is perhaps the 
most simple, since it does not require us to conjecture that the Lord takes on the form 
of Kapila and/or other ṛṣis.  According to this interpretation of the term (as a 
karmadhāraya), īśvaramaharṣis would be those great ṛṣis who are ‗lordly‘ 
(īśvara)—in other words, who have attained the condition of lordliness (aiśvarya). 
 As discussed in §IV.9, according to the YD, siddhi, like the condition of 
aiśvarya, results in ‗non-obstruction‘ (avighāta, apratighāta),699 and there is 
evidence that siddhi and the other categories of the pratyayasarga were originally 
associated with stages of yogic practice.
700
  Similarly, in the third chapter of the YS 
and VBh, the supernatural powers of aiśvarya are presented as a result of a yogin‘s 
development.
701
  An explicit connection between the abilities of īśvara and yogins is 
found in the YD‘s commentary on SK 56, which mentions in passing that ‗a single 
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 MOTEGI (2006), p. 53, n. 27. 
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 Cf. n. 679 above. 
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 See nn. 500, 502 (§IV.9). 
700
 See nn. 499, 501 (§IV.9) and the reviews of OBERHAMMER (1961) and KENGHE (1968) in 
CHAPTER III. 
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 Cf. YS 3.44-45: ‗From concentration on the grossness, inherent form, subtlety and purposiveness 
[of the elements], there is victory over the elements.  Then there is the manifestation of [the powers 
of] atomisation, etc., perfection of the body, and non-injury from the qualities of [the physical body].‘   
(sthūlasvarūpasūkṣmānvayārthavattvasaṃyamād bhūtajayaḥ //44// tato ’ṇimādiprādurbhāvaḥ 
kāyasampat taddharmānabhighātaś ca //45//). 
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īśvara or yogin has a multitude of bodies due [merely] to the application of desire‘ 
(see further discussion in §V.4).
702
  Moreover, īśvara is associated with omiscience 
in the YS,
703
 while ‗unrestricted knowledge‘ (aviparītajñānaṃ) (in other words, 
omniscience) is presented as a result of siddhi in the YD.
704
  On the basis of this 
evidence, it is possible that the term īśvaramaharṣi refers to those ṛṣis who, through 
yogic practice resulting in siddhi, have become similar to īśvara in terms of their 
omniscience, which thus qualifies them to be authoritative figures (āpta).  Of course, 
this definition of īśvaramaharṣi would also include Kapila, who is born with such 
knowledge (as well as aiśvarya and the other sāttvika bhāvas).705 
 That the YD accepts progressive yogic practice as conducive to the 
attainment of Sāṃkhya knowledge is apparent in the text‘s treatment of the merit 
(dharma) attained through the yogic practices of yama and niyama as a step on a 
path to knowledge and liberation, also apparently involving the generation of 
dispassion (vairāgya).706  Moreover, the fact that the perception of the subtle 
elements by yogins is possible only after the gross elments have been ‗completely 
attained‘ (samprāpta) by them (see §IV.3)707 suggests that yogic practice is a 
progressive activity, which may perhaps eventually lead to a yogin to independently 
attain Sāṃkhya knowledge through reflection (ūha) and thereby become qualified as 
an authoritative figure (āpta), an ‗īśvaramaharṣi who is free from faults such as 
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 ekasyeśvarasya yogino vecchāyogād anekaśarīratvam (YD on SK 56, p. 262, ll. 22-23). 
703
 See n. 672 above. 
704
 See n. 502 (§IV.9). 
705
 See n. 696 above; n. 458 (§IV.8). 
706
 See nn. 422, 425 (§IV.6) and nn. 442, 444 (§IV.7). 
707
 devānāṃ yānīndriyāṇi tāni dharmotkarṣād viśuddhāny aviśeṣān api gṛhṇanti [prāg eva viśeṣāt] / 
yogināṃ ca samprāptaviśeṣāṇām / (YD on SK 34ab, p. 218, ll. 3-5).  This can be compared to the 
YS‘s statement that ‗victory over the elements‘ leads to various supernormal abilities (cf. n. 701 
above). 
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passion, who is of undoubted intelligence, and who has seen suprasensuous 
objects‘.708 
 However, the YD also makes a clear distinction between the knowledge of 
yogins and the knowledge of ṛṣis.  Yogic perception is included in the framework of 
the pramāṇas,709 while the knowledge of Kapila,710 as well as the knowledge 
attained through ūha (apparently associated with other ṛṣis),711 falls outside of this 
framework.  Similarly, Sāṃkhya knowledge generated through practice (abhyāsaja) 
is distinguished from the unprecedented (apūrva) knowledge attained through the 
siddhis (which include ūha).712  This suggests that ūha is not an ability that results 
from yogic practice but is rather a spontaneous occurrence, perhaps the fulfilment of 
a potential inherent in ṛṣis alone. 
 In the absence of further evidence, it is impossible to determine which 
interpretation of the term īśvaramaharṣi is assumed by the YD-kāra.  On account of 
the lack of definitive evidence in the text that īśvara takes on a body in the form of 
Kapila and/or other ṛṣis, I would be inclined to take the term as a karmadhāraya 
meaning ‗lordly great ṛṣis‘, whether this refers to ṛṣis who have become lordly 
through yogic practice or who are inherently lordly.  The choice of interpretation, 
however, does not affect the fact that while other ṛṣis and yogins may be able to 
attain Sāṃkhya knowledge independently, Kapila is clearly distinguished from them 
in terms of his innate knowledge. 
 Kapila is unique among ṛṣis, insofar as the YD elevates him to the status of a 
deity (deva)—possibly even an embodiment of īśvara—whose body, endowed with 
innate knowledge of the Sāṃkhya categories, was produced ‗due to the favour 
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 vyapagatarāgādidoṣāṇām asandigdhamatīnām atīndriyārthadṛśvanām īśvaramaharṣīṇām 
āptatvam ācakṣmahe na sarveṣām / (YD on SK 6cd, p. 100, ll. 4-5).  For context, see n. 367 (§IV.3). 
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 See n. 390 (§IV.4). 
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 See n. 390 (§IV.4). 
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 See nn. 507, 510 (§IV.9). 
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 See n. 415 (§IV.6). 
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(anugraha) of primordial Materiality (pradhāna)‘.713  The implications of this fact, 
in terms of the apparent purpose behind Kapila‘s birth, will be considered in the 
following section. 
 
§4. The origin, nature and role of Kapila and his knowledge, according to the 
 Yuktidīpikā. 
 
The fact that, according to the YD, Kapila was born with innate knowledge of the 
distinction between Materiality (prakṛti) and Consciousness (puruṣa) presents an 
interpretative problem when considered in the context of the basic teleology of 
Sāṃkhya.  In order to reiterate this aspect of the Sāṃkhya system, it will be helpful 
to introduce an analogy. 
 The relationship between prakṛti and puruṣa can be illustrated by the image 
of an audience of puruṣas in a cinema watching a screen on which is projected the 
activity of prakṛti.  The objectives of this film are two: first, the enjoyment or 
entertainment of the puruṣas, and second, the realisation of the nature of the viewing 
experience (see §II.3).  That is, at first prakṛti‘s activity takes the form of escapism, 
in which each puruṣa identifies himself with the actions on screen, but its ultimate 
objective is to attain a kind of self-reflexivity, drawing attention to the fact that it is 
actually only a film, at which point the film ends and the puruṣas are left in a 
darkened cinema; that is, they are liberated from the viewing experience. 
This analogy is somewhat complicated by the fact that prakṛti functions 
differently with regard to each particular puruṣa.714  That is, despite the fact that 
there is only one screen, the viewing experience is so subjective that every puruṣa 
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 See n. 693 above, n. 460 (§IV.8) and n. 606 (§V.2). 
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 I.e., as a result of the conditions (bhāva), which determine the phenomenal circumstances of an 
individual‘s incarnation (see §II.5, IV.6). 
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sees something different, depending upon which stage in the process of realisation it 
has reached.  This process may in fact require multiple viewings.  Each phenomenal 
reincarnation of an individual can be thought of as a return to the cinema for another 
viewing.  Prakṛti writes a new character into its film for the benefit of each puruṣa 
entering the cinema.  If the character on screen with whom a puruṣa identifies is 
killed off before the realisation of separation sets in, the puruṣa leaves briefly and 
returns to identify with a new character.  When eventually the self-reflexive aspect of 
the film sinks in and the puruṣa ceases to identify with any of the characters, the film 
ends once and for all for that particular puruṣa, although it continues for others. 
This understanding of the process central to Sāṃkhya meets with an 
interesting problem when we consider the leading actor in prakṛti‘s film, Kapila, 
who was born with innate knowledge of the fact that he was only a character in this 
film.  Since it is this knowledge that is held to result in the liberation of the puruṣa 
identified with a particular character in the film, we might ask why Kapila was 
written into the film in the first place.  That is, if the puruṣa with which Kapila is 
associated has no need for further experience of prakṛti‘s activity, what is the 
purpose of Kapila‘s birth? 
The evidence of the YD suggests a unique explanation of Kapila‘s role on the 
Sāṃkhya screen.  As noted in the previous section, the VBh and MV associate 
Kapila with īśvara, who incarnated out of compassion for transmigrating beings.715  
While it is possible that the YD also views Kapila as an embodiment of īśvara, this 
association is not explicit, and the YD mentions pradhāna rather than īśvara in 
connection with Kapila‘s birth. 
 As already discussed, according to the YD, the bodies of both Kapila and 
Brahmā were born ‗due to the favour (anugraha) of primordial Materiality 
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(pradhāna)‘.716  Kapila‘s disciple, Āsuri, was also ‗favoured‘ (anugṛhīta) by a 
stream (srotas) of purity from pradhāna, which led to the production of his 
‗dispassion deriving from (primordial) Materiality‘ (prākṛtika vairāgya).717  
Moreover, the anugraha of everyone, including those of inferior intellectual 
capacity, is given as the reason for the explanation of śāstra by means of formal 
inference.
718
 
 It is clear that the notion of anugraha in the YD is connected with prakṛti‘s 
activity and with the production of such things as dispassion and knowledge.
719
  
Beyond these suggestions, the YD does not explain the nature of anugraha.  In the 
Mahābhārata (MBh), however, the term is often used in the context of the duties 
proper to a king.
720
  For example, in Book 3 of the epic, Hanumān, in conversation 
with Bhīma, refers to nigraha, ‗repression‘ or ‗punishment‘, and anugraha, ‗favour‘, 
shown towards one‘s subjects, as two complementary duties of a king: 
When a king correctly proceeds with repression and favour, then the limits of 
the people are well established.
721
 
 
It is possible to draw an analogy between these two duties of a king and the two 
purposes of prakṛti.  Just as a king both represses and favours his people, prakṛti 
both binds the puruṣas by the illusion of identification with the phenomenal world 
and liberates them by producing the knowledge of their actual difference from 
prakṛti. 
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 See n. 693 (§V.3). 
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 See n. 462 (§IV.8). 
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 See n. 331 (§IV.2).  Cf. VBh‘s mention of the anugraha of beings as the motivation behind 
īśvara‘s incarnation (§V.3, n. 675). 
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 It should also be noted that OBERHAMMER (1961, pp. 152-163) argues that a particular creation of 
prakṛti, the anugrahasarga, may have been introduced into the Sāṃkhya system in the Ṣaṣṭitantra 
(although the YD‘s śāstra quotations do not make reference to it) and then replaced with the paradigm 
of the bhāvas in the SK.  It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study to determine whether the 
YD‘s use of the term anugraha bears any connection to the anugrahasarga. 
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 I thank Prof. James Fitzgerald for drawing my attention to this usage of the term. 
721
 nigrahānugrahaiḥ samyag yadā rājā pravartate / 
     tadā bhavati lokasya maryādā suvyavasthitā // (MBh 3.149.39). 
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 It thus seems plausible that the term anugraha in the YD refers to the 
manifestation of prakṛti‘s soteriological purpose.  The process by which this purpose 
is manifested in the phenomenal sphere is consistently described in terms of a 
‗stream‘ or ‗flowing‘ (srotas, abhiṣyanda).  Āsuri is favoured by a ‗stream of purity‘ 
(śuddhisrotas) from pradhāna.722  The ‗stream of attainment‘ (siddhisrotas) always 
flows from pradhāna but is hindered by error, incapacity, and contentment.723  (The 
latter three categories can be thought of as representing ‗repression‘ (nigraha), also 
manifested in streams from pradhāna by the māhātmyaśarīra.724)  The prākṛtika 
form of the condition of knowledge (jñāna) arises as a ‗flowing‘ (abhiṣyanda) from 
prakṛti.725  Under SK 69, the commentator even refers to the Sāṃkhya system itself 
as a ‗stream of science‘ (vidyāsrotas).726 
 This imagery suggests that prakṛti‘s soteriological tendency can be 
manifested as a stream flowing directly from its primordial, unmanifest aspect 
(pradhāna) into the phenomenal sphere of experience, where it takes on a variety of 
forms conducive to the liberation of particular puruṣas.  The manifestation of 
Kapila‘s physical body appears to be an instance of this manifestation of anugraha.  
Since Kapila was born with innate jñāna, we can assume that this knowledge itself 
was also a result of prakṛti‘s anugraha.  This assumption is supported by the 
argument, presented in §IV.8, that Kapila‘s sāṃsiddhika knowledge was essentially 
of a prākṛtika character, except that in Kapila‘s unique case there was no hindrance 
to the production of this knowledge directly from pradhāna.727  As suggested in 
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 See n. 462 (§IV.8). 
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 See n. 486 (§IV.9). 
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 See nn. 484, 485 (§IV.9). 
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 See n. 460 (§IV.8) 
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 YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 14-16: ‗[The Sāṃkhya system] was expounded—i.e., completely 
explained—by this sage Kapila because he was capable of interpreting the stream of science practiced 
since long ago.‘ (tena kapilamuninā samākhyātaṃ samyag ākhyātaṃ cirābhyastasya vidyāsrotaso 
nirvacanasāmarthyāt /). 
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§V.2, the original Sāṃkhya śāstra may be considered to pre-exist in pradhāna in a 
potential form, which would agree with the fact that Kapila was born directly from 
pradhāna with innate knowledge of the substance of this śāstra. 
 Both Kapila and the knowledge with which he was born thus seem to be 
viewed as a direct manifestation of prakṛti‘s soteriological tendency.  Since Kapila 
himself was born with none of the hindering intellectual conditions (tāmasa bhāva) 
which would account for his embodiment,
728
 we can assume that this manifestation 
was for the general anugraha of other embodied puruṣas.  This is confirmed by the 
YD‘s explanation of the difference between the embodiment of Kapila and 
Hiraṇyagarbha (i.e., Brahmā)729 and embodiment as the result of one‘s intellectual 
conditions (bhāva): 
Before the manifestation of primordial Materiality (pradhāna), there was no 
possibility of merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma), on account of the fact 
that these are qualities of the intellect (buddhi), and [the intellect] is a product 
(vikāra) of primordial Materiality (pradhāna).  Then, without those [bhāvas], 
[the constituent qualities] of goodness (sattva), etc., aiming at the [dual] 
purpose of the experience of [the sensory objects of] sound (śabda), etc., and 
the realisation of the difference between the constituent qualities (guṇa) and 
Consciousness (puruṣa), remaining in the state of the intellect (mahat), ego 
(ahaṃkāra), subtle elements (tanmātra), faculties (indriya), and elements 
(bhūta), produced bodies (śarīra) beginning with those of supreme ṛṣi and 
Hiraṇyagarbha.  But after the time of the decay of the six attainments 
(ṣaṭsiddhi), the cycle of transmigration (saṃsāracakra) began as a result of the 
functioning of activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas) due to the interaction and 
variegation of the constituent qualities (guṇa).730 
 
The embodiment of Kapila and Brahmā is here presented as prior to the initiation of 
the cycle of transmigration and associated explicitly with the two general reasons 
given by the SK for the activity of prakṛti in relation to puruṣa: observation of that 
                                                 
728
 paramarṣir bhagavān sāṃsiddhikair dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryair āviṣṭapiṇḍo viśvāgrajaḥ 
kapilamuniḥ / (YD on SK 69b, p. 267, ll. 13-14). 
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 Given that viriñca and hiraṇyagarbha are both common epithets of Brahmā, and both are 
mentioned together with Kapila, it is likely that they refer to the same figure. 
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 prāk pradhānapravṛtter dharmādharmayor asambhavo buddhidharmatvāt tasyāś ca 
pradhānavikā<ra>tvāt / tatas tadvyatiriktaṃ śabdādyupa<bhoga>lakṣaṇaṃ guṇapuruṣāntaropa-
labdhilakṣaṇaṃ cārtham uddiśya sattvādayo mahadahaṃkāratanmātrendriyabhūtatvenāvasthāya 
paramarṣihiraṇyagarbhādīnāṃ śarīram utpādayanti / ṣaṭsiddhikṣayakālottaraṃ tu guṇavimarda-
vaicitryād rajastamovṛttyanupāti saṃsāracakraṃ pravṛttam <iti> / (YD on SK 52, p. 255, ll. 8-13). 
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activity and the eventual realisation of the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa.731  
Later in this passage, the commentator reiterates that the bhāvas begin to function in 
connection with the subtle body (and thus to direct its transmigratory path) only after 
the time of the decay of the ‗six attainments‘.732  These ‗six attainments‘ are different 
from the eight attainments comprising the siddhi category of the pratyayasarga and 
are explained in another passage of the YD as six extraordinary forms of 
reproduction: 
In the first creation, offspring and the like were manifested by the beings 
produced out of Materiality (prakṛti) by the mind (manas) alone, as desired, 
without the union of a couple, due to an abundance of the quality of goodness 
(sattva).  This occurs even today, as the tortoise bears her eggs through thought 
(nirūpita) [alone].  Even then, having looked at one‘s beloved with the eyes, 
one [would] consider his purpose accomplished.
733
  When this [ability] was 
diminished, attainment through speech (vāksiddhi) came into being.  After 
speaking [together], whatever the beings desire is produced.  This occurs even 
today, as the conch bears offspring by [crying]
734
.  Also, having spoken with 
one‘s beloved, one experiences great pleasure.  When this [ability] was 
diminished, attainment through the hands (hastasiddhi) came into being.  
Touching hands, they produce the desired object.  This occurs even today, as 
having looked at one‘s beloved for a long a time and having touched hands, 
there arises pleasure.  When this [ability] was diminished, attainment through 
embracing (āśleṣasiddhi) came into being.  By embracing, beings attain what 
is desired.  This occurs even today, as embracing one‘s beloved, there is 
delight.  When this [ability] was diminished, attainment by copulation 
(dvandvasiddhi) began.  A man and a woman, coming together, would produce 
offspring, and [the notion of] possession—‗this is mine, this is mine‘—came 
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 Cf. SK 37: ‗Because the intellect produces every experience of the puruṣa and also [because] it 
distinguishes the subtle difference between pradhāna and puruṣa.‘ (sarvaṃ pratyupabhogaṃ yasmāt 
puruṣasya sādhayati buddhiḥ / saiva ca viśinaṣṭi punaḥ pradhānapuruṣāntaraṃ sūkṣmam //). 
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 so ’yaṃ liṅgākhyo bhāvākhyaś ca ṣaṭsiddhikṣayakālād ūrdhvaṃ bhavati / (YD on SK 52cd, p. 256, 
l. 20). 
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 I follow LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 60) in interpreting this line as a description of a 
separate siddhi, since attainment through sight is clearly different from attainment through the mind 
alone, and without this assumption there would be only five siddhis in this passage.  However, given 
the context of the rest of the passage, it would be more natural to take this line as an illustration of the 
preceding siddhi.  It is probable that the text is corrupt here and an explanation of ‗attainment through 
sight‘ is missing from the preceding portion of the passage, in which case the tortoise‘s nirūpita might 
refer not to ‗thought‘ but to ‗sight‘.  It is also strange that the first two siddhis have not been named, 
as the last four have. 
734
 The Critical Ed. has vitatena here, which makes no sense in this context.  vitata is an adjective 
meaning ‗spread out‘, ‗bent‘, or ‗wide‘.  Three manuscripts attest to the reading vikṛtena (YD, p. 229, 
n. 9), which also makes no sense.  Kumar and Bhargava (YD (1990-92), p. 293) amend the text to 
viruta, which they translate as ‗crying‘; for lack of a better alternative, I have followed this 
suggestion. 
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into being.  Only at this time is transmigration (saṃsāra) explained [to have 
begun].
735
 
 
Evidently, these forms of reproduction apply to those beings who existed between 
the time of the production of Kapila and Brahmā from prakṛti and the time of the 
onset of saṃsāra.  As mentioned in §V.3, the bodies of Brahmā‘s sons and 
grandsons are said to have been produced by means of siddhis.
736
  Taken together, 
these passages suggest that Kapila and Brahmā were produced first, directly out of 
primordial Materiality, for the purpose of manifesting the two primary purposes of 
prakṛti‘s activity.  Brahmā then produced offspring by means of the first form of 
attainment (by thought alone).
737
  The powers of attainment of the generations 
succeeding Brahmā gradually deteriorated until the normal cycle of transmigration 
(according to the bhāvas) began.738 
 Some major interpretative conclusions can be drawn from the evidence of the 
YD presented so far.  Given the fact that Brahmā appears to initiate the physical 
creation of succeeding generations of beings, he seems to fulfill the first purpose of 
prakṛti, the experience of prakṛti‘s activity (in the form of bodily incarnation) by 
various puruṣas.739  Moreover, Brahmā‘s creation of the categories of the 
pratyayasarga as streams out of pradhāna would also be conducive to the 
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 pūrvesarge prakṛter utpannānāṃ prāṇināṃ sattvadharmotkarṣād antareṇa dvayasamāpattiṃ 
manasaivāpatyam anyad vā yathepsitaṃ prādurbhūva / tad etad adyāpi cānuvartate yat kacchapikā 
nirūpitenāṇḍadhāraṇam karoti / priyam khalv api cakṣuṣā nirīkṣya kṛtārtham ātmānaṃ manyate / 
tasyām api kṣīṇāyāṃ vāksiddhir babhūva / abhibhāṣya prāṇino yad icchanti tadāpādayanti / tad 
adyāpy anuvartate yac chaṅkhī vitatenāpatyaṃ bibharti / priyaṃ khalv api sambhāṣya mahatīṃ 
prītim anubhavati / tasyām upakṣīṇāyāṃ hastasiddhir babhūva / saṃspṛśya pāṇim īpsitam artham 
upapādayanti / tad etad adyāpy anuvartate yat priyaṃ cirād ālokya pāṇau saṃspṛśya prītir bhavati / 
tasyām upakṣīṇāyām āśleṣasiddhir babhūva / āliṅganena prāṇina īpsitaṃ labhante / tad etad adyāpy 
anuvartate yat priyam āliṅgya nirvṛtir bhavati / tasyām upakṣīṇāyāṃ dvandvasiddhir ārabdhā 
strīpuṃsau saṅghṛṣyāpatyam utpādayetāṃ mamedaṃ mamedam iti ca parigrahāḥ pravṛttāḥ / 
etasminn evāvasare saṃsāro varṇyate / (YD on SK 39cd, p. 229, ll. 4-17). 
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 See n. 693 (§V.3). 
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 This is supported by the fact that the māhātmyaśarīra‘s production of his sons out of pradhāna by 
thought alone is mentioned by the YD-kāra as an instance of the prākṛta production of physical 
bodies (see §IV.8, n. 475). 
738
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 60) suggest that this scheme ‗was presumably an ancient 
way of explaining the manner in which divine realm reproduction differs from natural reproduction‘. 
739
 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973, p. 284): ‗The God Brahmā not only creates the worlds, he also creates 
beings who populate them.‘ 
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experience of puruṣas in the phenomenal realm.740  This agrees with the fact that 
Brahmā (identified with the māhātmyaśarīra) was born with innate aiśvarya741—in 
other words, with the power to manifest his will in the world by thought alone. 
 Although, as apparent from the discussion in §V.3, īśvara plays no role in the 
initial manifestation of the tattvas from pradhāna, it seems that once he has become 
embodied in the form of the māhātmyaśarīra he has the power to influence the shape 
taken by this manifestation in the phenomenal realm.  This ability, however, is 
apparently not confined to the māhātmyaśarīra or other deities.  The YD also tells us 
that ‗a single īśvara or yogin has a multitude of bodies due [merely] to the 
application of desire‘.742  It is perhaps significant in this connection that both gods 
and yogins are also able to perceive the subtle elements (tanmātra),743 the non-
specific (aviśeṣa) forms of the specific (viśeṣa) elements which compose the 
phenomenal level of experience.  MALINAR (1999) suggests that yogins are able to 
influence the particular phenomenal configurations of reality precisely because they 
have attained an insight into the productive nature of the tattvas as principles 
common (sāmānya) to all particular (viśeṣa) aspects of the phenomenal world: 
Insight into the productivity of prakṛti is only ascribed to gods and Yogins.  
This is one implication of what is designated as aiśvarya.  They alone are able 
to manipulate the common causal potency and to change the arrangement and 
the formation of the effects, of individual things, without, however, 
transgressing the scope of ‗natural‘, prākṛtic possibilities.744 
 
In other words, yogic practice may lead to the same ability, innate in the 
māhātmyaśarīra, to manifest physical bodies directly out of the productive potential 
of pradhāna.  One suspects that such an ability would be designated by the YD-kāra, 
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 See n. 475 (§IV.8), n. 484 (§IV.9). 
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 See n. 696 (§V.3). 
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 ekasyeśvarasya yogino vecchāyogād anekaśarīratvam (YD on SK 56, p. 262, ll. 22-23). 
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 tatra devānāṃ yānīndriyāṇi tāni dharmotkarṣād viśuddhāny aviśeṣān api gṛhṇanti [prāg eva 
viśeṣāt] / yogināṃ ca samprāptaviśeṣāṇām / asmadādīnāṃ tu viśeṣān eva tamasā parivṛtatvāt / (YD 
on SK 34, p. 218, ll. 3-5). 
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 MALINAR (1999), p. 641. 
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according to the scheme outlined in §IV.8, as vaikṛta aiśvarya—as lordliness 
deriving from a practice undertaken in the phenomenal (vaikṛta) realm of experience. 
 Kapila, on the other hand, who was born with innate jñāna, would appear to 
fulfill the second primary purpose of prakṛti; by disseminating his knowledge of the 
distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa, he effects the salvation of embodied beings.  
This interpretation agrees with PARROTT (1990a)‘s argument that prakṛti is viewed 
by the Sāṃkhya texts as ‗a guru who teaches Puruṣa through her skilful means‘.745  It 
seems that Kapila fulfills prakṛti‘s role as a guru with regard to all puruṣas. 
 JACOBSEN (2008) draws a similar conclusion regarding the relative roles of 
Kapila and Brahmā according to the YD: ‗Here the salvific function—the revelation 
of knowledge that leads to release—and the world creating function are separated.  
The first function belongs to Kapila, the second to the body of greatness.‘746  
JACOBSEN contrasts this division in labour between Kapila and Brahmā with the later 
view of Kapila as an avatāra of Viṣṇu (see §V.5): ‗Polytheism means that the divine 
functions are divided between several gods. [...] Making Kapila an avatāra of Viṣṇu 
is a development in the direction of monotheism.‘747  In other words, in the context 
of the YD, the Sāṃkhya system‘s acceptance of a plurality of deities (as different 
manifestations of the interaction between puruṣa and prakṛti) allows for the two 
primary purposes of prakṛti—embodiment and salvation—to be fulfilled by two 
separate figures. 
 In terms of his innate knowledge, Kapila is effectively assigned a higher 
status even than Brahmā, which would explain the commentator‘s statement that ‗all 
beings up to Brahmā‘ must attain the ‗intended goal‘ of (or ‗intended meaning 
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 PARROTT (1990a), p. 82. 
746
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 45.  CHAKRAVARTI (1975,  pp. 282-283) suggests a similar division in labour, 
contrasting Kapila‘s salvific function to the duties of other deities (interpreted by CHAKRAVARTI as an 
entire class of māhātmyaśarīras). 
747
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 49. 
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[behind]‘748) Sāṃkhya by means of one of the three primary siddhis,749 by which the 
knowledge innate in Kapila is transmitted to later generations.  In fact, Kapila is 
elsewhere said to have been born ‗first‘ or ‗chief‘ among all (viśvāgraja).750 
 This unique soteriological purpose behind Kapila‘s manifestation is reflected 
in the commentator‘s expression of homage to Kapila at the beginning of the text: 
Homage to the supreme ṛṣi, the guru whose splendour is equal to the rays of 
the sun, who is a sun for the deep darkness of saṃsāra.751 
 
Kapila, initially born out of the favour (anugraha) of prakṛti, continues to manifest 
this soteriological tendency through his role as a guru, initiating a tradition of 
knowledge and becoming an icon and exemplar to which later seekers aspire.  In the 
commentator‘s description of the onset of Āsuri‘s prākṛtika vairāgya, for example, 
Āsuri‘s esteem for Kapila serves as the initiating factor that leads to his inclination 
toward knowledge as a result of the anugraha of pradhāna.752 
Of course, Kapila does not impart his knowledge with a view to self-
aggrandizement.  The commentator stresses that Kapila‘s motivation in 
disseminating his knowledge has nothing to do with any of the reasons that usually 
motivate individuals: 
[Opponent:] There is no reason for the transmission, on account of the 
inapplicability of the causes (nimitta) such as merit (dharma).  The 
transmission of the philosophical system (śāstra) for the sake of merit 
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 See n. 590 (§V.1). 
749
 See n. 509 (§IV.9). 
750
 YD on SK 1, p. 8, l. 20; on SK 69, p. 267, l. 14.  Although the term viśvāgraja could refer simply 
to the fact that Kapila was born ‗at the beginning of the universe‘, the term agra usually has a 
connotation of superiority or prominence. 
751
 ṛṣaye paramāyārkamarīcisamatejase / 
    saṃsāragahanadhvāntasūryāya gurave namaḥ // (YD Intro., p. 1, ll. 5-6).  WEZLER (1970, p. 258) 
notes this passage in his discussion of the deity-like nature of Kapila in Sāṃkhya. 
752
 YD on SK 43, p. 234, ll. 9-13: ‗But the prākṛtika [conditions] are those like the dispassion of the 
glorious Āsuri.  For his merit, produced due to his esteem for the supreme ṛṣi, destroyed his impurity, 
because of being opposed [to it].  When this was destroyed, a stream of purity came forth from 
prakṛti, favoured by which, having become a mendicant, the desire to know arose in him, due to 
affliction from the three forms of suffering.‘ (prākṛtās tu tadyathā vairāgyaṃ bhagavadāsureḥ / tasya 
hi paramarṣisambhāvanād utpanno dharmo ’śuddhiṃ pratidvandvibhāvād apaja<ghāna> / tasyām 
apahatāyāṃ prakṛteḥ śuddhisrotaḥ pravṛttaṃ yenānugṛhīto duḥkhatrayābhighātād utpannajijñāsaḥ 
pravrajitaḥ /). 
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(dharma) is not applicable to the supreme ṛṣi, on account of [his] non-
attachment to the results [of merit].  It is not for the sake of profit (artha) or 
pleasure (kāma), on account of the contingency of the neglect of pupils.753  It is 
not for the sake of liberation (mokṣa), on account of the attainment of that from 
innate knowledge (sāṃsiddhika jñāna) itself.  It is not for the sake of the 
opposites of these [potential causes], because this is impossible.  
Consequently, the teacher (ācārya) imparted the treasure of the philosophical 
system (śāstra) for no reason. 
[Proponent:] It was not for no reason.  Rather, he imparted it out of 
compassion (anukampā).  Seeing Āsuri being oppressed by the personal, 
divine, and external pains (duḥkha), ascertaining the non-functioning of the 
pains (duḥkha) in himself, who was endowed with a psycho-physical body 
(kāryakaraṇa), due to the power of knowledge (jñāna), and [ascertaining] the 
virtues of his disciple, [thinking] ‗How can Āsuri, and other people by way of 
him, have the same equanimity that I have with regard to pleasure (sukha) and 
pain (duḥkha) due to the presence of knowledge (jñāna)?‘, the glorious 
supreme ṛṣi thus declared the philosophical system (śāstra) out of compassion 
(anukampā).754 
 
Once the Sāṃkhya śāstra has thus been manifested by Kapila out of compassion, it 
continues to effect ‗the anugraha of everyone‘ through the explication of its 
categories by later Sāṃkhya teachers such as Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the YD-kāra.755  
Kapila‘s original śāstra continues to serve as the ideal prototype of the system and 
the ultimate source of authority for Sāṃkhya teachers.756  However, as discussed in 
§V.2-3, it is apparently also possible for other ṛṣis to access this śāstra 
independently through mental reflection (ūha), through an extraordinary capacity 
inherent in ṛṣis, or possibly as a result of their progressive practice of yogic 
                                                 
753
 The significance of the phrase nārthakāmārthaṃ śiṣyāṇām anāyāsaprasaṅgāt is unclear, but it 
most likely implies that Kapila would be neglectful of pupils if he was motivated by profit and 
pleasure.  Alternatively, it might mean that pupils would be neglectful (i.e., not willing to study with 
Kapila) if they had to pay for it. 
754
 āha: sampradānasyākasmikatvam dharmādinimittānupapatteḥ / na tāvāt paramarṣer 
dharmārthaṃ śāstrapradānam u<pa>padyate phalenānabhiṣvaṅgāt / nārthakāmārthaṃ śiṣyāṇām 
anāyāsaprasaṅgāt / na mokṣārthaṃ sāṃsiddhikenaiva jñānena tatprāpteḥ / na tadviparītārtham 
asambhavāt / pariśeṣād akasmād ācāryaḥ śāstranidhānaṃ pradadāv iti / ucyate: na akasmāt kiṃ 
tarhi anukampayā pradadau / ādhyātmikādhidaivikādhibhautikair duḥkhaiḥ pīḍyamānam āsurim 
upalabhya, svātmani ca jñānasāmarthyāt sati kāryakaraṇasamprayoge duḥkhānām apravṛttiṃ 
parijñāya śiṣyaguṇāṃś ca, kathaṃ nāma yathā mama sukhaduḥkheṣu jñānopanipātāt sāmyam evam 
āsurer api syāt, taddvāreṇānyeṣām api puruṣāṇām <ity> evam anukampayā bhagavān paramarṣiḥ 
śāstram ākhyātavān / (YD on SK 70ab, p. 268, l. 20 – p. 269, l. 3). 
755
 See n. 331 (§IV.2); cf. nn. 595, 604, 609 (§V.2). 
756
 See n. 590 (§V.1) and n. 609 (§V.2). 
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discipline.  This would not invalidate the significance of Kapila‘s original 
manifestation of the śāstra, but would rather confirm the universality of that śāstra. 
Assuming that these conclusions are valid, there remains an interpretative 
problem with regard to the position of the puruṣa with which Kapila is associated.  
To return to the cinema image: is there a liberated puruṣa behind Kapila still in the 
audience, watching the film projected by prakṛti for the benefit of other puruṣas?  
Or, perhaps, is Kapila without his own particular puruṣa but rather projected onto the 
screen for the benefit of all puruṣas? 
As discussed in §V.3, there is some evidence to suggest that Kapila might be 
considered an embodiment of īśvara.  The soteriological conception of Kapila 
apparent in the YD would be compatible with the VBh‘s reference to ‗the anugraha 
of beings‘ as the motivation behind īśvara‘s embodiment as Kapila.757  The fact that, 
according to the YD, Kapila is manifested from pradhāna in the same manner as 
Brahmā, who is considered an embodiment of īśvara, might suggest that Kapila is 
regarded as a similar embodiment. 
On the other hand, given the veneration with which Kapila is treated in the 
YD, if he were considered an embodiment of īśvara, one would expect the 
commentator to make this explicit.  Moreover, as we have seen, Kapila‘s 
manifestation is explicitly associated only with the soteriological purpose of prakṛti, 
which is directed towards all beings except for Kapila.  It thus seems plausible that 
Kapila, the bearer of a primordial Sāṃkhya śāstra, is considered a direct 
manifestation of prakṛti in its primordial, universal aspect, before the activity of 
prakṛti becomes differentiated according to the intellectual conditions (bhāva) 
associated with particular puruṣas.  In other words, in a postmodern twist, the 
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 See n. 675 (§V.3). 
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director makes an appearance in his own film in order to remind the other characters 
of the fact that it is only a film. 
 
§5. The soteriological role of Kapila in the Yuktidīpikā, in relation to the other 
 classical Sāṃkhya commentaries. 
 
This view of the nature of Kapila and the role of his knowledge in relation to 
subsequent Sāṃkhya tradition is unique among the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries 
examined in this study.  The relative terseness of these other commentaries, 
especially with regard to the issues surrounding doctrinal authority, would make it 
difficult to determine whether they assume a similar view of the origination and 
transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.  Moreover, as the comparison of these texts in 
CHAPTER IV has made clear, the YD‘s views generally bear little relation to those of 
the other commentaries.
758
  However, a few major points of difference can be 
observed, which make it possible to offer some tentative conclusions with regard to 
the place of the YD‘s views in the context of the historical development of the 
Sāṃkhya school. 
 In order to provide some context for this discussion, a few words must first 
be said about the origins of the figure of Kapila.  JACOBSEN (2008) presents a 
comprehensive discussion of the history of the occurrences of Kapila in Sanskrit 
literature.  The earliest text to refer extensively to a ṛṣi (or ṛṣis) called Kapila is the 
MBh.
759
  JACOBSEN argues that ‗several Kapilas‘ are mentioned in the MBh,760 and 
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 There is nothing in the YD to suggest that the commentator was familiar with the earlier GBh, and 
it is my general feeling that the YD-kāra was unaware of the commentarial tradition of which both 
GBh and MV are representative.  The MV likewise does not explicitly refer to the views of the YD.  
Similarly, although, as LARSON AND  BHATTACHARYA (1987, pp. 227-228) observe, Vācaspati 
appears to quote directly from the YD on one occasion (TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-17; cf. n. 604, 
§V.2), he does not appear to make use of the YD‘s views in his interpretation of the SK. 
759
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 12. 
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identifies two distinct Kapila figures in particular, representing two different forms 
of ascetic tradition:
761
 
The contradictory natures of these two Kapilas may be considered evidence of 
the existence of two different Kapila figures, one a Vedic ascetic and one 
influenced by Śramaṇa ideas, or they may represent two stages in the history of 
Kapila, beginning as a Vedic ascetic and thereafter being appropriated by 
ascetics who had adopted Śramaṇa values.  If any of these should be thought of 
as the Sāṃkhya Kapila is not clear.762 
 
In some respects, the Kapila associated with non-Vedic asceticism seems to most 
obviously prefigure the Sāṃkhya Kapila.763 In the MBh, this Kapila rejects the 
authority of śāstra in favour of first-hand experience.764  This can be compared to the 
classical Sāṃkhya rejection of scriptural (ānuśravika) means to liberation.765  
Similarly, in the Baudhāyanadharmasūtra (BDhS), Kapila is presented as a demon 
(asura) and founder of the ascetic stages of life (āśrama)—in other words, as an 
opponent of the Vedic tradition.
766
  BRONKHORST (2007) cites this BDhS passage as 
evidence for his argument that Kapila was originally a deity associated with the 
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 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 13. 
761
 JACOBSEN (2008, pp. 13-16) cites the episode in which Kapila destroys the sons of King Sagara in 
MBh 3.3.104-8, and suggests that this Kapila represents the Vedic tradition of asceticism ‗associated 
with tapas; with the acquisition of powers and immense feats of asceticism‘ (pp. 22-23), in contrast to 
the Kapila who converses with Syūmaraśmi in the form of a cow in MBh 12.260-62 (see JACOBSEN, 
pp. 16-18), who represents a tradition that ‗belonged to a different world-view, a world-view that 
emphasised karma, saṃsāra, punarbhava, and mokṣa‘ (pp. 22-23). 
762
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 23. 
763
 Similarly, JACOBSEN (1998, p. 85) concludes: ‗Judging from the content of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, it 
seems probable that its founder was similar in many ways to the Buddha or Mahāvīra.  He was an 
extraordinary human being, who by himself realized the form of liberation that could be attained by 
oneself by means of discriminative knowledge.‘ 
764
 MBh 12.260.17: ‗If you see anything perceptible here that is considered superior to non-violence, 
besides treatises on doctrine, speak it.‘ (yad atra kiṃcit pratyakṣam ahiṃsāyāḥ paraṃ matam / ṛte tv 
āgamaśāstrebhyo brūhi tad yadi paśyasi //). 
765
 SK 2ab: ‗The scriptural [means] are like the perceptible, for they are connected with impurity, 
decay, and excess.‘ (dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktaḥ). 
766
 BDhS 2.11.27-28 (Olivelle‘s translation): ‗There is, however, only a single order of life, the 
teachers maintain, because no offspring is produced in the others. With respect to the above position 
they cite this: ―There was once a demon named Kapila, the son of Prahlāda.  It was he who created  
these divisions in his campaign against the gods.  No wise man should pay any heed to them.‖ ‘  
(ekāśramyaṃ tv ācāryā aprajanatvād itareṣām // tatrodāharanti / prāhlādir ha vai kapilo nāmāsura 
āsa / sa etān bhedāṃś cakāra devaiḥ saha spardhamānaḥ / tān manīṣī nādriyet //).  JACOBSEN (2008, 
p. 12) notes the anti-ritual nature of Kapila in this passage.  As noted by both BRONKHORST (2007, p. 
68) and JACOBSEN (2008, p. 12), Kapila is also associated with the founding of renunciatory practices 
in Baudhāyanagṛhyasūtra 4.17. 
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ascetic traditions of the region of ‗Greater Magadha‘767—traditions which, 
BRONKHORST argues, originated outside of the Vedic milieu.
768
 
 As discussed by both BRONKHORST and JACOBSEN,
769
 Kapila is associated 
with a variety of deities in the MBh, including Viṣṇu, Śiva, Prajāpati and Viriñca.  
He is also mentioned in a passage of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (ŚU)—identified by 
BRONKHORST as ‗perhaps the earliest reference to ―the seer Kapila‖ ‘770—in which 
he appears to be associated with Hiraṇyagarbha and Rudra.771  JACOBSEN suggests 
that this early association ‗may perhaps have contributed to the later divinization of 
Kapila and to the Sāṃkhya perception of him having been created at the beginning 
of each cycle of creation‘.772  BRONKHORST, on the other hand, argues that Kapila 
was considered a deity even prior his appearance in the ŚU.773 
While the divine associations of Kapila are apparent from early in the 
tradition, the development of the figure is not straightforward, as JACOBSEN‘s study 
makes clear.  Not only is Kapila associated with various deities and presented as a 
non-Vedic ascetic, as BRONKHORST emphasizes, but he also occurs as a Vedic-style 
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 BRONKHORST (2007), pp. 61-68. 
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 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 28: ‗There can be no doubt that the early Jaina and Brahmanical texts 
examined here describe forms of asceticism which are based on some shared assumptions.  These 
assumptions were not part of the Brahmanical heritage.  No, they should be considered as having been 
current in the spiritual culture of Greater Magadha, before they came to exert an influence on texts 
that present themselves as belonging to the Brahmanical tradition.‘ 
769
 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63; JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 19-20. 
770
 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63. 
771
 ŚU 5.1-2 (Olivelle‘s translation): ‗Two things, knowledge and ignorance, are set down in the 
imperishable and infinite fort of brahman, where they lie hidden.  Now, ignorance is the perishable 
and knowledge is the immortal.  But the one who rules over both knowledge and ignorance is 
another—who alone presides over womb after womb, and thus over all visible forms and all the 
sources of birth; who in the beginning carried this Kapila born of the seer together with his body of 
knowledge and would look on him as he was being born.‘ (dve akṣare brahmapure tv anante 
vidyāvidye nihite yatra gūḍhe /kṣaraṃ tv avidyā hy amṛtaṃ tu vidyā vidyāvidye īśate yas tu so ’nyaḥ // 
yo yoniṃ yonim adhitiṣṭhaty eko viśvāni rūpāṇi yonīś ca sarvāḥ / ṛṣiprasūtaṃ kapilaṃ yas tam agre 
jñānair bibharti jāyamānaṃ ca paśyet //).  Olivelle (ŚU, p. 625, n. 2) suggests that this may be a 
reference to the Sāṃkhya Kapila in particular. 
772
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 10. 
773
 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 63: ‗Modern interpreters have not infrequently preferred the translation 
―tawny, red‖ to ―Kapila‖, because comparison with other verses of the Upaniṣad (3.4; 4.11-12) shows 
that this seer Kapila must be identical with Hiraṇyagarbha and linked to Rudra.  This identity poses 
no problem the moment we abandon the idea that Kapila ever was an ordinary human being.‘ 
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ascetic
774
 and even a Vedic ṛṣi.  As JACOBSEN observes, Kapila does not usually 
appear in the traditional lists of seven ṛṣis, although he does appear in such a list in 
the MBh:
775
 
Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka, together with Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila, and 
the seventh, Sanātana—these seven ṛṣis are declared the mental sons of 
Brahmā, whose discrimination (vijñāna) has come of its own accord, who 
dwell in the renunciatory (nivṛtta) dharma.776 
 
The association of Kapila with renunciation in this verse conforms with his portrayal 
elsewhere as an ascetic associated with śramaṇa ideals, while the mention of 
discrimination (vijñāna) recalls the primary objective of the Sāṃkhya system: 
‗discrimination between the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower‘ 
(vyaktāvyaktajñavijñāna).777  Nevertheless, the fact that Kapila is presented in this 
verse as a ṛṣi and a son of Brahmā reflects a degree of assimilation into the Vedic 
world-view.
778
  As JACOBSEN suggests,
779
 the statement that Kapila‘s discrimination 
‗has come of its own accord‘ seems to prefigure the classical Sāṃkhya view that 
Kapila was born with innate (sāṃsiddhika) knowledge.780  In other words, according 
to this conception, Kapila and his knowledge are part of a top-down process of 
manifestation, rather than a bottom-up pursuit of liberation (through individual 
ascetic practice and first-hand experience).  These two dynamics apparent in the 
references to Kapila in the early literature seem to anticipate an apparent 
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 See n. 761 above.  BRONKHORST (2007, pp. 64-65), on the other hand, presents the Kapila and 
King Sagara episode as support for the view that Kapila was originally considered a demon opposed 
to the Brāhmaṇical tradition (cf. n. 766 above). 
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 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 18. 
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 sanaḥ sanatkujātaś ca sanakaḥ sasanandanaḥ / 
    sanatkumāraḥ kapilaḥ saptamaś ca sanātanaḥ // 
    saptaite mānasāḥ proktā ṛṣayo brahmaṇaḥ sutāḥ / 
    svayamāgatavijñānā nivṛttaḥ dharmam āsthitāḥ // (MBh 12.327.64-65). 
777
 SK 2d; see §II.3. 
778
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987, p. 112) suggest that ‗what might be called the uprading of 
Kapila to the status of Hiraṇyagarbha or one or another mythological figure (Agni, Rudra, Śiva, and 
so forth) together with efforts to list Kapila, Āsuri, and other Sāṃkhya teachers in enumerations of the 
―great seers‖ in the epic and Purāṇic literature may be taken as further attempts to establish a proper 
lineage for the Sāṃkhya philosophy.‘ 
779
 JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 18-19. 
780
 Cf. nn. 453, 458, 462, 476 (§IV.8). 
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contradiction in classical Sāṃkhya between, on the one hand, the rejection of Vedic 
scripture and emphasis on a bottom-up inferential process, and on the other hand, the 
importance of Kapila‘s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine and the top-down 
dissemination of this doctrine. 
 The evidence of the YD alone, among the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries, 
suggests a resolution to this contradiction.  The YD-kāra makes an effort to reconcile 
Sāṃkhya doctrine with the Vedas and to acknowledge their authority (§V.1).  In 
addition, he seems to emulate the model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the 
production and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine (§V.2).  According to this 
conception, Kapila‘s initial articulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine represents the 
manifestation of a universal, primordial Sāṃkhya śāstra.  This original śāstra 
remains the primary point of reference for later Sāṃkhya teachers, assisting later 
generations in the inferential process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is attained, 
although some extraordinary individuals may also be able to attain this knowledge 
independently.  The evidence of the YD thus suggests that the concept of 
authoritative testimony (āptavacana) holds more value in classical Sāṃkhya than has 
been generally assumed.
781
 
 The complexity of the picture of Kapila‘s development presented by the early 
texts is echoed in a survey of his occurrences in the classical Sāṃkhya 
commentaries.  Although, speaking generally, the commentators stress the 
significance of Kapila‘s original formulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine, and as 
BRONKHORST observes, ‗Kapila‘s divine nature may [...] be taken as established for 
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 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1973), p. 274: ‗The acceptance of trustworthy communication which includes 
the holy tradition is a later concession to a growing Brāhmaṇa orthodoxy and is for the system 
practically unimportant.‘  Similarly, LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 29: ‗Sāṃkhya had never 
denied reliable testimony (āptavacana or śruti) as a legitimate and important means of knowing, but 
Sāṃkhya clearly gave pride of place in knowing to independent reasoning.‘ 
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classical Sāṃkhya‘,782 the commentators‘ views on the precise origin and nature of 
Kapila vary.
783
  As discussed in §IV.8, the GBh, YD, MV, and TK agree that Kapila 
was born with innate (sāṃsiddhika) merit, knowledge, dispassion, and lordliness.784  
The SK itself states that Kapila transmitted his knowledge out of compassion 
(anukampā) to Āsuri, and that this knowledge was then passed down to Īśvarakṛṣṇa 
through a succession of disciples.
785
  Beyond these points of agreement, a distinct 
development can be traced in the commentaries, whereby Kapila‘s status has 
changed over time. 
 Although the GBh specifies that only Kapila was born with innate sāttvika 
bhāvas, while ‗the four sons of Brahmā—Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, and 
Sanatkumāra‘ were endowed with sāttvika bhāvas ‗deriving from Materiality‘ 
(prākṛta) at sixteen years of age,786 elsewhere Gauḍapāda groups Kapila among the 
sons of Brahmā and quotes a verse similar to the MBh passage mentioned above:787 
In this world, there was a glorious son of Brahmā named Kapila, as here 
follows: ‗Sanaka, Sanandana, and the third, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu, 
and Pañcaśikha—These seven great ṛṣis have been declared the sons of 
Brahmā.‘788 
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 BRONKHORST (2007), p. 62.  Similarly, WEZLER (1970, p. 257) observes that ‗the deification of 
Kapila, adequately testified in epic and purāṇic sources, was also a prevalent mythological view of the 
Sāṃkhya authors‘ (‗die in epischen und puranischen Quellen hinlänglich bezeugte Deifizerung 
Kapila‘s auch geltende mythologische Anschauung der Sāṃkhya-Autoren war‘). 
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 JACOBSEN (2008, pp. 32-33) observes: ‗Most commentaries agree that Kapila passed his teaching 
on to Āsuri, but they offer different versions of Kapila‘s origin and nature.  One gets the impression 
that each commentary had to add a new detail or an original interpretation to the body of knowledge 
regarding the nature and origin of Kapila as part of its general interpretative contribution.  There is, in 
fact, a remarkable variety in the speculations about Kapila in the Sāṃkhyakārikā commentaries.‘ 
784
 See nn. 453, 458, 462, 476 (§IV.8). 
785
 SK 70-71: ‗The sage bestowed this purifying, foremost [knowledge] to Āsuri out of compassion.  
Āsuri likewise [bestowed this knowledge] to Pañcaśikha, and by him the philosophical system was 
expanded.  It was transmitted through a succession of disciples, and it has been condensed by the 
noble-minded Īśvarakṛṣṇa in āryā [verses], having completely discerned the established truth.‘ (etat 
pavitram agryaṃ munir āsuraye ’nukampayā pradadau / āsurir api pañcaśikhāya tena ca bahudhā 
kṛtaṃ tantram // śiṣyaparamparayāgatam īśvarakṛṣṇena caitad āryābhiḥ / saṃkṣiptam āryamatinā 
samyag vijñāya siddhāntam //). 
786
 See nn. 453, 455 (§IV.8). 
787
 JACOBSEN (2008, p. 18-19) notes this point of continuity between the MBh and GBh. 
788
 iha bhagavān brahmasutaḥ kapilo nāma / tadyathā— 
    sanakaś ca sanandanaś ca tṛtīyaś ca sanātanaḥ / 
    āsuriḥ kapilaś caiva voḍhuḥ pañcaśikhas tathā / 
    ity ete brahmaṇaḥ putrāḥ sapta proktā maharṣayaḥ // (GBh on SK 1, p. 35, ll. 13-17). 
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Āsuri and Pañcaśikha are well-known as early Sāṃkhya teachers.  Their assimilation 
(and perhaps that of Voḍhu789) into this list of seven ṛṣis probably reflects an attempt 
to further legitimize the lineage of Sāṃkhya teachers within the framework of the 
Brāhmaṇical tradition.  However, at no point does Gauḍapāda elevate Kapila above 
the ontological status of other ṛṣis, nor does he associate Kapila with any deity. 
 As discussed in §V.3-4, the YD elevates Kapila above the status of Brahmā‘s 
sons and grandsons, placing him on a par with Brahmā in terms of the circumstances 
of his birth.  Both Kapila and Brahmā were manifested out of the favour (anugraha) 
of primordial Materiality at the time of the first creation, before the onset of the cycle 
of transmigration (saṃsāra).790  Moreover, as discussed in §IV.10, the YD is unique 
among the Sāṃkhya commentaries in its clear conception of the relationship 
between the paradigms of the bhāvas and the pratyayasarga.  According to this 
relationship, Kapila is unique in being exempt from the need to attain the condition 
of knowledge (jñāna) through one of the three primary attainments (siddhis), 
through which all other beings ‗up to Brahmā‘ must attain Sāṃkhya knowledge.791  
This suggests that Kapila is also elevated above other ṛṣis (perhaps Brahmā‘s sons), 
who seem to be associated with the attainment of knowledge through reflection 
(ūha).792  Kapila thus fulfills a unique soteriological role according to the YD.  He 
appears to represent a direct manifestation of prakṛti‘s soteriological tendency for 
the benefit of other beings (§V.4), though it is not clear whether he might be also 
considered an embodiment of īśvara (§V.3). 
                                                 
789
 As far as I am aware, Voḍhu does not appear elsewhere either as a Sāṃkhya teacher or in the usual 
lists of seven ṛṣis. 
790
 See n. 693 (§V.3) and nn. 730, 735 (§V.4). 
791
 See n. 509 (§IV.9) and n. 569 (§IV.10). 
792
 See nn. 507, 508, 510 (§IV.9). 
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 It is possible that the YD‘s view of Kapila‘s origin represents a deliberate 
attempt to elevate Kapila beyond his earlier status as one of Brahmā‘s sons, as 
attested by the GBh, although the YD does not otherwise seem to be aware of the 
views expressed by the GBh.  Alternatively, given the commentator‘s apparent 
familiarity with the views of Sāṃkhya teachers prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, especially in 
connection with mythological subject matter,
793
 the evidence of the YD might reflect 
an earlier conception of the nature and role of Kapila.
794
  It is also possible that the 
YD‘s presentation of Kapila somehow anticipates his later elevation to the status of 
an incarnation of Viṣṇu in later Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts. 
 As mentioned in §V.3, VBh 1.25 presents Kapila as an incarnation of 
īśvara,795 while the MV refers to īśvara as ‗the light of Kapila‘796 and relates a 
mythological account of the birth of Kapila as an incarnation of the ‗ancient puruṣa‘ 
(purāṇapuruṣa).797  The term purāṇapuruṣa is a common epithet of Viṣṇu.  As 
JACOBSEN (2008) observes, this account of Kapila‘s birth is unique among the 
classical commentaries on the SK: ‗The fact that Kapila was considered the son of 
Devahūti and Kardama is in accordance with the Bhāgavatapurāṇa but this is not 
stated in the early Sāṃkhya commentaries.‘798  JACOBSEN takes this fact, along with 
a reference by Māṭhara to Viṣṇu‘s incarnation as Kalki,799 as evidence of the text‘s 
late date,
800
 citing the dates for the text proposed by LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA 
(1987) as ‗anywhere from the ninth century onward‘.801  With regard to its 
                                                 
793
 Cf. the YD‘s discussion of the views of Pañcādhikaraṇa and Vindhyavāsin on the bhāvas (§IV.8, 
nn. 465, 466) and OBERHAMMER (1961)‘s discussion of the YD‘s quotations (arguably) from the 
Ṣaṣṭitantra (CHAPTER III). 
794
 This possibility might be supported by Vācaspati‘s attribution of the passage quoted by VBh 1.25 
(see §V.3, n. 675) to Pañcaśikha. 
795
 See n. 675 (§V.3). 
796
 See n. 684 (§V.3). 
797
 See n. 686 (§V.3). 
798
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34. 
799
 kalkī bhaviṣyati bhāvivastugrāhiṇī / (MV on SK 33, p. 50, l. 4). 
800
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 34. 
801
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 33; LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), p. 291. 
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identification of Kapila with Viṣṇu, the MV differs most noticeably from the GBh, 
with which it otherwise generally agrees, as apparent in the discussion of these texts 
in CHAPTER IV. 
 As JACOBSEN also observes,
802
 Vācaspati‘s TV, also a late text, similarly 
refers to Kapila as an incarnation of Viṣṇu in its commentary on VBh 1.25 : 
It is taught that Kapila attained knowledge (jñāna) as he was being born, due 
simply to the favour (anugraha) of the great Lord (maheśvara).  By the name 
Kapila he is known as a particular incarnation (avatāra) of Viṣṇu.803 
 
While in the YD Kapila‘s birth (and by extension the production of his knowledge) 
is said to be due to the anugraha of pradhāna,804 the TV suggests that this was due 
rather to the anugraha of Viṣṇu. 
 In the TK, Vācaspati echoes VBh 1.25 by referring to Kapila as ‗the first 
knower‘ (ādividvas)805 but does not suggest that Kapila was an incarnation of Viṣṇu.  
Rather, the TK‘s discussion of the applicability of authoritative testimony 
(āptavacana) to Kapila suggests that Kapila‘s knowledge was the result not of any 
anugraha, but of his experience in past incarnations: 
There is a possibility that at the beginning of an age (kalpa), Kapila, the first 
knower, has a remembrance of the revelation (śruti) learned during previous 
ages, just as one awakened from sleep has a [remembrance] of things learned 
on the previous day.
806
 
 
This passage suggests that Kapila‘s inherent authoritative status is not the result of a 
soteriological inclination on the part of any deity (or of pradhāna, as in the YD), but 
rather the result of his own study of śruti in previous incarnations. 
                                                 
802
 JACOBSEN (2008), pp. 35-36. 
803
 kapilasyāpi jāyamānasya maheśvarānugrahād eva jñānaprāptiḥ śrūyata iti / kapila nāma viṣṇor 
avatāraviśeṣaḥ prasiddhaḥ / (TV on VBh 1.25, p. 78, ll. 22-23). 
804
 Cf. nn. 458, 459 (§IV.8); 693 (§V.3). 
805
 TK on SK 5, p. 27, l. 22 (see n. 806 below) and TK on SK 43, p. 128, ll. 3-4: sargādāv ādividvān 
atrabhagavān kapilo mahāmunir dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvaryasampannaḥprādurbabhūveti smaranti 
/.  WEZLER (1970, p. 259-260) notes these passages and suggests that the quotation in VBh 1.25 
served the source of the application of the term ādividvas to Kapila. 
806
 ādividuṣaś ca kapilasya kalpādau kalpāntarādhītaśrutismaraṇasambhavaḥ, suptaprabuddhasyeva 
pūrvedyuravagatānām arthānām aparedyuḥ / (TK on SK 5, p. 27, ll. 22-23). 
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 While it is thus apparent that the view of Kapila as an avatāra of Viṣṇu was 
not firmly established by Vācaspati‘s time, the MV and TV testify that it was 
beginning to be acknowledged by Sāṃkhya authors.  With regard to the reason for 
this development, JACOBSEN suggests: ‗The fact that Kapila was accepted as an 
avatāra of Viṣṇu in these texts probably means that the Sāṃkhya tradition had lost 
much of its independence by the ninth century.‘807  Similarly, WEZLER (1970) 
suggests that while Kapila had occasionally been identified with Viṣṇu since the time 
of the MBh, the Sāṃkhya acceptance of this view must have been due to the 
influence of the Vaiṣṇavas upon the school.808 
 There is no evidence in the YD to suggest an identification of Kapila with 
Viṣṇu,809 although the commentator presents a similar paradigm for the production 
of Kapila and his knowledge—due to the anugraha of pradhāna rather than of 
Viṣṇu.  We can probably say that the YD represents a transitional stage in the 
Sāṃkhya conception of the nature of Kapila.  He has been given a key soteriological 
role in the Sāṃkhya system and has been elevated in status beyond other ṛṣis, but he 
has not yet come to be considered an incarnation of Viṣṇu and thereby ultimately to 
become secondary in importance to Viṣṇu himself.  While the YD shows various 
signs of an effort to integrate both Sāṃkhya doctrine and the lineage of Sāṃkhya 
teachers into the framework of the broader Brāhmaṇical tradition, it does not yet 
show signs of the influence of Vaiṣṇavism. 
 With regard to the possible influence of the YD upon the later classical 
Sāṃkhya texts, this appears to have been minimal.  Although, as LARSON AND 
BHATTACHARYA (1987) observe,
810
 Vācaspati appears to quote directly from the YD 
                                                 
807
 JACOBSEN (2008), p. 36. 
808
 WEZLER (1970), p. 262. 
809
 Rather, as discussed in §V.3, all references to major deities seem to be to either Brahmā or Śiva. 
810
 LARSON AND BHATTACHARYA (1987), pp. 227-228. 
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on one occasion,
811
 he does not seem to make much use of the YD‘s views in his 
interpretation of the SK.  The TK‘s interpretation of the vīta and avīta inferences, for 
example, testifies to a lack of understanding of their original significance as attested 
by the YD.
812
  Although the MV does not display any explicit familiarity with the 
YD‘s views, it does contain some statements reminiscent of these views.  Māṭhara 
refers to those for whom ‗the qualities [of things] are placed [directly] before the 
eyes‘ (sākṣātkṛtadharman) in his definition of authoritative individuals (āpta).813  He 
also accepts five of the ten members (avayava) of inference accepted by the YD.
814
  
Like the YD (in the opening verses of the text),  SK 73 (added to the text by the MV) 
refers to the SK as ‗an image in a mirror‘ of an earlier tantra.815   It is possible that 
the YD and MV were influenced by the same trends of interpretation in some 
respects, but Māṭhara does not appear to have been aware of the YD itself. 
 The YD‘s view that Kapila was born due to the anugraha of prakṛti is 
probably related to the evidently old conception of prakṛti‘s ability to manifest itself 
in ‗streams‘ (srotas, abhiṣyanda) flowing directly into the phenomenal sphere of 
experience (see §IV.8-10; V.4).
816
  This view is apparent nowhere else in the 
classical Sāṃkhya texts.  It is possible that the VBh‘s view that Kapila was born out 
of the anugraha of īśvara is somehow related to the YD‘s use of anugraha, and that 
Vācaspati‘s interpretation of the VBh passage represents an adaptation of this 
concept to the context of Vaiṣṇava soteriology.  Otherwise, though, the YD‘s view of 
                                                 
811
 TK on SK 72, p. 173, ll. 16-17; cf. n. 604, §V.2. 
812
 See nn. 334, 344, 345, 348, 349 (§IV.2). 
813
 See n. 358 (§IV.3). 
814
 See nn. 320, 322, 324 (§IV.2). 
815
 See nn. 609, 610 (§V.2). 
816
 The ābhiṣyandika form of the condition of jñāna is attributed to the early Sāṃkhya teacher 
Pañcādhikaraṇa (see §IV.8, n. 465), while the passage relating the māhātmyaśarīra‘s production of 
streams (srotas) from pradhāna is attributed to a śāstra (see §IV.9, n. 484), perhaps to be identifed as 
the Ṣaṣṭitantra, as argued by OBERHAMMER (1961, pp. 135-138). 
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the origin of Kapila and his role in the formulation and transmission of Sāṃkhya 
doctrine seems to have been lost to later Sāṃkhya authors. 
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CHAPTER VI: Conclusion. 
 
 
This study has demonstrated that, according to the YD, ordinary seekers of liberation 
are generally considered to be dependent upon the Sāṃkhya tradition initiated by the 
ṛṣi Kapila for the attainment of knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas.  The author of the 
YD appears to emulate the model of Vedic revelation in his conception of the 
origination and transmission of Sāṃkhya doctrine.  According to this conception, 
Kapila‘s initial articulation of Sāṃkhya doctrine represents the manifestation of a 
universal, primordial Sāṃkhya śāstra.  This original śāstra remains the primary 
point of reference for later Sāṃkhya teachers, assisting later generations in the 
inferential process by which Sāṃkhya knowledge is attained.  Some extraordinary 
individuals may also be able to attain this knowledge independently, either as the 
result of yogic practice or through a faculty of reflection (ūha) attributed to ṛṣis.  
This fact does not contradict the authority of Kapila‘s original Sāṃkhya śāstra but 
rather affirms the universality of that śāstra. 
 The evidence of the YD thus suggests that the concept of authoritative 
testimony (āptavacana) holds more value in classical Sāṃkhya than has been 
generally assumed.  The text‘s definition of āptavacana allows for the maintenance 
of the tradition of Sāṃkhya texts and teachers.  Inference (anumāna), which is used 
to logically prove the existence of the Sāṃkhya tattvas, is viewed by the author of 
the YD not as an independent means to Sāṃkhya knowledge, but rather as a formal 
tool for the exposition of Sāṃkhya śāstra to ordinary seekers. 
 The YD views Kapila as a direct manifestion of the soteriological tendency 
of primordial Materiality (pradhāna), produced at the beginning of the process of 
227 
 
creation, with innate knowledge of the Sāṃkhya tattvas.  Kapila serves as initiator of 
the Sāṃkhya tradition and as an exemplar to which later seekers aspire.  He thus 
effects the favour (anugraha) of all embodied puruṣas on behalf of prakṛti. 
 The comparison of the classical Sāṃkhya commentaries in CHAPTER IV has 
demonstrated that the evidence of the YD resolves several interpretative issues 
which remain obscure in the other commentaries.  These include not only the role of 
āptavacana in relation to the production of Sāṃkhya knowledge, but also the 
relationship between the conditions (bhāva) and the intellectual creation 
(pratyayasarga), and the nature of the various modes of production of the condition 
of knowledge (jñāna).  The discussions in CHAPTER V have shown that the YD 
represents a transitional stage in the conception of Kapila in the classical Sāṃkhya 
tradition.  In the YD, Kapila has been given a key soteriological role in the Sāṃkhya 
system and has been elevated in status beyond other ṛṣis and even major deities, but 
he has not yet come to be identified as an incarnation (avatāra) of Viṣṇu as attested 
in the later MV and TV. 
 The evidence presented in the course of this study suggests several avenues 
of further inquiry into the significance of the YD‘s views of Kapila and of the 
production and transmission of knowledge.  The relation of these views to earlier, 
proto-Sāṃkhya and pre-classical Sāṃkhya views, especially as reconstructed from 
portions of the MBh and the YD‘s references to earlier Sāṃkhya authors, deserves a 
separate study.
817
  For instance, it has been beyond the scope of this study to 
determine whether a connection exists between the YD‘s notion of the anugraha of 
prakṛti and the early Sāṃkhya concept of the anugrahasarga, which, OBERHAMMER 
                                                 
817
 On the work done by previous scholars on the reconstruction of early Sāṃkhya views, see n. 2 
(CHAPTER I). 
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(1961) suggests, was introduced into Sāṃkhya in the Ṣaṣṭitantra.818  The 
anugrahasarga, OBERHAMMER notes, also occurs in several Purāṇas.819  An 
examination of this and other Sāṃkhya ideas found in the Purāṇas and other non-
technical Sāṃkhya texts contemporary with the YD may serve to clarify the sources 
of the YD‘s portrayal of Kapila and other figures of cosmological prominence.  
Likewise, a consideration of the relation of the YD‘s views to later, post-classical 
Sāṃkhya texts might prove fruitful. 
 The apparent influence of the Grammarian (vyākaraṇa) tradition on the 
author of the YD could become the focus of a significant study.
820
  More generally, 
the evidence of the YD provides an insight into the process by which the disparate 
philosophical views of various schools have come to be integrated within the broader 
Brāhmaṇical tradition.  In particular, the conclusions drawn in this study may 
contribute to our understanding of general assumptions in the tradition with regard to 
the nature of the knowledge of ṛṣis and other supernormal forms of knowledge,821 
and with regard to the primordial origination of śāstra.822  The manner in which 
these assumptions have influenced the YD‘s views provides a particularly striking 
case in point, given the generally assumed emphasis in Sāṃkhya upon logical 
thought rather than tradition. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
818
 OBERHAMMER (1961), p. 163. 
819
 Ibid., pp. 152-156. 
820
 Cf. nn. 312 (§IV.1); 364 (§IV.3); 590 (§V.1); 616, 620 (§V.2) . MOTEGI (2006, p. 54) likewise 
suggests that this aspect of the YD deserves further study. 
821
 See the reviews of WEZLER (2001) and AKLUJKAR (2009) in CHAPTER III. 
822
 See the review of POLLOCK (1985) in CHAPTER III. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
References are made to the following editions, unless otherwise noted: 
 
BDhS = Baudhāyanadharmasūtra (2000) 
GBh = Gauḍapādabhāṣya (1972) 
MBh = Mahābhārata (1999) 
MV = Māṭharavṛtti (1922) 
NS = Nyāyasūtra (1986) 
NSBh = Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (1986) 
NU = Nirukta (1998) 
SK = Sāṃkhyakārikā (1979) 
SSV = Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti 
ŚU = Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (1998) 
SV= Sāṃkhyavṛtti (1978) 
SVS = Suvarṇasaptati 
TK = Tattvakaumudī (2004) 
TV = Tattvavaiśāradī (1971) 
VBh = Vyāsabhāṣya (1971) 
VP = Vākyapadīya (1966) 
VPV = Vākyapadīyavṛtti (1966) 
VS = Vaiśeṣikasūtra (1975) 
YD = Yuktidīpikā (1998) 
YS = Yogasūtra (1971) 
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